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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis attempts to explain the change in 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ regarding 
Cyprus between 2002 and 2004. It argues that the overriding factor in this policy 
change was a change in leadership, i.e., the coming to power of the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), which developed a decidedly liberal outlook on foreign 
affairs following its split in 2001 from the anti-Western, Islamist Welfare Party. 
Other crucial determinants included the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue and 
selective support for interest groups within Turkey, both of which were affected to 
various degrees by the European Union and a propitious change in decision-making 
context. 
 
This thesis shows how constant policy failures during the 1980s and 1990s led to an 
identity crisis and the subsequent radical ideational transformation of the AKP 
whereby the party leadership renounced political Islamism and began to espouse an 
EU-oriented policy agenda and compatible rhetoric.  
 
The arguments presented in this thesis contribute to the literature on foreign policy 
analysis, political leadership and Europeanization. With regard to foreign policy 
analysis, this thesis shows that foreign policy change is a multi-causal phenomenon 
that can only be explained by a combination of various concepts. Moreover, it argues 
that despite the fact that no ready-made formula can account for all cases of foreign 
policy alterations, changes in leadership and a favourable decision-making 
composition appear to be indispensable determinants of any foreign policy shift. 
 
With regard to leadership, by applying a social-learning model to the analysis of the 
AKP leadership, this thesis follows the evolution of the Turkish Islamist Movement 
towards conservative democracy and an embracing of EU norms, which in turn 
resulted in a change in 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVpolicy. It is argued that 7XUNH\¶VQHZ&\SUXV
policy was above all the consequence of a radical normative shift in the mindset of 
the new Turkish leadership. 
 
With regard to Europeanization, this WKHVLVGHPRQVWUDWHVKRZWKHFKDQJHLQ7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus was bolstered by the Europeanization process. In this 
context, it can be understood that the EU militated in favour of a policy alteration by 
Europeanizing the Cyprus disagreement with the acceptance of the Republic of 
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Cyprus into the EU in May 2004. The third essential determinant of Turkish foreign 
policy shift was the emergence of a propitious decision-making context within Turkey, 
which rendered such a policy shift possible. 
 
  
  4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Wyn Rees at the University of 
Nottingham and Dr. Geoffrey Edwards at the University of Cambridge, for 
their valuable contribution to the completion of my research. I would also like 
to thank the staff at the School of Politics and International Relations and my 
colleagues for providing a supportive and friendly research environment. 
Finally, I would also like to express my gratitude to the officials, academics 
and journalists in Turkey and in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus for 
sharing their opinions with me. Last but not least, I would like to give my 
special thanks to my wonderful daughters, øSHN and Deniz, who rendered my 
life meaningful. Therefore, this thesis, in all modesty, is dedicated to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5 
 
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS 
 
AKP-Justice and Development Party 
ANAP-Motherland Party 
APEC-Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation  
BIA-Business Interest Associations  
BSP-Bulgarian Socialist Party 
CFSP-Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CTP-Republican Turkish Party 
DP-Party Democratic  
DSP-Democratic Left Party 
EC-European Community  
ECHR-European Court of Human Rights  
EFTA-European Free Trade Association  
EOKA-B-National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters 
EPC-European Political Cooperation  
EU-European Union 
FP-Virtue Party 
HCCI-Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
HDZ-Croatian Democratic Union  
IKV-Economic Development Foundation  
ITC-Committee of Union and Progress 
MGK-National Security Council 
MHP-Nationalist Action Party 
Mh6ø$'-The Independent Industrialists and Businessmen¶s Association 
NAFTA-North American Free Trade Area 
NATO-North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
  6 
 
NSWP-Non Soviet Warsaw Pact  
NPAA-National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
OSCE-Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PCC-Polish Chamber of Commerce 
PKK-.XUGLVWDQ:RUNHUV¶3DUW\ 
PSD-Social Democratic Party 
ROP-Republic of Cyprus 
RP-Welfare Party 
TBMM-Turkish National Grand Assembly 
TESEV-Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 
TOBB-Turkish Union of Chambers and Bursaries 
TRNC-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
7h5.øù-Confederation of Turkish Labour Unions 
7h6ø$'-Turkish Businessmen and Industrialists¶ Association 
UBP-National Union Party  
UK-United Kingdom 
UN-United Nations 
UNFICYP-United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
URC-United Republic of Cyprus  
US-United States 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  7 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT..................................................................................................................2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS..........................................................................................4 
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS........................................................................................5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................. 7 
PART ONE: DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE.........................................11 
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................11 
1. Context of the Topic .......................................................................................... .11 
2. Background ......................................................................................................... 12 
3. The Cyprus Question as an Intractable Problem ................................................. 13 
4. Nature of the Puzzle ............................................................................................ 14 
5. Argument ............................................................................................................ 15 
6. Defining Change ................................................................................................. 21 
7. Research Methodology ....................................................................................... 22 
8. Outline ................................................................................................................ 25 
CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CYPRUS QUESTION.....................29 
1. The Cyprus Question and Federalism ................................................................ .29 
7KH81¶V3DUDPHWHUVIRU&\SUXV ........................................................................ 34 
3. Literature Review on Cyprus .............................................................................. 36 
3.1. Causes of the Cyprus Conflict......................................................................36 
3.2. Conflict Resolution in Cyprus......................................................................39 
3.3. Legal and Constitutional Aspects of the Cyprus Question...........................41 
3.4. The Role of Outside Powers and Institutions in Cyprus...............................44 
CHAPTER II: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL AND TOWARDS 
CYPRUS IN PARTICULAR......................................................................................49 
1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy ...................................................... ...49 
1.1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in General................................49 
1.2. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1990-2001.................51 
1.3. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy from the Early 2000s to Date..53 
2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus ......................................................... 57 
2.1. The EPHUJHQFHRIWKH&\SUXV4XHVWLRQDQG7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\LQ
the 1950s..............................................................................................................57 
2.2. TurNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1980........................................................59 
  8 
 
2.3. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1990........................................................63 
2.4. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1990........................................................64 
2.5. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-2001........................................................65 
2.6. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\$IWHU........................................................72 
CHAPTER III: THREE WAYS IN WHICH TURKISH POLICY ON CYPRUS HAS 
CHANGED..................................................................................................................77 
1. Change in Policy Instruments ......................................................................... 78 
2. Change in the Policy Goal .............................................................................. 82 
3. The Normative Change ................................................................................... 85 
CHAPTER IV: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE................................88 
1. Causes Related to the International System .................................................... 90 
1.1. International Institutionalization..............................................................91 
1.2. Interdependence.......................................................................................91 
1.3. Third Parties.............................................................................................92 
1.4. Major External Developments.................................................................93 
2. Domestic Political Causes of Foreign Policy Change .................................... 94 
2.1. Parliament................................................................................................94 
2.2. Interest Groups.........................................................................................96 
2.3. Public Opinion.........................................................................................96 
2.4. Democratization.......................................................................................98 
2.5. Media.....................................................................................................100 
2.6. Economic Development.........................................................................102 
2.7. Cultural Change.....................................................................................103 
2.8. Regime Change......................................................................................104 
2.9. Major Internal Developments................................................................105 
3. Factors Related to the Organizational Structure ........................................... 106 
3.1. Domestic Institutionalization.................................................................106 
3.2. Bureaucratic Advocacy..........................................................................108 
3.3. Presence of Alternative Policy Options.................................................110 
3.4. Decision-making Mandate.....................................................................111 
4. Leadership Dynamics................................................................................... .112 
PART TWO: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE.................................113 
CHAPTER V: A MODEL DEFINING THE CAUSES OF TURKISH FOREIGN 
POLICY CHANGE ON CYPRUS............................................................................113 
1. Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish Leadership with 
a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs ....................................................................... 115 
  9 
 
1.1. Theoretical Framework on the Impact of Leadership on Foreign 
Policy.................................................................................................................116 
1.2. Why a Model of Leadership is an Essential Component of any Foreign 
Policy Change....................................................................................................119 
1.3. ³5HVRQDQFH´³&ULWLFDO-XQFWXUHV´DQG,GHDWLRQDO7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH
AKP from Islamism towards an EU-Oriented Political Party...........................129 
1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus..........................................134 
2. 7KH(8¶V,PSDFWRQ7XUNH\V1HZ&\SUXV3ROLF\ ....................................... 139 
2.1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Discord.................................................140 
2.2. Potential Alternatives to Institutionalization of EU Norms as an 
Explanatory Mechanism....................................................................................144 
2.3. 7KH3RVLWLRQVRIWKH(80HPEHU6WDWHVRQ&\SUXVDQG7XUNH\¶V(8
Membership.......................................................................................................151 
3. Emergence of a Propitious Decision-Making Context .............................. ...152 
CHAPTER VI: FIRST DETERMINANT: A NEW LEADERSHIP.........................169 
1. Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish Leadership with 
a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs .................................................................... ...170 
1.1. The Turkish Ideological/Cultural Framework.......................................170 
1.2. Why a Policy Change on Cyprus Did Not Take Place under the Coalition 
Government (1999-2002)..................................................................................177 
1.3. Ideational Transformation of the AKP from Islamism towards an EU-
Oriented Political Party......................................................................................182 
1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus..........................................201 
CHAPTER VII: SECOND DETERMINANT: THE ROLE OF THE EU................206 
1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Issue ............................................................ 207 
1.1. Democratic and Acquis Conditionality..................................................207 
1.2. Determinacy and Legitimacy of Conditions..........................................212 
1.3. Credibility of Conditionality..................................................................213 
1.4. Size and Speed of Rewards....................................................................214 
2. The Positions of the Member States and the United States on Cyprus ......... 215 
2.1. Introduction............................................................................................215 
2.2. The United States...................................................................................216 
2.3. The EU and its Member States..............................................................221 
CHAPTER VIII: THIRD DETERMINANT: DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, 
HOW THE DECISION WAS MADE.......................................................................237 
1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 237 
1.1. An Abortive Attempt to Change the Cyprus Policy..............................240 
  10 
 
1.2. Successful Foreign Policy Change on Cyprus.......................................243 
2. The Political Actors .................................................................................... ..245 
2.1. (UGR÷DQDQG*O....................................................................................245 
2.2. The Business Elite.................................................................................248 
2.3. The Military...........................................................................................253 
2.4. President Sezer.......................................................................................258 
2.5. Political Parties......................................................................................262 
2.6. The Advent to Power of the CTP-DP Coalition....................................264 
3. Conclusion .................................................................................................... 266 
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................................271 
INTERVIEWS...........................................................................................................283 
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  11 
 
PART ONE: DEFINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Context of the Topic 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the question of ZK\ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\
changed so abruptly between 2002 and 2004. While Ankara advocated a 
confederal solution until 2002, the AKP government started to favour a federal 
settlement in line with the UN parameters after coming to power in November 
2002. The findings of this research demonstrate that there were three factors 
which explain this puzzling change. First, the new leadership came to power 
with a new mindset on foreign affairs. Unlike its predecessors, the AKP 
leadership recognized the need to find a federal solution to the Cyprus dispute. 
It made clear that ³the Cyprus problem must be settled by all manner of means 
in line with the Annan Plan´ (TBMM Reports Journal November 23, 2002). 
Second, the EU, in granting Turkey a membership perspective, thereby 
rendered a settlement a sine qua non for Turkey to proceed with its own 
membership process. The third factor was the emergence of a propitious 
decision-making context, which empowered the pro-settlement actors within 
Turkey and weakened those who were anti-solution. 
 
The introduction starts with a background on the Cyprus question explaining 
the historical context of the Cyprus problem. The argument lays out the 
theoretical framework in which the Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus 
is examined. In the third part of the introduction, the definition of change is 
made to make clear what is considered to be a change in foreign policy. In the 
fourth part of the introduction, the research methodology employed in this 
thesis is explained. The last part of the introduction is the general outline of 
the thesis. 
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2. Background 
 
The beginning of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the mid-1950s, 
when British colonial rule on the island started to fall apart. In 1960, with the 
involvement of Britain and the United States, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
were able to come to terms on the establishment of a bi-communal federation 
on the island. However, although the Turkish Cypriots were content with the 
1959-60 agreements and the 1960 Constitution, which gave them equal rights 
within the state administration, the Greek-Cypriots were not. Eventually, their 
discontentment with the 1959-60 agreements, which fell short of their ultimate 
objective ± the establishment of a unitary Hellenic state in which the Turkish 
Cypriots would enjoy minority rights, rather than power-sharing ± led to the 
failure to implement the 1960 Constitution in 1963. 
 
The Turkish Cypriots were ousted from their administrative positions in 
December 1963, and as a consequence of the emerging intra-ethnic violence, 
they were forced to live in small enclaves, isolated from the world and 
HQFLUFOHG E\ WKH LVODQG¶V ODUJHU *UHHN &\SULRW SRSXODWLRQ XQWLO WKH PLOLWDry 
intervention by Turkey in 1974 (Interview 1 September 05, 2011). Talks 
between the leaderships of the two communities, which had begun in 1967, 
bore fruit in meetings held between 1977 and 1979, and the parties once again 
agreed on the objective of establishing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on 
Cyprus. 
 
In fact, despite their professed aim, neither of the sides were committed to 
such a solution until 2002, and as the Greek Cypriots attempted to setup a 
unitary state in which Turkish Cypriots would have the status of a minority, 
the Turkish Cypriots, together with Turkey, worked towards establishing an 
independent Turkish Cypriot state (Interview 2 September 9, 2011; Interview 
3 September 8, 2011).  
   
The European Union accepted the Greek Cypriot application for EU 
membership in the name of the entire island in 1993. The negotiations with the 
Greek Cypriots started 1997. While the Helsinki Council of the EU in 1999 
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granted Turkey candidate status, it made clear at the same time that the 
Republic of Cyprus would be accepted as a member even in the absence of a 
settlement in Cyprus. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus became a member of 
the EU in May 2004 without a settlement and thus without any control on the 
northern part of the island.  
 
$QNDUD¶VVWDQce on Cyprus did not change until the advent to power of a new 
leadership in Turkey in 2002. Shortly after forming a government in 
November 2002, Justice and Development Party (AKP) officials made a 
fundamental VKLIWLQ7XUNH\¶V Cyprus policy. Up until that point, Ankara had 
mainly been pursuing hard-line confederalist policies designed by TRNC 
President Rauf 'HQNWDú a highly esteemed figure among the Turkish 
bureaucratic and military elite (Interview 4 September 6, 2011). With the 
advent to power of the AKP, not only did Ankara move away from advocating 
a confederal model towards backing a resolution based on the UN parameters 
of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, it began to assume a pro-active role in 
trying to reach a settlement along these lines, eventually going so far as to 
allow the UN Secretary-General to attempt to catalyse a settlement in January 
2004 by filling in the blanks in those areas of the UN plan upon which the 
Cypriot parties had been unable to reach agreement.  
 
3. The Cyprus Question as an Intractable Problem 
 
The Cyprus question has proved so intractable as it is a protracted and intense 
disagreement between ethno-national groups who see their interests and even 
their survival in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the groups see their interests as 
being mutually incompatible. Competing claims for sovereignty by distinct 
ethno-national groups give rise to the most intractable political divisions. In 
such cases, negotiation, bargaining and compromise are difficult, since the 
claims of one side are usually unacceptable to the other. This animosity may 
then be intensified by the trauma of ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2). 
In Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities are divided by mistrust and 
fear. This suspicion is fuelled by the media, while the educational system and, 
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LQWKH*UHHN&\SULRWFDVHWKH&KXUFKIXUWKHUFRORXUHDFKJURXS¶VSHUFHSWLRQV
of the other (Khashman 1999: 6). 
 
Having two distinct school systems emphasing the dissimilarities between the 
two communities, sharpens their consciousness of their different national 
identities and their opposing loyalties, and inhibits the forging of a common 
Cypriot identity. In Greek Cypriot schools, students are taught to see Greek 
territorial expansion and enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) as 
desirable (Lindley 2007: 228-9). The Church maintains control over most of 
the schools and brings teachers over from Greece (Interview 5, September 29, 
2011). 
 
In the educational systems on both sides of the island, the goals are ethnically 
defined. The educational system and history are used on both sides with 
competing allegations to sovereignty and statehood. Against this background, 
history has become the main battleground for the legitimation of contradictory 
SROLWLFDO FODLPV ,W LV ³IHWLVKL]HG´ DQG JLYHQ D YRLFH QRW MXVW WR VSHDN EXW WR
command. It has become a moral force with the authority to dictate what is 
morally (and, by extension, politically) desirable for Cyprus and its future 
(Papadakis et al. 2006: 4-6). This made the parties persist in their maximalist 
positions and view the Cyprus question as a zero-sum game, in which gain for 
the one is considered to be the loss of the other. Until 2002, both sides 
persisted on these maximalist zero-sum positions, a unitary state on the Greek 
Cypriot side and a confederation on the Turkish Cypriot side.  
 
4. Nature of the Puzzle 
 
Until 2002, the policies of the parties were defined along nationalistic and 
zero-sum lines.  While the Greek Cypriots presumed a unitary Hellenic 
Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots would merely enjoy minority status, the 
Turkish Cypriots and Ankara sought a confederal formula on the basis of two 
sovereign states. This was based on the policies of 'HQNWDú7KHVHPD[LPDOLVW
positions did not allow the parties to consider a formula, where both sides 
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would have to make compromises under the UN parameters with a view to 
unifying the island. However, the stance of Ankara on the Cyprus question 
started to change with the advent of a new leadership in Turkey in November 
2002. This was puzzling in that for the first time a government in Turkey 
began to proactively advocate a federal formula on the basis of the UN 
parameters to the extent of allowing the UN Secretary General to fill in the 
parts in the accord, where the parties could not converge. This thesis seeks to 
find out the causes behind this abrupt policy change under the AKP 
government, which actively backed a settlement along the parameters set out 
by the UN. This was in contrast to its predecessors, including the coalition 
government of 1999-2002, that failed to make such a fundamental shift despite 
the credible membership perspective for Turkey furnished by the EU at the 
1999 EU Council Helsinki summit. 
 
5. Argument 
 
This thesis aims to LGHQWLI\ WKH FDXVHV EHKLQG 7XUNH\¶V VXGGHQ FKDQJH LQ
foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus from 2002. It argues that three main factors 
triggered the process by which Turkey abandoned a policy of resolution on the 
basis of a two-state or confederal model in favor of a federal solution: the 
advent to power of a new leadership with a new conciliatory mindset in 
foreign policy, the impact of the European Union in terms of the 
Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute with Greek Cypriot accession and, the 
emergence of a propitious decision-making setting within Turkey to shift 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\. 
 
Some authors H[SODLQ $QNDUD¶V QHZ SROLF\ RQ &\SUXV LQ WHUPV RI domestic 
power considerations within Turkey .ÕQDFÕR÷OX DQG 2NWD\ ; Robins 
2007), whereas others view the new leadership and its new approach to 
foreign policy as the paramount determinant of this policy change 0g]FDQ
and Usul 2010; Uslu 2011). Researchers also point to the simultaneous 
processes of democratization, Europeanization and the de-securitization of 
foreign policy-making in Turkey (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; Tocci 2005; 
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.LULúoL$UDVg]FDQ,QWKLVUHJDUGsome have emphasized 
WKH (8 DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV DV WKH FDUGLQDO UHDVRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ FKDQJH 
7HU]L  .DOLEHU  .LULúoL  $UDV  ZKHUHDV others give 
precedence to a bottom-up process of democratization within Turkey, 
bolstered by an EU component * g]FDQ  7RFFL . However, 
democratization and the de-securitization of foreign policy may not have an 
immediate influence on foreign policy behaviour, and none of the above-
mentioned scholars provides a detailed explanation that combines theories of 
OHDGHUVKLSIRUHLJQSROLF\DQDO\VLVDQG(XURSHDQL]DWLRQLQH[SODLQLQJ7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy shift on Cyprus, nor can they adequately account for the radical 
LGHDWLRQDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQ7XUNH\¶VQHZOHDGHUVKLSWKDWOHGWRWKHLUHVSRXVDO
of EU norms and a new policy on Cyprus. The essential question here ± and 
one that has not yet been sufficiently analysed ± is how a political party 
originating from a strongly anti-Western, pro-TRNC Turkish Islamist 
movement came to prioritize both EU membership and a new policy on 
Cyprus, diverging not only from its predecessor, the Islamist Welfare Party, on 
the Cyprus question, but from other mainstream political parties, which held 
fast to the status-quo oriented policies in Cyprus. In a parliamentary speech, 
Baykal, the leader of the main opposition party, DLUHGWKDW³LI\RXDUHQRWLQD
position to create better conditions for our kin in Cyprus, then abandoning the 
status-quo PLJKW EH FRQWUDU\ WR RXU LQWHUHVWV´ (TBMM Reports Journal 
November 26, 2002).  
 
$OWKRXJKWKH(8LVRIWHQSUHVHQWHGDV WKHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWDFWRULQ$QNDUD¶V
new Cyprus policy (Terzi 2005; Kaliber .LULúoL$UDVVXFK
accounts fail to provide thorough analyses of how the EU accession process 
affected Turkish foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus that draw on theories of 
Europeanization. This thesis argues that the EU contributed to the process of 
Turkish foreign policy change vis-j-vis Cyprus by Europeanizing the Cyprus 
dispute and empowering pro-settlement interest groups in Turkey. Thus, the 
EU played a crucial role in swaying Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus by 
providing a credible membership perspective for Turkey 
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This thesis illustrates how the advent to power of a new leadership with a new 
outlook on foreign affairs was the crucial GHWHUPLQDQWRI$QNDUD¶VQHZSROLF\
on Cyprus. The AKP was formed at a time when the Turkish military was 
FUDFNLQJ GRZQ RQ 7XUNH\¶V ,VODPLVWV 0RGHUQL]HUV \HQLOLNoLOHU) within the 
Turkish Islamist Movement, known as the National View Movement, split off 
to form the AKP following the shut-down of the Islamist Welfare Party in 
1998. Realizing that an Islamist party could not accede to and maintain power 
within the Turkish political setting ± Turkish Islamist parties were closed 
down by the Turkish Constitutional Court not only in 1998, but in 1971, 1981, 
1983 and in 2001, on the grounds that they had allegedly become the focus of 
activities aimed at underminLQJ 7XUNH\¶V VHFXODU-democratic system ± the 
AKP espoused EU membership as its main objective in order to enlist EU 
support to protect the party against the powerful secular establishment of 
Turkey. 
 
In analyzing the process by which the AKP renounced its Islamist past and 
came to embrace an EU-RULHQWHGDJHQGDWKLVWKHVLVUHOLHVRQ7KRPDV5LVVH¶V 
social-learning model ZKLFK GHVFULEHV KRZ µresonance¶ and µcritical 
junctures¶OHDGWRWKHreconstruction of identity and the redefinition of interests 
%|U]HO DQG5LVVH5LVVH. µRHVRQDQFH¶, which accounts 
for the appropriateness and legitimacy of a particular identity construction in a 
specific political setting (Risse 2001: 203), demonstrates how an 
institutionalized secular domestic context forced the Turkish Islamic 
Movement to transform its identity, since Islamism did not resonate well in 
such a setting. Recognition of the fact that the only way to come to and remain 
in power within the Turkish domestic structure was to give up their Islamist 
LGHQWLW\LQGLFDWHVWKHµVRFLDOOHDUQLQJ¶RIWKH$.3. The social learning model 
also posits WKH SUHVHQFH RI µFULWLFDO MXQFWXUHV¶ ZKLFK GHVFULEHV D QRYHO DQG
uncertain environment, crisis, or vehement policy failure that facilitates a 
policy shift (Risse 2001: 212-3 and 562). After such a policy failure, identity 
re-construction comes about after a process of arguing, persuasion, social 
learning and redefinition of identities and interests %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH 
66). While ideational transformation may originally be triggered by a desire to 
remain in power or some other political considerations, once the identity re-
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construction occurs, it outlives alterations in instrumental interests. (Risse 
2001: 213). 
 
Whereas different approaches, such as Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism 
and Rationalism, are also examined in Chapter V, Section 1.2, the findings of 
this research demonstrate that all of these accounts were limited in their 
explanation of the concept of foreign policy alteration due to the complexity 
and multi-dimensional aspect of the phenomenon. Realism maintains that the 
political decisions are a consequence of structural determinants on which the 
decision-makers do not have any control. However, this thesis clearly shows 
that the decisions of the decision-makers are not simply a consequence of 
structural dynamics as suggested by the Realists.  
 
Liberals, on the other hand, assert that liberal institutions make a crucial 
impact on the decisions of the policy-makers arguing that cooperative 
behaviour within an anarchic and hierarchical system is possible on the basis 
of norms, regimes and institutions, which provide states with various channels 
of political exchange rather than only the interstate channel advocated by the 
realists (Keohane 1984). This argument holds true, notwithstanding, as long as 
the leadership has a disposition to espouse such norms and values of the 
liberal institutions. As expounded in Chapter VI, Section 1.2. and 1.3, while 
the coalition government was reluctant to embrace EU norms and values, the 
AKP government was disposed to do so. 
 
Constructivism regards concepts as socially constructed in line with the 
identities and interests of the key actors in the system. Thus, these concepts 
may be changed by the human agents by a process of social practice and 
interaction. Constructivism puts special emphasis on ³VKDUHG LGHDV´, which 
construct the identities and interests of humDQDFWRUV7KHVH³VKDUHGLGHDV´DUH
not given by nature, but can change by a process of social construction (Wendt 
1992). Ideas may only have an impact on foreign policy behaviour, however, 
as long as they are espoused by the leadership as states are abstract entities 
without the power to make decisions. While the coalition government failed to 
espouse ideas to pursue a more constructive and pragmatic policy on Cyprus, 
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the AKP government adopted such ideas and made the EU membership and 
thus the settlement of the Cyprus problem its political goals. In this sense, 
constructivist, leadership and social learning approaches account for why the 
coalition government held fast to the traditional confederalist line on Cyprus 
disregarding the views that circulated around for a solution in Cyprus and why 
the AKP government opted to embrace such ideas for a settlement in Cyprus. 
In this sense, Liberalism and Realism fail to recognize the weight of 
leadership and social learning, which are the ineluctable components of any 
decision on foreign policy alteration. Therefore, ³Constructivism´, 
µleadership¶ and µsociDO OHDUQLQJ¶ are the main approaches employed in this 
research. 
 
7KLVWKHVLVGUDZVRQOHDGHUVKLSDQG5LVVHDQG&KHFNHO¶VVRFLDOOHDUQLQJPRGHO 
in spelling out not only why the AKP government resolutely and proactively 
favoured a federal settlement in the island on the basis of the UN parameters, 
but also ZK\WKHFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQWWKH$.3¶VSUHGHFHVVRUIDLOHGWRGRVR 
and held fast to the idea of forming a confederation in Cyprus. An account of 
the behaviour of both political formations cDOOVIRUD³FRJQLWLYHDSSURDFKDQG
the OHDUQLQJ SURFHVV´ RQ WKH SDrt of both the AKP and the coalition 
government. In this sense, ³OHDGHUVKLS G\QDPLF´ VWDQGV RXW DV DQ critical 
component of any decision of foreign policy shift. As analysed in Chapter VI 
Section 1.1, whereas the coalition parties preceding the AKP had forceful 
cognitive priors as regards the maintenance of the status quo in the island, and 
WKXV IDLOHG WR FKDQJH $QNDUD¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ the AKP government, in the 
face of constant policy failures, was able to re-define WKHSDUW\¶VLGHQWLW\DQG
interests through a cognitive learning process. Such a re-definition led to the 
espousal of a new pragmatic policy on Cyprus. While this ideational 
transformation rooted in the cost-benefit calculations of the AKP initially, it 
outlived this pragmatic alteration and stuck. 
 
Within this context, the failure of Turkish Islamist politics and the closure of 
WKH$.3¶VSUHGHFHVVRU:HOIDUH3DUW\53Rn January 16, 1998 by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court, which ruled that the activities of the RP were 
undermining the principles of plural democracy and laicism in Turkey, 
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UHSUHVHQWHG D µFULWLFDO MXQFWXUH¶ ± as did the upholding of that ruling by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which demonstrated that the 
European context was not going to support the survival of an Islamist party in 
Turkey. 
 
,Q UHODWLQJ 5LVVH¶V VRFLDO OHDUQLQJ WKHRU\ WR WKH $.3¶V VKLIW RQ &\SUXV WKLV
thesis also draws on an adoption-costs model. Namely, it maintains that the 
AKP government¶VDGRSWLRQRIDQ(8-oriented policy agenda and its espousal 
of a foreign-policy change on Cyprus were initially motivated by cost-benefit 
calculations. However, the process of cost-benefit analysis and ideational 
transformation of the party go hand in hand.  
 
After focusing on the role of the new Turkish leadership, this thesis examines 
how the EU accession process contributed WR7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\FKDQJH
vis-j-vis Cyprus. The first and foremost aspect entails the Europeanization of 
the Cyprus discord. The Europeanization of the Cyprus issue with the 
prospective entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU meant that any 
Turkish government aspiring to EU accession would be obliged, under the 
acquis communautaire, to apply EU norms to the Republic of Cyprus. In fact, 
the 1996 Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey required 
Ankara to extend this agreement to all new members of the EU, including the 
Republic of Cyprus. Within this context, Turkey would have to allow Greek-
Cypriot-flagged vessels and aircraft to use its ports and airports. In the event, 
because it has refused WRGR VR7XUNH\¶V accession process has been frozen 
since December 2006. Accordingly, a settlement of the Cyprus dispute has 
become a sine qua non for Turkey to clear its own pathway to EU 
membership.  
 
7KH (8 DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV DOVR LPSDFWHG RQ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ by 
empowering certain domestic actors within Turkey between 2002 and 2004.  
The credibility of EU membership strengthened the hands of pro-EU domestic 
actors ± above all the government but also the Turkish Businessmen and 
,QGXVWULDOLVWV $VVRFLDWLRQ 7h6ø$' DQG RWKHU QRQ-governmental 
organizations favoring the Annan Plan ± and weakened that of EU-sceptics 
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opposing the plan, most important among them, the military. Accordingly, 
while pro-EU, pro-Annan Plan domestic interest groups became more vocal as 
the referendum approached, dissenters were forced to remain silent.  
 
Any foreign policy decision can be understood as being made by an 
µDXWKRULWDWLYH GHFLVLRQ XQLW¶ FRQVLVWLQJ RI HLWKHU a predominant leader, i.e. a 
VLQJOH LQGLYLGXDO ZLWK WKH SRZHU WR FRPPLW RU ZLWKKROG DOO RI D UHJLPH¶V
resources related to a particular issue regardless of any opposition by others, a 
single group, or multiple autonomous actors (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 
1989: 365-6). In the latter case, decision-making may be more difficult, since 
numerous influential actors may be capable of complicating or obstructing the 
decision-making process. 
 
With regard to the change in 7XUNH\¶V&\Srus policy that occurred between 
2002 and 2004WKLVVKLIWZDVIDFLOLWDWHGE\3ULPH0LQLVWHU(UGR÷DQ¶VUROHas 
theµSUHGRPLQDQWOHDGHU¶, who after an interactive process with the other actors 
in the decision-making group, PDGH D GHFLVLRQ WR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV
policy. 
 
6. Defining Change 
 
In conceptualising shifts in foreign policy, this thesis employs Kleistra-
0D\HU¶VPRGHO, which identifies and defines three different types of change: 
change in programmes/instruments, change in strategies/problems/goals, and 
change in political/normative foundations. Instrumental change involves a 
change in methods or means ± for example, diplomatic negotiations, instead of 
military force ± but not in ultimate goals. In other words, with instrumental 
change, the policymaker changes what s/he does and how s/he does it, while 
his/her purposes remain intact (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3). With regard 
to Cyprus, by expanding the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶VUROHWRLQFOXGHWKHSRZHU
of arbitration rather than restricting him to a PLVVLRQRIµJRRGRIILFHV¶which 
did not include the right to set forth plans, proffer suggestions, or impose them 
on the parties, Ankara changed a crucial instrument in the negotiations. This 
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instrumental change was designed to catalyse a solution, and it made possible 
the emergence of the Annan Plan, in which the Secretary-General himself 
µILOOHGLQWKHEODQNV¶RQZKLFKWKHSDUWLHVKDGEHHQunable to converge. 
 
In the case of a change in strategies/problems/goals, the policymaker redefines 
or forfeits his/her goal so that not only does the policymaker change what s/he 
does and how s/he does it, his/her purpose also undergoes a shift. Changes in 
policy statements and policy actions can also be defined as changes in 
problems/goals (C. F. Hermann 1990: 5), as in TuUNH\¶VPRYHDZD\IURPWKH
idea of a confederal settlement in Cyprus it had advocated implicitly since 
1960s and explicitly since the mid-1990s towards acceptance of a federal 
model in full compliance with the UN parameters from 2002 onwards.  
 
Finally, normative and political foundational change involves a shift in the 
underlying concept of foreign policy (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3), as in 
WKH LQVWLWXWLRQ RI WKH SROLF\ µ]HUR SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV¶ SXW IRUWK E\
Ahmet 'DYXWR÷OX DQ DGYLVHU WR WKH 7XUNLVK SULPH PLQLVWHU since 2001 and 
appointed to the post of foreign minister in 2009, to replace the hard-line 
outlook that had dominated 7XUNH\¶V foreign policy prior to 2002. After this 
GDWH $QNDUD EHJDQ HPSKDVL]LQJ LWV µVRIW SRZHU¶ DWWHPSWLQJ WR HVWDEOLVK
friendly relations and smooth out differences with its neighbours on the basis 
of economic inter-dependency in a stable neighbourhood. It was within this 
framework that Ankara took the initiative in attempting to settle the Cyprus 
dispute. 
 
7. Research Methodology 
 
7KLV WKHVLV DQDO\VHV WKH FDVH RI 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy shift on Cyprus 
between 2002 and 2004 on the basis of qualitative data. This time period 
chosen as this is the only period that a substantial shift in TurkH\¶V &\SUXV
policy occurred by the concurrence of three determinants: leadership, the EU 
and decision-making. Given the fluid, multi-factorial causality of foreign-
policy change, establishing the causes of a specific instance of foreign-policy 
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change requires a detailed, inductive analysis of the particular case in 
question. By using the case-study approach, this thesis identifies variables, 
K\SRWKHVHV DQG FDXVDO PHFKDQLVPV WR DFFRXQW IRU 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy 
change vis-j-vis Cyprus after 2002. 
 
The collection of data relating to this study was hindered by the absence of a 
clear-cut theory capable of accounting for foreign-policy change in general. 
This lack of a definitive theory can be attributed to the fact that foreign-policy 
change is a complicated, multi-causal process that involves numerous factors 
that are not necessarily the same in all cases. In order to introduce a multi-
FDXVDO H[SODQDWLRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy change vis-j-vis Cyprus, a 
model was developed following a thorough examination of the literature on 
foreign-policy change in general and on Europeanization in particular. Based 
on the findings of the literature review, factors with the potential to influence 
foreign policy were grouped under four main categories (Table 1).  
 
TABLE I: Potential Factors in Foreign Policy Change 
Category Factor 
International System International Institutionalization 
Inter-dependence 
Third Parties 
Major International Developments 
National Political System Parliament 
Interest Groups 
Public Opinion 
Democratization 
Media 
Economic Development 
Cultural Change 
Regime Change 
Major Domestic Developments 
Organizational System Domestic Institutionalization 
Bureaucratic Advocacy   
Presence of Alternative Policy 
Options 
Decision-making mandate 
Individual 
Policymakers/Leaders 
Preferences and Interests of the 
leadership 
 
The model was then constructed using the relevant factors as independent 
variables. The three relevant independent variables are found to be the 
international institutionalisation (the EU), the decision-making mandate and 
the preferences and interests of the leadership, which are written in bold in 
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Table I. After the pertinent independent variables are determined, I explored 
whether the above-mentioned three types of foreign-policy change occurred as 
the dependent variables.  
 
Data was collected from various political texts (speeches, press conferences, 
party statements) the media (newspapers, television/radio broadcasts, internet 
resources), the academic literature on 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LQFluding 
relations with the EU, Cyprus and other countries, and the literature regarding 
general aspects of foreign policy, foreign-policy change and Europeanization. 
Written papers signed by the government, official documents and publications 
of the Turkish Foreign Ministry along with documents generated by various 
LQVWLWXWLRQVUHOHYDQWWR7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQUHODWLRQVVXFKDVWKH(8&RPPLVVLRQ
and the UN Security Council, were also analysed. Furthermore, approximately 
20 interviews were conducted with academic experts on Turkish foreign 
policy, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish relations; diplomats from the Turkish 
Foreign Ministry and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; other politicians from both the governing and 
opposition parties in the TRNC; and a Turkish-Cypriot journalist in Nicosia 
during August-September 2011. 
 
A multi-dimensional model was constructed to explain how the advent to 
power of a new leadership and EU determinants affected 7XUNH\¶V QHZ
Cyprus policy. This thesis contributes to the academic literature by applying a 
social-learning model to the case of the AKP, and it contributes to the 
literature on Europeanization by disclosing how the Europeanization process 
unfolded in the case of Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus. Among the 
potential causes of foreign-policy change listed in Table I, the model employs 
µOHDGHUVKLS ZLWK D QHZ RXWORRN RQ IRUHLJQ DIIDLUV¶ µWKH (8¶ ZKLFK
HQFRPSDVVHVµWKH(XURSHDnizaWLRQRIWKH&\SUXVGLVSXWH¶DQG µemergence of a 
propitious decision-PDNLQJFRPSRVLWLRQ¶IRUDFKDQJHLQIRUHLJQSROLF\ 
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8. Outline 
 
7KLVWKHVLVKDVVRXJKWWRDQVZHUWKHTXHVWLRQ³:KDWZHUHWKHUHDVRQVIRUWKH
radical shift in Turkish foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus between 2002 and 
2004"´  
 
Chapters I and II establish the background against which this question will be 
answered. While Chapter I provides a chronological overview of the Cyprus 
problem that looks at the emergence of the disagreement, the causes of the 
conflict, the legal and constitutional aspects of the discord, the question of 
federalism, the role of outside powers and various conflict-resolution 
initiatives, including the UN parameters for Cyprus, Chapter II focuses on 
Turkish foreign policy in general during the 1990s and 2000s and Turkish 
foreign policy towards Cyprus since the 1950s in particular, and it includes a 
review of the literature on the determinants of Turkish foreign policy. 
 
&KDSWHU,,,GUDZVRQ.OHLVWUDDQG0D\HU¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\
change to expound on what reDOO\FKDQJHGLQ$QNDUD¶V&\SUXV policy between 
2002 and 2004. Accordingly, it highlights the change in foreign-policy 
instruments represented by replacing the UN Secretary-*HQHUDO¶V UROH RI
µJRRG RIILFHV¶ ZLWK WKDW RI DUELWUDWRU LQ WKH GLVSXWH WKH FKDQJH in foreign 
policy goal from the institution of a confederal solution to the establishment of 
a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation in line with UN parameters; and the 
QRUPDWLYHFKDQJHUHSUHVHQWHGE\WKH$.3¶VDEDQGRQLQJRI7XUNH\¶VVHFXULW\-
oriented foreign policy in favour of one with a more conciliatory and 
cooperative outlook on foreign affairs. 
 
Chapter IV explicates foreign-policy change in general, presenting a list of 
determinants derived from the literature. Accordingly, the causes of foreign-
policy change are subsumed under four chief categories: causes related to the 
international system, causes related to the domestic system, causes related to 
organizational structure and causes related to the leadership. In this chapter, 
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various of these determinants are analysed, and their relevance to the Cyprus 
case is explored. 
 
Chapter V offers a detailed theoretical framework that explains foreign-policy 
change in Turkey. In the first part of the chapter, ideational changes at the 
leadership level are described according to a social-learning model that 
accounts for the advent to power of a new leadership with a new identity 
emerging from an ideational crisis induced by policy failure. The ideational 
transformation of the Turkish Islamist Movement from Islamist to centrist and 
its adoption of an EU-oriented foreign-policy agenda from early 2000s 
onwards is explained by a social-learning model, with an adoption-costs 
model also used to account for the initial motivation EHKLQG WKH $.3¶V
foreign-policy change on Cyprus.  
 
7KH VHFRQG SDUW RI WKH FKDSWHU VSHOOV RXW WKH UROH RI WKH (8 LQ 7XUNH\¶V
foreign-policy alteration. After first accounting for international 
institutionalization as a cause of foreign-policy change in general, it examines 
the role of international institutionalization in terms of the specific case of 
7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy shift on Cyprus, namely with regard to the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI (8 QRUPV UHTXLUHG E\ WKH µacquis communautaire¶
which made a settlement on Cyprus a de facto condition for any Turkish 
government aspiring to EU membership. The chapter also attempts to explore 
WKHH[SODQDWRU\YDOXHRI(XURSHDQL]DWLRQWKHRULHVLQUHODWLRQWR$QNDUD¶VQHZ
Cyprus policy. Within this framework, determinacy of conditions, legitimacy 
of conditions, credibility of conditionality and size and speed of rewards were 
examined as alternative explanations; ultimately, it was understood that these 
models are unable to furnish more than a scant understanding of $QNDUD¶VQHZ
policy on Cyprus. In addition to discussing the Europeanization of the Cyprus 
issue, this chapter also establishes the theoretical background against which 
the issues of the (8¶VHPSRZHUPHQWRIFHUWDLn interest groups within Turkey. 
 
Chapter VI applies the theory on leadership outlined in the previous chapter to 
the case of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-j-vis Cyprus. The chapter starts 
ZLWK DQ H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH SURFHVV WKDW OHG WR WKH SROLWLFDO ,VODPLVWV¶ PRYH
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towards the centre of the Turkish foreign policy spectrum and their adoption 
of an EU-oriented policy agenda from the late 1990s onwards. It shows how, 
in contrast to the more conflictual outlook of previous Turkish foreign policy 
that regarded all of 7XUNH\¶VQHLJKERurs as threats, the AKP assumed a more 
pragmatic viewpoint with the intention of developing Turkey¶VUHODWLRQVZLWK
its neighbours and addressing the ossified problems of Turkish foreign policy. 
1RWRQO\GRHV WKLVFKDSWHUH[DPLQH WKH$.3¶VQHZIRUHLJQSROLF\YLVLRQE\
DQDO\VLQJWKHSDUW\¶VLGHRORJLFDOEDFNJURXQGDQGWKHFRQcepts of Ottomanism 
and neo-Ottomanism, it also makes use of a social-learning model in arguing 
why the policy change that occurred under the AKP government was not able 
to come about under its predecessor. 
 
Chapter VII continues to apply the theory developed in Chapter V to the case 
of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-j-YLV &\SUXV E\ KLJKOLJKWLQJ WKH (8¶V
impact on this policy. After analysing the Europeanization of the Cyprus 
question, it examines alternative theories that could potentially account for 
Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus. This chapter also looks on the 
SRVLWLRQVRI WKH(8PHPEHU VWDWHV DV UHJDUGV7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLS DQG WKH
Cyprus question. Chapter VIII discloses how a propitious decision-making 
composition emerged in Turkey and allowHG(UGR÷DQWRPDNHDUDGLFDOshift 
LQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\E\H[WHQVLYHO\GUDZLQJRQSULPDU\VRXUFHV 
 
The conclusion offers a summary of the main assertion of this thesis, namely 
that the 2002-2004 shift in Turkish foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus was the 
result of a combination of dynamics related to the Turkish leadership and to 
the EU in terms of Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute and a propitious 
decision-making context. This chapter also points out the contributions to the 
literature made by this thesis and clarifies the potential capacity of the model 
constructed to account for the Turkish foreign policy shift on Cyprus to 
explain foreign-policy change in general. In fact, the model employed in this 
study is applicable to the specific case of Turkish foreign-policy change vis-j-
vis Cyprus in 2002-04 and cannot be automatically applied to other cases of 
foreign-policy change without an exhaustive, inductive analysis of the specific 
location and time period in question. That said, however, leadership and a 
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favourable decision-making composition seem to be ineluctable components 
of any foreign-policy alteration. Moreover, the general model embraces a wide 
range of variables with the potential of altering foreign-policy dynamics, from 
international institutionalization to bureaucratic advocacy, and can be used as 
a starting point by scholars of different areas for their own case studies. 
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CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND TO THE CYPRUS 
QUESTION 
 
In order to give the reader some insight into the origins of the research 
question, this section discusses the Cyprus controversy, illustrating how 
$QNDUD¶VSROLF\RQ&\SUXVFKDQJHG$V WKH LQYROYHGSDUWLHV DQG WKH8QLWHG
Nations (UN) have all envisioned a federal solution for Cyprus, I first analyse 
what the prospects of success of such a solution have been. I conclude that it 
has been a problematic formula for the solution of the Cyprus disagreement, 
which is characterized by nationalist standpoints on both sides. However, there 
seems no alternative to a federal model in Cyprus as a confederal settlement is 
unacceptable to Greek Cypriots and a unitary state is unacceptable to Turkish 
Cypriots. Secondly, I outline the UN parameters for a solution on the island, 
which is a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. Thirdly, I review the literature 
pertaining to the political situation in Cyprus. This literature gives insight into 
the nature of the disagreement, sets out the causes of the Cyprus conflict, 
outlines various propositions for conflict resolution in Cyprus and discusses 
the legal and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus controversy and the role 
played by outside powers and institutions on the island. 
 
 1. The Cyprus Question and Federalism 
 
As the involved parties and the UN are all seeking a federal settlement in 
Cyprus, it is useful here to explore what conditions are required for federalism 
to be successful, and to consider the extent to which these exist in this case. 
Success depends on three cardinal factors: communities and their leaders must 
be committed to the idea of federation; crosscutting cleavages must exist 
within the societies seeking federation; and there should be more than two 
units in the federation to minimize confrontation between the two dominant 
units (Khashman 1999: 5-6). 
 
First, there should be a widespread conviction among all communities or states 
that federalism is a worthwhile objective, and a genuine desire to become a 
  30 
 
federal entity. All parties must be willing to compromise and share power, and 
there must be mutual sympathy between the peoples of the states to be 
federated. There must be assurance that no one unit will seek to dominate the 
others. A willingness to embrace federalism is more likely where leaders are 
trusted by their communities and where there is no strong tendency to 
nationalism. In a federal system, minority groups will have a level of 
representation in government that is at least proportionate to (if not greater 
than) their numbers (Dodd 1999: 1-2). 
 
However, the Cyprus conflict is a protracted and intense disagreement 
between ethno-national groups who see their interests and even their survival 
in zero-sum terms. Moreover, the groups see their interests as being mutually 
incompatible. Competing claims for sovereignty by distinct ethno-national 
groups can give rise to the most intractable political divisions. In such cases, 
negotiation, bargaining and compromise are difficult, since the claims of one 
side are usually unacceptable to the other. This animosity may then be 
intensified by the trauma of ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2). In 
Cyprus, the Greek and Turkish communities are divided by mistrust and fear. 
This suspicion is fuelled by the media, while the educational system and, in 
WKH*UHHN&\SULRWFDVHWKH&KXUFKIXUWKHUFRORXUHDFKJURXS¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRI
the other (Khashman 1999: 6). 
 
In the case of Cyprus, the consciousness of different national identities and 
dissimilarities between the two communities were sharpened by the presence 
of two distinct school systems. Such a context impeded the emergence of a 
common Cypriot identity. The Greek Cypriot educational system regards 
Greek territorial expansion and enosis (unification of Cyprus with Greece) as 
desirable policy objectives. The Church has a predominant position in the 
schools and decides which teachers would be brought over from Greece to 
teach in Greek Cypriot schools (Interview 5 September 29, 2011). In both 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot educational systems, the political the goals are 
defined ethnically. The history taught in the educational system contains 
competing allegations as regards sovereignty and statehood, which renders 
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history the main battleground for the legitimation of contradictory political 
claims (Papadakis et al. 2006: 4-6). 
 
Although the two communities lived side by side between 1571 and 1963, 
they remained essentially separate; there was little intermarriage and only 
limited participation in a common social and cultural life. Although they 
coexisted peacefully enough, their sense of a common Cypriot identity was 
limited; this was eroded in the early 1900s and declined further between 1955 
and 1960. It was crushed entirely in the violence of 1963-1974, when Turkish 
Cypriots were forced to live in tiny enclaves under a blockade imposed by 
Greek Cypriots. The blockade undermined any lingering belief that 
cohabitation was workable. The media, educational systems and Greek 
Cypriot Church have ever since served to divide the two societies. Since there 
is no precedent in Cypriot history for the idea of a single, national Cypriot 
identity, in which people are treated as individuals and not as distinct groups, 
any federal agreement is likely to collapse. This was the case with the 1960 
Constitution, which lasted only until 1963 (Lindley 2007: 228-9 and 37). 
 
The lack of cooperation between groups on the island means that they are 
unlikely to accept or commit to a federal constitution. When a partnership 
agreement was reached in 1960, the Greek Cypriot commitment to enosis and 
suspicion on the part of the Turkish Cypriots quickly brought the partnership 
to an end. It is doubtful that Greek Cypriots would commit themselves to 
federation and likely that Turkish Cypriots would feel threatened by any such 
Greek Cypriot offer. There is little tolerance of or appetite for compromise in 
either community or leadership (Khashman 1999: 6). 
 
The second determinant of success in federal systems is the presence of 
crosscutting cleavages which might mitigate any confrontation between the 
dominant units. Crosscutting leverages are those unifying elements that cut 
across social groups. In Switzerland, for instance, Catholicism cuts across 
seven German, one French and one Italian canton and functions as a unifying 
element for them all. The presence and promotion of activities that generate 
organizations running counter to national divisions, such as labour unions, 
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business and educational institutions, mitigate the risk of bi-communal 
confrontation (Dodd 1999: 1-2). 
 
The stability of federal systems is actually enhanced by the presence of a 
variety of ethnic/religious groups with competing interests. Rather than giving 
rise to violence and instability, these cleavages make the system function more 
effectively. However, where a federation is split along religious, national or 
linguistic lines, there is a greater risk that the country will be torn apart by 
violence. Where there is more than one cleavage, the potential risks are 
cancelled out and no single cleavage can become rooted in the system. The 
1960 Republic of Cyprus was a dyadic, bi-communal, federal structure, where 
society was separated along religious, ethnic and linguistic lines. Since the two 
societies were divided on every issue, crosscutting cleavages did not exist. In 
the absence of other factors that might have served as integrative glue, it was 
harder for the federal structure to operate and the communities to cooperate. In 
VXFK FDVHV WKH PLQRULW\ JURXS¶V GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQ ZLWK DVSHFWV RI GD\-to-day 
politics can be enough to destabilize the system (Khashman 1999: 3 and 6). 
 
Thirdly, the more units there are in a federal entity, the greater are its chances 
of survival. When the federation encompasses only two federal units separated 
by ethnic or religious divisions, the risk of confrontation between the two 
communities is higher. In the case of Cyprus, federation is generally envisaged 
as bi-communal (there are only two communities) and bi-zonal (the island is 
divided by a border). However, as both communities are very nationalist in 
outlook and lack any sense of commitment to a common authority, the 
situation might soon turn into a zero-sum game. The population imbalance on 
the island further complicates matters. In federations, decisions are generally 
taken by a majority. In such cases, the minority group soon becomes 
dominated by the majority group (Khashman 1999: 6-7). 
 
Cyprus is clearly divided along ethnic/religious lines. In the absence of any 
common identity, it is unlikely that a socialist or liberal party will emerge that 
attracts members from both communities. Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots alike would vote collectively to protect the interests of their 
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respective ethnic/religious community. In this situation, the minority Turkish 
Cypriots could soon be dominated by the majority Greek Cypriots on every 
issue apart from those that call for separate approval from both communities. 
This might lead to the outbreak of tensions, as in the case of the 1960 
Constitution, and the breakdown of the system. 
 
In the three years following the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, 
the Greek Cypriot majority strove to impose its dominance on the minority 
Turkish Cypriots, leading to inter-communal violence and the collapse of the 
system. The Annan Plan of 2004, which was rejected by Greek Cypriots, also 
envisaged a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. As will be shown in the next 
chapter, the UN continues to propose a federation similar to the 1960 model. 
But as long as the parties remain unengaged with the process and committed 
to pursuing their own nationalist, zero-sum objectives, any federal resolution 
is likely to follow the same path as the 1960 system. 
 
Having said this, the bi-zonal, bi-communal federation proposed by the UN 
seems ± for all its deficiencies ± to be the only alternative for Cyprus. The 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities have different preferences in 
regard to settlement: while Greek Cypriots would prefer a unitary state in 
which Turkish Cypriots would be a minority, Turkish Cypriots would prefer a 
two-VWDWH VROXWLRQ 1HLWKHU VLGH ILQGV WKH RWKHU¶V VROXWLRQ DFFHSWDble. Public 
surveys on both sides indicate that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
see a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the only viable settlement for the 
island (Lordos et al. 2009: 12). The success of such a federation rests on the 
ability of both sides to abandon their nationalist discourse, espouse a post-
nationalist viewpoint and respect the rights and concerns of the other 
community. 
 
7XUNH\¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH &\SUXV LVVXH LV FUXFLDO EHFDXVH H[WHUQDO DFWRUV DUH
very important in the Cyprus conflict. The creation of a shared identity, or the 
coexistence of separate identities are made more difficult by Greek-Turkish 
mainland rivalry. Full settlement and greater cooperation between Greece and 
Turkey are necessary if the Cyprus conflict is to be resolved (Elise and 
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Lisaniler 2009: 208). Turkey is the only country that Turkish Cypriots want to 
VHH DV D JXDUDQWRU SRZHU RQ WKH LVODQG $QNDUD¶V QHZ &\SUXV SROLF\ LV DQ
essential step towards a post-nationalist standpoint both in Turkey and Cyprus. 
Ankara has not just changed its traditional stance on the Cyprus question by 
moving away from confederalism towards federalism; it is now actively 
promoting a settlement based on the UN parameters.  
 
 2. 7KH81¶V3DUDPHWHUVIRU&\SUXV 
 
After the collapse of the federal Republic of Cyprus in 1963, inter-communal 
talks for the re-unification of the island started in 1968 EHWZHHQ'HQNWDú WKH
leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, and Clerides, the leader of the 
Greek Cypriot community, under the auspices of the United Nations. The talks 
continued on and off until the 1974 interventions of the Greek junta and 
Turkish military 6|]HQ E. In April 1975, a Population Exchange 
Agreement was concluded between the two sides. Turkish Cypriots present in 
the south after the 1974 Turkish military intervention were transferred to the 
north and the Greeks in the north moved to the south. By this agreement, bi-
zonality was confirmed and endorsed as a UN parameter g]JUJQ.  
 
On February 12, 1977, the parties compromised sufficiently to agree on four 
points, the first and fourth of which were significant from a constitutional 
perspective. First, the parties agreed that Cyprus should be an independent, 
non-aligned, bi-communal, federal republic. Second, they settled that the 
powers and functions of the central federal government should safeguard the 
unity of the country while still having regard to the bi-communal character of 
the state (Dodd 1999: 2). The parameters agreed upon by the parties, and 
confirmed by the UN, were that Cyprus should be a bi-zonal (with regard to its 
territory), bi-communal (with regard to its constitution) federation governed 
by the principle of political equality. Since the late 1970s, all talks between the 
parties have taken place under the auspices of the United Nations and have 
aimed to achieve a solution within these parameters. 
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The principle of bi-communality has constitutional significance; under this 
principle, the constitution must acknowledge that the power and the 
competencies of the state are shared by the two communities 6|]HQE. 
Bi-zonality, on the other hand, is the territorial aspect of the negotiations. It 
DVVXPHV WKH ³FOHDU PDMRULW\ RI ODQG RZQHUVKLS DQG SRSXODWLRQ´ E\ *UHHN
Cypriots in the south and Turkish Cypriots in the north. It is envisioned that 
only a small percentage of Greek Cypriots would settle in the north and vice 
versa in order not to threaten the dominance of the Greek Cypriots in the south 
and Turkish Cypriots in the north (Interview 6 August 24, 2011). 
 
Although the parties agreed on the bi-communal, bi-zonal and federal 
character of the republic in the 1977 High Level Agreements, their definitions 
of federalism varied considerably. Whereas Greek Cypriots had in mind a 
federal structure akin to a unitary state, with a powerful central government, 
Turkish Cypriots argued for a confederal or two-state structure with a weak 
central government and strong constituent states. Both approaches were a long 
way from the bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal settlement promoted by the UN. 
Neither party changed its maximalist stance until the early 2000s. 
 
A comprehensive settlement plan that took into consideration the conflicting 
demands and concerns of the parties was not tabled by the UN until 2004. The 
Annan Plan was first introduced by the UN in 2002. It was revised several 
times and put to simultaneous referenda on both sides of the island in April 
2004. But while 65% of Turkish voters accepted the plan, 75% of Greek 
Cypriots rejected it. While the Turkish side had changed its position towards 
the acceptance of a federal settlement based on the UN parameters, the Greek 
Cypriot side continued to press for a unitary state, in which Turkish Cypriots 
would only be granted minority status. ³8QLWHG&\SUXV5HSXEOLF´DVSLFWXUHG
by the Greek Cypriots was a government owned by the Greek Cypriots and 
thus it was Cyprus represented by the Greek Cypriots that would accede to the 
EU on May 01, 2004. The Turkish Cypriots would only be incorporated to the 
already existing Greek Cypriot state as citizens having equal rights (Interview 
7 September 27, 2011). The Annan Plan, on the other hand, envisaged a 
compromise agreement that involved concessions on both sides. The Turkish 
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Cypriot approval and the Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan indicated that 
while Turkish Cypriots had renounced their maximalist ideal of setting up 
their own state on the island, the Greek Cypriot side was not keen to share 
power under a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. 
 
$QNDUD¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ ZDV D FUXFLDO PRYH WRZDUGV WKH
resolution of the conflict in Cyprus. Having previously espoused the 
maximalist position and sought confederation, Ankara changed its position in 
2002 and accepted the UN parameters. It has made sincere efforts to find a 
solution based on these parameters, playing a major part in the emergence of 
the Annan Plan and changing the dynamics of the Cyprus conflict. By this 
policy change, Ankara and Turkish Cypriots demonstrated that they were 
committed to finding a resolution, even if the settlement plan was entirely laid 
out by the UN (Interview 3 September 8, 2011). 
 
3. Literature Review on Cyprus 
 
The literature on Cyprus covers four main areas: the causes of the Cyprus 
conflict, conflict resolution in Cyprus, legal and constitutional aspects of the 
Cyprus question and the role of outside powers and institutions. Although all 
these research fields are broadly related to the subject of this thesis ± the post-
2002 change in Turkish foreign policy ± none of them directly tackles this 
issue. The following sections review the literature within these four areas, 
highlighting their relevance to the subject of this research. 
 
 3.1. Causes of the Cyprus Conflict 
 
The causes of the conflict are one of the most widely studied fields in research 
on Cyprus. The ethno-national tension (Bryant 2004; Papadakis et al. 2006; 
Bose 2007; Loizides 2007; Anastasiou 2008) aQG ERWK VLGHV¶ UHIXVDO WR
FRPSURPLVH<HúLODGDDQG6|]HQ3HULFOHRXVVWDQGRXWDVWKHPRVW
significant reasons for the Cyprus conflict.  
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Intense and protracted ethno-national tensions give rise to the most intractable 
political dissensions; ethno-national groups tend to view their interests and 
even their survival in zero-sum terms and as incompatible with the interests of 
other groups. This is exacerbated when one ethno-national group lays claim to 
sovereignty. In such cases, negotiation and compromise are difficult because 
the claims of one side are unacceptable to the other. The situation may be 
intensified where there has been ethno-national violence (Bose 2007: 1-2). 
 
The conflicting nationalist narratives in Cyprus emerged in the late 19th 
century as it changed from a religion-centred society under Ottoman rule into 
a society that saw itself in terms of ethnic groups. The arrival of modern, 
nationalist sensibilities helped fracture Cyprus. Both communities 
appropriated the ideas and materials of modernity to reinvent themselves and 
their concept of citizenship. Muslims and Christians were transformed into 
Turks and Greeks with distinct national identities, based on conflicting 
nationalist narratives (Bryant 2004: 15-6).  
 
The British colonial period (1878-1960) witnessed the rise of Greek and 
Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. This was not the usual story of European 
colonizers encountering a people without history; while Greek Cypriots, who 
sought enosis, viewed themselves as the creators of Western civilization, 
Turkish Cypriots, who wanted taksim, saw themselves as the heirs of the 
glorious Ottoman Empire. These mutually antagonistic identities came into 
conflict during the decolonization process and the founding of the republic in 
1960, leading to ethno-national violence. The problem with Cyprus was not 
the absence of history, but the overwhelming presence and influence of 
history, which was used by both sides to support their competing claims to 
sovereignty and statehood (Papadakis et al. 2006: 1-6 and 6-8). 
 
The Greek and Turkish Cypriot nationalist ideologies have undermined 
relations between the two communities. This dual nationalism has been 
engineered by leaders on both sides and fostered by the nationalist nature of 
the political culture (Anastasiou 2008: 8-9); ethnic differences are entrenched 
in the political parties, intellectuals and the press on both sides. Both ethnic 
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communities maintain political and cultural bonds with their respective 
motherlands, to which they feel a strong sense of nationalism and loyalty; they 
identify themselves as Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot, rather than simply 
Cypriot (Loizides 2007: 172-3). 
 
Scholars have pointed to the lack of cooperation between the two sides, 
showing how each has sought to achieve a unilateral victory at the expense of 
the other. The failure of the Annan Plan is ascribed to the emotionally charged 
Greek Cypriot mentality, which was anachronistic to European post-
nationalism and a direct consequence of the Grand Idea of Greek irredentism. 
By rejecting the plan, the Greek Cypriots demonstrated that they were 
incapable of adapting to the post-war transformation of Europe and the new 
European dream. The Greek Cypriot approach was based on an irredentist 
perception of the nation state values, which turned into a mainstream ideology 
that allowed no room for UHFRQFLOLDWLRQ ZLWK WKH LVODQG¶V RWKHU FRPPXQLW\
Unable to internalize the European paradigm, Greek Cypriots failed to make a 
politically sound evaluation of this ideology and its likely consequences. Had 
they relinquished their irredentist ambitions, it might have been possible to 
overcome the ethnic divisions of the past and reunite Cyprus. The island could 
have been an example of the European paradigm of unity in diversity, rather 
than a centre of friction (Pericleous 2009: 86). As it is, EU membership 
presents a major challenge in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus question. 
The entry of Greek Cypriots into the EU, without a settlement on the island, 
has only served to reinforce the Greek Cypriot strategy of non-cooperation 
<HúLODGDDQG6|]HQ-9).  
 
I would argue that the fundamental cause of the Cyprus discord is the 
adherence of both sides to ethno-national concepts of national identity. 
+RZHYHU ZKLOH WKH 7XUNLVK &\SULRWV¶ DSSURYDO RI XQLILFDWLRQ LQ $SULO 
seems to indicate a readiness to withdraw from this nationalist position, the 
Greek Cypriot leadership refuses to abandon its aspiration to unite the island 
under a unitary state. Turkish Cypriots have not just accepted the idea that the 
island should be unified under the UN parameters; in 2003, they brought to the 
presidency a solution-oriented leader to replace the nationalist President 
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'HQNWDú ZKR KDG VHUYHG IRU GHFDGHV 7KH DEDWHPHQW RI WKH QDWLRQDOLVW
mentality among Turkish Cypriots and the emergence of solution-oriented 
parties are both supported by the Turkish government and have facilitated the 
change in Turkish foreign policy.  
 
Examination of the causes of the Cyprus discord may shed light on how a 
settlement might be achieved. This issue is analysed in the next section. The 
current stalemate in Cyprus can only be overcome if Cypriots can move past 
the old concept of ethnic nationalism and internalize the culture of mutual 
coexistence seen in other European societies.  
 
 3.2. Conflict Resolution in Cyprus 
 
A number of scholars have focused on what type of settlement is best for 
Cyprus, with possible solutions ranging from federation to a two-state 
arrangement. While some scholars see bi-zonal, bi-communal federation as the 
RQO\YLDEOHVHWWOHPHQW/LMSKDUW6|]HQDQGg]HUVD\/RUGRVHWDO
2009; Trimikliniotis 2009), others argue that federation is not a good formula 
for Cyprus (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Khashman 1999; Fouskas and 
Tackie 2009). Instead, they proffer alternatives ranging from a Hellenic Greek 
Cypriot state (Fouskas and Tackie 2009) to a confederation or a two-state 
formula (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 2005; Bose 2007).  
 
Supporters of federation contend that the federal formula is viable in a deeply 
divided society if power is shared efficiently and group autonomy is protected. 
Power-sharing means that representatives from all key groups participate in 
the political decision-making, particularly at the executive level. Group 
autonomy ensures that these groups have the authority to run their own 
domestic affairs, notably in the areas of education and culture (Lijphart 2004: 
97-9). 
 
It is claimed that the majority of Cypriots are dissatisfied with the status quo 
and want a solution; research suggests that 81% of Greek and 74% of Turkish 
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Cypriots accept that a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation is the only viable 
settlement (Lordos et al. 2009: 11-2). It has been argued that the Annan Plan 
was for the most part a viable, functional and fair solution for both Cypriot 
communities. De facto or de jure partition or a majoritarian, unitary, non-
geographical consociation is not viable, and would be both costly and 
dangerous. For these reasons, it is argued, it makes more sense to use the 
Annan Plan as the foundation for the future negotiations on unification rather 
than to start from scratch (Trimikliniotis 2009: 107).  
 
Supporters of the Annan Plan argue that its vision of a loose bi-zonal, bi-
communal federation composed of two constituent states is the logical 
outcome of the principles and agreements that have been reached by the two 
parties and approved by the international community over the past four 
decades. Although such a settlement does not meet all the demands of either 
party and forces them to make compromises, it secures the fundamental needs 
of the two sides. 6|]HQDQGg]HUVD\DQG-9). 
 
Others question the feasibility and applicability of federalism for profoundly 
divided societies (Khashman 1999; Bose 2007; Emilianides 2009), arguing 
that federalism is not just a constitutional condition, but a social-psychological 
attitude on the part of the decision-makers. Maintenance of a federation hinges 
on the commitment and goodwill of the decision-makers and acceptance on 
the part of the common people, both of which are absent in Cyprus (Khashman 
1999: 2-3 and 6-7). The constitutional structure of the federation suggested in 
the Annan Plan is also criticized. It is contended that the plan was built on 
division and discrimination rather than democracy and the protection of 
fundamental rights, and that the emerging state would be unviable since it 
would lack constitutional guarantees to function properly with regard to the 
executive, the legislative and the judiciary (Emilianides 2009: 95). 
Accordingly, some authors propose splitting the hostile peoples into sovereign 
or at least autonomous territorial components. However, it is also argued that 
stability and coexistence in the most tumultuous parts of the world can only be 
sustained in the long run by soft frontiers and cross-border cooperation (Bose 
2007: 2-4). 
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Some scholars criticize the imperial, post-colonial arrangements that governed 
Cyprus from 1958-60 and offer a post-imperial constitutional model for the 
island (Fouskas and Tackie 2009). They argue that the constitution imposed on 
Cyprus by Britain was essentially dysfunctional, and that it enabled British 
and imperial powers to intervene in Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot 
disagreements and protect their interests ± effectively maintaining their 
imperial rule. These authors suggest that Cyprus can address the problem by 
opting out of the security constraints imposed by NATO and the Anglo-Saxon 
powers in the eastern Mediterranean, and by constructing a post-imperial 
solution based on island-wide economic cooperation and societal integration, 
rather than ethnic-political separatism. This solution should be engineered by 
Cypriots themselves (Fouskas and Tackie 2009: 1-7). 
 
Other authors propose a confederal or two-state settlement in the island 
(Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 2005). They argue that Cyprus should be 
split into two politically equal, sovereign states, each with the right of self-
determination. Any solution should be constructed on this reality. (Arsava 
1996: 49-51) Given the failure of the Republic of Cyprus, it is argued, any 
abiding resolution must be based on political and constitutional equality 
between the two communities (Bartmann 1999: 6-7). Critics of the federal 
model envisioned in the Annan Plan argue that in this type of state, the smaller 
community is the minority within a majority voting system. In the absence of 
any other interest group, there would be nothing to counteract the Greek 
&\SULRWPDMRULW\¶VGRPLQDWLRQRI WKH OHJLVODWXUH RU WKH executive ± violating 
the UN principle of political equality between the parties (Dodd 2005: 50-1). 
 
3.3. Legal and Constitutional Aspects of the Cyprus Question 
 
While a number of scholars have chosen to concentrate on the legal status of 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; 
Hoffmeister 2006; Geldenhuys 2009), others have examined the legal and 
constitutional features of the Republic of Cyprus, ranging from the 1959-60 
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agreements to the AnQDQ 3ODQ 6|]HQ  +RIIPHLVWHU  6|]HQ DQG
g]HUVD\ 
 
While some contest the statehood of the TRNC (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; 
Hoffmeister 2006; Geldenhuys 2009), others focus on its legality (Hoffmeister 
2006), and others on its independence (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 1999; Dodd 
2005). Those contesting its statehood argue that it fails to meet Western 
standards of governance and violates prevailing international norms. States of 
this kind may function for several years, but such unilateral bids for 
recognition are seldom successful in the long term. They may even have 
destabilizing HIIHFWVDFURVVWKHUHJLRQ(YHQZKHUHDSURVSHFWLYHVWDWH¶VFODLP
to statehood is recognized in principle, translating this conceded right into 
political reality may be problematic if there is significant opposition from 
other countries. There may even be attempts to keep such states outside the 
international mainstream. Trapped in limbo by their ambiguous status, 
unrecognized states face an uncertain political future. (Geldenhuys 2009: 1-4). 
 
It has been argued that when Cyprus was decolonized in the 1960s, the UN 
charter extended the right of self-determination to the population as a whole, 
not to Greek and Turkish Cypriots separately. Nor are Greek Cypriots entitled 
to self-determination on the basis of their numerical majority as claimed by the 
Greek Cypriots. (Interview 5 September 29, 2011) Since neither side has the 
right to separate self-determination, decisions can only be made with the 
approval of the majority within each ethnic group. Thus, the Greek Cypriot 
petition to the UN for enosis in 1960 was illegal since it was not backed by the 
majority of Turkish Cypriots. It is also contended that the TRNC was not a 
founder -lacking a legitimate political status - in the establishment of the 
United Republic of Cyprus (URC), which was not abolished in the Annan 
3ODQ)RUWKLVUHDVRQWKHLVODQG¶VIXWXUHOLHVZLWKWKH85&as an independent 
and sovereign state with a single international legal personality (Hoffmeister 
2006: 7-9 and 193). 
 
Those who see the TRNC as an independent state (Arsava 1996; Bartmann 
1999) assert that it has everything a state should have: a society, country, 
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sovereignty and all the required institutions. As per international law, 
recognition is not necessary to the formation of a state. These authors argue 
that Cyprus is in effect already split into two separate sovereign states; the 
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities are politically equal and 
enjoy separate rights of self-determination (Arsava 1996: 49-51). The failure 
of the Republic of Cyprus is ascribed to the growing inter-communal violence 
and the gradual expulsion of Turkish Cypriots from government, particularly 
between 1963 and 1974. Some authors even argue that Greek Cypriots lost 
their right to a republic when they recast Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic 
minority in the new state rather than their partners in nation-building. 
According to these authors, any abiding resolution in Cyprus must be based on 
political and constitutional equality between the two communities (Bartmann 
1999: 6-7). 
 
Another group of authors have examined the legal and constitutional features 
of the power-sharing mechanisms in Cyprus, from the 1960 Constitution to the 
$QQDQ3ODQ6|]HQ+RIIPHLVWHU6|]HQDQGg]HUVD\7KH\
distinguish between the 1959 Zurich and London agreements, which were 
based on a non-territorial federative structure, and the Annan Plan, which 
visualized a territorial federative/confederative structure composed of two 
constituent states with a single international legal personality and sovereignty. 
The Annan Plan granted each community a high level of autonomy (even 
semi-sovereignty) within its respective boundaries. 6|]HQ-5). These 
authors argue that the central legal question of the Cyprus discord is whether a 
new Republic of Cyprus should be a continuation of the existing state or 
whether it should become the successor of two predecessor states, the TRNC 
and the Greek Cypriot state, as envisioned in the Annan Plan 6|]HQ DQG
g]HUVD\-9). They point out that the original legal documents (1959-
60) establishing the Republic of Cyprus also envisioned a federation and did 
not grant either community the right of self-determination.(Hoffmeister 2006: 
7-9 and 193).  
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3.4. The Role of Outside Powers and Institutions in Cyprus 
 
A number of scholars have explored the role played by international 
organizations in attempts to resolve the Cyprus disagreement. It is maintained 
that Cyprus conflict can be analyzed within the context of three intertwined 
circles. In the first circle, there are the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the 
second one, there are two homelands, Greece and Turkey. In the outer circle, 
there are significant external actors, which cannot be overlooked in the case of 
strategically located Cyprus (Interview 8 July 29, 2011). Thus, its resolution 
lies not only in a reconciliation of interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
but also in a strategic reformulation of the foreign policy objectives and 
priorities of the actors involved 0IWOHU%Do. Authors focus on 
the roles played by the UN (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 2001; E. Aksu 2003; 
Palley 2005; Yakinthou 2009), the EU (Diez 2002; Christou 2004; Tocci 
2004; Hannay 2005; Sepos 2008; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009) and other 
DFWRUV <HúLODGD DQG 6|]HQ  3HULFOHRXV  0RUJDQ  *UHDWHU
WKLUGSDUW\LQYROYHPHQWLVVHHQDVHVVHQWLDO<HúLODGDDQG6|]HQ+DQQD\
2005; Bose 2007; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009) to overcoming the 
bitterness and mistrust between the parties and any interference from those 
with a vested interest in ensuring hostilities continue (Bose 2007: 2-4).  
 
Some have focused on the role of the UN in the Cyprus discord (Richmond 
and Ker-Lindsay 2001; E. Aksu 2003; Palley 2005; Yakinthou 2009). The UN 
6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶VRIIHU WR FRQGXFW D VR-FDOOHG ³JRRGRIILFHV´PLVVLRQZDV
accepted by both communities on the island and endorsed by the Security 
Council. This involved him facilitating discussions between the disputant 
parties, although neither group would countenance until 2002 anything more 
than this since they believe that no outsider can judge their best interests. It 
has been argued that in the run up to the elaboration of the Annan Plan, the 
UN Secretariat exceeded the proper limits of its mission (particularly in late 
2002, early 2003 and March 2004) by attempting to arbitrate between the 
parties, rather than impartially aiding them to attain a resolution of their own 
(Palley 2005: 5-6 and 10-2). Thus, UN intervention in Cyprus can only extend 
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VRIDUDVWKHSDUWLHV¶FRQVHQWDQGLWVRZQSULQFLSOHRIQHXWUDOLW\DOORZ(E. Aksu 
2003: 148-50).  
 
Other scholars impute the failure of previous settlement attempts to the 
inadequacy of UN diplomacy, which, they argue, has not addressed the 
LVODQG¶V GHHS-seated political and ethnic divisions 7KH 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO¶V
good offices mission was ill-equipped to unravel intractable local and regional 
animosities, constrained as it was by both inside and outside interests and the 
inevitable politicization of the talks. Indeed, it has been suggested that the UN 
should eschew addressing political issues such as matters of sovereignty and 
territory, which it finds difficult to deal with (Richmond and Ker-Lindsay 
2001: xviii-xix). Critics of the UN cite its mistaken and unfair treatment of 
Cyprus, particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 541 (1983), 
which after the declaration of the TRNC urged member states not to recognize 
and offer aid to the new state and which recognized Greek Cypriots as the only 
representative of the Republic of Cyprus and denied Turkish Cypriots any 
formal status in their own state. This is seen by some as pivotal moment; the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots by the UN deprived them of any legitimate 
power to offset the Greek Cypriot position at the international level and 
removed any incentive for Greek Cypriots to come to terms with the other side 
(Yakinthou 2009: 172). In this sense, there are very few incentives for the 
Greek Cypriots to bargain over the reunification of the island with the northern 
part, which it claims as its own, but occupied and controlled by Turkey 
(Rotberg 2009: 246).   
 
Since Cyprus joined the EU, a number of authors have focused on the effect 
this organization has had on the dynamics of the Cyprus question (Diez 2002; 
Christou 2004; Tocci 2004; Hannay 2005; Sepos 2008; Anastasiou 2008; 
Michalis 2009). It has been suggested that the Cyprus dispute will only be 
settled when the island transforms itself into a post-modern society and adopts 
a political arrangement that transcends its historical insecurities. Cypriots have 
to move on from their past and create their own history. In this sense, the EU 
is regarded as a post-nationalist society for the creation of a similar model in 
Cyprus. 0LFKiOLV-4 and 206). Diez, for example, in 2002 suggested 
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that EU could bring about a solution in Cyprus by the prospect of EU 
membership and concomitant ideational transformation towards a post-
natLRQDOLVWVRFLHW\RU³SRVWPRGHUQLVDWLRQ´RILGHQWLWLHV, which is the only way 
for a just and peaceful settlement in Cyprus (Diez 2002: 12-3). 
 
It is claimed that the EU could help bring about an enduring solution in 
Cyprus by fostering the post-modernization of its identities and politics (Diez 
2002). Not just Cyprus, but also Greece and Turkey might be transformed by 
Europeanization and globalization. There are those who contend that the entry 
of Cyprus into the EU guarantees the emergence of a multi-ethnic, democratic 
structure and political process on the island. Within the EU framework, they 
argue, the Cyprus issue might be revisited outside the confines of nationalist 
discourse (Anastasiou 2008: 208). 
   
Within such a scenario, any settlement in Cyprus would depend on what 
incentives and conditions the EU offered to the two communities on the island 
DQG WR 7XUNH\ 7KH (8¶V LQFRQVLVWHQW DQG DPELYDOHQW DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV
Turkey¶V PHPEHUVKLS KDG eroded its credibility in that country, but the 
unification of Cyprus reawakened the desire in Turkey to join the EU and 
catalyse the transformation of the Turkish state and society. Unification would 
DOVR HQKDQFH WKH (8¶V FUHGLELOLW\ DV D ³VRIW VHFXULW\´ SURYLGHU DW WKH JOREDO
scale, since it might be seen as evidence of an influence that extends beyond 
WKH XQLRQ¶V ERUGHUV (Christou 2004: 183-4 and 86-7). It has also been 
suggested that the EU can play a constructive role in the resolution of the 
FRQIOLFW E\ DFFHSWLQJ 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS DQG SURPRWLQJ WKH HQWU\ RI
Turkish Cypriots into the union (Hannay 2005: 50-1 and 236-8). 
 
In the event, the EU was unable to sway Greek Cypriots from their nationalist 
position and Cyprus subsequently SOD\HGDVWUDWHJLFUROHLQEORFNLQJ7XUNH\¶V
accession, initially through Greece and subsequently as a member in its own 
right by using its veto power (Sepos 2008: 149-51) 7KH (8¶V IDLOXUH LQ
Cyprus has been ascribed by some authors to its inability to grasp the 
complicated make-up of the parties concerned; having fundamentally different 
objectives, what are incentives for some players become disincentives for 
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others. The EU accession framework was unable to offer significant incentives 
for a settlement that addressed the basic interests of both principal parties. Any 
such settlement would have to be based on inclusive, multi-system governance 
with shared sovereignty, permeable borders, secured freedoms and protected 
cultural and historical properties (Tocci 2004: 2-3).  
 
Tocci also claimed that the manner and timing with which EU membership 
was promised to the Republic of Cyprus limited any chance the EU might 
have had of solving the discord, and in fact, had unforeseen negative 
consequences (Tocci 2007: 39-40). By granting Greek Cypriots EU 
membership in the absence of a settlement and treating them as the sole 
representatives of Cyprus, the EU swung the power balance in the Greek 
&\SULRWV¶ IDYRXU DQG KDUPHG DQ\ FKDQFHV RI D VHWWOHPHQW 7KH (8 ORVW LWV
leverage with Greek Cypriots in the run up to the Annan Plan. While it created 
incentives for solution on one side, it disincentivized the other (Yakinthou 
2009: 172).  
 
In addition to the UN and the EU, some scholars have focused on the role 
played by other actors in the Cyprus conflict <HúLODGD DQG 6|]HQ 
Pericleous 2009; Morgan 2010). The main players were the US along with the 
EU, Greece and Turkey. Some authors saw the process as being related to the 
86¶VRYHUKDXORILWVIRUHLJQSROLF\UHVSRQGLQJWRGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKH0LGGOH
East, it attempted to protect Eurasian energy resources and counteract the 
unfavourable effects of Islamic fundamentalism. Turkey was at the centre of 
such planning. These authors argue that as the Kemalist establishment 
declined, the power balance shifted in Turkey, threatening domestic and even 
regional instability and posing a potential risk to Western interests in the 
region. Against this background, the settlement of the dispute and the 
normalization of relations between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus within the 
European paradigm would have taken on a global significance (Pericleous 
2009: 21-2). Some scholars even propose that there should be greater US 
involvement to overcome the stalemate, arguing that an effective third party 
would have been crucial for coordinating the initiatives of the UN and the EU. 
The US, which has substantial influence over Greece and Turkey, and 
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therefore on both Cypriot parties, is best placed to fill the role of mediator 
<HúLODGDDQG6|]HQ-9). 
 
Those who have examined British history on the island argue that British 
colonial governance has been partly to blame for the failure to find a solution 
in Cyprus. The British are criticized for their failure to engage with the 
Cypriots, their lack of understanding of Cypriot identity and the low quality of 
most of the British colonial governors. The exclusion of Cypriots from 
democratic political participation from 1931 onwards meant that, post-
independence, there was no tradition of bi-communal consensus politics on the 
island. The British policy robbed subsequent Cypriot generations of the 
political leadership and experience they needed to make the 1960 Constitution 
function. Nor has there ever been just one Cypriot culture. This ambiguity as 
regards the Cypriot identity has trickled down to Cypriots themselves; some 
arguing, for example that few islanders refer to themselves as Cypriots without 
the Greek or Turkish prefix (Morgan 2010: 256-7). Morgan went on to suggest 
tKDW WKHHOXVLYHFRQFHSWRI³&\SULRWQHVV´had to be more deeply rooted if an 
integrated Cypriot community was to be generated. This insecurity leads 
Cypriots themselves to believe that the Cyprus disagreement will ultimately be 
settled through outside intervention (Morgan 2010: 256-7). 
 
Turkey played a crucial role in working up the Annan Plan into an agreement, 
alongside the US, EU and UN following the change of leadership in Ankara. 
Many have argued, however, that a solution in the island required greater 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LQYROYHPHQW <HúLODGD DQG 6|]HQ  +DQQD\  %RVH
2007; Anastasiou 2008; Michalis 2009). Insofar as the Cypriot parties could 
not reach a solution alone, the Turkish government repeatedly asked for 
greater UN engagement after 2002 and gave the UN the authority to arbitrate 
JRLQJEH\RQG WKHSRZHURIJRRGRIILFHV ,QGHHG LWZDV$QNDUD¶V LQLWLDWLYH
that rendered the emergence of the Annan Plan possible. 
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CHAPTER II: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL 
AND TOWARDS CYPRUS IN PARTICULAR 
 
This chapter considers four main themes that are related to my research topic: 
the determinants of Turkish foreign policy from the 1990s onwards; literature 
related to Turkish foreign policy in general; Turkish foreign policy towards 
Cyprus from the 1VRQZDUGVDQGWKHUHDVRQVIRU7XUNH\¶VSROLF\FKDQJH
on Cyprus. In the second part of this chapter, after briefly examining the 
Turkish foreign policy at the period of interest (1990s and post-2001), I 
continued with the Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus during the same 
period. In the case of 1950s, between 1960 and 1980, and 1980s, I merged 
7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DQG 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ DV GXULQJ WKLV SHULRG
Turkish foreign policy was in large measure dominated by the Cyprus conflict.  
 
1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
1.1. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in General 
 
The literature identifies four key factors that have shaped Turkish foreign 
policy. The most important of these are its Western orientation (Oran 1996 
and 2010; Soysal 2004; Oran 2010) and anti-revisionism (Deringil 1989; Oran 
1996 and 2010; Hale 2000; Onar 2009). Also highlighted are the impact of 
$WDWUN (Cooper 2002; Stone 2004) DQG 7XUNH\¶V 2WWRPDQ OHJDF\ 5RELQV
$KPDG)XOOHU,OJÕWDQGg]NHoHFL-Taner 2012).  
 
7XUNH\¶V:HVWHUQLVPLVVHHQLQLWVFRPPLWPHQWWRFDSLWDOLVPVHFXODULVPDQG
democracy, while its anti-revisionism is expressed in its adherence to the 
status quo in international politics and to current international borders (Oran 
1996: 353-4). Despite the problematic relations between Turkey and the EU, 
7XUNH\¶V GHVLUH WR MRLQ WKH (8 LV XQOLNHO\ WR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V FROOHFWLYH
defence engagements, foreign trade connections and long-standing cultural 
and social bonds with the West render a change in orientation unlikely (Soysal 
2004: 44).  
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7KHFRXQWU\¶VDQWL-revisionism was illustrated at the formation of the Republic 
in 1923 when it abandoned the expansionism, irredentism and universalism 
associated with Ottomanism, while also refusing to embrace pan-Islamism or 
pan-Turkism (Fisher Onar 2009: 232). It has been suggested that anti-
revisionLVPWRRNURRWLQ7XUNLVKIRUHLJQSROLF\IROORZLQJWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHIHDW
in World War I (Hale 2000: 57-8) and was prompted by $WDWUN¶V GLFWXP
³SHDFH DWKRPHSHDFHLQWKHZRUOG´7KHSULPDU\REMHFWLYHRI7XUNLVKOHDGHUV
being the survival and continuity of Turkey as a sovereign independent state, 
they were careful to eschew any form of adventurism in their foreign policy 
(Deringil 1989: 3).  
 
$WDWUN WKH IRXQGHU RI PRGHUQ 7XUNH\ UHPDLQV D VLJQLILFDQW LQIOXHQFH RQ
7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ $GKHUHQFH WR $WDWUN¶V OHJDF\ LV HYLGHQW LQ ERWK
domestic and external political spheres (Cooper 2002: 122). His principles of 
non-expansionism, non-imperialism, non-adventurism, non-chauvinism, non-
revanchism and legality remain the basic norms shaping Turkish foreign 
policy (Stone 2004: 2-3). 
 
A number of authors have underlined the role of history ± specifically 
7XUNH\¶V2WWRPDQKHULWDJH± DVDGHWHUPLQDQWLQ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\7he 
abortive Sevres Treaty of August 1920 continues to influence Turkish policy-
making. The Treaty of Sevres, which was signed by the Ottoman Sultan, left 
the majority Turkish-Muslim population of Anatolia with a rump state in the 
centre of Anatolia. Although the treaty was never enacted, the fear it 
engendered continued to shape Turkish foreign policy, particularly after the 
end of the Cold War (Ahmad 2004: 9). 
 
The death, destruction and impoverishment brought by the defeat in the First 
World War were followed by the occupation of the imperial capital and the 
GLYLVLRQDQGVXEMXJDWLRQRI WKHHPSLUH2QO\WKHOHDGHUVKLSRI$WDWUNVDYHG
Turkey from extinction. The legacy of this period is still evident in the 
FRQWLQXLQJ UHYHUHQFH IRU$WDWUNDQGDQDWLRQDOFRQYLFWLRQ WKDW7XUNH\PXVW
be self-UHOLDQW 0DQ\ 7XUNV EHOLHYH WKDW 6HYUHV EHWUD\HG :HVWHUQ (XURSH¶V
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real intentions towards Turkey (Robins 2003: 104-5). Indeed, the Kemalist 
elite believed that no other state can be trusted and that Turkey has to be ready 
to fight for its territorial integrity at any given time. Kemalist circles still 
largely view the world from this perspective of endangerment ,OJÕW DQG
g]NHoHFL-Taner 2012: 15). 
 
I agree with the authors who argue that Western-orientation and anti-
revisionism remain the paramount principles of Turkish foreign policy. 
$WDWUN¶V SULQFLSOHV RI QRQ-expansionism, non-irredentism, Westernism and 
non-imperialism have had an undeniable impact on Turkish foreign policy, 
having been followed by Turkish rulers up until the 1990s. Indeed, this thesis 
shows that these principles have played a role in Turkish foreign policy 
towards Cyprus. However, as the following sections show, the Ottoman 
legacy, particularly Ottoman suffering under Western capitalism and the 
Sqvres fear of dismemberment have also had a lasting impact on the foreign 
policy behaviour of the Turkish elite (Ahmad 2004: 9). This was particularly 
evident in the EU-VFHSWLF FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V -2002) inability to 
devise a new pragmatic policy on Cyprus by sticking to a confederal solution 
on Cyprus due to their fear of loss of territory. 
 
1.2.  Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy between 1990-2001 
 
It is underlined in the literature that the end of the Cold War had wide-ranging 
repercussions on world politics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new 
³ZRUOGGLVRUGHU´DURVHDVFRXQWULHVIURPWKH%DONDQVWR&HQWUDO$VLDDQGWKH
Middle East descended into ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and 
terrorism. Turkey, sitting at the centre of these unstable regions, faced 
numerous challenges. The period in the aftermath of Cold-War until the 9/11 
incident has been a re-adjustment proFHVV IRU 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DQG D
search for a new international role in a changing world.  *|]HQ-32). 
 
:LWK WKH IDOO RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ 7XUNH\¶V UHJLRQDO ZHLJKW ZDV LQLWLDOO\
bolstered. To the north, the Soviet Union disappeared, to be replaced by the 
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weaker countries of the Caucasus. Soviet satellites in the Balkans broke free, 
and Greece became mired in problems with Albania and Macedonia. In the 
Middle East, Iran struggled to regain stability after its destructive war with 
Iraq, in 1990-1 Gulf War and Syria remained without a protector. Turkey was 
able to relax, though as it turned out, not for long (Oran 2010: 359-60). Old 
ethnic and nationalist conflicts, long frozen by the Cold War, soon resurfaced. 
Multi-ethnic countries like Yugoslavia began to crumble and Turkey found 
itself surrounded by growing instability in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the 
Middle East (Buzan 2001: 3). 
 
In the 1990s, Turkey entered its post-$WDWUN SHULRG 8S XQWLO WKLV SRLQW
7XUNH\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO LVRODWLRQLVW-oriented policy and its cardinal principle of 
restricted international engagement had remained intact, but against the 
background of growing regional tension, they were no longer adequate. 
Turkish foreign policy traditionally favoured adherence to the status quo, but 
the regional status quo was changing, and the country was forced to expand 
and diversify its foreign policy to address the new instabilities. (Buzan 2001: 
3). It adopted a pragmatic approach based on multilateral cooperation and 
alliances with Europe and the United States. Continuing its tradition of 
circumspection, it retained its policy of non-expansion and made no attempt to 
establish a monopolistic zone of influence (Kut 2001: 9-11). 
  
While anti-revisionism and Westernism remained the cardinal principles of 
Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s, growing international instability forced 
Ankara to become more assertive about protecting Turkish interests. However, 
this new activism was not reflected in its Cyprus policy; Ankara continued to 
stick to its traditional policy, which aimed for a confederal structure on the 
island. This was because the coalition governments that ruled Turkey in the 
1990s stuck to the old security oriented standpoint in foreign policy and 
Cyprus was seen as a national cause on which no concessions could be made.  
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1.3. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy from the Early 
2000s to Date 
 
The literature focuses on a number of key areas: a first group of scholars have 
underlined the effect of democratization, liberalization and globalization on 
7XUNLVKIRUHLJQSROLF\7RFFL$UDV*g]FDQ.|VHEDODEDQ
2011; B. Park 2012); a second group have focused on the foreign policy vision 
RIWKHQHZOHDGHUVKLSLQ7XUNH\5DEDVDDQG/DUUDEHH'DYXWR÷OX
0g]FDQDQG8VXO6|]HQa) and a third group have discussed the 
impact of Europeanization in Turkey since 1999 (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; 
.LULúoL$UDV7KHGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQDQG(XURSHDQL]DWLRQSURFHVVHV
in the Turkish context go hand in hand. 
 
Authors considering the impact of democratization, liberalization and 
JOREDOL]DWLRQ7RFFL$UDV*g]FDQ.|VHEDOaban 2011; B. 
Park 2012) argue that foreign policy under the AKP is built on the principle of 
liberalism and use of economic relations to achieve its objectives. The populist 
and progressive forces which support the AKP seek to expand their economic 
power and to undermine the monolithic power structure. By empowering the 
non-establishment societal components, globalization and the associated 
SURFHVVRIOLEHUDOL]DWLRQKDYHFRQVLGHUDEO\ZHDNHQHGWKHFHQWUH¶VSRZHUEDVH
in Turkey and undermined the privileged status of the Westernist elite 
.|VHEDODEDQ  -4). It has been argued that Turkey has made 
considerable strides towards modernity with its growing civil society, the 
formation of a diaspora of Turks living abroad, expanding media and 
communications, ongoing democratization and greater integration into the 
global economy (B. Park 2012: 5-6). 
 
7KHVHVFKRODUVPDLQWDLQWKDW7XUNH\¶VGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQDQGPRGHUQL]DWLRQDUH
motivated predominantly by endogenous factors: the Turkish themselves have 
increasingly come to question the validity of Kemalism in the 21st century. 
The changes in Turkish society may have coincided with the beginning of its 
accession into the EU, but many Turkish actors are arguing that the country 
should accept the Copenhagen criteria for its own sake, not just to meet the 
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demands of the EU. This internal change is evidence of the ongoing evolution 
of the Turkish nation-state (Tocci 2005: 82). 
 
7KHVH UHVHDUFKHUV FRQWHQG WKDW 7XUNH\¶V GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ KDV HQKDQFHG LWV
strategic merit in the eyes of the Western world, especially since the 9/11 
attacks, which were seen as originating from the radical regimes of the Middle 
East. Not only is Turkey strategically located, it is also seen as a model for the 
Middle East and Central Asian Turkic republics 6|QPH]R÷OX  -9). 
Since the September 11 attacks against the US, the democratic-liberal 
transformation and globalization of the Middle Eastern countries has become a 
priority for the US. The failure of the globalization process in nearly all of 
these countries has made Turkey even more important in the eyes of the West 
as a shining example of a Muslim state with a Western orientation, able to 
combine a functioning democracy and modernization programme with a 
traditional Muslim population 2÷X]OX-90). 
 
$VHFRQGJURXSRIVFKRODUVKDYHGLVFXVVHG WKHUROHSOD\HGE\7XUNH\¶VQHZ
leadership in the development of its foreign policy (Rabasa and Larrabee 
0g]FDQDQG8VXO'DYXWR÷OX7KHVHDXWKRUV contend that 
while the AKP government has been NHHQ WR PDLQWDLQ 7XUNH\¶V :HVWHUQ
orientation as one of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy, it at the same 
time has aimed WRGHHSHQDQGEURDGHQ$QNDUD¶VERQGVZLWKWKH0LGGOH(DVW
Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Balkans. This is in accordance with the 
$.3¶V GRFWULQH RI ³VWUDWHJLF GHSWK´ RU WKH EHOLHI WKDW 7XUNH\¶V VWUDWHJLF
position and its control of the Bosphorus enable it to play a significant 
international role ('DYXWR÷OX The strategic depth concept is informed 
E\7XUNH\¶V2WWRPDQSDVW DQG LWV KLVWRULFDO DQGFXOWXUDO WLHV WR WKH%DONDQV
WKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG&HQWUDO$VLD7XUNH\¶VVWUDWHJLFGHSWKHQDEOHVLWWRSOD\D
regional power role and to establish multiple alliances, which serve to 
FRXQWHUEDODQFH $QNDUD¶V WLHV ZLWK WKH :HVW DQG JLYH LW JUHDWHU IUHHGRP RI
action (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008: 75-6). 
 
DaYXWR÷OX LV JHQHUDOO\ FUHGLWHG DV WKH LQYHQWRU RI VWUDWHJLF GHSWK DQG WKH
DUFKLWHFWRI$.3¶VQHZ IRUHLJQSROLF\ DQG WKXV WKHPRVW LQIOXHQWLDO IRUHLJQ
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PLQLVWHULQWKHFRXQWU\¶VKLVWRU\0g]FDQDQG8VXO-9 and 23). He 
identified six guiding principles underlying the new Turkish foreign policy. 
The first is the need to balance security and freedom; freedoms should not be 
sacrificed for security, but nor should they be allowed to lead to chaos. The 
second is the need to avoid problems with neighbouring countries; this is 
achieved by cultivating good relations with them, minimizing security risks 
and maximizing joint interests. The third principle is to pursue proactive 
engagement and preventive diplomacy. The belief is that high-level political 
dialogue, economic interdependence, a common approach to security and 
mutual tolerance will help secure regional stability. The fourth principle is to 
establish balanced and systematic relations with all global powers, while the 
ILIWKLVWRSOD\DQDFWLYHLQWHUQDWLRQDOUROH)LQDOO\7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLcy is 
JXLGHGE\DGHVLUH WR FKDQJH WKHFRXQWU\¶V LPDJHRQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDJH
Seen as a hard power throughout the Cold War, it now wishes to be viewed as 
a rising economic power, culturally inclusive and a source of military security 
'DYXWR÷OX.  
 
The third group of scholars have underlined the impact of Europeanization 
VLQFH7HU]L.DOLEHU.LULúoL$UDV7KH\FRQWHQG
that considerable legal, political and economic reforms have been undertaken 
by Turkey in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria. As the country has 
transformed internally, political attitudes have changed, as have its perceptions 
of who it sees as friends and enemies. Internal transformation, and changing 
attitudes to other countries in the region, have begun to reshape the foreign 
policy preferences of policy-makers. Both they and the public have begun to 
see their environment through new eyes and to remember past relationships 
and cultural and civilizational affinities. They are now keen to explore 
opportunities for engagement in these regions. The foreign policy elite is 
focused on making Turkey an effective player from Africa to the Far East 
(Aras 2009: 30-5). 
 
7KHVHDFDGHPLFVPDLQWDLQWKDW7XUNH\¶VWUDGLWLRQDOIRUHLJQSROLF\UKHWRULFZDV
³UHDOLVW´LQRXWORRNDQGEXLOWRQWKHFRQFHSWVRIQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWDQGPLOLWDU\
power, particularly in the 1990s. Since 1999 and the onset of the 
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Europeanization process, however, the foreign policy elite has changed its 
thinking, and Turkey now positions itself as a soft power. In this sense, the EU 
has transformed Turkish foreign policy-makers through the process of social 
learning, identity construction and norm internalization. Having initially 
affected the behaviours of policy-makers, the Europeanization process has 
gone on to influence their perceptions and thinking (Terzi 2010: 1 and 5). 
 
Although democratization, liberalization and globalization (Tocci 2005; Aras 
*g]FDQ.|VHEDODEDQ%3Drk 2012) and Europeanization 
7HU]L  .DOLEHU  .LULúoL  $UDV  DUH VLJQLILFDQW
determinants, I agree with those who suggest that the most significant factor 
has been the foreign policy vision of the new leadership (Rabasa and Larrabee 
200'DYXWR÷OX0g]FDQDQG8VXO:LWKRXWDQHZOHDGHUVKLS
with a new outlook on foreign affairs, a policy change would not have come 
DERXW 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ DQG GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ ZRXOG QRW
automatically have brought about a new foreign policy on Cyprus. Had this 
been the case, the coalition government would have abandoned its traditional, 
security-oriented line on Cyprus.  
 
'HVSLWHWKHHVVHQWLDOUROHSOD\HGE\WKH(8LQDOWHULQJ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\
under the AKP government, it had had no impact on the previous coalition 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V&\SUXVSROLF\$SROLF\VKLIWZDVRQO\SRVVLEOHZLWKWKHDUULYDO
in power of the AKP leadership. While the social learning, identity 
construction and norm internalization aspects of the Europeanization process 
(Terzi 2005) may offer an attractive explanation for the change in policy on 
Cyprus, it should be noted that their effect was not automatic. Social learning 
PD\ DFFRXQW IRU WKH $.3¶V QHZ &\SUXV SROLF\ EXW LW KDG QR HIIHFW RQ WKe 
previous coalition government, which had a sceptical attitude towards the EU. 
The AKP government, emerging as it was against a background of policy 
failure and ideational transformation, was receptive to such social learning. In 
contrast, the coalition government, whose thinking was conditioned by 
historical and institutional setting, was unable to conceive of a new Cyprus 
SROLF\:HPD\FRQFOXGHWKHQWKDW WKHFUXFLDO IDFWRULQ7XUNH\¶VQHZSROLF\
was the new leadership and the EU. 
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2. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Cyprus 
 
This section focuses on 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\VLQFHWKHV,WLVGLYLGHG
into four sub-VHFWLRQV 7KHVH DUH 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ LQ WKH V
7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ EHWZHHQ  DQG  7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ LQ
WKHVDQG7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\DIWHU 
 
2.1. The EmeUJHQFHRIWKH&\SUXV4XHVWLRQDQG7XUNH\¶V
Cyprus Policy in the 1950s 
 
The Ottoman Empire conquered Cyprus in 1571 and ruled the island until 
1878. In the 1877-8 Russian-Ottoman war, Russians occupied large sections of 
Ottoman territory in the Balkans and eastern Anatolia. Under the Treaty of 
Berlin, signed in June 1878, Britain received Cyprus from the Ottomans in 
exchange for its promise to support them against the Russian Empire 
dHWLQVD\D-8). 
 
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne represented international recognition of the 
Republic of Turkey. According to the treaty, the Ottomans officially ceded 
sovereignty to Britain on Cyprus. The treaty sought to balance the interests of 
Greece and Turkey around the Aegean by prescribing the de-militarization of 
the Aegean islands close to the Turkish coast and the exchange of the Greek 
population in Turkey and the Turkish population in Greece. The equilibrium 
established by the treaty lasted in Cyprus until the mid-1950s (Soysal 2004: 
42). 
 
The Cyprus problem began to emerge when British colonial rule on the island 
started to fall apart in the mid-1950s. At the Tripartite Conference, held jointly 
with Britain and Greece from August 29 to September 7, 1955, $QNDUD¶V
initial reaction was to advocate the continuation of the status quo (i.e. British 
colonial rule). Otherwise, Ankara argued, the island must be returned to its 
previous owner, which was Turkey (Interview 10 August 26, 2011).  
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When Britain was defeated in the Suez operation in 1956, it lost its status as 
the ultimate power in the Middle East to the United States. It no longer needed 
Cyprus as a colony but wished to retain military bases on the island. Among a 
number of possible solutions was the partition of the island, which was 
embraced by Ankara as a policy on December 28, 1956 and announced in the 
Turkish parliament by Prime Minister Menderes. Britain proposed several 
plans, all of which were rejected ± it seemed that a solution was becoming 
increasingly elusive )ÕUDWE-1). Finally, the US, fearing the outbreak 
of a conflict between its two NATO allies, got involved. Wanting to avoid a 
tussle in the eastern flank of NATO between Greece and Turkey and to 
preserve the integrity of the alliance, it set forth the independence formula for 
Cyprus (Interview 11 September 16, 2011). 
 
On the cusp of the Cold War, Greece and Turkey were not in a position to 
resist American pressure, and an agreement was reached at the Zurich 
conference of February 6-11, 1959. A deal was signed at the London 
conference on February 19, 1959, and on December 19, 1959, Britain agreed 
to grant the right of self-determination to Cyprus. 7KH86DQG%ULWDLQ¶VGHVLUH
to maintain stability in the southern flank of NATO at this high point of the 
Cold War pushed them to seek a solution on the island. The result was the 
1959 and 1960 treaties that founded the Republic of Cyprus. The treaties 
provided a power-sharing mechanism for the Greek and Turkish communities 
on the island, but while Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots were satisfied, the 
Greek side was unhappy with the agreements, which fell short of their aim ± to 
set up a unitary state 7UNHú  -60). During this period, Ankara 
FKDQJHG LWV LQLWLDO VWDQFH RI ³SDUWLWLRQ´ RI WKH LVODQG EHWZHHQ WKH WZR
FRPPXQLWLHV WRZDUGV WKHDGYRFDF\RI WKH³LQGHSHQGHQW5HSXEOLFRI&\SUXV´
established by the 1959-60 treaties )ÕUDW-40).  
 
Under the Treaty of Establishment, the British were allowed to keep two 
military bases on Cyprus as ³VRYHUHLJQ EDVH DUHDV´ 7KH 7UHDW\ RI $OOLDQFH
allowed Greece and Turkey to keep a certain number of soldiers on the island, 
while the Treaty of Guarantee prescribed that the Republic of Cyprus could 
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not be unified with any other state. The aim of this stipulation was to prevent 
enosis (unification with Greece: the Greek Cypriot preference) or taksim 
(partition of the island: the Turkish Cypriot preference). The Treaty of 
Guarantee also laid down that the independence and unity of the island would 
be guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey. These countries were given the 
right to act jointly or unilaterally if the status quo was in peril (Lindley 2007: 
230). 
 
The 1960 agreements envisioned a consociational federal model for Cyprus. In 
the absence of any other alternative, the two communities were forced to 
accept this formula. However, once Britain had relinquished its control, the 
forces of division within Cypriot society became increasingly powerful. It 
soon became clear that the majority of Greek Cypriots wanted to bring about 
enosis (Khashman 1999: 5). This paved the way for the collapse of the federal 
system in the next decade. 
 
2.2. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1980 
 
Between 1960 and 1980, as the immediate fear of nuclear exchange gradually 
receded after the Cuban nuclear crisis (1962) and the superpowers settled into 
the status quo, the Cold War lost some of its terror. Turkey attempted to 
capitalize on this slight thawing of the tensions between the two blocs and to 
reduce its over-dependence on the US and pursue a more autonomous foreign 
policy. Its most significant act in this regard was its intervention in Cyprus in 
1974 (Oran 2010: 393 and 409). 
 
Throughout this period, the Cyprus question was the main determinant of 
Turkish foreign policy. Since the early 1960s, Turkish policy towards Cyprus 
had been moulded in reaction to changes in Greek policy towards the island. 
The abolition of the power-VKDULQJPHFKDQLVPWKHGHFRQVWUXFWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V
guarantor status and the reduction of Turkish Cypriots to minority status were 
integral to Greek policy, the final aim of which was to establish a unitary state 
which could be integrated into Greece. The Turkish side, for its part, sought to 
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keep the power-sharing mechanism intact and circumvent enosis 7UNHú
2007: 160).  
 
The status quo set up by the 1960 agreements finally collapsed thanks to the 
inter-communal violence that took place from 1963 onwards. In November 
1963, Makarios, the Greek President of the island, proposed 13 amendments to 
the 1960 Constitution. (Ahmad 2004: 32). However, since they would have 
removed the veto and quota powers of the Turkish Cypriots, changing them 
from equal partners into a minority within the republic, the proposed 
amendments were rejected by the Turkish side on December 16, 1963. 
Fighting broke out between the two sides in Nicosia on December 21, 1963, 
and in March 1964, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) arrived on the island (Lindley 2007: 230). But the violence also 
had further-reaching effects; it precipitated a crisis between Greece and 
Turkey and prompted Ankara to start thinking about the idea of a Turkish 
military intervention in support of the Turkish Cypriots (Ahmad 2004: 32). 
 
On March 16, 1964, the Turkish Grand National Assembly authorized the 
government to stage a military intervention in Cyprus under the Treaty of 
Guarantee (1960), on the grounds that it was necessary to put an end to the 
suffering of the Turkish Cypriots (Erhan 2010: 413-6). The collapse of the 
power-sharing mechanism and refusal of the Greek demands in December 
1963 were followed by pogroms and population movements, confirming the 
7XUNLVK&\SULRWV¶ZRUVW IHDUV(Robins 2003: 118). In 1964, Turkish Cypriots 
were forced out of administrative office by the Greek Cypriots; they were told 
in 1965 by the then President of the island, Makarios, that they could only 
return if they consented to the 13 constitutional amendments 6|]HQE. 
 
On January 15, 1964, the London conference was convened to bring the 
FRQIOLFW WR DQ HQG 'HQNWDú DUJXHG WKDW WKH  DJUHHPHQWV KDG IDLOHG WR
provide security for Turkish Cypriots and effective guarantees were needed. 
Accordingly, it was necessary to set up a federal state composed of two 
communities, and to separate the two communities geographically. Ankara 
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DGRSWHGWKLVDV7XUNH\¶VRIILFLDOSRVLWLRQUHYLYLQJWKHLGHDRISDUWLWLRQ)ÕUDW
2010b: 437). 
 
Ankara had been content with the status quo established by the 1959 and 1960 
agreements and had supported the idea of a republic in Cyprus between 1958 
and 1964. However, events had demonstrated that the 1960 agreements could 
not guarantee the security of Turkish Cypriots, leading Ankara to conclude 
that this security would only be made possible if they were ceded their own 
territory (Uslu 2004: 212))RUWKLVUHDVRQ LQ7XUNH\¶VSROLF\WRZDUGV
Cyprus started to change, gradually evolving into a desire to see the 
establishment of a bi-zonal federation, where the two communities would be 
separated.  
 
By 1967, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were finding cohabitation increasingly 
difficult. The exclusion of the Turkish community from constitutional-
bureaucratic structures pushed them to carve out their own administrative 
mechanisms (F. Aksu 2010: 209). Makarios had made it clear that unless 
Turkish Cypriots assented to the 13 amendments, he would not let them 
resume their previous administrative positions, so on December 28, 1967, the 
Temporary Turkish Cypriot Administration was declared, followed on 
February 13, 1975 by the Turkish Federal Republic of Cyprus. Ultimately, the 
Turkish Cypriot position was to create a federal, divided Cyprus; like Ankara, 
they had come to believe that it was impossible to guarantee the security of 
Turkish Cypriots while they were spread all over the island. 
 
In 1967, a military junta took power in Greece. The junta decided to unite 
Cyprus with Greece (enosis) in order to offset its internal impotency within 
Greece. Makarios whose final goal was also to achieve enosis, but over a 
longer time period (Interview 1 September 5, 2011) feared that the move 
might prompt Turkish military intervention as a guarantor power 6|]HQ
2010b). In response, the mLOLWDU\MXQWDLQ$WKHQVVWDJHGDFRXSG¶HWDWDJDLQVW
Makarios on July 15, 1974 (he managed to escape assassination by fleeing 
through a back door) (Karpat 1975: 186). Athens immediately replaced him 
with Nicos Sampson, the head of the EOKA-B (National Organisation of 
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Cypriot Fighters), whose ultimate aim was to achieve enosis of Cyprus with 
Greece $\GÕQ-9). On July 20, 1974, Turkey, resorting to its right 
as a guarantor power under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, finally sent troops 
to Cyprus to prevent Greece from invading the island. The Turkish troops 
occupied sections of the island in the north 6|]HQE. 
 
Following the Population Exchange Agreement, which was signed by both 
sides in August 1975, Greek Cypriots still in the north moved to the south and 
Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south were transferred to the north, creating 
two homogeneous regions (Lindley 2007: 231). Ethnic separation of the 
island, which had started in 1963, ZDV FRPSOHWHG E\ 7XUNH\¶V PLOLWDU\
operations in July and August 1974 (Robins 2003: 132).  
 
The inter-communal talks that had started in June 1968 under the auspices of 
the UN resulted in the conclusion of the High Level Agreement (1977-9). The 
two leaderships agreed on the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal 
federation, in which the functions of the state would be shared equally by the 
two communities. Since then, all talks have been aimed at finding a solution 
based on these parameters. 
 
Given the de facto division of the island from 1963 onwards, the outcome of 
the 1977-+LJK/HYHO$JUHHPHQWZDVLQ OLQHZLWK$QNDUD¶VH[SHFWDWLRQV ,W
DOVRHFKRHG$QNDUD¶VYLHZ± held since 1964 ± that any settlement should be 
based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. This policy was formulated in 
response to Greek Cypriot attempts to undermine the Republic of Cyprus and 
to root out Turkish Cypriots from the island, as a way of protecting the 
security of the latter.  
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2.3. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1990 
 
In General 
 
In the 1980s, Turkey faced international isolation because of its human rights 
breaches and the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus. The country 
endeavoured to broaden its foreign relations and to extricate itself from 
international isolation, but its foreign policy autonomy was to some degree 
compromised by its continuing economic dependence on the US (Oran 2010: 
534-6) :KLOH 7XUNH\¶V KXPDQ ULJKWV¶ LQIUDFWLRQV FRQWULEXWHG WR WKH
deterioration of its relations with the EU, its relationship with the United 
States was relatively unproblematic; mainly because Washington saw Ankara 
as a strategic outpost against the Soviet Union and Iran $\GÕQ-9). 
 
By the 1980s, the Soviet economy, unable to compete with capitalism, was 
breaking down. Gorbachev, who came to power in April 1985, decided to 
address the political and economic ills of the Soviet Union, but his efforts 
were unable to prevent the social crisis and the ultimate collapse of the USSR 
(Tellal 2010: 617). Since then, the US, the Western model of international 
capitalism and Western attitudes towards human rights have moulded the 
world. 
 
Meanwhile, important events were also taking place in Turkey. In September 
1980, there was a military coup (the military junta lasted until 1983), while on 
November 15, 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared the formation of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The Turkish side made it clear that 
declaration of the TRNC did not mean they had abandoned the idea of a 
settlement based on federation. (Olgun 1999: 7) However, although Greek 
Cypriots never wished to share power with Turkish Cypriots, they were able to 
portray Ankara as the unreasonable side ± by playing on its bad human rights 
record 6|]HQE. 
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2.4. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-1990 
 
The Turkish desire to see a bi-zonal and bi-communal federal settlement for 
Cyprus continued into the 1980s. However, in this period, a rift emerged 
EHWZHHQ 7XUJXW g]DO WKH 7XUNLVK 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU -1989 and later 
President 1989-1993), and the Turkish bureDXFUDF\ g]DO ZKR KDG D PRUH
pragmatic and trade-oriented outlook on foreign relations of Turkey, viewed 
&\SUXVDVDQREVWDFOHWR7XUNH\¶VH[SDQVLRQRILWVFRPPHUFLDODQGHFRQRPLF
bonds with its neighbours .HPDO .LULúoL D . He was in favour of 
solving the Cyprus dispute and normalizing Greek-Turkish relations on the 
basis of trade. To do this, he argued, it was necessary to take the initiative in 
WKH &\SUXV WDONV E\ H[FOXGLQJ 'HQNWDú +RZHYHU WKH Turkish bureaucratic 
HOLWHFRQWLQXHGWREDFNWKHSROLFLHVRI'HQNWDúDVLWKDGVLQFHWKHV 
 
On August 9, 1980, a new round of talks began between the two Cypriot 
communities with the initiative of g]DO7KH7XUNLVK VLGH¶VREMHFWLYHZDV WR
reach a federal solution composed of two regions and two communities. On 
January 17, 1985, a draft agreement, which envisioned a federal republic of 
Cyprus built on an independent, non-aligned, bi-zonal, bi-communal state with 
two official languages, was presented to the parties by the UN. While the 
Turkish side signed the draft agreement, the Greek side turned it down. On 
July 25, 1989, a new plan was submitted to the parties by Perez de Cuellar, the 
UN Secretary General. In the new plan, the Federal Republic of Cyprus would 
be composed of two federal states and its constitutional structure would be 
based on two zones and two communities. Although the plan came close to 
PHHWLQJWKHFRQFHUQVRI WKH7XUNLVKVLGHLWZDVUHSXGLDWHGE\'HQNWDúZKR
had not been part of the consultation process )ÕUDWDDQG-3). 
 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU0HVXW<ÕOPD]VHHPHGWREHLOODWHDVHZLWKg]DO¶VLQLWLDWLYHWR
VHWWOHWKH&\SUXVGLVFRUGDQGSRLQWHGRXWWKDW³QR7XUNLVKJRYHUQPHQWZDVLQ
a posiWLRQ WR PDNH FRPSURPLVHV RQ &\SUXV FRQWUDU\ WR WKH QDWLRQ¶V GHVLUH´
(Uslu 2004: 219)<ÕOPD]ZDVQRWWKHRQO\SHUVRQUHOXFWDQWWRSXWSUHVVXUHRQ
'HQNWDú WR DFFHSW WKH SODQ 7KH 7XUNLVK EXUHDXFUDF\ DQG SROLWLFDO HOLWH¶V
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VXSSRUW IRU 'HQNWDú PDGH LW LPSRVVLEOH IRU g]DO WR Iorce the issue. Thus, 
g]DO¶VSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKIDLOHGDQG$QNDUDFRQWLQXHGWRIROORZWKHKDUG-line 
FRQIHGHUDOLVWSROLFLHVRI'HQNWDúXQWLOWKHV 
 
This period also saw the beginning of the Europeanization of the Cyprus issue 
IROORZLQJ*UHHFH¶VDFFHVVLon into the EU in 1981. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the EU (or EC as it then was) favoured Athens over Ankara, and the 
Cyprus issue played an increasingly bitter role in EU-Turkish relations, to the 
point where Turkey eventually became alienated from Europe (Eralp 2009: 4-
5). 
 
The lack of conviction among the Turkish leadership, the fragmented 
decision-making structure in the Turkish political context and the lack of 
support from the EU combined to curb any real chance of policy change in the 
V :KLOH 3UHVLGHQW g]DO KDG D PRUH SUDJPDWLc approach to the Cyprus 
TXHVWLRQ3ULPH0LQLVWHU<ÕOPD]EDFNHGE\WKH7XUNLVKPLOLWDU\DQGFLYLOLDQ
bureaucracy, held to the traditional line. In such an environment, President 
g]DOFRXOGQRWSXVKIRUSROLF\FKDQJHVLQJOH-handedly. The leadership of the 
AKP, on the other hand, was convinced that change was necessary. Its 
decision-making structure was such that no other actor was in a position to 
WKZDUW VXFK D SROLF\ VKLIW 0RUHRYHU WKH SDUW\ ZDV DZDUH WKDW 7XUNH\¶V
accession to the EU hinged on finding a solution in Cyprus. 
 
2.5. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\-2001 
 
In General 
 
$IWHU WKH &ROG :DU 7XUNH\¶V PDLQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SULQFLSOHV JRDOV DQG
priorities did not initially change. It continued to advocate preserving the 
status quo and to pursue a pragmatic policy based on multilateral cooperation 
(Kut 2001: 9-11). However, the instability encircling Turkey compelled it to 
get involved in all these FRQIOLFWV DQG WR GLYHUVLI\ LWV UHODWLRQV $QNDUD¶V
foreign policy had to be expanded and diversified in response to the changing 
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SROLWLFDO JHRJUDSK\ 8QGHU WKLV QHZ IUDPHZRUN 7XUNH\¶V FKLHI RULHQWDWLRQ
continued to be towards the US and the EU, but it also became more assertive 
in its policies towards regions like the Balkans, the Middle East and the 
Caucasus. These developments were calculated to help Turkey realize its 
political objectives in the region. 
 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\LQWKHV 
 
In the 1990s, the Cyprus issue became increasingly Europeanized as the 
republic embarked upon its application to join the EU. The Greek Cypriot 
administration applied for EU membership in the name of Cyprus as a whole 
in July 1990. The EU accepted this application in 1994 and commenced 
accession talks with the Greek Cypriot administration on behalf of the whole 
island in December 1996. When the EU included Cyprus in the enlargement 
process, Turkish foreign policy started to change. Having been outwardly 
committed to a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal solution in Cyprus since 1964, 
Ankara changed its position in the mid-1990s to seek a confederal settlement. 
This policy lasted until 2002 when the AKP reverted back to the policy of a 
federal settlement in Cyprus. 
 
In April 1992, Boutrus Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General, submitted a 
framework agreement, which comprised a Set of Ideas. Like the Perez de 
Cuellar (1984-6) propositions, the Set of Ideas was a federal settlement which 
underscored the political equality of the two communities. While the Turkish 
Cypriots accepted, the Greek Cypriots ruled out the Set of Ideas out of hand. 
When it came out that the EU was prepared to open accession talks with the 
Republic of Cyprus, this inevitably led to the perception that the republic 
would be accepted as an EU member with or without a settlement (Dodd 
2005: 42-3). The Greek Cypriots, who were already half-hearted about coming 
to an agreement with Turkish Cypriots, became even more disinclined towards 
a federal solution when the EU membership process started. Indeed, they 
expected to be able to use this process to achieve their ultimate objective of a 
unitary state. 
 
  67 
 
When the Greek Cypriot Administration was accepted into the EU accession 
process in 1994, the Turkish side started to formulate a confederal solution. 
The Turkish leadership feared that the principles of bi-zonality and bi-
communality, which had been advocated by Ankara hitherto, were bound to be 
compromised under the EU, which grants the rights of free settlement and 
property ownership to all its citizens (Interview 12 August 08, 2011). In such 
an environment, the sovereignty of a federated Turkish state of only 250 000 
people could easily be watered down, unless it was protected by special 
guarantees inserted into EU law (Interview 13 September 07, 2011). 
Accordingly, in August 1994, the Turkish Cypriot side declared that a federal 
solution was no longer possible on the island. Upon the approaching of the 
entry into effect of the EU-Turkish Customs Union agreement on December 
31, 1995, Denktas feared that entry into effect of such an agreement might 
compromise the projected customs union agreement between Turkey and the 
TRNC. Denktaú appealed to President Demirel, who convened the NSC to 
discuss the issue. After the NSC meeting, a Joint Declaration was issued, on 
December 28, 1995, by Turkey and the TRNC, stipulating the simultaneous 
accession of the TRNC and Turkey into the EU (Uslu 2004: 224-5). This was 
seen as a much more effective way of preventing Turkish Cypriots from being 
subsumed by the larger Greek-Greek Cypriot population.  
 
In January 1996, Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war in the Aegean 
because of uninhabited islands (Imia/Kardak) when Turkey landed troops on 
an island in the face of the Greek troops who were located on a different 
island. The crisis could only be overcome by an American intervention by 
LQWHQVHWHOHSKRQHGLSORPDF\DGPRQLVKLQJWKHWZRFRXQWULHVWKDW³WKHRQHWKDW
shoots first would be in trouble with the US´ (Milliyet January 31, 1996).  
 
Richard Holbrooke, the US Under-Secretary of State for European and Middle 
(DVW$IIDLUVYRLFHGWKDW³DVGHPRQVWUDWHGE\WKH,PLDFULVLVVRORQJDV*UHHN-
Turkish tension endures in the region, the stability would be elusive in the 
(DVWHUQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQ´ (Milliyet February 1, 1997). Holbrooke qualified the 
.DUGDN&ULVLVDV³DYHU\JUDYH LQFLGHQWZKLFKVHHPHGIXQQ\ LQ ILUVWSODFH´
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Holbrooke also said WKDW ³7XUNH\ ZRXOG EH WKH Iront country of the New 
(XURSH´(Milliyet February 1, 1997).  
 
On January 20, 1997, a Turkey-TRNC Declaration of Solidarity was signed 
for the military protection of the Turkish Cypriots after a Greek Cypriot order 
of S-300 ground to air missiles from Russia. The declaration also accentuated 
the sovereign rights of the Turkish Cypriots and underlined that every 
unilateral step to be taken by the Greek Cypriot Administration towards the 
EU membership will accelerate the integration process between Turkey and 
the TRNC." (Turkish Daily News February 3, 1997, January 21, 1997). In July 
1997, another Joint Statement announced that a special partnership between 
Turkey and the TRNC was established and the two states would integrate in 
the fields of economy, finance, defence and foreign affairs. Once again the 
sovereignty and independence of the TRNC was underscored (Zaman July 21, 
1997). 
 
The Imia and S-300 crisis were watershed developments that convinced the 
American government that there was the danger of war in the Eastern 
Mediterranean between the two NATO allies. This resulted in a new American 
bid to integrate Turkey with the EU structures by a solution in Cyprus. The 
American objective was to provide stability and security in regions where 
which major energy resources (Middle East and Transcaucasia). Within this 
framework, Turkey was depicted DVDµSLYRWDOVWDWH¶LQUHODWLRQWR86LQWHUHVWV
as it had the ability to stabilize the Black Sea region, control the 
Mediterranean Sea, balance Russia in the Caucasus, offer an antidote to 
Islamic fundamentalism and serve as a southern anchor of NATO. According 
to Washington, Turkey, the largest and most powerful country in the Eastern 
Mediterranean, was the only country that could be integrated into Western 
political structures. Such integration would require the democratization of the 
authoritarian Kemalist regime and the setting up of peaceful relations with its 
neighbouring countries, notably Greece. As a result, Richard Holbrooke was 
appointed PreVLGHQW &OLQWRQ¶V VSHFLDO HQYR\ WR &\SUXV LQ  (Pericleous 
2009: 21-3). 
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At the December 1997 Luxembourg summit, the European Council officially 
announced the Greek Cypriot candidacy for EU membership and excluded 
Turkey from the immediate enlargement process. Accession talks with the 
Greek Cypriots began on March 31, 1998 (Milliyet March 31, 1998; The 
European Council December 12-3, 1997). The Luxembourg decisions had an 
enduring impact on the collective consciousness of the Turks and their 
relationship with Europe (Robins 2003: 108-9). Ankara insisted that the 
decision of the summit was discriminatory and invidious and that it had been 
made under the influence of Athens. The inclusion of Cyprus in the first wave 
of enlargement was a let-down for Ankara, who saw this as evidence of the 
international community siding with the Greeks (Eralp 2004: 71-2). 
   
After the Luxembourg summit, Ankara suspended its relations with the EU 
and announced that Turkey would integrate with the TRNC to the same degree 
that the EU and Greek Cypriots were to be integrated. A Joint Statement on 
July 29, 1998, by Turkey and the TRNC envisaged expanding the January 20, 
1997 Joint Declaration by forming an economic and financial union as a 
UHVSRQVH WR&\SUXV¶GUDZLQJFORVHU WR WKH(87KLVZDV IROORZHGE\D MRLQW
press conference in early September 19E\7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUøVPDLO
&HP DQG 3UHVLGHQW 'HQNWDú in the TRNC underlining a confederal solution. 
According to this proposal, there would be two sovereign and equal states on 
the island, which would form a confederation by a cooperation agreement 
(Interview 14 September 5, 2011). 
 
7XUNH\¶VDOLHQDWLRQIURP(XUope and its decision to ally itself with the TRNC 
prompted fears in the EU that it was losing any influence it had over the 
country, and that this would make a federal solution in Cyprus even more 
elusive. The EU also began to fear that it was losing its chance to influence 
7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF G\QDPLFV LQFOXGLQJ WKH GHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ SURFHVV DQG WKH
harmonization of its structures with those of the EU. Seeing the unfavourable 
consequences of its policies towards Turkey, it reconsidered these policies 
between December 1997 and December 1999 (Interview 11 September 16, 
2011).  
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On Cyprus, despite the failure of the Holbrooke bid, Washington was resolved 
to find a solution to the Cyprus discord to stabilize and secure the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The UN proposed a new string of negotiations starting from 
December 1999. On June 29, 1999, the UN Secretary General called for the 
WDONV 'HQNWDú was against the bid demanding first the recognition of the 
TRNC. On July 20, 1999, Prime Minister Ecevit also underscored that the 
talks should aim to VHWXSDFRQIHGHUDWLRQ'HQNWDú was convinced by Ankara 
to go to New York to start the talks in December 1999 to clear the way to 
7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8 (Dodd 2010: 201-2). 
 
At the December 1999 Helsinki summit, the European Council declared 
Turkey a candidate country. However, the Council also stressed that Cyprus 
would be accepted as a member even if a solution could not be found for the 
island. At the Copenhagen EU Council of December 2002, the Greek Cypriots 
obtained agreement on the entry of a divided Cyprus into the EU. This 
decision became an additional incentive for the Greek Cypriots to dismiss the 
Annan Plan due to the fact that they expect a better deal after accession 
(Faustmann 2011: 154-5). This decision effectively removed any incentive 
Greek Cypriots may have had to come to an agreement with Turkish Cypriots. 
As Tocci argued, once the Greek Cypriots had secured the carrot of 
membership, the EU lost its power to influence the leadership, which 
thereafter pursued its interests as it saw fit (Tocci 2007: 46).  
 
At the Copenhagen summit, Turkey ensured a date for the commencement of 
its accession talks. The Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Council of 
2002 stated that if the ³(XURSHDQ&RXQFLOLQ'HFHPEHURQWKHEDVLVRID
report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey 
fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open 
DFFHVVLRQQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK7XUNH\ZLWKRXWGHOD\´ (Council of the European 
Union 2002). 
 
The US strongly backed Turkey in obtaining a date for the beginning of 
accession talks as part of its broader foreign policy vision in the wake of the 
Cold War to secure the Middle East and Transcaucasia where major energy 
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resources are located (Pericleous 2009: 21-3). This broader vision had been 
laid out by Richard Holbrooke, US Undersecretary of State assigned to 
(XURSHDQDQG0LGGOH(DVWDIIDLUVDQGHQYLVLRQHG7XUNH\DVD³SLYRWDOVWDWH´
stability in which would spill over to the neighboring states, thereby 
contributing international stability. According to this post-Cold War doctrine, 
Turkey not merely stabilized the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the 
Caucasus, but also provided an antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and 
functions as the southern anchor of NATO after the first US war against Iraq 
in 2003. Within this framework, Turkey, the largest and the most powerful 
country in the Eastern Mediterranean, was the sole country with the potential 
to be fully incorporated in the Western political system, the EU, and thus 
reverse the potential unfavorable consequences of Islamic fundamentalism by 
rendering Turkey a model state in the region. For this to materialize, the 
establishment of peaceful relatLRQVZLWK7XUNH\¶VQHLJKERUVQRtably Greece, 
and settlement of the Cyprus dissension was regarded as essential (Pericleous 
2009: 21-3).  
 
This line of vision was consistent with the newly emerging EU notion of 
granting Turkey candidate status at the end of 1999. The EU had similar 
concerns to those of the US. Especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks in 
the US by radical Islamists, the idea of accepting Turkey as a member to the 
EU to stabilize the Middle East, which was considered to be the cradle of 
fundamental Islamism, was gaining ground. With the advent to power 
SFKU|GHU¶V6'3LQ*HUPDQ\LQDQG6LPLWLV¶3$62.LQ*UHHFHLQ
the two important leaders aspiring for a European Turkey, this new European 
vision was put into practice.  
 
The main difference between the role played by the US and the EU was that 
while the US endeavoured to facilitate talks by supporting the UN efforts, the 
(8¶V UROH DIWHU JUDQWLQJ 7XUNH\ FDQGLGDWH VWDWXV ZDV LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG DQG
thus had the potential to oblige FKDQJHLQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\$IWHU
as an EU candidate, Turkey came under the obligation to implement the 
acquis communautaire to proceed with its membership process. The 
application of the acquis called for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. In this 
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sense, 7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSDVSLUDWLRQVZHUHGLUHFWO\OLQNHGZLWKD settlement 
in Cyprus GXHWRWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQRIWKH(8QRUPVZLWKLQ7XUNH\¶s legal 
structures.  
 
However, tKH(8¶VGHFLVLRQWRJUDQWXQFRQGLWLRQDOPHPEHUVKLSWR WKH*UHHN
Cypriots in the name of the whole of Cyprus has been a crucial factor in the 
continuing deadlock. Had the achievement of a settlement been made a pre-
condition for Greek Cypriot accession into the EU, they would have been 
forced to come to an agreement with the Turkish side, but as the legally 
recognized representatives of the whole island, this was no longer necessary. 
From December 1999 onwards, Greek Cypriots exploited their position to 
force the Turkish side to make compromises. 
 
2.6. 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\After 2001 
 
In General  
 
The 21st century has seen the crystallization of a multi-centred but hierarchical 
international system. None of the great powers is in a position to control all 
aspects of the international system 6|QPH]R÷OX-2); the US may be 
the dominant power in military terms, but the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) is in fierce economic competition with the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the European Union *|]HQ-2). 
 
Turkey managed to retain its strategic weight in this new environment due to 
its strategic location 6|QPH]R÷OX  -9). After the 9/11 attacks, the 
democratic-liberal transformation and globalization of the Middle East took on 
a higher priority for the US. As the only indigenous Muslim state with a 
Western orientation, a functioning democracy and a modernization agenda, 
Turkey therefore became increasingly important to the West 2÷X]OX 
89-90). 
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Having spent the 1990s adapting to the changing global circumstances, 
Ankara spent the 2000s developing a more pro-active, multi-dimensional and 
diversified foreign policy which takes account of regional and global 
developments. Turkey retained its Western orientation, but the structural 
changes brought about by the termination of the Cold War gave rise to various 
security threats, to which Ankara had to respond.  
 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\LQWKHV 
 
Between May 1999 and November 2002, the coalition government, composed 
of the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Motherland Party (ANAP) and the 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP), pursued an unprecedented programme of 
UHIRUP LQ RUGHU WR PHHW WKH (8¶V PHPEHUVKLS FULWHULD ,Q 2FWREHU  
articles of the Turkish Constitution relating to fundamental rights and 
freedoms were amended g]EXGXQ  . However, the coalition 
government finally collapsed when it sought to enact another significant 
reform package in August 2002. This package went beyond what was 
envisioned in the first National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis 
(NPAA) and what was required by the EU .HPDO .LULúoL D -4 and 
42). 
 
However, despite these important reform packages, the coalition made no 
mention of Cyprus. This was because the coalition leadership embraced the 
traditional Turkish approach on the Cyprus issue and sought to severe the 
Cyprus question from 7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVV 
 
The Cyprus talks that started in New York in December 1999. After a battery 
RI WDONV LQ  'HQNWDú GHFODUHG DW WKH HQG RI ILIWK VHVVLRQ LQ 1RYHPEHU
2000 that he would not attend the next round of negotiations, scheduled to be 
held in January 2001. This decision was taken in consultation with Turkey 
after a summit in Ankara with the participation of DenkWDú, the Turkish 
President, Turkish Prime Minister, Chief of Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, 
Foreign Minister and the Minister responsible for Cyprus (+UUL\HW November 
23, 2000).  
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In November 2001, speaking to Parliament, Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail 
Cem, said WKDW³LQFDVHRIDFFHVVLRQRIWKH5HSXEOLFRI&\SUXVLQWRWKH(8WKH
TRNC may choose to integrate with Turkey,which will pay whatever the 
heavy price Turkey might have to face´ (Milliyet November 3, 2001). Prime 
Minister Ecevit confirmed this stance, mentioning that such an integration 
with the TRNC could either be in the form of full annexation or autonomy 
(Bila November 04, 2001). 'HYOHW %DKoHOL /HDGHU RI WKe Coalition Partner 
0+3 DQG 'HSXW\ 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³DFFHSWLQJ WKH *UHHN
&\SULRWVWRWKH(8ZDVDIDLWDFFRPSOLDQG7XUNH\ZRXOGQRWVHWWOHIRUWKDW´ 
(Zaman November 04, 2001). 
 
Similar concerns were voiced by American and British diplomats as well as 
*QWKHU 9HUKHXJHQ the (8¶V &RPPLVVLRQHU IRU (Qlargement. Verheugen 
criticised $QNDUD¶V ODFN Rf support for the UN initiative, and stated that 
³7XUNH\ KDV WR WDNH WKH QHFHVVDU\ VWHSV IRU D VROXWLRQ LQ &\SUXV´ (Milliyet 
January 17, 2002). IQ 1RYHPEHU  'HQNWDú LQYLWHG &OHULGHV ZKR
invariDEO\UHLWHUDWHGWKDW³LI'HQNWDú ZRXOGVLJQ$QQDQSODQVRZRXOGKH´WR
start to face-to-face talks. The talks started on January 16, 2002. The Turkish 
bureaucracy maintained its backLQJIRU'HQNWDúg]N|NXQGHUOLQHGLQ-DQXDU\
 WKDW³WKHRQO\VROXWLRQ WR WKH&\SUXVTXHVWLRQ LV WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRID
QHZ SDUWQHUVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH WZR VRYHUHLJQ VWDWHV´ (Milliyet January 31, 
2002).  
 
%\ $SULO  WKHUH ZDV QR KHDGZD\ (FHYLW RIIHUHG D µYHOYHW GLYRUFH¶
referring to the Czech-Slovak breakup. In late April 2002, the Turkish Cypriot 
VLGH SUHVHQWHG D µ'UDIW 2XWOLQH RI WKH )RXQGLQJ 'RFXPHQW IRU WKH QHZ
3DUWQHUVKLS6WDWHRI&\SUXV¶ZKLFKUHVWHGRQ WKH LGHDRI WZRVWDWHVDQG WZR
peoples in Cyprus. On May 14, 2002, Foreign Minister Cem defended this 
position at a NATO ministerial meeting. Jack Straw, British Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, replied that these proposals would likely to lead to 
deadlock in the talks (Dodd 2010: 167 and 215). 
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In July 2002, the economic and political situation in Turkey was in a tailspin 
and the coalition government was unable to master it. Prime Minister Ecevit 
was gravely ill and the coalition was on the verge of collapse (+UUL\HW July 
10, 2002). In the same month, Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, who was in 
favour of a confederal structure in Cyprus, resigned from office and from the 
'63 WR IRUP D QHZ SROLWLFDO SDUW\ ,Q $XJXVW  ùNU 6LQD *UHO ZDV
appointed as the new Foreign Minister. Therefore, Ecevit, who thought that he 
KDGVHWWOHGWKH&\SUXVGLVFRUGLQDQG*UHOZKRZDVNQRZQWREH even 
more hardliQHWKDQ'HQNWDú on the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations, 
were responsible in Cyprus affairs. Annan rightfully presumed that his 
proposals would be dismissed out of hand by Ankara (Hannay 2005: 173-4).  
 
7KH 81 ZDV EODPLQJ 'HQNWDú for an irreconcilable approach. Further 
meetings in September and October 2002 provided no positive results. Ankara 
wanted the 2002 talks to be successful. However, Turkish officials continued 
to advocate a confederal Cyprus in contradistinction to a federal solution. For 
example, In December 2002, the Chief of Staff Hilmi g]N|NVDLG WKDW³DQHZ
SDUWQHUVKLS IRUPHG E\ WZR VWDWHV´ ZRXOG EH WKH EDVLV RI D VROXWLRQ (Dodd 
2010: 217-8).  
 
$IWHU 'HQNWDú GHFLGHG WR ZDON RXW RI WKH WDONV LQ 1RYHPEHU  KLV
confederalist policies were forcefully backed by the coalition government and 
the civilian-military bureaucracy in Ankara. Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, 
Prime Minister Ecevit and the Chief RI6WDII+LOPLg]N|NGHOLYHUHGVSHHFKHV
LQDQGVWURQJO\VXSSRUWLQJ'HQNWDú¶VWDQFHRQWKH&\SUXVGLVFRUG
2QO\ 7h6ø$' ZKLFK DOO DORQJ GHVLUHG WR FDUU\ WKURXJK 7XUNH\¶V (8
membership, announcHG LQ'HFHPEHU WKDW'HQNWDú¶s intransigence was 
hDUPLQJ 7XUNH\¶V LQWHUHVWV DQG EORFNLQJ 7XUNH\¶V URDG WR (8 PHPEHUVKLS
8QWLO1RYHPEHU$QNDUD¶VVWDQFHDQGWKH81SDUDPHWHUVIRUDVROXWLRQ
in Cyprus were at loggerheads with each other. 
 
In November 2002, the coalition government was replaced by the AKP. In 
contrast to its predecessor, tKH$.3¶VGLVFRXUVHGXULQJWKHHOHFWLRQFDPSDLJQ
was based on commitment to reforms and EU membership, improvement of 
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relations with neighbours and settlement of the Cyprus issue (Election 
Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 37). The AKP looked on the Cyprus issue as an 
REVWDFOH WR 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH (8 Prime 0LQLVWHU $EGXOODK *O
stated: ³QR VROXWLRQ LQ &\SUXV LV QR VROXWLRQ´ DQG ³7XUNH\ ZLOO EH RQH VWHS
DKHDG´ LPSO\LQJ WKDW7XUNH\GLGQRWZLVK WREHDFFXVHGRI LQWUDQVLJHQFH LQ
the conflict (Robins 2007: 298-9). 7KHQHZJRYHUQPHQW¶VDWWLWXGHRQ&\SUXV
was at loggerheads with that of Ecevit&HP*UHODQGg]N|NDOORIZKRP
believed that a confederal Cyprus was possible. On November 24, 2002, just 
DIWHUWKHDGYHQWWRSRZHURIWKH$.3<DúDU<DNÕúWhe new Foreign Minister, 
visited Denktas, who was hospitalised in New York, to persuade him to accept 
the amended version of the Annan Plan (Office of the Prime Minister 
November 24, 2002). As a result of Ankara¶VSUHVVXUH'HQNWDú sent a letter to 
Annan on November 27, 2002 expressing his desire to discuss his plan. 
 
:LWK WKH DGYHQW WR SRZHU RI WKH $.3 LQ 1RYHPEHU  $QNDUD¶V IRUHLJQ
policy goal in Cyprus once again changed from defence of a confederal or 
two-state Cyprus towards the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal 
Cyprus compatible with the UN parameters. The AKP government backed the 
Annan Plan, first draft of which was announced in November 11, 2002. Upon 
the responses of the two sides the plan was amended on December 10, 2002 
before the beginning of the EU Copenhagen summit in December 12, 2002.  
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CHAPTER III: THREE WAYS IN WHICH TURKISH 
POLICY ON CYPRUS HAS CHANGED  
 
For the purposes of this study, foreign policy change is defined as a change in 
the programme or instruments being used to affect foreign policy; the 
alteration of the policy strategy, problem or goal; or a change in the 
political/normative foundation of the policy. This definition draws on the work 
of Kleistra and Mayer. A programme/instrument change is a qualitative 
change in the methods or means used by the policy-maker, such as a shift from 
military force to diplomatic negotiation. Although the instrument may change, 
the policy purposes do not. In the case of problem change, the decision-maker 
changes or even abandons the original policy goal. The instruments utilized 
and how they are wielded by the policy-maker may also change. In the case of 
normative change, the political foundation underlying the policy changes (C. 
F. Hermann 1990: 5; Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3).  
 
7KLVFKDSWHUGUDZVRQ WKH.OHLVWUD DQG0D\HUPRGHO WR VKRZKRZ7XUNH\¶V
Cyprus policy has altered since 2002 and the advent to power of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP). The instruments, the goals and the normative 
IRXQGDWLRQRI$QNDUD¶V&\SUXVSROLF\FKDQJHGXQGHUWKHQHZOHDGHUVKLS 
 
7KHPRVWLPSRUWDQWLQVWUXPHQWDOFKDQJHLQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\WRRNSODFH
in 2004 when the Turkish side authorized the UN Secretary General to set a 
timetable for the completion of the Cyprus talks and to act as arbitrator 
(Interview 15 September 27, 2011). In addition to pursuing diplomatic 
channels, the AKP also adopted a proactive policy for the settlement of the 
Cyprus discord. The AKP government also, for the first time, adopted a range 
of tactics such as putting pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership, lobbying, 
propaganda and sending MPs from the Turkish Parliament to persuade Turkish 
Cypriots to support the Annan Plan and work it up into an agreement.   
 
The goal of Turkish policy on Cyprus also changed after the AKP¶VFRPLQJWR
power. The AKP government approved the Annan Plan, with its bi-zonal, bi-
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communal federal proposal. This represented a shift from the previous policy, 
which supported the idea of a confederation. 
 
,Q WHUPV RI WKH QRUPDWLYH IRXQGDWLRQ 7XUNH\¶V SUH-2002 approach ± to be 
only passively involved in the Cyprus negotiations ± also changed. As of 
2002, Ankara favoured a policy of proactive interference in Cyprus politics 
and pushed hard for a settlement on the island. This change in approach arose 
IURP WKH $.3¶V QHZ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ YLVLRQ :KLOH SUHYLRXV 7XUNLVK
governments looked on Cyprus as a national cause, the AKP government saw 
it from a more pragmatic perspective. It viewed the Cyprus issue as potentially 
a win-win situation; the Turkish side made considerable concessions on 
Cyprus because it believed that a settlement would benefit both sides. The 
$.3¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\YLVLRQwas geared towards ensuring that Turkey avoided 
problems with its neighbours, which it believed was best achieved through 
proactive engagement and preventive diplomacy, and towards changing the 
FRXQWU\¶V LPDJH 7KLV QHZ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ YLVLRQ was what underlay the 
goYHUQPHQW¶V PRUH SUDJPDWLF DQG FRQVWUXFWLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LQ UHVSHFW RI
Cyprus. 
 
The following chapter analyzes the concepts of change in policy instruments, 
change in the policy goals and normative changes respectively. The relevant 
sections also analyze WKHVH FRQFHSWV LQ WKH FDVH RI 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\
change on Cyprus between 2002 and 2004 and discover which of these three 
types of change are relevant in this case. 
 
1. Change in Policy Instruments 
 
An instrumental/programme change implies a qualitative change in the 
methods or means employed by the policy-maker to pursue a policy goal. 
However, although the instrument may alter, the fundamental policy purpose 
remains intact (C. F. Hermann 1990: 5; Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3).  
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The AKP got actively involved in the process in order to force the Greek 
Cypriot side to settle the Cyprus discord. To this end, it made the key 
instrumental changes of granting the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, the 
right to arbitrate the dispute and accepting a calendar for the termination of 
negotiations. These two instrumental changes were crucial in the emergence of 
the Annan Plan, which was the first comprehensive settlement plan for the 
Cyprus dispute to be put to referenda on both sides of the island. 
 
Since 1964, the Secretary General has been authorized by the United Nations 
6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO WR FRQGXFW ³JRRG RIILFHV´ LQ UHJDUG WR WKH &\SUXV
negotiations (Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices 
in Cyprus 2010). In this capacity, the Secretary General facilitates discussions 
and, if possible, negotiations between disputant parties. He is exclusively 
commissioned to lend assistance to the parties in their quest for a settlement. 
He is not authorized to set forth plans, proffer suggestions or impose them on 
the parties. Until the Annan Plan process, none of the parties in Cyprus had 
consented to extend the mission of good offices to include arbitration. This 
was finally done by the AKP government in January 2004 (Palley 2005: 5-6).  
 
The move repreVHQWHG QRW RQO\ D TXDQWLWDWLYH LQFUHDVH LQ WKH $.3¶V
diplomatic commitment, but also a qualitative shift in the diplomatic 
instruments it was willing to employ, as arbitration grants the Secretary 
*HQHUDOWKHULJKWWR³ILOOLQWKHEODQNV´RQFRQWURYHUVLDO issues. The power of 
arbitration is essentially different from the mission of good offices, which had 
failed to achieve a solution since 1967. Thus, under the governance of the 
AKP, the political instruments utilized by Turkey have changed significantly. 
TKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V PRYH ZDV WKH FUXFLDO LQVWUXPHQW WKDW UHVXOWHG LQ WKH
emergence of the Annan Plan; without it, the plan might never have come 
about. 
 
The power of arbitration ZDVJUDQWHGE\(UGR÷DQRQ-DQXDU\24, 2004, giving 
the Secretary General the right to submit proposals and plans to the parties and 
to impose them if he saw fit (Interview 15 September 27, 2011). In this 
arrangement, if one of the parties rejects a plan or proposal, the Secretary 
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General can make this public, increasing the pressure on the reluctant party. If 
they do not want to seem intransigent, the parties are forced to consent to the 
propositions offered by the Secretary General. This was what happened when 
Kofi Annan asked the parties to grant him the right to fill in the gaps in the 
plan if no agreement could be reached (Dodd 2010: 242-3).  
 
The Greek Cypriot side did not want to give him this right, but they were 
forced to concede to avoid being labelled as the intransigent party, particularly 
as the Turkish side had already agreed. They finally gave in, under pressure, 
but they continued to protest throughout the process and again in September 
 (UGR÷DQ¶V GHFLVLRQ WR JLYH WKH 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO WKH SRZHU RI
arbitration was the most consequential iQVWUXPHQWDO FKDQJH LQ 7XUNH\¶V
Cyprus policy and a turning point in the process. Annan filled in the gaps 
himself, following consultation with the parties and with his special 
representative in Cyprus, and the Annan Plan came into existence (Interview 
15 September 27, 2011).  
 
If this authority had not been granted to the UN Secretary General, it would 
have been almost impossible for the parties to reach a compromise. By 
changing the instruments employed in the negotiations and putting the 
reluctant Greek Cypriot side under international pressure, the Turkish side 
forced them to accept the UN plan. However, the Greek Cypriot side 
subsequently rejected the plan in the referendum on April 24, 2004.  
 
7KH VHFRQG LQVWUXPHQWDO FKDQJH LQ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ ZDV $QNDUD¶V
acceptance of a timetable for the progress of the talks. The government felt 
that, without a clear timetable, the negotiation process would have dragged on 
indefinitely and the efforts of the international community would have failed, 
as they had already done several times since 1967. The parties had to be 
moved on through the negotiation process to the final stage of give and take 
and the referendum. Accordingly, it was decided that following the 
comprehensive settlement talks in Nicosia between February 19 and March 22 
and %UJHQVWRFN LQ March 2004, the UN would come out with a 
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comprehensive settlement document, which would be put to referenda on both 
sides of the island in April 2004, before the entry of Cyprus into the EU. 
 
The third instrument change by the AKP government has been its adoption of 
a range of new tactics. It has put pressure on the Turkish Cypriot government 
and launched a propaganda campaign to persuade the public to approve of the 
SODQ :KHQ 'HQNWDú 3UHVLGHQW RI WKH 751& IURP 1983 to 2005, refused to 
cooperate with the Turkish government, it accused him of being intransigent 
and inflexible. Instead, the AKP backed the advocates of the plan in northern 
Cyprus, like Mehmet Ali Talat, who presumed that the ³$QQDQ3ODQKDVEHHQ
the most realistic proposal ever put forward for a solution of the Cyprus 
GLVSXWH´ (Interview 16 September 6, 2011). This was unprecedented in 
Turkish foreign policy; previous Turkish governments had always gone along 
with the status quo-oriented policies of 'HQNWDúZKRwas widely admired by 
both the military and civilian bureaucratic elite and the general public. 
 
(UGR÷DQVXJJHVWHGWKDW'HQNWDúVKRXOGZDJHKLVFDPSDLJQDJDLQVWWKH$QQDQ
3ODQLQWKH751&UDWKHUWKDQLQ7XUNH\DQG'HQNWDú¶VGHPDQGWRDGGUHVVthe 
Turkish parliament was ignored by the parliament leadership for a long time. 
%OHQW $UÕQo 6SHDNHU RI WKH 3DUOLDPHQW GLG QRW UHIHU to 'HQNWDú DV WKH
³SUHVLGHQW´ DQG said only WKDW ³KH´ FRXOG FRPH DQG DGGUHVV WKH SDUOLDPHQW
Eventually, the Former Parliamentarians Union asked parliament to provide a 
YHQXHIRU'HQNWDúWRVSHDNEXWWKH\WRRZHUHUHEXIIHG$UÕQo¶VVWDQFHILQDOO\
changed when he came under criticism from the Republican People's Party, 
DQG )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU $EGXOODK *O FRQYLQFHG KLP WR OHW 'HQNWDú DGGUHVV
parliament. The affair created friction within the AKP, particularly among the 
QDWLRQDOLVWV 6OH\PDQ 6DUÕEDú WKH $.3 GHSXW\ IURP WKH FLW\ RI 0DODW\D
announced that he would vote against the Annan Plan if it was brought to 
parliament. FuaW *HoHQ WKH $.3 GHSXW\ IURP WKH FLW\ RI +DWD\ DOVR
expressed reservations, arguing that little information had been released about 
the Annan Plan %DOFÕ$SULO.  
 
1RWFRQWHQWZLWKVXSSRUWLQJ7DODWRYHU'HQNWDúWKH$.3VHQW03VIURPWKH
Turkish parliament to northern Cyprus. These MPs were carefully chosen, so 
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MPs from Hatay, for example, were sent to those regions in northern Cyprus 
that were occupied by Turkish Cypriots whose families had also originally 
FRPHIURP+DWD\7KHVHGHSXWLHVXUJHG7XUNLVK&\SULRWVWRYRWHµ\HV¶IRUWKH
VDNHRI7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSDGGLQJWKDW LI*UHHN&\SULRWVUHMHFWHG WKH
plan and Turkish Cypriots approved it, the Turkish Cypriot state would be 
recognized by the international community. Consequently, many Turkish 
Cypriots voted in favour of the Annan Plan because they believed it would 
clear the way for the recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state .ÕOÕo<DúÕQ. 
(Interview 17 July 26, 2011).  
 
2. Change in the Policy Goal 
 
A problem/goal change comes about when the decision-maker changes or 
forfeits their policy goal. Not just what is done and how it is done, but the 
purposes of the policy-maker shift. (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392-3) In 2002, 
7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\JRDOZLWKUHJDUGWR&\SUXVVKLIWHGIURPWKHDGYRFDF\
of a confederation, which had been its position since the mid-1990s, towards a 
bi-zonal, bi-communal federation consistent with the UN parameters. The 
$.3¶VHlection manifesto clearly set out EU membership as a political 
goal alongside the resolution of the Cyprus disagreement by any means 
(Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37).  
 
A pure confederation denotes the coalescence of two or more autonomous 
states or entities that have agreed to jointly exercise power in defined areas of 
government activity such as security and foreign affairs. In confederations, 
policies and decisions must be made jointly and each side must have the right 
WR VHFHGH IURP WKHXQLRQ$ IHGHUDWLRQRQ WKH RWKHUKDQG LVZKHQ´VHYHUDO
states, ordinarily separate and sovereign political units, or units with the claim 
of sovereignty, mutually agree to coalesce to form a state with a single central 
JRYHUQPHQWZKLOVWNHHSLQJVRPHOHYHORIJXDUDQWHHGVRYHUHLJQW\´$OWKRXJK
WKHUH LV QR ULJKWRI VHFHVVLRQ IRU WKH UHJLRQVRU VWDWHV ³WKHFHQWUDO DXWKRULW\
alone cannot decide on the presence and character of the regional (or national) 
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DXWKRULWLHV´7KHLQYROYHPHQWRIWKHUHJLRQDOXQLWVLQFHQWUDOGHFLVLRQ-making 
is the supreme point here. (Dodd 1999: 3-5). 
 
The Annan Plan modified the 1960 Constitution to envision a federal state 
with a single sovereignty rather than a confederation comprised of two parties 
witK HTXDO DQG VHSDUDWH VRYHUHLJQW\ 7KH WHUP ³VWDWH´ LQ WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ
GHQRWHV³SURYLQFH´RU³FRXQW\´,VPDLO8OXoHYLN. The plan refers 
WRWKH*UHHNDQG7XUNLVK&\SULRWVWDWHVDV³FRQVWLWXHQWVWDWHV´LQRther words, 
they are like the states of the US ± without sovereignty. Like the 1960 
Constitution, the Annan Plan did not grant the parties the right of self-
determination. In this sense, it stipulated a federal structure.  
 
Federalism and confederalism are controversial concepts and open to 
interpretation. The 1960 Republic of Cyprus might qualify as both a federation 
and a confederation. Similarly, while some scholars regard the Annan Plan as 
envisaging a federation, others consider that it intended to set up a 
confederation in Cyprus. Yet others see it as containing elements of both. The 
important point is that Ankara was ready to accept the UN parameters and to 
give the Secretary General the power of arbitration, implying that it was 
willing to accept whatever settlement plan the UN proposed. It not only 
abandoned its maximalist position to accept a federal solution in Cyprus; it 
assented that this would be based on the UN parameters. The change of stance 
ZDV HYLGHQFH RI WKH QHZ JRYHUQPHQW¶V JHQXLQH FRPPLWment to finding a 
solution in Cyprus consistent with the UN parameters and an example of its 
new, proactive approach to foreign policy.  
 
The nub of the Cyprus dispute remains the different attitudes of the UN, 
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots on the one hand and Greek Cypriots on the other 
towards the status of Turkish Cypriots. While the UN and Turkey argue that 
Turkish Cypriots should possess equal sovereign rights and share 
administrative power with Greek Cypriots, the latter are inclined to view 
Turkish Cypriots as a minority and seem not to be ready to share power with 
them. This is in contradiction of the founding agreement, the 1960 
Constitution and the UN parameters. In his report after the Greek Cypriot 
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rejection of the Annan Plan in the referenda of April 2004, Kofi Annan 
UHPDUNHG WKDW ³WKH *UHHN &\SULRWV ZHUH QRW UHDG\ WR VKDUH SRZHU ZLWK WKH
Turkish Cypriots and he advised the international community to lift the 
isolations on the Turkish Cypriots in view of their cooperation in the 
settlement of the &\SUXV GLVVHQVLRQ´ (Report of the Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2004: Article 93). 
 
Annan pointed out that in opting for unification, the Turkish Cypriots had 
abandoned their long-held policy of seeking recognition for their own state 
(Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices 
in Cyprus 2004: Paragraph 87). The UN Security Council had passed 
resolutions refusing to recognize the TRNC, and partition would be counter to 
WKH81¶VREMHFWLYHVEXWWRPRYHWRZards recognition would now also be to go 
against the will of the Turkish Cypriots themselves, who had voted in favour 
of reunification of the island (Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 
His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 2004: Paragraph 90) $QQDQ¶V
comments offer clear proof that the UN envisions a federal solution in Cyprus, 
does not recognize the TRNC as a state and will not grant Turkish Cypriots the 
right of self-determination. 
 
As set out earlier, for all its defects, there seems no alternative to a federal 
settlement in Cyprus. It is not the fist preference of either side, but the Greek 
Cypriot desire to see a unitary state is unacceptable to Turkish Cypriots, and 
the Turkish Cypriot dream of a recognized, independent state is rejected by 
Greek Cypriots. However, the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan calls 
into question the Greek Cypriot willingness to concede to the foundation of a 
federal Cyprus. The Annan Plan called for compromise on both sides. While 
Turkish Cypriots have been prepared to relinquish their dream of statehood, 
their sovereignty and substantial segments of their territory, Greek Cypriots 
seem unwilling to agree to share their power and wealth with Turkish 
Cypriots. 
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3. The Normative Change 
 
,Q WKHHDUO\V WKHQRUPDWLYHIRXQGDWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\DOVR
FKDQJHG3UHVLGHQW7XUJXWg]DOKDGDWWHPSWHGWRVHWWOHWKH&\SUXVGLVFRUGLQ
1991, proposing a conference to include Greece, Turkey and the two 
FRPPXQLWLHV RQ WKH LVODQG 7KLV ZDV D GHSDUWXUH IURP 7XUNH\¶V WUDGLWLRQDO
policy of non-involvement. However, he was turned down by the Greek and 
Greek Cypriot sides. Prime Minister MesXW <ÕOPD] DOVR VHHPHG WR EH LOO DW
HDVHZLWKg]DO¶VHQGHDYRXUVSRLQWLQJRXWWKDWQR7XUNLVKJRYHUQPHQWZDVLQ
DSRVLWLRQWRPDNHFRPSURPLVHVRQ&\SUXVLQGHILDQFHRIWKHQDWLRQ¶VZLVKHV
1HYHUWKHOHVV 3UHVLGHQW g]DO FRQWLQXHG WR SXVK IRU 7XUNLVK LQYROYHPHnt in 
negotiations between the two parties through Akbulut, his puppet prime 
minister. At the end of 1991, Demirel, the new Turkish Prime Minister, 
UHVXPHG $QNDUD¶V SUHYLRXV VWDQFH RI QRQ-involvement (Uslu 2004: 219-21). 
$SDUWIURPg]DO¶VVKRUW-lived initiative, Turkish governments avoided actively 
engaging in the Cyprus dispute. The domestic environment during the 1990s 
made it inconvenient to push for a solution in Cyprus, and Turkey had to wait 
until the early 2000s to see another initiative emerge (Robins 2003: 121-2). 
 
g]DO¶V ELG WR VROYH the Cyprus disagreement was prompted by his liberal 
outlook and his pragmatic and trade-oriented approach to foreign affairs. He 
liberalized the Turkish economy in the 1990s, privatizing many state 
enterprises and encouraging the emergence of a vibrant private business 
sector. He ZDV LQ IDYRXU RI H[SDQGLQJ 7XUNH\¶V FRPPHUFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF
bonds with its neighbours, and pursued economically oriented foreign policy 
to foster inter-dependency between the countries in the region (Kemal KLULúoL
2006a: 11). g]DOVRXJKWDVHWWOHPHQWWRWKH&\SUXVGLVSXWHLQWKHKRSHWKDWLW
would promote trade which would improve Greek-Turkish relations.  
 
/LNHg]DOWKH$.3HVSRXVHd a more liberal and trade-oriented foreign policy. 
Prior to 2002, Turkey had assumed a passive approach on the Cyprus 
TXHVWLRQ'HQNWDúDKLJKO\HVWHHPHGILJXUH and a national hero in Turkey, had 
the ear of the Turkish government'HQNWDú¶VKLJKQDWLRQDOVWDQGLQJLQ7XUNH\
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rendered him a very hard and awkward target for Turkish governments to 
attack (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 2-3). Ankara simply supported the negotiations 
between the two sides and followed a policy of non-intervention. Since 2002, 
the new Turkish government has embraced a policy of proactive involvement. 
,WKDVWDNHQWKHLQLWLDWLYHLQWKHZRUGVRI3ULPH0LQLVWHU*O³7XUNH\ZLOOEH
RQH VWHS DKHDG´ DQG intervened in the process to push the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership and Turkish Cypriots towards approval of the Annan Plan. The 
$.3 HQGHG $QNDUD¶V SROLF\ RI OHDYLQJ WKH ODVW ZRUG WR 'HQNWDú ,QGHHG
(UGR÷DQdid QRWVFUXSOH WRSXEOLFO\FULWLFL]H'HQNWDúDQGRWKHURSSRQHQWVRI
the Annan Plan and to back its supporters. This new approach reflected 
$QNDUD¶V QHZ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GRFWULQH RI VHWWOLQJ 7XUNH\¶V SUREOHPV ZLWK LWV
QHLJKERXUV]HURSUREOHPVDGRSWLQJDFRQFLOLDWRU\VWDQFHDQGVHHNLQJ³ZLQ-
ZLQ´VROXWLRQV 
 
$V SDUW RI LWV SROLF\ WR HQVXUH ³]HUR SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV´ WKH QHZ
leadership sought to reduce security risks and PD[LPL]H 7XUNH\¶V MRLQW
interests. As the biggest economy in the Balkans, Caucasia and the Middle 
East, it has followed the principles of proactive engagement and preventive 
diplomacy as a way of reducing the risks posed by regional instability, under-
deveORSPHQWDQGSRYHUW\'DYXWR÷OXDUJXHGWKDWKLJK-level political dialogue, 
economic interdependence, a common approach to security and mutual 
tolerance are crucial to securing regional stability, and that simmering 
conflicts must be addressed before they flare up as they might have 
unfavourable consequences for Turkey. At the same time, foreign policy has 
EHHQ JXLGHG E\ WKH GHVLUH WR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V LPDJH IURP D KDUG WR D VRIW
power; it has wished to be seen as a country that is culturally inclusive, 
economically prosperous and militarily secure 'DYXWR÷OX.  
 
These new norms became the driving force of Turkish foreign policy change 
not just in Cyprus but on the whole. The country has genuinely endeavoured to 
smooth out its differences with its neighbours and to stabilize its 
neighbourhood. The AKP government has attempted to address deep-seated 
issues with Cyprus, Greece and Armenia, but its initiatives have repeatedly 
been frustrated by the inflexible agendas of its neighbours. In the mid-2000s, 
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Turkey took the lead in founding a free economic zone encompassing Syria, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Its efforts to liberalize the economies of these 
countries were again thwarted by the outbreak of anti-regime rebellion in 
Syria in 2011. 
 
7RVXPXS7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\FKDQJHGLQLQWKUHHNey ways. The 
AKP changed its policy instruments, extending the good offices mission of the 
UN Secretary General to include arbitration and making the emergence of the 
Annan Plan possible. The government also pushed for a fixed calendar on the 
Cyprus talks, put pressure on the TRNC administration and campaigned for an 
affirmative vote for the Annan Plan in northern Cyprus. Secondly, the goal of 
Turkish foreign policy radically changed from advocacy of a confederal 
solution to support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on the basis of the 
81SDUDPHWHUV7KLUGO\WKHQRUPDWLYHIRXQGDWLRQVRI7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\
changed substantially. While Ankara had previously regarded the TRNC as a 
national cause and looked at the Cyprus issue from a security perspective, the 
new Turkish government adopted a more cooperative and pragmatic foreign 
SROLF\DSSURDFKZLWKDQH\HWRVHWWOLQJ7XUNH\¶VULIWVZLWKLWVQHLJKERXUV 
 
In the following chapter, I lay out a list of potential variables that can affect 
foreign policy change before focusing on my theory chapter. I extracted these 
variables from an analysis of the literature on foreign policy alteration. The 
variables in the list are not exhaustive and can be expanded by exploration of 
other determinants. These variables help determine potential variables of 
7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\FKDQJH2Q&\SUXV7KHOLVWPD\DOVRKHOSVFKRODUVWR
determine the causes of foreign policy behaviour in other cases. After the next 
chapter, I focus on the theory chapter on Turkish foreign policy change on 
Cyprus. I draw on some of the variables from the following list to construct 
my model to account for Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus.  
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CHAPTER IV: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE 
 
This chapter discusses those variables which might cause a government to 
alter its foreign policy. The list, which is presented in Table II, has been 
compiled following examination of the literature on foreign policy change. It 
is not exhaustive and other determinants may be identified by foreign policy 
analysts. Each variable is briefly analysed and its relevance to the Turkish 
policy change on Cyprus is considered. This analysis of individual 
GHWHUPLQDQWV LV WKH ILUVW VWHS WR FRQVWUXFWLQJ D PRGHO VSHFLILF WR 7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy change on Cyprus.   
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TABLE I Potential Causes of Foreign Policy Change 
 
TABLE I: Potential Factors in Foreign Policy Change 
Independent Variable 
(carrier for or barrier to 
change) 
 
Factor 
International System International institutionalization of norms  
(Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 
2001; Smith, 2004) 
Structural interdependence  
(Goldmann 1982)  
Influential third parties  
(Goldmann 1982; Greffenius 1994; Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001) 
Major international developments  
(C. F. Hermann 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1991; 
Gustavsson 1999) 
 
National Political System National parliaments  
(Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Robins 2003; Kaarbo 2010; 
Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010; Doeser 2010)  
Dominant interest groups  
(C. F. Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Skidmore 
1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001)  
Public opinion  
(Holsti 1982; C. F. Hermann 1990; Risse-Kappen 
1991; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Robins 2003; Kaarbo 
2010; Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010)  
Democratization  
(T.W. Park et al. 1994; Kaliber 2005)  
Media 
5RELQVgQLú2SSHUPDQQg]FDQ
2010)  
Economic development  
(T.W. Park et al. 1994)  
Cultural change  
(Rynhold 2007)  
Regime change  
(C. F. Hermann 1990; Hagan 1994)  
Major internal developments  
*XVWDYVVRQ0IWOHU%Do(UDOS 
Organizational System Domestic institutionalization  
(Goldmann 1982; Hagan 1994; Barnett 1999; Checkel 
5RELQV)XOOHU,OJÕWDQGg]NHoHFL-
Taner 2011)  
Bureaucratic advocacy  
(C. F. Hermann 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1991; 
Schraeder 1994; Rosati 1994)  
Presence of alternative policy options  
(Goldmann 1982; Moravcsik 1993; Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001)  
Decision-making mandate  
(M. G. Hermann and C. F. Hermann 1989; M. G. 
Hermann 2001) 
Individual 
Policymakers/Leaders 
Preferences and interests of the leadership  
(Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1984, 
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1988, 1989, 1999, 2001; C. F. Hermann 1990; 
Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 
2001; M. G. Hermann et al. 2001; Boronza 2008) 
 
 
 
Numerous scholars have pointed out the multi-causal nature of foreign policy 
change (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; 
Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). An examination of 
the literature indicates that the causes of foreign policy change can be grouped 
into four main categories: external causes, domestic causes, causes related to 
the organizational structure and causes related to the leadership. This is 
reflected in the table above. The following sections analyse how these 
determinants affect foreign policy change in general before showing how they 
apply iQ WKH FDVH RI 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ RQ &\SUXV 7KH main factors that 
SURPSWHG 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ FKDQJH ± the change in leadership, international 
institutionalization, pressure from interest groups and changes in the nature of 
7XUNH\¶VGHFLVLRQ-making process ± are analysed in the theory chapter. 
 
1. Causes Related to the International System 
 
Scholars agree that external factors have a significant impact on foreign policy 
shift (Goldmann 1982; Holsti 1982; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; 
Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). It has been argued 
that the dialectical interplay between state, society and the global environment 
affects the degree to which foreign policy changes (Rosati 1994: 221), while 
Goldmann suggests that foreign policy changes in response to shifting 
conditions or environmental circumstances as a process of adaptation to the 
new environment (Goldmann 1982: 247). Holsti also sees external factors as 
independent variables that can affect foreign policy alteration. These external 
factors may include military or non-military threats and the vulnerabilities and 
dependencies created by previous relationships (Holsti 1982b: 14).  
 
Hermann argues that one of the primary agents of foreign policy change is 
external shock (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3), while Carlsnaes points to the 
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influence of the structural dimension or the international system. (Carlsnaes 
1993: 19-21). Another model suggests that change may be triggered by a 
change in fundamental structural conditions, which are influenced by both 
international and domestic factors. The international factors may be political 
(such as inter-nation power relationships and the military aspects of national 
security) or economic (transnational economic transactions and their 
institutional circumstances) (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). A shift in the 
international system may function as either a barrier to or carrier for change 
(Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Also highlighted are the roles played by 
international institutionalization, interdependency, third parties and major 
external developments. These are discussed in further detail below. 
 
1.1. International Institutionalization 
 
International institutionalization is one of the international factors that may 
bring about foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001; Smith, 2004). International institutionalization refers to the 
treaties and agreements signed by a government, and to international 
commitments and expectations which affect foreign policy (Goldmann 1982: 
253-4). As international institutionalization is of particular relevance to this 
research, it is discussed at length in the theory chapter.  
 
1.2. Interdependence  
 
Interdependence may be defined here as a mutual structural dependence 
between two states. If the two governments share a similar policy outlook, it is 
easier to effect a change in foreign policy. On the other hand, if one 
government wishes to make a change that would bring it into conflict with its 
partner, this might undermine their continuing interaction. This consideration 
may inhibit foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982: 253-4). 
 
The impact of interdependence on foreign policy was illustrated during the 
Cold War. By the 1970s, Germany had become more dependent on its export 
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business with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union than it was on the US. The 
US, on the other hand, refused to do business with its Cold War enemies. The 
higher degree of interdependence between Europe and the Soviet Union 
DFFRXQWV IRU(XURSH¶VXQZLOOLQJQHVV WR MRLQ WKH86 LQ LWV UHWULEXWLYHSROLFLHV
towards the Soviet Union. Thus, from the US perspective, interdependence did 
QRWVHUYHDVDPHGLXPWRVWDELOL]HGpWHQWHKRZHYHUIURPWKH(8SHUVSHFWLYH
LWKHOSHGWRIRVWHU(DVW:HVWGpWHQWH(Goldmann 1982: 263-4). 
 
6LPLODUO\ 7XUNH\¶V ELG WR VHWWOH LWV GLIIHUHQFHV ZLWK $UPHQLD LQ WKH V
conflicted with its policy towards its ally Azerbaijan. When Armenia occupied 
areas of Azerbaijani territory in 1993, Turkey had closed its border with 
Armenia. When the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement process started in 2008, 
$]HUEDLMDQRSSRVHG7XUNH\¶VDWWHPSWWRQRUmalize its relations with Armenia 
DVWKHODWWHUKDGQRWZLWKGUDZQIURPLWVWHUULWRU\7KXV7XUNH\¶VDOOLDQFHZLWK
Azerbaijan impeded the reconciliation process between Armenia and Turkey. 
 
1.3. Third Parties 
 
Another international systemic factor is the impact of third parties within the 
international system; their support or opposition can stabilize or de-stabilize a 
policy (Goldmann 1982: 253-4) For example, third parties had a huge 
influence on the Camp David negotiations of the late 1970s. Without US 
mediation, talks between Egypt and Israel would have been unlikely 
(Greffenius 1994: 214-6), but while the US served as a facilitator, the process 
ZDV DGYHUVHO\ DIIHFWHG E\ 6\ULD DQG ,UDT¶V KRVWLOLW\ WR (J\SW¶V DWWHPSW DW
rapprochement with Israel. 
 
The EU is the most important third party to have affected Turkish foreign 
policy on Cyprus. It pressured Turkey to accept the Annan Plan prior to the 
accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. As will be explained in the 
WKHRU\FKDSWHUWKH(8¶VLPSDFWRQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\KDVEHFRPHPRUH
far-UHDFKLQJ DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV DQG WKH
entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU. The power of international 
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institutionalization means the EU now plays a much more significant role in 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ 
 
1.4. Major External Developments 
 
Major external developments may have an immediate impact on the policies 
of the affected countries (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). Gustavsson describes such 
important developments as international structural factors, dividing them into 
two categories: international political factors and international economic 
factors (Gustavsson 1999: 83-4) The Vietnam Tet Offensive in 1968, the 
Jerusalem visit of Sadat in 1977 and the 1971 decision of the US to suspend 
the convertibility of dollar into gold are all examples of developments that 
significantly affected the policies of the countries involved (C. F. Hermann 
1990: 12). Other examples are the 1973 Oil Crisis, which affected the foreign 
policy of many European states (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 631), and the 
termination of the Cold War and its effect on the policies of most countries.  
 
The major external development that pushed Turkey to reorient its foreign and 
security policy was the end of the Cold War in 1990 2÷X]OX. The 
end of the Cold War had wide-ranging impacts on world politics; as the Soviet 
superpower collapsed, a power vacuum arose and a new world order surfaced. 
The forces of ethnic nationalism, religious fundamentalism and even terrorism 
gathered strength in the old Soviet regions. Turkey, which sat at the centre of 
these instabilities, was faced with the challenge of constructing a foreign 
policy to respond to the ideological/political vacuum, micro/ethnic nationalism 
and the growing power politics between the US, Russia and larger EU 
countries, who were all looking to exploit the power vacuum in Eurasia 
*|]HQ-30 and 31-2). 
 
7R ZKDW H[WHQW LV 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ FKDQJH RQ &\SUXV WKH UHVXOW RI such 
structural issues? I would argue that they alone are not responsible; more 
important are WKH OHDGHUVKLS¶V FKDQJH LQ RXWORRN WKH G\QDPLFV RI GHFLVLRQ-
making in Turkish politics and the influence of the EU accession process. 
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2. Domestic Political Causes of Foreign Policy Change 
 
Scholars also agree on the importance of the domestic factor (Goldmann 1982; 
Holsti 1982; Hermann 1990; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001). Factors associated with the national political system may 
contribute to or curb foreign policy alteration (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). 
It has been argued that the dialectical interplay between state, society and 
environment leads to modification in foreign policy (Rosati 1994: 221). Holsti 
cites internal threats, economic conditions and political factionalization as 
some of the reasons why foreign policy is restructured (Holsti 1982b: 14), 
while Hermann identifies domestic factors as one of the main motivations for 
what he calls domestic restructuring (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3). The 
domestic politics of the state ± what Goldmann calls political stabilizers ± may 
also hinder foreign policy change (Goldmann 1982: 247). Political domestic 
factors might include electoral results, opinion polls and coalitions involving 
major political actors, while domestic economic factors include GDP growth, 
inflation rates and unemployment levels (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). All these 
factors can impact upon foreign policy.  
 
The following paragraphs explore the domestic factors operating in Turkey 
and their effect on the policy change on Cyprus. The literature highlights a 
number of possible influences including parliament, interest groups, public 
opinion, democratization, the media, economic development, cultural change, 
regime change, major internal developments and crisis situations (Goldmann 
1982; Putnam 1988; Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Hagan 1994).  
 
2.1. Parliament 
 
The literature acknowledges that parliaments may either catalyse or inhibit 
foreign policy change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392), but it suggests that they 
generally play a minimal role in decision-making on foreign policy. This is 
especially true in a single-party government, where individuals may be 
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IRUELGGHQIURPYRWLQJDJDLQVWWKHOHDGHUVKLS¶VGHFLVLRQRQSDLQRISXQLVKPHQW
Thus, in single-party governments, parliament might only play a marginal role 
in foreign policy-making (Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 21). 
 
Only in exceptional situations will parliaments play a major role in foreign 
policy. The parliamentary opposition to the Danish footnote policy, for 
example, was effectively an attack on WKH UXOLQJ SDUW\¶V SUR-NATO policy. 
Between 1982 and 1988, the opposition majority in parliament passed a series 
of parliamentary resolutions on foreign policy that ran counter to the 
government line. Thus, during this period, the official foreign policy of 
Denmark was actually being formulated by the opposition.(Doeser 2010: 6-7).  
 
In the Turkish context, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has traditionally 
played a secondary role in Turkish foreign policy-making (Kaarbo 2010: 9; 
Robins 2003: 79-80). The parliament deals with domestic political issues and 
has only a limited interest in foreign affairs, which it conducts through the 
Foreign Affairs Commission. The Commission is in charge of discussing new 
foreign affairs bills, conducting trips abroad and receiving visiting foreigners 
(Robins 2003: 79). Much debate takes place in parliament, but in practice, the 
parties tend to follow the policies of their leaders, the government or the 
military. Only in exceptional cases does the Turkish parliament play a role in 
foreign policy decisions. One of these exceptions was its rejection in March 
RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VPRtion to allow US forces to use Turkey as a base 
in their intervention in Iraq (Kaarbo 2010: 9). Faced with a divided 
government, the leadership did not want to take sole responsibility for the 
decision. The executive did not enforce party discipline but gave MPs a free 
vote on the issue.  
 
In contrast, when a government is powerful and the leadership of the 
governing party enforces party discipline, the role of the parliament wanes 
(Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 34). In March 2003, the Turkish Parliament 
demonstrated its plain backing for the status-quo in Cyprus. The communique 
laid out by the participation of all the political parties in the parliament read 
that ³any solution in Cyprus should protect the political equality of the two 
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communities and a settlement could not be a pre-FRQGLWLRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V
accession into the EU.´ Despite this avowed backing for the TRNC, the AKP 
JRYHUQPHQW ZDV DEOH WR VKLIW $QNDUD¶V WUDGLtional Cyprus policy (TBMM 
Reports Journal March 11, 2003). So it was that the Turkish parliament played 
QRUROHLQWKHSROLF\FKDQJHRQ&\SUXV7KHGHFLVLRQVZHUHWDNHQE\(UGR÷DQ
alone. The AKP was the majority party in parliament and no individual within 
WKH$.3JRYHUQPHQWZDVLQDSRVLWLRQWRFRQWHVW(UGR÷DQ¶Vdecisions.  
 
2.2. Interest Groups 
 
It has been posited that dominant interest groups within a country may 
influence its foreign policy decisions. These groups may facilitate foreign 
SROLF\DOWHUDWLRQZKHQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSROLFLHVDUHLQWKHLULQWHUHVWVRUWKH\ 
may serve as a barrier to foreign policy shift if the policies of the government 
are at odds with their interests (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). This factor is 
examined at length in the theory chapter as interest groups, especially business 
interests, were one of the key determinants in Turkish foreign policy change 
on Cyprus. Business interests are becoming increasingly influential in 
7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GHFLVLRQVDV7XUNH\HPHUJHVDVD UHJLRQDOHFRQRPLF
power. 
 
2.3. Public Opinion 
 
A number of scholars have pointed to public opinion as a factor that might 
have an impact on foreign policy decisions. Hermann asserts that foreign 
policy change is likely when constituencies, or the relationships between them, 
VKLIW$GUDPDWLFVKLIWLQDGRPHVWLFFRQVWLWXHQW¶VEHKDYLRXURUEHOLHIPD\JLYH
rise to a new alignment and attract many new supporters; this new popularity 
may incline policy-makers towards a shift in foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 
1990: 7). In this framework, public support may make it easier to alter foreign 
policy; conversely, public opposition can obstruct change (Kleistra and Mayer 
2001: 392). 
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Scholars have looked at the impact of public opinion on foreign policy within 
three different types of domestic structure. A state-dominated structure is 
characterized by centralized political institutions and a polarized society with 
weak social organization. Societal actors/public opinion have no influence in 
this type of structure and coalition building is limited to the political elite. In 
the societal control model, on the other hand, society is likely to be 
homogeneous with a high degree of mobilization and weak state structures. 
The policy network is controlled by society and public opinion plays a key 
role. Finally, in the democratic corporate structure, social organizations and 
political institutions have comparable levels of power. In this type of structure, 
political and societal actors bargain to find common ground, ultimately 
compromising to create middle-of-the-road-policies (Risse-Kappen 1991: 
486). 
 
Public opinion matters in liberal countries and an overwhelming public 
consensus may well stall policy-makers. Even here, though, the public impact 
on foreign policy decisions is limited and indirect (Risse-Kappen 1991: 510-
1). The public by and large reacts emotionally rather than rationally on foreign 
policy matters. When they approve they cheer; when they disapprove they boo 
and demand more action. Public reaction is also time-specific and contingent 
on the situation; it does no more than prescribH WKHRXWHU OLPLWVRID OHDGHU¶V
DFWLRQDWDVSHFLILFSRLQW LQ WLPH ,WFDQJXLGHWKHOHDGHU¶VDFWLRQVEXW LWFDQ
also be manipulated to serve his purpose (M. G. Hermann 1988: 274-5). 
 
Canada is one example of public opinion playing a significant role as a carrier 
IRU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DOWHUDWLRQ *URZLQJ SXEOLF VHQVLWLYLW\ DERXW &DQDGD¶V
dependence on the US pushed Canadian leaders to reduce this dependence. 
The change in Canadian policy between 1972 and 1980 was a slow 
governmental response to growing public concern regarding American 
LQYHVWPHQWLQ&DQDGDDQGWKHQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHFRXQWU\¶s growing 
cultural, economic and policy dependence on the US (Holsti 1982a: 92-5).  
 
The limited assimilation of the democratic culture in the Turkish political 
setting means that relationships between the political parties and their 
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supporters are shaped by clientelist bonds. Hence, Turkish foreign policy is 
predominantly formulated by the political elite. Since the social and economic 
transformation of Turkey began in the 1990s, individuals are less dependent 
on the state for a living, civil society has grown, and the media has 
proliferated. Although these all indicate the emergence of a Western 
European-style, liberal society (Robins 2003: 90-1), public opinion still has 
only a limited influence on Turkish foreign policy, and Turkish public opinion 
continues to be managed by the Turkish foreign policy elite (Kaarbo 2010: 9-
10). The occasion described in Section 2.1, when MPs were allowed a free 
vote on whether Turkey should permit the US to use it as a staging post in its 
Iraq intervention, was a rare opportunity for the public (through its MPs) to 
sway foreign policy, but it was only made possible because the government 
was divided and the leadership did not want to take sole responsibility for the 
decision. Under normal circumstances, the powerful government leadership 
reinforces party discipline and both parliament and public opinion have little 
effect on foreign policy decisions. The leadership assumes full responsibility 
for its decisions and indeed has the power to manipulate public opinion 
(Kesgin and Kaarbo 2010: 19-20 and 34). 
 
Before 2002, foreign policy decisions were made collectively by the foreign 
ministry, the security establishment (the National Security Council), the Prime 
Minister, the President and coalition leaders, depending on the situation. After 
2002, the AKP, as a popular, single party government, was able to mobilize 
public opinion and the various intereVWJURXSVLQIDYRXURI7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQ
to the EU. It was then able to put together a powerful coalition to change 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\7KXVSXEOLFRSLQLRQGLGKDYHDQLQGLUHFWLPSDFWRQ
the Cyprus policy change.   
 
2.4. Democratization  
 
The transition from authoritarianism to democracy may also have an impact 
RQDFRXQWU\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WKURXJKLWVHIIHFWRQLGHRORJ\DQGYDOXHV\VWHPV
the state-VRFLHW\ UHODWLRQVKLS DQG WKH UHJLPH¶V SROLWLFDO LQWHUHVWV 7KH
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breakdown of an authoritarian regime will be accompanied by a change in 
ideology and value systems. The public may have become disillusioned with 
the ideologies an authoritarian regime uses to legitimize its activities, such as 
nationalism, and with its dogmatic approach to issues such as national 
security, economic development and social stability. This may be 
accompanied by growing popular support for democratic ideals. During 
democratization, attitudes to national security may well be reappraised, 
leading the government to dramatically change its foreign policies (T. W. Park 
et al. 1994: 171-2). 
 
As well as the ideology and value systems, democratization also affects the 
state-society relationship. This change has three dimensions. First, state 
control over manpower, economic activities and mass media is reduced (this 
may have implications for the implementation of foreign policy). Second, the 
VWDWH¶V DXWRQRP\ GLPLQLVKHV DQG WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ WKH VWDWH DQG WKH
social elite becomes more complex. Previously dominant interest groups lose 
some of their political sway, and a larger societal interest group emerges to 
form new pressure groups. Third, its increased legitimacy gives the state 
greater power to push for its foreign policy goals. (T. W. Park et al. 1994: 
174). 
 
Since the 1990s, Turkish society has gone through a major process of 
transformation. The AKP could only come to power after radically moving 
towards the centre of Turkish politics. The political parties with strict 
LGHRORJLHVVXFKDV WKH5HSXEOLFDQ3HRSOH¶V3DUW\DQG WKH1DWLRQDOLVW$FWLRQ
Party, could not mobilize public support and lost their popularity. Partly as a 
result of the EU accession process, the military, which has held fast to the 
traditional nationalist standpoint on Cyprus, lost its influence over foreign 
policy. Its security-oriented discourse on Cyprus lost its legitimacy and it was 
unable to mobilize public opinion in favour of maintaining the status quo on 
the island.  
 
The AKP entirely gave up the nationalist and security-oriented standpoint of 
the previous coalition government. The growing democratization of Turkish 
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society, the pluralization of the media and the emergence of liberal 
intellectuals and scholars since the 1990s have all combined to foster an 
environment in which opinions can be freely expressed. Thus, the Annan Plan 
was discussed publicly in the run up to the referendum on April 24, 2004. The 
GHPRFUDWLF FRQWH[W ZDV WKHUHIRUH LPSRUWDQW LQ IDFLOLWDWLQJ 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ
policy change on Cyprus. However, democratization alone cannot account for 
the change; the mainstream political parties continue to adhere to the 
traditional Turkish policy on Cyprus. The key factor was the new leadership. 
 
2.5. Media 
 
Salience refers to the significance of an issue. In domestic politics, an issue 
becomes salient if it receives public attention, or if decision-makers give it 
importance within their political agenda (Oppermann 2010: 3-4). When a 
foreign policy issue is perceived as salient, policy in that area is likely to 
remain stable. Low salience, on the other hand, is likely to create instability in 
foreign policy. Low salience occurs where policy-makers are highly sensitive 
to the external environment and the political cost of abandoning previous 
policies is seen as low (Goldmann 1982: 251-2). 
 
When the public see an issue as salient, it is more likely to influence 
individual voting decisions. They will only respond to a policy outcome when 
WKHLVVXHLVVHHQDVVDOLHQW7KXVWKHKLJKHUWKHLVVXH¶VVDOLHQFHWKHJUHater the 
public response. Media coverage of a foreign policy issue can strongly 
influence its perceived salience, since most of the time, the media is the 
SXEOLF¶VRQO\VRXUFHRILQIRUPDWLRQRQH[WHUQDOPDWWHUV7KHmore extensively 
an issue is reported in the media, the more importance is attached to it by the 
public (Oppermann 2010: 4-5 and 6-7). 
 
Turkish private media activity has exploded in range and volume since 1989. 
A broad pluralism exists in the Turkish press in terms of radio and television 
broadcasting. Various perspectives such as nationalism, liberalism, the secular 
right, social democracy and Islamism are discussed regularly on television in a 
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range of programmes. However, the press is probably of greater weight in 
WHUPVRIIRUHLJQSROLF\,QERWKFDVHVPHDVXUHPHQWRIWKHPHGLD¶VLPSDFWRQ
foreign policy is exceedingly difficult (Robins 2003: 80-2).  
 
The debate on the Cyprus issue in the second half of 1992 highlighted the 
PHGLD¶VLQIOXHQFH0PWD]6R\VDODQHVWHHPHGDFDGHPLFDQGWKHQDGYLVHUof 
3UHVLGHQW g]DO ZKR ZDQWHG WR VHWWOH WKH &\SUXV SUREOHP YLJRURXVO\
VXSSRUWHG 'HQNWDú¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ WKH SUHVV $JDLQVW KLP HPHUJHG &HQJL]
dDQGDU D OLEHUDO FROXPQLVW NQRZQ WR EH FORVH WR g]DO dDQGDU GHIHQGHG
g]DO¶VLQLWLDWLYHVRQ&\SUXVFODLPLQJWKDW they were in the national interest. In 
WKLVFDVHWKHEDWWOHLQWKHPHGLDZDVZRQE\0PWD]6R\VDOZKRZDVDEOHWR
win over public opinion (Robins 2003: 83-4). 
 
In the debate over the Annan Plan, however, the tide of popular opinion began 
to turn. In the early 2000s, the business eliWHEHJDQWRTXHVWLRQWKHPLOLWDU\¶V
strategy of retaining two separate states on the island. This time, the military 
was unable to enlist the support of the media, which had come under the direct 
control of key industrial and financial players. Reports were published 
criticizing the stance of the military on Cyprus and undermining its position. 
7KH PHGLD DOVR FULWLFL]HG 'HQNWDú IRU SUHYLRXV ILQDQFLDO LUUHJXODULWLHV (G. 
g]FDQ. ,QWKLVSURFHVV'HQNWDú¶VSXEOLFLPDJHJUDGXDOO\XQGHUZHQW
a radical deconstruction from a preeminent national figure symbolizing 
Turkish pride, heroic resistance and unyielding national will into a fallible, 
self-serving political leader (Anastasiou 2008: 121-2).   
 
Eventually, the mainstream media opted to distance itself from the military on 
WKH&\SUXVTXHVWLRQ7KH$UP\&RPPDQGHU$\WDo<DOPDQ¶VYLVLW WR&\SUXV
before the referendum in 2004 was generally ignored and even criticized by 
some in the mainstream media. This new attitude was in stark contrast to its 
bellicose approach during the Syrian crisis of October 1998, which had left the 
Syrians feeling that Turkey could attack at any time *g]FDQ-4). 
 
In brief, the media was effectively employed by the backers of the Annan 
3ODQVXFKDV WKH7h6ø$' LQ WKHUXQXS WR WKH$SULOUHIHUHQGXP7KH
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7h6ø$' ZKRVH PHPEHUV RZQHG PXFK RI WKH PHGLD used it to propagate 
their ideas to both the policy-makers and the public gQLú  . The 
example shows that even though the media may not have a direct impact on 
foreign policy, it can be employed to manipulate public opinion to fall in with 
the interests of dominant groups. 
 
2.6. Economic Development 
 
A number of scholars have pointed out that economic development may serve 
as a carrier for foreign policy alteration. The nature of the relationship 
between the national economy and the international political economy, and the 
effect of international systemic change, must be taken into account. Economic 
growth may make a more independent foreign policy feasible, but export-led 
growth policies may also render such national economies more vulnerable to 
international economic change. For instance, their phenomenal economic 
growth over the last two decades has brought Korea and Taiwan face to face 
with the protectionist policies of the US and the European Community. These 
high, protectionist barriers have influenced their external economic policies 
and forced them to harmonize their own interests with those of others (T. W. 
Park et al. 1994: 174-5). 
 
Since 1980, Turkey has espoused an export-oriented economic model. At the 
urging of Turkish business circles, this has entailed the integration of the 
7XUNLVK HFRQRP\ ZLWK WKH ZRUOG HFRQRP\ &RQVHTXHQWO\ 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\
towards its neighbours has been to a great extent influenced by economic 
considerations; it has become interested in creating a more stable 
neighbourhood in order to protect and further its regional economic interests. 
$Q\7XUNLVKJRYHUQPHQWKDVWRWDNHDFFRXQWRI7XUNH\¶VHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWV
7KH $.3¶V SROLF\ WR VWDELOL]H WKH UHJLRQ DQG FUHDWH LQWHUGHSHQGHncies is in 
line with the wishes of the business community, which wants to see a stable 
business environment in the region. The pursuit of economic development 
does not sit easily with security-oriented policy as it implies a more 
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integrationist outlook based on economic interdependence. Having said this, 
continuing regional instability has made the policy difficult to implement. 
 
7XUNH\¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK KDV SOD\HG D UROH LQ 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\ FKDQJH RQ
Cyprus in the sense that Turkey needs a stable neighbourhood to further its 
economic interests. Ankara desires a region in which all the economies are 
LQWHJUDWHG DQG ERUGHUV DUH SHUPHDEOH 7R WKLV HQG LW GHYHORSHG WKH ³]HUR
SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV´ SROLF\ +RZHYHU HFRQRPLF GHYHORSPHQW DORQH
does not explain the change in policy on Cyprus; the previous coalition 
government supported economic development while continuing to pursue its 
traditional policy on the discord. Again, the change must be attributed to the 
new foreign policy vision of the AKP leadership. 
 
2.7. Cultural Change  
 
Cultural shift within a society may give rise to foreign policy alteration. For 
example, it has been argued that a post-materialist cultural shift on the liberal 
OHIWZDV WKHPDLQ LPSHWXVEHKLQG ,VUDHO¶VGHFLVLRQ WRSarticipate in the Oslo 
peace process. In Israeli society, the class-based divide between capitalism and 
socialism has been redrawn along cultural lines, with liberal post-modernists 
opposing conservative materialists. Liberal post-modernists, who are leftist in 
outlook, are drawn from the well-educated middle-class, while materialist 
rightists represent the less affluent, less well-educated parts of Israeli society 
(Rynhold 2007: 419-22).
 
 
It has been suggested that the rise of post-modernism in Israel brought about a 
shift in the domestic power balance, giving Rabin, the leader of the Labour 
Party, greater political power and encouraged him to pursue a liberal foreign 
policy. As a new generation replaced the old, the post-modernist ideas of the 
liberal left started to spread through the political culture, but However, their 
SHQHWUDWLRQ LQWR ,VUDHO¶V OHIW-wing parties, political culture remained and 
foreign policy-making system remained limited. Broader domestic and 
international political circumstances and the opposition of nationalist and 
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religious parties also conspired to limit their impact. As a result, the liberal left 
was marginalized and the Oslo process collapsed. The cultural shift 
temporarily opened up a new foreign policy vision within Israel in terms of its 
interests and strategy, but the failure of the Oslo process shows that cultural 
change alone is not enough to effect real, long-term foreign policy change 
(Rynhold 2007: 435-6). 
 
In the Turkish context, the right adheres to religious, conservative and 
nationalist values, while the left is characterized chiefly by its secularism. The 
party political system is dominated by the ongoing struggle between the 
centralized, cohesive and heavily secularized state elite and a culturally 
heterogeneous opposition with strong religious leanings. Centre-right parties 
have historically relied heavily on anti-state or anti-establishment sentiment to 
expand their electoral base gQLú-7). Recently, Islamists have moved 
WRWKHFHQWUHRI7XUNH\¶VSROLWLFDOVSHFWUXPWKH\KDYHWDNHQDSURPLQHQWUROH
within 7XUNH\¶V(XURSHDQL]DWLRQSURMHFW DQGHPEUDFHG(XURSHDQYDOXHV DQG
norms. This cultural shift among Islamists has been a PDMRUIDFWRULQ7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy change on Cyprus ± this is discussed more fully in the theory 
chapter. 
 
2.8. Regime Change 
 
A revolution or a great transformation within the political system may also be 
the catalyst for foreign policy change, as might a shift in the economic regime 
(C. F. Hermann 1990: 7 and 10-1). Hagan contends that regime change may be 
caused by: a change in leadership, ruling faction or coalition; the routine 
exchange of power between contending mainstream parties or groups (for 
example following elections); or a political revolution that brings to power an 
anti-system group or coalition.The most significant barrier to foreign policy 
alteration is domestic political division between competing personalities, 
bureaucracies/institutions, factions, parties or political groups. Dissidents 
within the ruling party, the military, the legislature and regional governments 
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may publicly oppose the regime, forcing it to make concessions to retain their 
support and stay in power (Hagan 1994: 144-5, 52 and 55). 
 
7KH$.3¶VDGYHQWWRSRZHULQZDVDQH[DPSOHof the routine exchange 
of power between mainstream parties within a democratic system. It replaced 
the coalition government through a general election, in accordance with 
regular political norms. The new government did not change the democratic-
secular nature of the Turkish state. The arrival of this new leadership was a 
crucial determinant of Turkish foreign policy change ± this is discussed further 
in the theory chapter.  
 
2.9. Major Internal Developments 
 
A shift in fundamental structural domestic conditions may also result in the 
alteration of foreign policy. These structural conditions may be political or 
economic: domestic structural political factors include the outcomes of 
elections, opinion polls and coalitions; while domestic structural economic 
factorVUHODWHWRWKHHFRQRP\¶VJHQHUDOKHDOWKDVGHWHUPLQHGE\*'3JURZWK
LQIODWLRQ UDWHV DQG XQHPSOR\PHQW OHYHOV $Q H[DPSOH ZRXOG EH 6ZHGHQ¶V
serious economic problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which pushed 
the Swedish government to seek EU membership (Gustavsson 1999: 83). 
 
The February-March 2001 domestic financial crisis in Turkey was a major 
internal economic development that pushed the coalition government to 
embark upon a process of economic and political restructuring 0IWOHU-%Do
2008: 207). It has been argued that this economic crisis made big business as 
well as 7XUNH\¶VVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHVWKDWWKHFRXQWU\QHHGHG
DQ ³(8 DQFKRU´ WR KHOS LW FRPH WKURXJK WKH FKDOOHQJHV IDcing the economy 
(Eralp 2009: 5). However, although economic developments have sharpened 
7XUNH\¶VGHVLUHWRMRLQWKH(8, the economic dimension is only one aspect of 
WKHFRXQWU\¶V(8DVSLUDWLRQVLWDORQHGRHVQRWH[SODLQ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\
change on Cyprus. 
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3. Factors Related to the Organizational Structure  
 
Factors related to the organizational structure of a state may also have an 
impact on foreign policy restructuring (Goldmann 1982; Holsti 1982; C.F. 
Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001). Holsti considers the impact of bureaucratic pressures on the 
policy-making process (Holsti 1982b: 14 and 221), while Rosati points to the 
impact of the factors related to the organizational structure (Rosati 1994: 221). 
Hermann identifies bureaucratic advocacy as an influential factor and 
advocates that a government can shift its foreign policy orientation only after a 
decision-making process. (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12-3). Conversely, one of the 
main factors inhibiting foreign policy alteration is the existence of 
administrative stabilizers (Goldmann 1982: 247). 
 
Carlsnaes points to the importance of the dispositional dimension, or how a 
particular intention is espoused by a particular political actor (Carlsnaes 1993: 
19-21). Gustavsson maintains that foreign policy change occurs at the end of 
the decision-making process, during the course of which individual actors 
attempt to persuade others to their view (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). 
Organizational factors may function as either barriers to or carriers for foreign 
policy change (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). 
 
The following sections consider in more detail the significance of factors 
related to the organizational structure: domestic institutionalization, 
bureaucratic advocacy, the presence of alternative policy options and the 
decision-making mandate.  
 
3.1. Domestic Institutionalization 
 
Domestic institutionalization refers to the degree to which a policy is 
institutionalized. A high degree of institutionalization inhibits change. 
(Goldmann 1982: 251-2). In political terms, institutionalization determines the 
political norms regulating the exchanges between the ruling party and the 
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opposition. While leaders in democracies are highly constrained by structural 
norms, leaders in non-institutionalized closed polities have minimal 
restrictions to their behaviour (Hagan 1994: 155-7). A leadership may stick to 
certain ideas, principles and policies if it strongly affiliates itself with them. A 
leadership, with less association with these ideas and principles, on the other 
hand, is likely to distance itself from them. Certain ideas and principles may 
also spread across the society through the writing of history and educational 
system. 
 
*HUPDQ\¶V FLWL]HQVKLS ODZ GDWLQg back to 1913, emphasized the connection 
between citizen and nation. By mid-1990s, this understanding of identity and 
citizenship was still held by many Germans. German understanding of identity 
and citizenship was consolidated over time as the concepts were 
institutionalized in domestic regulations and institutions. However, this 
domestic institutional setting was at odds with the regional outlook of the EU 
(Checkel 2001: 567-8).  
 
The institutional context determines which groups will be more influential in 
the political framework. However, this institutional structure is itself open to 
change as a result of the interaction between different individuals and groups. 
Normative structures determine the rules of the game and what is and is not 
possible, but they can be manipulated by talented strategic actors (M. Barnett 
1999: 26-8). 
 
In the Turkish context, the historical role of the military in Turkish politics 
was explicitly institutionalized through legislation in 1960. Up until 1960, the 
PLOLWDU\SOD\HGDFHQWUDOEXWFRYHUWUROHLQSROLWLFV$IWHUWKHFRXSG¶HWDW
the PLOLWDU\¶V LQIOXHQFH RQ JRYHUQPHQW DQG SROLF\-making was given a 
constitutional framework through the establishment of the National Security 
Council (MGK). The military could give its opinion to the MGK on political-
security related issues (Robins 2003: 75-7). 
 
The military has been a rigid follower of Kemalist principles, which were 
institutionalized within the Turkish state structure during the early years of the 
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republic. The six princLSOHVRI.HPDOLVPZKLFKZHUHDUHVSRQVHWR7XUNH\¶V
historical suffering at the hands of Western imperialist powers, first appeared 
LQWKH5HSXEOLFDQ3HRSOH3DUW\¶V533PDQLIHVWRLQDQGDQGZHUH
subsequently enshrined in the Turkish Constitution in 1937. They express a 
forceful anti-imperialist, nationalist stance; Article two of the Turkish 
&RQVWLWXWLRQVWLSXODWHVWKDW³7XUNH\LVDUHSXEOLFDQQDWLRQDOLVWSRSXOLVWVWDWH
VRFLDOLVW VHFXODU DQG UHYROXWLRQLVW VWDWH´ 7KXV XS XQWLO  .HPDOLst 
principles were seen as an integral part of the state identity ,OJÕW DQG
g]NHoHFL-Taner 2012: 12). 
 
Kemalism, which envisioned a Western orientation and democratic-laic 
Turkish state, determined the institutional confines for any political party 
operating within the Turkish political context. However, when Turkey entered 
its post-$WDWUNSHULRG LQ WKHV WKLV LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGVWUXFWXUH VWDUWHG WR
break down. It was further undermined when the AKP party came to power in 
2002. The new leadership no longer strictly adhered to the Kemalist principles 
of nationalism and secularism. With regard to Cyprus, the AKP deviated from 
the traditional nationalist discourse and successfully assumed a pragmatic 
approach to settle the dispute. As democratization gathered pace, boosted by 
the EU process, Kemalist ideology lost its legitimacy as the ruling principle of 
the country, and the military lost its power over the decision-making process. 
7KLV FKDQJH LQ 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF institutionalized structure is discussed in 
further detail in Chapter VI. 
 
3.2. Bureaucratic Advocacy 
 
Bureaucrats are generally conservative in nature and inclined to preserve the 
status quo, often because they fear that a deviation from standard operating 
procedures may adversely affect their career. Most bureaucrats see change as 
challenging the integrity of their entrenched institutional mission and few 
favour alterations in policy. The conservative and self-interested character of 
most bureaucratic institutions tends to force their members to counter change 
(Schraeder 1994: 118-20). 
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Established political groups and institutions generally seek to maintain their 
privileged position within government and society by protecting the 
legitimacy and stability of the system (Rosati 1994: 230). In this way, 
bureaucratic interests may impede foreign policy alteration in democracies. 
Any attempt at restructuring must negotiate a web of bureaucracy, which has 
the effect of mitigating against major shifts (Volgy and Schwarz 1991: 620). 
To bring about foreign policy change, the leadership will have to overcome or 
thwart organizational structures and processes, the inherent tendency of which 
is to maintain the existing order (C. F. Hermann 1990: 7-8 and 11-2). 
 
In normal times, bureaucratic politics, conducted in the hands of civil servants, 
tend to prevail; foreign policy outcomes are incremental and there is little 
potential for policy change. However, when crisis situations erupt, the head of 
state gets involved in the process, moulding public opinion and providing 
consistency among the narrow minded separate bureaucratic policies and the 
worldview of the administration. In this context, the views of the head of state 
and their advisers gain significance and bureaucratic politics takes a back seat 
(Schraeder 1994: 124-5 and 33-4). Hermann argues that high level diplomacy 
DQGFULVLV HYHQWV DUH WZRVLWXDWLRQV LQZKLFK WKH OHDGHUVKLS¶V LQYROYHPHQW LV
guaranteed (M. G. Hermann 2001: 59). 
 
The debate over whether to accept or reject the Annan Plan in 2004 was both a 
crisis situation and an occasion for high level diplomacy. Accordingly, the 
government came to the forefront and the bureaucrats took a back seat. Since 
2002, the AKP has challenged the traditional attitude of Turkish bureaucracy 
by adopting a more pragmatic approach on Cyprus. Far from being advocated 
by bureaucrDWV7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VKLIWRQ&\SUXVLVDQH[DPSOHRIKLJK
level diplomacy being conducted in defiance of bureaucratic interests. 
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3.3. Presence of Alternative Policy Options 
 
,I IHDVLEOH DOWHUQDWLYHV H[LVW WR DJRYHUQPHQW¶V H[LVWLQJSROLF\ WKLVSROicy is 
likely to be destabilized (Goldmann 1982: 250). On the other hand, when there 
are no feasible alternative options, the existing foreign policy is likely to 
endure (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). 
 
A rational government will not negotiate an agreement if there is a more 
desirable alternative than cooperation. A government in a position to gainsay 
cooperation by a simple but credible threat of non-agreement in favour of a 
superior alternative is in an advantageous position in terms of bargaining 
OHYHUDJH7KHPRUHDWWUDFWLYHDJRYHUQPHQW¶VDOWHUQDWLYHVWKHOHVVLQWHQVHLWV
desire for agreement and the greater bargaining power it has. Governments 
without attractive policy options or who have more to gain from cooperation 
are more likely to compromise (Moravcsik 1993: 499-500). 
 
EU accession candidates, in principle, have much to gain by establishing 
FORVHU UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH XQLRQ 7KLV HQKDQFHV WKH (8¶V DELOLW\ WR H[HUW
pressure %|U]HODQG5LVVHE. The EU can withhold rewards at little cost 
to itself; these rewards generally mean less to the EU than they do to the 
recipient. On the other hand, if the recipient government knows that assistance 
or acceptance is likely to be unconditional, any EU threat to withdraw rewards 
ceases to be credible. In the case of the Central and Eastern European 
FRXQWULHV¶&((&HQWU\LQWRthe EU, the interdependence between the EU and 
the CEEC was so asymmetrical in favour of the EU that it had little to gain 
from this enlargement (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 14). The 
FDQGLGDWHFRXQWULHVZHUHIRUFHGWRFRPSO\IXOO\ZLWKWKH(8¶VHQWU\FULWHULD
leaving them few policy alternatives. 
 
Sweden experienced similar difficulties when it was attempting to find its way 
out of economic crisis in 1990. When negotiations between the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community (EC) to give 
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Swedish companies full access to the EC internal market failed, it had no 
option but to seek EC membership (Gustavsson 1999: 87-9). 
 
,Q7XUNH\¶VFDVHVHWWOHPHQWRI WKH&\SUXVGLVsension became a de facto EU 
entry criterion when the Republic of Cyprus was accepted into the EU in May 
2004. As an EU candidate, Turkey is obliged to recognize the Republic of 
Cyprus and to open its ports and airports to the 5HSXEOLFRI&\SUXV¶V vessels 
and aircraft. Turkish ports and airports had remained open to the vessel and 
lanes of the Republic of Cyprus from 1974 until April 1987. Settlement of the 
Cyprus discord is a sine qua non for Turkey if it wants to proceed with the EU 
accession process (Interview 16 September 6, 2011). However, even after 
VLJQLILFDQWGHFOLQH LQ7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSSURVSHFWVVLQFHPLG-2000s, AKP 
government continued to stick its policy of a unified and federal Cyprus under 
WKH81SDUDPHWHUV6R$QNDUD¶VQHZ&\SUXVSROLF\GRHs not just arise from 
its EU aspirations; the policy change is the result of its new approach to 
foreign policy rather than a perceived lack of options. 
 
3.4. Decision-making Mandate 
 
The level of authority that policy-makers have in the decision-making process 
determines their decision-making mandate. Policy-makers may be the 
dominating actors in the policy arena or they may share a decision-making 
mandate with other powerful actors, which reduces their policy-making power 
(Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). This topic is analysed further in the theory 
chapter as one of the determinants of Turkish foreign policy change in Cyprus. 
I will demonstrate that only when a propitious decision-making context 
emerged within the domestic framework of Turkey, such a foreign policy shift 
became possible. The propitious decision-making setting reinforced the 
position of the Prime Minister and that no other political actor was in a 
position to thwart his decision.  
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4. Leadership Dynamics  
 
Lastly, leadership dynamics may also impact on foreign policy alteration 
(Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M.G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1999, 2001; M.G. 
Hermann and C.F. Hermann 1989; C.F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; 
Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; M.G. Hermann et al. 2001; 
Boronza 2008). This determinant is analysed extensively in the theory chapter 
as one of the cardinal determinants of Turkish foreign policy change on 
Cyprus. 
 
This chapter draws on the literature to identify the key factors underlying 
foreign policy alteration. These factors are gathered into four main categories 
± external, domestic, organizational and leadership dynamics ± which are then 
broken down into sub-categories. In Chapter V, the relevant determinants, 
leadership, decision-making mandate and the institutionalization of the EU 
norms, are used to construct a model accounting for 7XUNH\¶V  IRUHLJQ
policy change on Cyprus. Chapter VI (leadership), Chapter VII (the EU) and 
Chapter VIII (decision-making mandate) are the empirical chapters that 
separately deal with the relevant variables in the case of Turkish policy change 
on Cyprus.  
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PART TWO: EXPLAINING FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE  
 
CHAPTER V: A MODEL DEFINING THE CAUSES OF 
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE ON CYPRUS 
 
The review on the literature of foreign policy change and Turkish foreign 
policy shows that Turkish foreign policy towards Cyprus has been influenced 
by three determinants, the leadership, the EU and the decision-making process 
from among the determinants examined in Chapter IV. While Chapter V lays 
out a model on the basis of these three dynamics to account for Turkish policy 
shift on Cyprus, Chapter VI (leadership), Chapter VII (the EU) and Chapter 
VIII (decision-making context) analyzes these determinants in the case of 
Turkish policy change on Cyprus separately. 
 
While some authors ascriEH $QNDUD¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ FKDQJH WR GRPHVWLF
considerations .ÕQDFÕR÷OX DQG 2NWD\  5RELQV , others view the 
$.3OHDGHUVKLS¶VQHZDSSURDFKWRIRUHLJQSROLF\DVWKHPDLQGHWHUPLQDQW(M. 
g]FDQ DQG 8VXO  8VOX . Researchers also point to the de-
securitization of foreign policy as democratization and Europeanization have 
WDNHQKROG 7HU]L7RFFL.DOLEHU.LULúoL$UDV
*g]FDQ In WHUPVRI WKH HIIHFW WKH(8KDVKDGRQ$QNDUD¶V&\SUXV
policy, some emphasize the influence of the EU accession process (Terzi 
 .DOLEHU  .LULúoL  $UDV  ZKLOH RWKHUV VXJJHVW WKDW
7XUNH\¶V ERWWRP-up democratization ± which has been boosted by the EU 
influence ± KDVKDGDJUHDWHULPSDFW7RFFL*g]FDQ However, 
QRQH RI WKHVH DXWKRUV RIIHUV D GHWDLOHG H[SODQDWLRQ RI $QNDUD¶V QHZ &\SUXV
policy in terms of leadership and Europeanization dynamics. Accordingly, the 
following chapteU H[SOLFDWHV WKH WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN RI 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\
change by comparing and contrasting various theories and models.  
 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework utilised to explain Ankara¶V
new Cyprus policy. I will demonstrate how various literatures in Chapter IV 
will be brought together in this thesis to form a new approach to explain 
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7XUNH\¶VSROLF\FKDQJHRQ&\SUXV,ZLOOVKRZWKDWOHDGHUVKLSWKH(8DQGWKH
decision-making dynamics are responsible for such a change. I will at the 
same time critique the Realism and Liberalism and demonstrate why they fail 
WR SURYLGH D VDWLVIDFWRU\ H[SODQDWLRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V QHZ SROLF\, while 
Constructivism provides the most relevant account and Rationalism has also 
some explanatory value. The chapter is broken into three main sections. The 
first part expounds why the leadership is the essential component of any 
foreign policy alteration. I began with a discussion of the literature on the 
impact of leadership on foreign-policy alteration. Then, I justify the choice of 
the leadership approach by comparing and contrasting it with the other 
approaches and theories. 
 
This is followed by an examination of the ideational transformation of the 
AKP leadership by a cognitive learning process from an Islamist movement 
towards one with an EU-oriented policy agenda at the centre of Turkish 
politics. This explicates how the AKP leadership embraced a new foreign 
policy on Cyprus. $IWHU WKLV DQ DQDO\VLV LV SURYLGHG RI 'DYXWR÷OX¶V QHZ
foreign-policy vision, which purported to sHWWOH 7XUNH\¶V SUREOHPV ZLWK LWV
neighbours and reflected the change in the mindset of the Turkish leadership 
towards a more constructive position in foreign affairs. Finally, the cost-
EHQHILW PRGHO LV DQDO\VHG ZLWK UHJDUG WR LWV UHOHYDQFH WR WKH $.3¶V &\Srus 
policy. From this it may be concluded that while the AKP leadership was 
initially motivated by cost-benefit calculations in its transformation, once 
embarked upRQ WKH $.3¶V QHZ FRQVWUXFWLYH IRUHLJQ-policy vision never 
changed.  
 
The second part of the chapter unveils the theoretical framework with regard 
WR WKH HIIHFWV RI (8 G\QDPLFV RQ $QNDUD¶V QHZ &\SUXV SROLF\ ,W VWDUWV E\
explaining the Europeanization of the Cyprus dispute that began with the (8¶V
pledge to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a member in 1999 even without a 
settlement on the island, thus compelling any EU-oriented Turkish 
government to assume a more pragmatic approach vis-j-vis Cyprus in order to 
proceed with its own accession negotiations. I argue that the Europeanization 
of the Cyprus question required any EU-oriented Turkish government to find a 
  115 
 
VROXWLRQWRWKH&\SUXVGLVDJUHHPHQWWRSURFHHGZLWK7XUNH\¶VRZQDFFHVVLRQ
process.  
 
While KH (8 PHPEHU VWDWHV KDG GLIIHUHQW SRVLWLRQV RQ 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ, 
their stances meant less after Turkey was granted candidate status. Except for 
Greece and Britain, no other EU state had a preference for the type of 
settlement, federal, confederal or unitary, to be found in Cyprus. After 
7XUNH\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQDVDcandidate in 1999, rather than the policies of the EU 
PHPEHUVWRZDUGV7XUNH\¶V accession, the EU Commission became the critical 
actor in the pre-accession process. 7KH (8 &RPPLVVLRQ HYDOXDWHG 7XUNH\¶V
progress on the basis of the Copenhagen and acquis criteria. As long as 
Turkey met the EU cULWHULD ODLG RXW LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 5HJXODU 5HSRUWV
7XUNH\¶VRSSRQHQWVZLWKLQWKH(8had less cause WREORFN7XUNH\¶VSURJUHVV
7XUNH\¶VEDFNHUVZLWKLQWKH(8RQWKHRWKHUKDQGEHFDPHPRUHYRLFHIXOLQ
WKHLUVXSSRUWIRU7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQ(Schimmelfennig 2009, 420-1).  
 
The third part of this chapter is on the decision-making component, which is 
the last element that contributes to the shift in Turkish foreign policy. In this 
section, I will justify the choice of this approach and show why without a 
propitious decision-making setting, a foreign policy shift would be unlikely. 
 
TABLE II Explaining Turkish Foreign-Policy Change on Cyprus 
Leadership Dynamics Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New 
Turkish Leadership with a New Outlook on Foreign 
Affairs 
EU Dynamics   Europeanization of the Cyprus Issue (EU Conditionality) 
Decision-Making Dynamics Emergence of a Propitious Decision-Making Setting 
 
1. Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish 
Leadership with a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs 
 
One of the essential arguments of this thesis LVWKDWZKDWFKDQJHGLQ7XUNH\¶V
case was the coming to power of a leadership which was open to new ideas. If 
the decision-makers are open to change, the potential for foreign policy 
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alteration is more likely (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). In the case of 
Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus, while the coalition government 
(1999-2002) had internalized continuity and was resistant to change in 
7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ LWV VXFFHVVRU WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW ZDV PLQGHG to 
VKLIW7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\WRFOHDU7XUNH\¶VURDGWR(8PHPEHUVKLS 
 
In the following section, I will first give a theoretical framework as regards the 
role of leadership in foreign policy change and then I will justify the choice of 
my approach, a cognitive learning process on the part of the leadership, by 
comparing and contrasting it with the other models and theories.  
 
1.1. Theoretical Framework on the Impact of Leadership on 
Foreign Policy 
 
The potential for leadership dynamics to have a momentous impact on 
foreign-policy alteration is well understood (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1982; M. 
G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1989, 1999, 2001; C. F. Hermann 1989, s1990; 
Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; M. G. Hermann 
et al. 2001; Boronza 2008). Leader-driven change occurs when an 
authoritative decision-maker, usually the head of government, strives 
determinately to impose his own vision of foreign policy. The relevant 
policymaker has to have the belief, power and energy to force his government 
to redirect its foreign policy (C. F. Hermann 1990: 11-2).  
 
$ OHDGHU¶V ZRUOGYLHZ SROLWLFDO VW\OH PRWLYDWLRQ LQWHUHVW and training in 
foreign affairs and political socialization have an effect on his/her foreign-
policy decisions (M. G. Hermann 1988: 268-74). Holsti describes the 
significance of a OHDGHU¶VSHUFHSWLRQVDQGFDOFXODWLRQVSHUVRQDOLW\IDFWRUVDQG
attitudes towards external actors in explaining foreign-policy shifts (Holsti 
1982b: 14 and 221). If decision-makers internalize continuity and are resistant 
to change, the potential for foreign-policy change is unlikely, but if the leader 
is open to new ideas, an alteration in foreign policy may occur (Kleistra and 
Mayer 2001: 392). A change in foreign policy is also more likely when the 
power elite shifts its outlook, or when the composition of this elite changes (C. 
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F. Hermann 1990: 11-2). In this sense, the coming to power of the AKP, 
which had a different outlook on foreign affairs, was one of the essential 
determinants in Turkish policy change on Cyprus. 
 
Carlsnaes underscores the weight of the choices and preferences of human 
actors in foreign-policy behaviour, suggesting that all non-agential factors, 
rather than directly influencing policy action, are cognitively mediated by a 
particular human actor (Carlsnaes 1993: 19-21). In other words, when a 
change happens in the ideas held by key decision-makers, foreign policy 
change is more likely. Since the state is merely an organizational structure 
without the ability of learning, analysing, or decision-making, the perceptions 
and decisions of the policymaker are of key significance in foreign-policy 
change. Decisions are made by individual decision-makers, not by 
organizations. The decision-making process can begin only after the beliefs of 
the key decision-makers have changed and they are convinced of the necessity 
of foreign-policy alteration (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Once this 
cognitive process has taken place, the individual actors can engage in a 
process of persuasion and manipulation aimed at getting others to share their 
perceptions (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). As will be seen, WKH(UGR÷DQ-*OGXR 
who was convinced that a policy shift was crucial, engaged in a process of 
persuasion of the others to get them to their position. 
 
A regime change that occurs with the advent to power of a new leadership 
may give rise to policy change in a country, if the foreign-policy orientation of 
the new leadership differs from the previous one. Different types of regimes 
have different ways of defining the severity of a foreign µthreat¶ for example, 
leaders in moderate regimes tend not to view the international environment as 
hostile in terms of national security, and they strive to cooperate with other 
countries to settle issues of international concern, whereas leaders in radical 
regimes tend to view foreign adversaries as unrelenting and immediate threats 
to the established international and regional order (Hagan 1994: 143-50). The 
perceptions of the leadership will determine the foreign policy pursued by the 
government, and a new regime may define the µnational interest¶LQD distinctly 
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different way than the previous one in terms of international position and 
interests. 
 
In line with this theory, the termination of the Cold War has been presented as 
a result of Russian Premier MikhDLO *RUEDFKHY¶V undergoing a learning 
process that led to his espousal of new ideas. In fact, the ideas that Gorbachev 
latched onto are said to have been circulating among Soviet intellectuals and 
think tanks for severDO \HDUV ZLWKRXW KDYLQJ KDG DQ LPSDFW RQ *RUEDFKHY¶V
predecessors. In the case of Gorbachev, the interaction of ideas and an agent to 
transmit and implement these ideas is of utmost significance. In this regard, 
while Constructivism stresses the weight of new ideas, a cognitive approach 
underlines the interaction between structure and agency (Boronza 2008: 20-1 
and 26), and an account that fails to take into consideration the structure-
agency dynamic will provide only a partial explanation of foreign-policy 
change (Carlsnaes 1992: 247; Gustavsson 1999: 87-9; Boronza 2008: 26). 
 
Similarly, 6ZHGHQ¶V RULHQWDWLRQ WRZDUGV WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPXQLW\ EHFDPH
possible in 1990 as a result of cognitive shifts on the part of Prime Minister 
Ingvar Carlsson and Minister of Finance Allan Larsson. Perceiving and 
reacting to structural changes that included the end of the Cold War, the 
Swedish prime minister was backed by the Swedish business elite, think tanks 
and other influential interest groups, which contributed to his learning process. 
It was Carlsson and Larsson who decided to redirect Swedish foreign policy 
towards EC membership (Gustavsson 1999: 87-9). In short, the individual 
decision-makers changed their minds and embraced a new understanding of 
Swedish foreign policy. As was the case with Gorbachev and Russia, 
&DUOVVRQ¶VHVSRXVal of new ideas determined the time and type of change that 
occurred in Sweden. 
 
6LPLODUO\ WKH (UGR÷DQ-*O duo, after a cognitive learning process, process 
that brought about a pragmatic transformation, which involved giving up 
political Islamism and embracing an EU-oriented policy agenda, which 
entailed a solution to the Cyprus problem. Convinced of the need to change 
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7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ WKH (UGR÷DQ-*O GXR VHW DERXW SHUVXDGLQJ RWKHU
actors of their argument.  
 
1.2. Why a Model of Leadership is an Essential Component of any 
Foreign Policy Change     
 
In the following, I will review and critique the literature and justify the 
selection of my approach. I will outline the various theoretical approaches that 
have been considered for this thesis and then justify the choice of the applied 
perspective. I will demonstrate how the literature on leadership relates to my 
thesis. 
 
I assert in this thesis that Realist, Liberal and Constructivist accounts are poor 
at explicating the foreign policy shift without taking into account the 
leadership component. Realist explanations focus on the structure of the 
international system, which forces the governments to respond to such 
systemic dynamics. Hans Morgenthau, one of the founding fathers of the 
realist school, claims that the fundamental actors in international relations are 
the nation-states and international relations is based on the study of power. 
"The national interest", which is defined in terms of power, is essential for the 
nation-states (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985). According to Kenneth Waltz, 
international politics functions within the anarchic international system 
without any overarching authority, which forces states to rely on no-one but 
themselves to defend their own self-interest. For this reason, Neo-realists 
overlook more domestic state-based factors and focus on the international 
system to explain policy behaviour (Waltz 2001). Owing to their excessive 
emphasis on anarchy and power, realists believe that international law and 
international institutions are merely epiphenomenal. In other words, these 
institutions reflect the balance of power, but do not constrain or influence state 
behaviour. Realists that in the absence of any hierarchical authority in an 
anarchic system cooperation among states through a treaty or institution is 
unlikely (Mearsheimer 1994). 
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Major systemic developments may have an immediate impact on the policies 
of the affected countries (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). According to Realists, 
change may be triggered by a change in fundamental structural conditions, 
which are influenced by both international and domestic factors. The factors 
may be political (such as inter-nation power relationships and the military 
aspects of national security) or economic (transnational economic transactions 
and their institutional circumstances) (Gustavsson 1999: 83-5). These 
structural factors are defined as military or non-military threats and the 
vulnerabilities and dependencies created by previous relationships (Holsti 
1982b: 14). The Vietnam Tet Offensive in 1968, the Jerusalem visit of Sadat 
in 1977 and the 1971 decision of the US to suspend the convertibility of dollar 
into gold (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12), the 1973 Oil Crisis (Volgy and Schwarz 
1991: 631), and the termination of the Cold War are all examples of 
developments that significantly affected the policies of the countries involved. 
 
In Turkey¶V FDVH WKHUH ZDV QR major systemic development that forced the 
AKP government to respond to change. This suggests that a Realist approach 
is too simplistic for expounding foreign policy change, which is a complicated 
phenomenon. My argument is therefore that if  
³WKHUH ZDV VXFK NLQG RI D V\VWHPLF GHWHUPLQDQW WKHQ ZK\ GLG LW QRW
force the coalition government in the same way as the AKP 
government? Although Realist accounts for foreign policy change lay 
out the constraints under which decisions are taken, they ignore the 
weight of indiviudal decision-makers, who are responsible for actual 
foreign policy preferences. If major structural developments force the 
decision-makers to adjust their policies in line with these dynamics, 
then these explanations fail to account for the uncompromising stance 
of the coalition government, which held fast to the confederalist ideas 
far away from the UN parameters. It does not explain ³ZK\ WKH
coalition government resisted a foreign policy shift whilst the AKP 
government embraced such a policy.´ 
 
Liberal theory is based on three core assumptions. First, individuals and 
private groups, that is, non-state actors rather than the states, are the main 
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actors in international politics. Second, states are the representation of 
dominant groups in a domestic society and serve to their interests. Third, state 
behaviour across the international system is determined by the configuration 
of the preferences of these dominant groups (Moravcsik 1997). Doyle added a 
new important aspect to the liberal theory by setting forth democratic peace, 
which envisages the absence of war between mature liberal democracies 
(Doyle 1997).  
 
Neo-liberals institutionalists suggest a win-win approach to international 
relations accentuating the weight of international institutions, which can be set 
up on jointly beneficial arrangements and compromises. While the Liberal 
theory agrees with Neo-realism on the anarchic nature of the international 
system, the central position of the state and its interests in the analysis of 
international relations, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye contend that the effect 
of the anarchic environment has been overrated by Realists (R. Keohane and 
Nye 1989). Neo-liberals put emphasis on the eventuality of cooperative 
behaviour within an anarchic and hierarchical system, where states are the 
dominant actors and force is an effective tool of policy. Neo-liberals presume 
that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can 
be established on the basis of norms, regimes and institutions, which provide 
states with other channels of political exchange than the interstate channel 
advocated by the Realists. Neo-liberals also play to the plethora of agendas 
existing within the international system apart from power relations, such as 
norms and institutions, in which cooperation is possible. When complex 
interdependence prevails, execution of military force becomes unnecessary (R. 
O. Keohane 1984).  
 
Although many scholars have emphasized the EU as the overriding 
determinant in Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 
.LULúoL$UDV this is only part of the explanation. A Liberal 
RXWORRNRQ$QNDUD¶VQHZ&\SUXVSROLF\ZRXOGFRQVLGHUWKH(8¶V norms and 
institutions as the overriding driver of the policy shift and maintain that the 
$.3JRYHUQPHQW¶VSROicy was conducted in line with the institutionalization 
of the EU norms and values within the Turkish domestic setting. 
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,W KDV EHHQ DUJXHG WKDW 7XUNH\¶V FKDQJLQJ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ RQ &\SUXV ZDV D
consequence of the Europeanization process and EU pressure to accept the 
solution proposed by the UN (Interview 16 September 6, 2011; Interview 3 
September 8, 2011). According to this argument, obliged to harmonize its 
rhetoric with EU conditionality and legal requirements (Terzi 2005: 130-3), 
Ankara abandoned its previous securitized, isolated foreign and security policy 
LQ IDYRXU RI FRRSHUDWLRQ GLDORJXH DQG µZLQ-ZLQ¶ VROXWLRQV 7KH (XURSHDQ
&RXQFLO¶V +HOVLQNL GHFLVLRQ WR JUDQW 7XUNH\ FDQGLGDF\ VWDWXV LQ 'HFHPEHU
1999 pushed Ankara to settle its long-standing problems with its neighbours, 
generating an environment that was conducive to reform and change in 
Turkish foreign policy. In this new setting, national security was redefined and 
the traditional realpolitik perspective re-evaluated. In the first few months of 
2004, this new understanding was unveiled when the AKP government backed 
the re-unification of Cyprus over the old national security imperative (Kemal 
.LULúoLD. 
 
This is one of the essential arguments of this thesis. However, Liberalism also 
has similar deficiencies as RHDOLVP LQ DFFRXQWLQJ IRU $QNDUD¶V QHZ &\SUXV
SROLF\)RUWKH(8LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQWREHDG\QDPLFRI7XUNH\¶VQHZSROLF\
on Cyprus there needs to be a government in Ankara, which sticks to EU 
membership. Thus, Liberal arguments cannot have an effect on foreign policy 
behavior of a state unless they are embraced by a leadership. Whereas the 
AKP government was eager to espouse the accession criteria of the EU and 
settle the Cyprus question, the coalition government was half-hearted in doing 
VR,QWKLVVHQVHWKHDJHQF\ZDVRINH\VLJQLILFDQFHLQ7XUNH\¶VDGRSWLRQRID
new policy on Cyprus and without a EU-RULHQWHGDJHQF\WKH(8¶VLPSDFWRQ
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ZRXOGEHOLPLWHG 
 
Moreover, the AKP goveUQPHQW¶V DGRSWLRQ RI (8 QRUPV ZDV QRW VROHO\ D
consequence of the approval on the part of the party leadership of the 
legitimacy of the EU norms, but also a rational choice based on cost-benefit 
calculations of the AKP leadership. TKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW¶V LGHDtional 
transformation from political Islamism towards an EU-oriented party cannot 
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be explained by the Liberal theory. 7KH $.3¶V LGHDWLRQDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
towards an EU-oriented party and adoption of a new policy on Cyprus was a 
consequence of a cognitive learning process on the part of the AKP leadership. 
Liberal norms and institutions do not explain the cognitive process under 
which conditions these norms were adopted.  
 
Constructivism is helpful in explicating the weight of this emergence of new 
ideas in favour of a policy shift and why such ideas were adopted by the AKP 
and not by any other political party in Turkey. Unless these new ideas were 
espoused by the agency, they would have scant explanatory value in 
expounding foreign policy behaviour. Constructivist insight as used in this 
thesis, successfully tackles the interaction between the emerging new structure 
and the agency.  
 
Constructivism criticizes the commitment of Neorealism and Neoliberalism to 
a crude form of materialism. Wendt asserts that concepts used by both schools 
are not given by nature, but socially constructed by the nature of the identities 
and interests of the key actors in the system. Thus, these concepts may be 
changed by the human agents by a process of social practice and interaction. 
According to Wendt, even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is a 
VRFLDO FRQVWUXFWLRQ 7ZR PDLQ WHQHWV XQGHUOLH WKH ³FRQVWUXFWLYLVW´ DSSURDFK
³VKDUHG LGHDV´ GHWermine the structures of human association, rather than 
material forces, and these shared ideas construct the identities and interests of 
human actors, rather than being given by nature. Rather than seeing security as 
a competitive system in win-lose terms, states may hold alternative 'co-
operative' conceptions of security in win-win terms. In such an understanding, 
security of other states may be qualified as valuable. Likewise, social 
institutions do not have unchangeable meanings, but can change by a process 
of social construction (Wendt 1992).   
 
Since constructivists focus on beliefs and ideology, they put special emphasis 
on the role of non-state actors. Constructivists underline the role of 
transnational actors like NGOs or transnational corporations, which act like 
µQRUP HQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ WR LQIOXHQFH VWDWH EHKDYLRXU in the eyes of the 
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constructivists. Such transnational actors affect state behavior on issues like 
human rights or international trade by using rhetoric, lobbying, persuasion, or 
shaming (Keck and Sikkink 1998). According to constructivists, international 
institutions are actors in their own right seeking their own interests rather than 
being the passive tools in the hands of the states. In this sense, constructivivts 
regard international bureaucracies as active actors in international politics in 
pursuit of their own interests, eg free trade and protection of human rights, 
even contrary to the wishes of the states that generated them (M. N. Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004).  
 
The holders of this view claim that Ankara¶V WUDGLWLRQDO EXUHDXFUDWLF-
authoritarian foreign policy approach (Aras 2009: 30-3) was essentially 
nationalist and defensive in outlook and aimed at preserving the security of the 
Turkish nation-state. However, as the cultural mentalities and patterns of 
social-economic life in Turkey were transformed, policy-PDNHUV¶
understanding of what constituted the national interest also began to change. 
This new mindset paved the way for a new definition of the culture of national 
security and the culture of geopolitics (Aras 2009: 30-3). 
 
Similarly, it has been argued that with growing democratization and 
Europeanization, the Turkish public has become increasingly involved in 
foreign policy decisions and more critical of the traditional approach to 
foreign policy matters. In this sense, the Turkish public has itself become a 
political actor opposing the bureaucratic elite. Foreign policy matters have 
become part of public discussion, further fostering political mobilization and 
the democratization of state-society relations in Turkey (Kaliber 2005: 322-9 
and 33-4). 
 
According to the holders of this view, special emphasis is placed on the role 
played by Foreign Minister Ahmet DaYXWR÷OX ZKR LV VHHQ DV WKH PRVW
influential foreign minister in the history of Turkish foreign policy. They point 
out that ZKLOH $QNDUD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO &\SUXV SROLF\ ZDV VHHQ DV D PDWWHU RI
national security and was therefore not open to alteration, the AKP primarily 
re-constructed WKH &\SUXV LVVXH DV D VWXPEOLQJ EORFN LQ 7XUNH\¶V UHODWLRQV
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with the EU, membership of which is its ultimate foreign policy objective (M. 
g]FDQDQG8VXO-9 and 23). 
 
Applied to Turkish foreign policy with regard to Cyprus, Constructivist 
accounts successfully grasp the cognitive component involved in foreign 
policy alteration. Constructivism underlines the significance of new ideas in 
favour of a policy shift and explains why such ideas may not be espoused by 
the leadership as evidently seen in the case of the failure of the coalition 
government tR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ Hannay 2005: 173-4; Dodd 
2010, 201-2) and why they are embraced by the AKP. Such a policy alteration 
could merely be possible with the advent to power of the AKP leadership, 
which adopted the idea of a federal solution on the basis of the UN parameters 
to the Cyprus discord. In this case, the ideas, which were being advocated by 
pro-(8 FLUFOHV VXFK DV 7h6ø$' LQ 7XUNH\ ZHUH HPEUDFHG E\ WKH $.3
which in a cognitive learning process redefined its own as well as 7XUNH\¶V
interests.  
 
In accordance with ³5ationalist' explanations which are adopted in this thesis 
and will be discussed in the following parts of this chapter (Chapter V, Section 
1.3) at length, a government may opt to comply with policy change if it judges 
the benefits of compliance to outweigh the domestic costs of adoption 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 11-2). Such an adaptation is based on 
DQDFWRU¶VLQWHQWLRQWRPD[LPL]HSRZHUDQGZHDOWKLQRWKHUZRUGVactions are 
motivated by expectations of consequences. Human actors assess policy 
alternatives on the basis of expected outcomes in relation to their personal or 
collective aims and values. The political order is characterised by negotiations 
among rational actors pursuing personal preferences and interests, with those 
actors possessing contradictory interests and different resources negotiating a 
VWULQJ RI µFRQWUDFWV¶ WR UHDFK SROLWLFDO LQWHJUDWLRQ )RUHLJQ SROLF\ DV ZHOO DV
individual action is taken in pursuance of expected outcomes, with the 
international system viewed as consisting of interacting autonomous, egoistic, 
self-LQWHUHVWHG PD[LPL]HUV $FWRUV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV DUH IRU WKH PRVW SDUW
considered as given, and expectations of consequences are regarded as 
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determined by individual bias and the state of the external world (March and 
Olsen 1998: 949-52). 
 
It is maintained that, the AKP government acted as a rational actor on the 
basis of cost-benefit calculations. Accordingly, the reason behind the AKP¶V
foreign policy objectives, settlement of the Cyprus dispute and EU 
membership, was to come to and remain in power. The holders of this view 
claim that domestic power considerations were the guiding force behind 
$QNDUD¶V GHFLVLRQ WR DGRSW D QHZ SROLF\ RQ &\SUXV .ÕQDFÕR÷OX DQG 2NWD\
2006; Robins 2007). .ÕQDFÕR÷OX DQG 2NWD\ assert that the change was a 
tactical compromise by the AKP government to boost its position at home. 
The Cyprus issue has long been a national cause for the mainstream political 
parties, but the AKP saw LWPHUHO\DVDQREVWDFOHWR7XUNH\¶V(8DPELWLRQV
%HOLHYLQJWKDW7XUNH\¶VSULRULW\VKRXOGEHWREHJLQ accession negotiations with 
the EU, the AKP endorsed the UN settlement plan for Cyprus, even though it 
was aware RIWKH(8¶VDPELYDOHQWDWWLWXGHWRZDUGV7XUNH\¶VHQWU\,WKDVEHHQ
DUJXHGWKDWWKH$.3UHPDLQVFRPPLWWHGWR7XUNH\¶V(8ELGPDLQO\EHFDXVHLW
sees this as a way to enhance its domestic legitimacy. Finding a settlement to 
the Cyprus issue would enable the AKP to counter suspicions among the 
secularist Turkish establishment that the party had a covert Islamist agenda, 
bolster its popularity abroad and prolonging its term of office at home 
.ÕQDFÕR÷OX DQG2NWD\ -4). $FFRUGLQJO\ VKLIWLQJ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV
policy was not merely a question of foreign policy, but was also a means to 
IRUWLI\WKH$.3¶VSRVLWLon vis-j-vis the other important political actors within 
Turkey dHOHQN. 
 
Along similar lines it is suggested that the Cyprus issue is of exaggerated 
significance in Turkey because of the way in which power is configured 
within the Turkish domestic framework. While the Turkish establishment, 
including the military, attaches inordinate importance to the Cyprus problem, 
seeing it as key to its own interests and power, the AKP government had no 
such vested interest. In this sense, Cyprus had become a bone of contention 
between the old regime, which has profited by maintaining the status quo in 
the island, and the new challenger. It has been suggested that part of the 
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$.3¶V DJHQGD LQ FKDQJLQJ 7XUNH\¶V &\prus policy is to undermine the 
dominance of the Turkish establishment, which has in the past exploited 
security-related matters such as the Cyprus discord to strengthen its own 
position (Robins 2007: 298-9). 
 
Rationalism, which has explanatory value with regard to this thesis accounts 
IRU WKH EHKDYLRXU RI WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW ,Q FKDQJLQJ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV
SROLF\ DQG WKXV FOHDULQJ 7XUNH\¶V URDG WR (8 PHPEHrship, the AKP 
JRYHUQPHQW DOVR DLPHG DW FRQVROLGDWLQJ SRZHU ZLWKLQ 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF
institutional context, which did not allow any Islamist party to come and 
remain in power and looked on the AKP as enjoying a covert Islamist agenda. 
Fearing the eventuality of being ousted from power or closure of the party by 
the Constitutional Court, the AKP viewed the EU membership as the only way 
to consolidatH SRZHU ZLWKLQ 7XUNH\¶V ULJLG framework. This led the AKP 
leadership to give up political Islamism and espouse an EU-oriented political 
agenda after a process of re-evaluation and re-construction of its interests. 
 
From a cognitive perspective, decision-makers are not open-minded, but 
limited by their beliefs, perceptions and methods of information processing 
(Rosati 1995: 50); however, these perceptions are not fixed, but open to 
change. According to Goldmann, change may occur in response to negative 
feedback from policy as a result of a process of learning on the part of the 
leadership. The leadership may undergo perceptual shifts as a result of 
knowledge acquisition. Learning also encompasses the restructuration and 
modification of existing schemata, i.e. a series of mental models individuals 
construct in order to visualize and interpret their environment. Through a 
learning process, a leader restructures existing schemata by adding, deleting 
and merging mental models, which may in turn prompt him/her to re-define 
his/her goals or methods of achieving them (C. F. Hermann 1990: 12). 
 
Identity constructions that are unsuitable within certain settings may be 
DEDQGRQHGDWDµFULWLFDOMXQFWXUH¶Dnd a new identity may be established that is 
suitable to the existing framework (Risse 2001: 203). After the crisis or policy 
failure, identity re-construction occurs through the processes of arguing, 
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persuasion, social learning and redefining of identities and interests %|U]HO
and Risse 2003: 66). While ideational transformation may originally be 
motivated by a wish to remain in power or some other perceived political 
interest, identity re-construction outlives alterations in instrumental interests. 
In order words, once consensus is reached on a collective identity, it sticks 
(Risse 2001: 213). 
 
Whereas the AKP government proactively pushed for a federal solution on the 
basis of the UN parameters, the coalition government held fast to the idea of a 
confederation in Cyprus. I argue that the positions of both the coalition and the 
$.3 JRYHUQPHQW DUH EHVW VSHOOHG RXW E\ WKH ³FRJQLWLYH DSproach and the 
OHDUQLQJSURFHVV´RQWKHSDUWRIERWKSROLWLFDOIRUPDWLRQVZKLFKEULQJVWRWKH
fore the leadership component in any decision of foreign policy alteration. As 
explained in Chapter VI Section 1.1, the political parties of the coalition 
government had forceful cognitive priors and were suspicious of the Western 
intentions towards Turkey, and thus failed to adopt a new policy on Cyprus. 
The AKP government, on the other hand, faced constant policy failures, which 
led to the re-definition of its interests and identity after a cognitive learning 
process. This re-definition of interests and identity led the AKP to espouse a 
more constructive and pragmatic stance on the Cyprus question. While this 
ideational transformation took its source in the cost-benefit considerations in 
first place, it outlived this pragmatic behaviour and remained in place. The 
$.3JRYHUQPHQWDIWHUDEDQGRQLQJSROLWLFDO,VODPQHYHUTXHVWLRQHG7XUNH\¶V
EU orientation and adhered to a solution in Cyprus on the basis of the UN 
parameters.   
 
The role of the decision-makers is not merely shaped by structural dynamics 
as pointed by Realists. Institutions may influence foreign policy behaviour so 
long as the leadership is inclined to adopt its norms and values. The ideas may 
have an impact on foreign policy behaviour as long as these ideas are 
espoused by the leadership, as states are abstract entities without the power to 
make decisions. :KLOH WKH (8 QRUPV DQG YDOXHV VZD\HG 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ
policy on Cyprus, this occurred only when the AKP leadership embraced EU 
membership and thus the settlement of the Cyprus problem as its political 
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objectives. The ideas circulating around for a solution in Cyprus did not have 
an impact on the coalition government, which held fast to the traditional 
confederalist line on Cyprus. Accordingly, Realist, Liberal and Constructivist 
approaches all ignore the weight of the leadership, without which political 
decisions can not be made.  
 
1.3. ³5HVRQDQFH´³&ULWLFDO-XQFWXUHV´ and Ideational 
Transformation of the AKP from Islamism towards an EU-
Oriented Political Party 
 
The concepts RIµUHVRQDQFH¶ DQG³FULWLFDO MXQcWXUHV´ may help to account for 
the $.3¶VLGHDWLRQDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQIURPDQ,VODPLVWSDUW\WRZDUGV one with 
an EU-RULHQWHG DJHQGD DQG WKXV 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJn policy change on Cyprus. 
µ5HVRQDQFH¶ LV VDLG WR GHWHUPLQH WKH DSSURSULDWHQHVV DQG OHJLWLPDF\ RI a 
particular identity construction within a particular political setting. Identity 
constructions that are unsuitable within certain settings may be abandoned at a 
µFULWLFDOMXQFWXUH¶DQGDQHZLGHQWLW\PD\EHHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWLVmore suitable 
to the new framework (Risse 2001: 203). Such a pragmatic transformation, 
UHIHUUHGWRDVµVWUDWHJLFVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶(Checkel 2001: 562), can account 
IRU WKH 7XUNLVK ,VODPLVWV¶ UHQXQFLDWLRQ RI WKHLU ,VODPLVW LGHQWLW\ DQG
construction of a new identity compatible with the existing domestic and 
international framework.  
 
µ5HVRQDQFH¶RFFXUVZKHQWKHUHLVFRQVLVWHQF\EHWZHHQWKHGRPHVWLFVHWting of 
a particular identity and certain new norms, thus facilitating their adoption. 
Whereas some domestic settings are open to the construction of new identities, 
others preclude this possibility (Checkel 2005: 812-3). Change is produced by 
the reciprocal interplay between agential and structural factors (Carlsnaes 
1993: 21-2) that generate societal transformation and continuities or shifts in 
social systems. Individual actors both affect and are affected by pre-existing 
structures; these structures continue to exist after the actions occur and may 
both enable and constrain these actions to varying degrees. 
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Resonance occurs at µFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHV¶ i.e. important developments that force 
the persuadee to redefine his/her identity and interests. Persuasion is more 
likely when the persuadee is in a novel and uncertain environment provoked 
by the newness of an issue, a crisis or a serious policy failure (Checkel 2001: 
562). After the crisis or policy failure, identity re-construction occurs through 
the processes of arguing, persuasion, social learning and redefining of 
identities and interests %|U]HODQG5LVVH.  
 
The ideational transformation of the AKP from an Islamist party to a pro-EU 
party can be explained by its social learning. Prior to the founding of the AKP, 
the Turkish Constitutional Court had closed down five Islamist parties in 
1971, 1981, 1983, 1998 and 2001 on the grounds that they intended to 
undermine the secular structure of the Turkish Republic, the closure of the 
Welfare Party (RP) in 1998, the immediate predecessor of the AKP, within the 
IUDPHZRUN RI ZKDW EHFDPH NQRZQ DV WKH µ)HEUXDU\  SURFHVV¶ ZKLFK
included a military crackdown on Turkish Islamists. This process, along with 
WKH(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV¶XSKROGLQJRIWKHGHFLVLRQKDQGHGGRZQ
by the Turkish court, represented a critical juncture for the AKP, which came 
to the conclusion that political Islamism was viable in neither the Turkish nor 
the EU institutional contexts. Thus, policy failure gave rise to a crisis for the 
political Islamist identity and to the pragmatic re-construction of this identity 
as well as a re-definition of interests and a new policy orientation for the AKP 
leadership.  
 
The idea of resonance may also help to explain other instances of national 
identity construction and their variations within Europe. Whereas European 
identity construction was inconsistent with Englishness, its incorporation into 
French and German political discourse was easier. In the late 1950s, while 
Gaullist nationalism prevailed in France, a modern Western concept of 
Europeanness carried the day in Germany. The difference in responses may be 
explained by virtue of the different domestic political and legal cultures and 
traditional domestic rules and institutions in these countries. In the British 
case, incorporation of Europeanness into the British identity was hindered by 
the high domestic legitimacy of rules and institutions (Risse 2001: 214-5)
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Thus, Britain remained the least Europeanized country with regard to identity, 
and British elites, rather than framing Europe in constitutive terms, looked 
upon it in interest-based ones (Risse 2010: 251). In the case of Germany, EU 
regional and German domestic institutional settings were conspicuously at 
loggerheads with one another in terms of citizenship ± the stiffness of 
*HUPDQ\¶VFLWL]HQVKLSODZZKLFKGDWHGEDFNWRDQGHPSKDVL]HGEORRG
in connecting citizen and nation, was based on historical as well as 
institutional grounds ± and thus complicated change for Germany (Checkel 
2001: 567-8). 
 
While ideational transformation may originally be motivated by a wish to 
remain in power or some other perceived political interest, identity re-
construction outlives alterations in instrumental interests. In order words, once 
consensus is reached on a collective identity, it sticks ± as evidenced by the 
)UHQFK 6RFLDOLVWV¶ (XURSHDQ REVWLQDF\ in sticking with European integration 
and the Euro once they were adopted in the first place (Risse 2001: 213). 
 
The transformation of French national identity is an illustration of identity 
transformation out of the newness of an issue, a crisis or a serious policy 
IDLOXUH)UDQoRLV0LWWHUUDQG¶V6RFLDOLVW3DUW\FDPHWRSRZHULQZLWKWKH
aim of setting up democratic socialism in France, but the plan was a washout, 
and Mitterrand incurred heavy electoral losses. In 1983, he had no choice but 
to radically change his policy in the direction of neo-liberalism in order to 
remain in power. This brought on a profound ideational crisis within the 
6RFLDOLVW 3DUW\ ZKLFK JUDGXDOO\ GLWFKHG µVRFLDOLVP¶ WR EHFRPH D PRGHUQ
(XURSHDQ µVRFLDO GHPRFUDWLF¶ SDUW\ ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH LQLWLDO PRWLYH RI
remaining in power invited an ideational alteration.  
 
The selection of successful identities from among available identity 
constructions may be accounted for by perceived instrumental interests (Risse 
2001: 211-2 and 16) LQDSURFHVVUHIHUUHGWRDVµVWUDWHJLFVRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶
in which agents make exhaustive means-ends calculations, maximize their 
own normative commitments and strive to alter the utility of others (Checkel 
2001: 559). The political elite of the French right went through a similar 
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process in the FRXUVHRIWKHV,QWKLVFDVHWKHµFULWLFDOMXQFWXUH¶ZDVWKH
end of the Cold War, which was succeeded by a French identity crisis. After 
the re-unification of Germany and the re-construction of the European security 
order, the French rightist political elite got wise to the fact that French 
FRQFHSWV RI µJUDQGHXU¶ DQG µLQGHSHQGHQFH¶ had been undermined. The 1992 
referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht was tied to identity-related discourse 
with respect to the role of France in Europe. This time, EU integrationists 
gained the upper hand in all the main political parties. Thus, the French right 
also espoused a policy of EU integration, as the plurality of the French 
political elite came to line up with the idea of incorporating µEuropeanness¶ 
into French notions of µdistinctiveness¶ and subsequently began to visualize 
the future of the French nation-state within the European order (Risse 2001: 
211-3). It should be noted that both the transformations of the French left and 
WKH)UHQFKULJKWZHUHFDXVHGE\µFULWLFDOMXQFWXUHV¶ZKLFKDWWHVWVWR&KHFNHO¶V
claim that persuasion is more likely when the persaudee is in a novel and 
uncertain environment provoked by the newness of an issue, a crisis, or a 
serious policy failure (Checkel 2001: 562). 
 
Examples of how political parties in candidate countries learned to adjust their 
agendas to make them consonant ZLWK (8 UHTXLUHPHQWV LQFOXGH 5RPDQLD¶V
Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and 
the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). All three of these parties rendered EU 
membership their priority and adjusted their rhetoric and agendas accordingly. 
Both the PSD and HDZ abandoned nationalistic rhetoric in favour of a new 
program based on economic reform and a more efficient state. These two 
formerly illiberal parties persistently complied with EU pre-accession 
requirements after their respective rises to power in 2000 and 2004. Similarly, 
the BSP underwent a major transformation after its re-election in 2005, 
continuing to comply with EU reforms while espousing an agenda resembling 
that of a mainstream European socialist party. (Vachudova 2005: 25-6).  
 
In the same way, after facing constant policy failures and party closures, the 
Turkish Islamists had no alternative, but to abandon political Islamism 7DúNÕQ
2008: 53) and espouse EU membership as their political priority and adjust 
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their rhetoric and agenda DFFRUGLQJO\WRHQOLVWWKH(8¶VEDcking in the face of 
the rigid establishment of Turkey. This generated a profound ideational crisis 
among political Islamists, and eventually, the newly set up AKP gave up 
political Islamism in favour of a new programme aiming at EU membership 
and settlement of the Cyprus disagreement. The AKP officials made clear that 
they abandoned political Islamism. Just after being elected in November 2002, 
(UGR÷DQ VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH $.3 LV not a religiously-oriented party, and he 
mentioned that ³the Republic of Turkey was erected on the principles of 
³GHPRFUDF\ ODLFLVP VRFLDO VWDWH DQG UXOH RI ODZ´ (Office of the Prime 
Minister November 4, 2002). (UGR÷DQ ZKR KDG identified the EU as a 
³&KULVWLDQ FOXE´ LQ  GHYLDWHG IURP WKH WUDGLWLRQDO OLQH RI KLV SDUW\¶V
earlier Islamist predecessors as well as 7XUNH\¶V (8-sceptic bloc 8÷XU DQG
Yankaya 2008: 592). After its rise to power in 2002, the AKP, whose 
members were former Islamists and anti-EU, persistently complied with EU 
pre-accession requirements.  
 
The leadership aspect of this model accounts for how a new leadership with a 
new constructive outlook on foreign affairs was able to make a radical shift in 
7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ ,Q FRQWUDVW WR LWV SUHGHFHVVRU WKH FRDOLWLRQ RI WKH
DSP-MHP-ANAP, who held fast to the confederal policy line based on two 
sovereign states, the AKP changed this position fundamentally by accepting a 
federal formula on the basis of the UN parameters. While the leaders of the 
coalition parties had forceful cognitive priors with regard to the Cyprus 
TXHVWLRQ DQG WKXV YLHZHG LW DV D PDWWHU RI ³QDWLRQDO FDXVH´ WKH $.3
leadership, coming out of an ideational crisis, caused by policy failure due to 
the closure of the Islamists parties in Turkey several times, re-defined its 
identity and interests and was able to take on a more pragmatic and 
constructive vision on the Cyprus question, which enabled it to carry out such 
a fundamental policy shift.  
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1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus 
 
Intergovernmental bargaining is one of two bargaining methods (differential 
empowerment of domestic actors is the other) commonly employed by the 
European Union to entice target countries into compliance: Intergovernmental 
bargaining entails a top-down process of rule adoption in which the target 
government directly sizes up the gains and costs of promised EU rewards. A 
government may opt to comply with EU requirements if it judges the benefits 
of compliance to outweigh the domestic costs of adoption (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005: 11-2). Adoption of certain rules within the framework 
of the pre-accession process can be a result of a µlogic of consequences¶, 
which considers rule adoption to be a consequence of strategic instrumentality 
motivated by the behaviour of a rational actor, or by a µlogic of 
appropriateness¶, which views behaviour as rule-based and actors as motivated 
by internalized identities, values and norms.  
 
The µlogic of consequences¶ LV EDVHG RQ DQ DFWRU¶V LQWHQWLRQ WR PD[LPL]H
power and wealth; in other words, actions are motivated by expectations of 
consequences. Human actors assess policy alternatives on the basis of 
expected outcomes in relation to their personal or collective aims. The 
political order is characterised by negotiations among rational actors pursuing 
personal preferences and interests, with those actors possessing contradictory 
LQWHUHVWV DQG GLIIHUHQW UHVRXUFHV QHJRWLDWLQJ D VWULQJ RI µFRQWUDFWV¶ WR UHDFK
political integration. Foreign policy as well as individual action is taken in 
pursuance of expected outcomes, with the international system viewed as 
consisting of interacting autonomous, egoistic, self-interested maximizers. 
$FWRUV¶ SUHIHUHQFHV DUH IRU WKH PRVt part, considered as given, and 
expectations of consequences are regarded as determined by individual bias 
and the state of the external world (March and Olsen 1998: 949-52). 
 
Schimmelfennig qualifies compliance baVHG RQ D µORJLF RI FRQVHTXHQFHV¶ DV
µsocialization by reinforcement,¶ with the political actor weighing the 
RXWFRPHV RI QRUP FRPSOLDQFH UDWKHU WKDQ HYDOXDWLQJ WKH QRUP¶V
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appropriateness. Thus, adaptation of behaviour can occur while views, 
interests and identities remain unchanged. While socialization by 
reinforcement may eventually lead to sustained compliance and internalization 
of adopted norms, the initial behavioural shift comes before internalization, 
and compliance may endure for a certain length of time without internalization 
(Schimmelfennig 2005: 830-1). 
 
According to Vachudova, compliance that occurs as a result of a behavioural 
shift by the target government without internalization of norms becomes 
µselective¶ and µformal¶Within this framework, a target government may aim 
to selectively transpose a massive body of the acquis communitaire into its 
national legislation, while purposely shunning chief aspects of the 
Copenhagen Criteria with respect to the stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities. Alternatively, illiberal governments may exhibit µformal 
compliance¶, as they are persuaded, under growing pressure, to conclude 
formal agreements or treaties at the international level in order to enjoy the 
prestige of good relations with the EU, but then they fail to execute these 
treaties at the domestic level (Vachudova 2005: 144). This situation was 
witnessed in the CEEC, which formally adopted massive amounts of EU 
policy without properly applying or enforcing it %|U]HODQG5LVVH12a: 193-
4). Likewise, due to their limited statehood, the Western Balkan countries 
have suffered from serious problems related to the decoupling of formal 
institutional changes from the prevailing informal institutions and behavioural 
practices  %|U]HO-9). 
 
In contrast to the µORJLF RI FRQVHTXHQFHV¶ actors governed by a µlogic of 
appropriateness¶ are concerned with the legitimacy of rules and the 
appropriateness of behaviour. In line with this logic, just as human actors 
evoke an identity and match the obligations of an identity to a particular 
situation, political actors pursue their political purposes and establish rules in 
line with their identities rather than by rational expectations governed by their 
interests. A logic of appropriateness indicates appropriate ethical action driven 
by whether or not an action LV FRQVLGHUHG µYLUWXRXV¶7KXV IRUHLJQSROLF\ LV
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concerned with the application of the rules associated with specific identities 
to specific situations (March and Olsen 1998: 951-2). 
 
The external incentives model underscores a logic of consequences that 
regards actors as rational, goal-oriented and purposeful. Actors aim to 
maximize their utility by engaging in strategic interactions on the basis of 
instrumental rationality %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH  . Agents carefully 
calculate and seek to maximize given interests, adapting their behaviour to the 
norms and rules favoured by the international community (Checkel 2005: 
809). In this rationalist bargaining model, actors exchange information, threats 
and promises in a bargaining process in which bargaining power is a 
consequence of the asymmetrical distribution of information and benefits of a 
particular agrHHPHQW LQ FRPSDULVRQ WR DOWHUQDWLYH RXWFRPHV RU µRXWVLGH
RSWLRQV¶)RUWKHPRVWSDUWDFWRUVZLWKPRUHDQGEHWWHULQIRUPDWLRQDUHDEOHWR
manipulate the outcome in their favour. The actors that are least dependent 
upon a particular agreement are in the most advantageous position to threaten 
others with non-cooperation, thereby forcing them to make concessions 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 10). Bargaining leverage is 
determined by the asymmetric intensity of national preferences in terms of the 
relative costs and benefits of agreement. In the course of negotiations, a 
government able to open markets to which others desire access or to alter 
policies that others wish to change will be in an advantageous position. The 
more a government desires agreement, the greater the concessions and the 
effort it will be required to make to attain its goal. Similarly, the more a 
government stands to potentially benefit from a new policy, the weaker its 
bargaining position in negotiations (Moravcsik 1993: 499). 
 
In terms of EU accession, conditionality has been rendered more effective by 
the µDV\PPHWULF LQWHUGHSHQGHQFH¶ of the EU and the aspiring states that 
dominate the pre-accession process. Whereas the EU is not dependent upon 
establishing economic and political bonds with any specific candidate country, 
candidates tend to look upon EU membership as a necessity for economic 
survival and prosperity. Thus, for example, the CEE countries, which were 
very strongly inclined towards membership, had very little negotiating power 
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vis-j-vis the EU. Out of this imbalance, the EU was able to threaten liberal-
minded states balking at particular reforms with exclusion from the first round 
of enlargement and threaten illiberal-minded states with exclusion from the 
process altogether. It was within this context that considerable reforms were 
enacted ± by Poland in 1996-7 and by the Czech Republic in 1998-9. In fact, 
the mechanisms of EU enlargement are not meant to civilise, democratise and 
stabilise target countries: Rather than coaxing and cajoling unwanted states 
into rendering themselves desirable, the EU requirements and the structure of 
the pre-accession process are designed to keep them out altogether 
(Vachudova 2005: 109-10). 
 
Given that the EU does not coerce target governments into compliance during 
the pre-accession process, in order to have an impact, EU demands for 
domestic change must align with the political preferences and survival 
strategies of political elites %|U]HODQG5LVVHD-200). Governments 
may weigh up the potential costs and benefits of compliance and act according 
to their interest-based calculations, drawing on EU policies and institutions to 
push their own political agendas, please their constituencies, or consolidate or 
regain power. Thus, the EU has been used by reform coalitions to advance and 
legitimise their political agendas, and Turkey is not unique in this respect. 
 
For the AKP leadership, who had split from the Welfare Party following its 
closure by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1998, the EU accession process 
was viewed as the only instrument that could provide the AKP with the 
legitimacy it needed in the face of Turkey¶VULJRURXVO\secular establishment. 
Islamist parties had been shut down by the Turkish Constitutional Court five 
times RQWKHJURXQGVWKDWWKH\DLPHGWRXQGHUPLQH7XUNH\¶VVHFXODUVWUXFWXUH 
(Ayata 2004: 272). In such an environment, participating in the EU accession 
process was viewed by AKP officials as their only means of demonstrating to 
the Turkish establishment that the party did not have a hidden Islamist agenda  
(Tocci 2005: 80). By espousing an EU-oriented policy agenda, including 
compliance with EU demands on Cyprus, the AKP could cash in on the 
prestige of EU backup at the domestic level, allowing the party to broaden its 
base of support, damp down the political clout of the Kemalist state 
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establishment as well as the military, and cling to power by demonstrating its 
own attachment to Turkey¶V secular-democratic political structure. Thus, the 
$.3¶V (8 RULHQWDWLRQ ± and, within this framework, its acceptance of the 
Annan Plan for a settlement on Cyprus ± may initially be explained by cost-
benefit considerations with regard to coming to and remaining in power. In 
other words, WKH$.3¶VDFWLRQZDVLQLWLDOO\one of an instrumentally motivated 
rational actor behaving on the basis of Dµlogic of consequences¶. However, as 
Checkel notes, what starts as behavioural adaptation may, because of various 
cognitive and institutional lock-in effects, be followed by sustained 
compliance that is strongly suggestive of internalization and preference 
change (Checkel 2005: 809). Accordingly, after coming to power in 
November 2002, the AKP¶VQHZ(8RULHQWDWLRQVWXFN, and the party has never 
reverted to its previous Islamist identity or TXHVWLRQHG 7XUNH\¶V secular-
democratic structure and Western orientation.  
 
Thus, while a new foreign-policy vision based on WKH$.3¶Vnew identity was 
responsible in changing Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus, this was a 
consequence of the AKP JRYHUQPHQW¶V re-definition of its interests and 
identity on the basis of its cost-benefit calculations (Tocci 2005: 80). Turkish 
policy change on Cyprus was affected by the AKP JRYHUQPHQW¶VELGWRFRPH
to and remain in power in Turkey. However, after re-defininng its identity and 
interests by its cost-benefit calculations, the AKP persisted with its new 
Cyprus policy based on the UN parameters for a solution in Cyprus, and it 
continues to hold this position today, never once having reverted to its 
previous position7KXVWKH$.3¶VQHZ&\SUXVSROLF\LVaffected by both its 
cost-benefit calculations and its ideational transformation and new foreign 
policy vision. As a consequence of its newly adopted norms, the AKP 
leadership believes that a settlement on the basis of the UN parameters is a 
win-win solution for all the parties concerned. 
 
A cost-benefit analysis is also capable of explaining WKH$.3¶VFRPSOLDQFHRU
non-compliance with the acquis communitaire and Copenhagen Criteria than 
its compliance with EU demands vis-j-vis Cyprus, but since these issues fall 
outside the main subject of this thesis, it is enough to touch upon them here 
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only briefly. In fact, while the AKP complied with EU demands on Cyprus, it 
failed to conform to basic EU norms such as guaranteeing an independent 
judiciary, the rule of law, human rights and a free press. This may be 
explained by the fact that such compliance with the fundamental principles of 
human rights and freedoms would undermine the domestic power base the 
AKP was able to gradually establish following its advent to power in 2002. 
AKP compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria would have been in line with 
WKH µsocialization by reinforcement¶ described by Schimmelfennig and the 
µselective and formal compliance¶ described by Vachudova (Vachudova 2005: 
144) ± µVHOHFWLYH¶because the government, transposed into Turkish legislation 
huge amounts of the acquis that did not affect its power base, but  shunned 
basic EU norms such as human rights and the rule of law DQG µIRUPDO¶
measures because treaties signed at the EU-level were unlikely to be properly 
executed.  
 
7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VQRQ-compliance or slow pace of compliance is also related 
to the fact that accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey stalled with 
WKH*UHHN&\SULRWV¶UHMHFWLRQRIWKH$QQDQ3ODQDQGWKHVXEVWDQWLDOZDQLQJRI
WKH FUHGLELOLW\ RI 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS SHUVSHFWLYH :LWK WKH UHZDUG RI
PHPEHUVKLS DSSDUHQWO\ YHU\ IDU DZD\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V GRPHVWLF SRZHU
considerations gained the upper hand, and its efforts to comply with EU 
criteria decelerated. In brief, the cost-EHQHILW PRGHO H[SODLQV WKH $.3¶V
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria in the sense that in Turkey, as in 
other candidate countries, compliance is not a smooth process in harmony with 
EU criteria, but influenced in large measure by the cost-benefit considerations 
of the target governments. 
 
2. 7KH(8¶V,PSDFWRQ7XUNH\V1HZ&\SUXV3ROLF\ 
 
7KH(8ZDV WKHRWKHU FUXFLDOGHWHUPLQDQW LQ VZD\LQJ7XUNH\¶VQHZ&\SUXV 
policy. The Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement left any EU-oriented 
Turkish government with no other option but to tackle the Cyprus dissension 
to proceed with its own accession process. Turkey, itself a candidate for 
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membership since 1999, had to remove the Cyprus barrier in its way to EU 
membership. In the subsequent theoretical framework, I will show why the EU 
element was an essential factor in Turkish foreign policy alteration on Cyprus 
by also examining the alternative accounts and demonstrating why they fail to 
explain Turkey¶VQHZSROLF\ 
 
In the second section of this part (Chapter V, section 2.2) I also analyze the 
SRVLWLRQVRIWKH(8PHPEHUVWDWHVRQ7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSDQGWKHVHWWOHPHQW
of the Cyprus question. Rather than taking the major role in the period 
following Turkey being given candidate status in 1999, the member states left 
the running to the Commission. The EU Commission thus emerged as the key 
DFWRULQ7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVVHYDOXDWLQJ7XUNH\¶VSURJUHVVDFFRUGLQJWR
the Copenhagen and acquis criteria rather than political and economic 
considerations that were later to dominate member state attitudes. Similarly, 
the EU Commission did not consider the Cyprus problem as a political 
criterion. However, settlement of the Cyprus question was essential as it 
became part of the acquis criteria. 
 
2.1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Discord 
 
Although the EU, in fact, made the decision to accept the Republic of Cyprus 
as a member despite the absence of a solution in 1999, it was with the prospect 
of the Republic of Cyprus¶V DFFHVVLRQ to the EU without a solution that the 
Cyprus issue was Europeanized. As a candidate country, Turkey would have 
to contend with the Cyprus problem within the context of the EU acquis. 
Thus, a solution for Cyprus became a sine qua non for the advancement of 
7XUNH\¶VRZQDFFHVVLRQSURFHVVprompting Ankara to accept the Annan Plan 
and then to push for another solution after the plan was rejected by the Greek 
Cypriots in April 2004. 
 
The following discussion of the Europeanization of the Cyprus question 
begins with an analysis of the literature on international institutionalization as 
a factor in foreign-policy alteration. It is followed by an examination of the 
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UHOHYDQFH RI WKH FRQFHSWV RI µGHPRFUDWLF FRQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ µacquis 
FRQGLWLRQDOLW\¶DQGµGHWHUPLQDF\DQGOHJLWLPDF\RIFRQGLWLRQV¶ZLWKUHJDUGWR
7XUNH\¶VFKDQJHLQ&\SUXVSROLF\)URPWKLVLWPD\EHFRQFOXGHGWKDWUDWKHU
than being a democratic or acquis conditionality, or a determinate or 
legitimate EU norm, the Cyprus issue has become a de facto criterion for the 
progress of accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey, requiring any 
Turkish government with EU aspirations to address the discord on Cyprus. 
 
2.1.1. International Institutionalization as an External Factor of 
Foreign-Policy Change  
 
International institutionalization is one international factor that may lead to 
foreign-policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 
2001; Smith, 2004). International institutionalization encompasses treaties and 
agreements signed by a government as well as customs that entail international 
commitments and expectations that DIIHFWDVWDWH¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\(Goldmann 
1982: 253-4). International laws, norms and regimes influence the existing 
foreign policy of a state, which is dependent upon WKDW VWDWH¶V SDVW DOOLDQFH
agreements, political engagements and commercial relationships as well as the 
international environment (Rosati 1994: 230). The normative regulations of a 
particular state may be consistent or inconsistent with international rules, 
agreements or norms (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 406),IDSDUWLFXODUFRXQWU\¶V
regulations are inconsistent with the regulations of an organization in which 
that particular country aspires to take part, then that country must adapt its 
regulations to those of the organization in question. In the case of Turkey, this 
organization is the EU. 
 
Over the last twenty years, the EU has constructed an institutional framework 
of supranational and intergovernmental components that govern European 
economic and monetary policies, environmental policies, justice and home 
affairs and an increasing number of social policies (Risse 2010: 244). Just as 
European institutions influence the policies of member-states in a top-down 
process, member-states upload their concerns and preoccupations to the 
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(XURSHDQOHYHOLQDµERWWRP-XS¶SURFHVV(Edwards 2006: 144). The EU is also 
increasingly affecting the foreign and security policies of its members. While 
at the first European Political Cooperation (EPC) meetings in the early 1970s 
only a few concrete decisions regarding foreign policy could be taken, this 
situation started to change gradually with the ever-increasing 
institutionalization of the EPC. On several contentious issues, preference-
outliers within the EU were narrowed owing to the progressive 
institutionalization of the EPC as well as the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP). Until the EPC/CFSP system was set up, EU member states 
were unable to come to a common understanding on foreign-policy issues. 
Under the institutionalized structure of the EPC/CFSP, common behaviours 
are now deeply imbedded in the national practices of EU member states as a 
result of the intensive cooperation that has been the outcome of institution-
building within the EU in general and within the EPC/CFSP in particular (M. 
E. Smith 2004: 121-3).  
 
Institutionalization at the international level may take place under international 
organizations other than the EU and according to international norms other 
than those of the EU. For instance, the parties of a disagreement may sign an 
international agreement, thereby institutionalizing the dissension between the 
parties in question under international law, and, accordingly, this agreement 
between the parties gains international recognition.  
 
The Oslo Peace Process exemplifies institutionalization under international 
law. In the process, Israel underscored the institutionalization of peace under 
international norms with the signing of an international agreement between the 
parties concerned. As a rHVXOW815HVROXWLRQZKLFKVHWRXWWKHµland for 
peace¶ formula of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process, was applied to the 
process to reinforce these norms. US President Jimmy Carter worked hard for 
the establishment of a Palestinian state out of his commitment to the norms of 
human rights and a just peace. Anwar Sadat, the Egyptian leader, purposed 
two objectives: maintaining friendly relations with Arab nations and 
advancing the issue of Palestinian human rights. The durability of peace 
between Israel and Egypt since Oslo denotes that successful normative 
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institutionalization at the international level has prevented domestic political 
actors from creating circumstances that would pave the way for a return to the 
pre-1979 state of conflict and tension (Greffenius 1994: 213 and 18). 
 
2.1.2. Institutionalization of EU Norms in the Case of Cyprus  
 
In 1999, the EU granted Turkey candidacy status, considerably raising the 
credibility of EU membership for Turkey and thus making the EU the most 
important external determinant of Turkish foreign policy. Accession requires 
candidates to meet EU demands in two chief domains: First, they must meet 
the Copenhagen Criteria, which envisions stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities; and second, they must adopt the acquis communautaire, the 
accumulated legislative and judicial decisions that comprise the body of 
European Union law. Furthermore, the EU may also ask individual countries 
to meet certain additional conditions. In the case of Turkey, the EU asked 
Ankara to contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute, pressuring the 
Turkish leadership to accept the Annan Plan. 
 
On November 5, 2003, the EU Commission released its Regular Report on 
7XUNH\¶V progress towards accession for 2003, accompanied by a strategy 
paper WKDWHPSKDVL]HGKRZ³failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a 
PDMRU KLQGUDQFH IRU 7XUNH\¶V (8 SURVSHFWV´ (European Commission 
November 5, 2003). The following day, in addressing the European 
3DUOLDPHQWLQUHODWLRQWR7XUNH\¶V(83URJUHVV5HSRUWDQG6WUDWHJ\3DSHURI
 *QWHU Verheugen, the EU commissioner for enlargement, disclosed 
that a resolution on the island was not a pre-condition, but a political message 
inserted into the documents wittingly. According to Verheugen, the reality was 
that Turkey needed to take the initiative to solve the problem in line with the 
UN plan (Radikal November 6, 2003). 9HUKHXJHQ¶V Vtatements indicate that 
the EU was pressuring Ankara to contribute to the resolution of the conflict, 
but that as the Republic of Cyprus had not yet acceded to the EU, it lacked 
sufficiently powerful institutionalized tools to officially declare a resolution on 
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Cyprus as a pre-FRQGLWLRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V own membership. It was for this 
reason that the EU, through the formal documents of the accession process and 
WKURXJK9HUKHXJHQ¶VVWDWHPHQWVDVFRPPLVVLRQHUDVNHG7XUNH\WRFRQWULEXWH
to a settlement while at the same time underscoring that a solution on Cyprus 
was not a pre-condition for Turkey¶VDFFHVVLRQ. However, once the Republic 
of Cyprus acceded to the EU ± without a resolution on the island, and despite 
7XUNH\¶VDFTXLHVFHQFHto EU demands that it accept the Annan Plan ± the EU 
would be able to officially request that Ankara extend the Additional Protocol 
between Turkey and the EU to the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member. 
Failure to do so would constitute a contravention of the acquis communautaire 
and would block Turkey¶s accession process. Thus, EU norms were imposed 
on Turkey, forcing Ankara to change its Cyprus policy and assume a more 
pragmatic approach with regard to the Cyprus dispute in order to promote its 
own accession process. ,Q IDFW $QNDUD¶V IDLOXUH WR H[WHQG WKH $GGLWLRQDO
Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus is to a great extent accountable for the 
stalling of accession talks between Turkey and the EU.  
 
2.2. Potential Alternatives to Institutionalization of EU Norms as 
an Explanatory Mechanism  
 
In order to sufficiently evaluate the Europeanization of the Cyprus 
disagreement, the following discussion examines other models, namely 
µ'HPRFUDWLF &RQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ µAcquis &RQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ µ'HWHUPLQDF\ RI
&RQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ µ&UHGLELOLW\ RI &RQGLWLRQDOLW\¶ DQG µ6L]H DQG 6SHHG RI
5HZDUGV¶ (Grabbe 2001, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; 
Vachudova 2005; Sasse 2008; Schimmelfennig 2008; Dimitrova 2011) as 
alternative explanations WKDW FRXOG SRVVLEO\ DFFRXQW IRU 7XUNH\¶V SROLF\
change on Cyprus. As will be seen, however, all of these models are deemed 
to be irrelevant. 
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2.2.1. Democratic and Acquis Conditionality  
 
Article 7 of the Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen Summit in June 
1993 VWLSXODWHVWKHIROORZLQJµdemocratic conditionality¶ for EU membership:  
 
³0embership involves that the candidate country has achieved stability 
of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union (European Council 1993: Article 7).´ 
 
At the July 1997 European Council meeting in Berlin, the 15 EU countries 
agreed on WKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶Vµ$JHQGD¶ and consonant reforms. 
µ$JHQGD¶H[SDQGHG WKHSUH-conditions for candidate countries from the 
µ&RSHQKDJHQ&ULWHULD¶RIWR include the &RXQFLORI(XURSH¶Vµ)UDPHZRUN
&RQYHQWLRQ IRU WKH 3URWHFWLRQ RI 1DWLRQDO 0LQRULWLHV¶ DV D SUH-condition for 
candidate countries (European Commission 1997). By 2009, 43 member states 
KDGVLJQHGµ$JHQGD¶DQGKDGUDWLILHGLW 
 
It is obvious that the Cyprus question has nothing to with the level of 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the existence of a functioning 
market economy and respect for and protection of minorities in Turkey. So, 
the settlement of the Cyprus question was not a democratic conditionality for 
Turkey.  
 
Acquis conditionality refers to compliance with the specific rules of the acquis 
communautaire, according to which candidate countries must adjust their 
legislation as a precondition for EU membership. Application of acquis 
conditionality started roughly in 1995 during the course of the CEEC 
accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 211). The Regular Reports 
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issued annually not only detail the progress and shortcomings of each state 
with regard to democratic and acquis conditionality (Vachudova 2005: 120-1), 
they also lay out certain conditions for the candidates beyond the boundaries 
of these criteria. Through these blanket reports, the EU makes clear its 
priorities with regard to each individual candidate. 
 
Given that resolution of the Cyprus discord could not be associated with either 
democratic or acquis conditionality until the entry of the Republic of Cyprus 
into the EU in 2004 (See Chapter VII, Section 1.1), neither of these types of 
conditionality can be considered to be explanatory factors in the change in 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\.  
 
2.2.2. Determinacy or Legitimacy of Conditions 
 
The theory of determinacy presumes that rule-adoption is more likely when 
conditions appear in the form of rewards. The clearer the behavioural 
implications of a rule, the more legalized and binding its status, the more it is 
determinant. Determinacy also includes an informational aspect that lets 
would-be adopters know what they need to do to obtain their rewards. In other 
words, there should be no uncertainty on the part of the candidates as to the 
requirements for accession (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12-3). 
Similarly, the theory of legitimacy presupposes clarity and expects that 
ambiguously and inconsistently defined rules will result in diminished 
FRPSOLDQFH$ UXOH¶V FDSDFLW\ WR FRPSHO compliance of target countries also 
decreases if member countries do not accept it on the whole or apply it 
inconsistently, whereas DUXOH¶VFDSDFLW\WRFRPSHOFRPSOLDQFHLQFUHDVHVLILW
LVERXQGXSZLWKWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VFRQVWLWXWLYHYDOXHVDQGQRUPVDQGWKHUXOH-
making-process is legitimate (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 12 and 
18-9). In other words, the more determinate and legitimate the rule, the more 
likely it is to be adopted. 
 
As a one-way process in which the non-members have to comply with the 
acquis in full (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18-9), the EU accession 
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process is ridden with legitimacy grievances. Because non-members are not 
involved in the rule-making process, a simple EU demand that a non-member 
adopt a rule creates a problem of determinacy/legitimacy. Conversely, if the 
EU enters into a deliberative process with a target country, bargains for its 
concerns and particular needs in the interpretation and implementation of the 
rules and ties its demands to international standards and higher principles, then 
the legitimacy of the rule is enhanced and any perception of imposition is 
diminished. 
 
Political conditionality itself can be said to lack both determinacy and 
legitimacy, as the EU requires certain countries to fulfil conditions that are not 
included in the acquis or that are not fulfilled by some EU member-states 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 32). The link between meeting certain 
tasks and the reception of benefits is hazy, and, it should be noted, the 
conditions laid out in the Copenhagen Criteria are very generic and diffuse, 
and having been established only in 1993, there has not been sufficient time 
for the criteria to be adequately elaborated (Grabbe 2001: 1025). To 
compensate for this, the EU clarifies its priorities through opinions issued by 
the Commission and through the Regular Reports issued annually for each 
candidate that details their progress and shortcomings with regard to meeting 
democratic and acquis conditionality (Vachudova 2005: 120-1). 
 
However, measurements of progress and standards of compliance are unclear. 
There are no quantitative targets, requirements are complex, and the EU may 
eventually require applicants to undertake certain tasks that are not made clear 
at the start of accession negotiations. Applicant countries are also faced with 
contradictory instructions: whereas the EU promotes decentralization, 
efficiency and democratic legitimacy, it also expects fast and full 
implementation of the acquis. Lastly, applicant countries are unsure of the 
requirements expected of them because they receive different advice and 
signals from different EU actors ± the European Council, the European 
Parliament, individual member-states that possess veto power over accession ± 
who may place emphasis on different tasks to be completed. (Grabbe 2001: 
1025-7). 
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The domain of minority protection is one in which the legitimacy problem is 
most evident, in that a flagrant double-standard exists between members and 
candidates. Whereas EU institutions assess the treatment of ethnic minorities 
in candidate countries with great care, they overlook the treatment of ethnic 
minorities in the member states themselves. Furthermore, there is no 
consensus among members as to whether or not minority protection should in 
the future remain one of the main values enumerated in Article 6 or whether, 
perhaps, all members should pass modest forms of minority-protection 
legislation (Vachudova 2005: 121-2). In short, conditionality with respect to 
minority rights is neither consistent ± as its application varies across countries 
± nor credible ± since non-compliance does not lead to a halt in talks (Sasse 
2008: 844-5). 
 
In essence, the demand for a settlement of the Cyprus issue cannot be 
considered a determinate or legitimate condition for Turkey, since it falls 
outside the domain of both the Copenhagen Criteria and the acquis 
communitaire. However, settlement became a de facto criterion for Turkey 
because of the need to extend the Additional Protocol to the Republic of 
Cyprus. This was a direct consequence of the accession of the Republic of 
Cyprus to the EU prior to a settlement, since, as a candidate country, under the 
conditions of the acquis communautaire, Turkey would now be required to 
extend the Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey to the 
Republic of Cyprus. The Customs Union Customs Union agreement between 
the EU and Turkey is based on March 6, 1995 decision of the EU-Turkey 
Association Council, which was established by the Ankara Agreement to 
implement a customs union between Turkey and the EU, and entered into 
effect on December 31, 1995. 
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2.2.3. Credibility of Conditionality  
 
EU rewards must be bound up with compliance. If a candidate perceives that 
the EU will provide unconditional assistance or membership, then threats to 
withdraw rewards will not be credible, or, if a candidate perceives that the EU 
will stipulate additional political, strategic or economic criteria, it may strive 
to obtain rewards from the EU without fulfilling the criteria, or, it will not 
proceed with fulfilling the criteria, assuming that rewards will not be paid 
regardless. Any of these cases will result in the non-adoption of EU rules.  
 
The µcredibility of conditionality¶ LV HQKDQFHG E\ consistency, as in the 
decision taken by the 1999 Helsinki Summit to open accession talks with 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia on the basis of their progress in satisfying 
accession criteria. In contrast, credibility was diminished by the decision to 
open accession talks with Romania and Bulgaria on political grounds, namely 
their backing of NATO¶V intervention in Kosova (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005: 14-5). Again, after 1997, geopolitical as well as domestic 
calculations led Germany to assure Poland that Germany would not allow 
3RODQG¶Vexclusion from the next round of enlargement, thereby reducing the 
credibility of conditionality while strengthenLQJ3RODQG¶Vbargaining position 
in the accession process (Vachudova 2005: 109). 
 
Moreover, due to the absence of clear benchmarks for assessment and 
mechanisms of enforcement, the minority condition undermines effective 
conditionality and highlights the distinction between rule adoption and rule 
implementation (Sasse 2008: 844-8). As part of the Copenhagen Criteria, 
minority rights is neither credible nor consistent, because its application varies 
across members and candidates. Accession talks with Latvia and Estonia were 
opened before they fully met this criterion, and when they failed to fulfil their 
compliance, the talks did not stall. (The Latvian parliament ratified the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as late as 
May 26, 2005 after its accession to the EU.) 
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Regarding the (8¶Vstipulation that Ankara contribute to the settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute, this was a highly political demand that had no pertinence to 
either the democratic conditionality represented by the Copenhagen Criteria or 
the acquis conditionality represented by the adoption of the acquis 
communitaire and as such represented an inconsistency in conditionality. 
Furthermore, the credibility of conditionality was reduced, as any expectation 
UHJDUGLQJ $QNDUD¶V HIIRUWV YLV-j-vis Cyprus lay outside the requirements of 
both the Criteria and the acquis. Ultimately, 7XUNH\¶VSURJUHVVZDVPHDVXUHG
with regard to the progress it made towards satisfying the Copenhagen criteria, 
not with regard to its efforts to settle the Cyprus dispute. Had a solution in 
&\SUXV EHHQ D FRQVLVWHQW FULWHULRQ $QNDUD¶V approval of the Annan Plan 
should KDYHXQEORFNHG7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVV 
 
2.2.4. Size and Speed of Rewards 
 
As a candidate state draws closer to joining the EU, its policies and institutions 
become more and more harmonised with the acquis (Dimitrova 2011: 222). 
However, the ultimate reward of membership remains a long way in the 
distance at those moments at which adoption costs are incurred. While 
intermediate rewards such as aid and trade liberalization exist, accession is 
ultimately linked to overall preparedness, and membership benefits are not 
partially dis-membered to reward partial readiness. Since the reward of 
accession comes in one fell swoop after a very long and highly politicized 
process, policymakers of candidate countries may find it useful to wait until 
the accession date draws near before making up any of their deficits. As a 
result, rather than acting as a scalpel that can be used to carve out 
individualized policies over the course of the accession process, conditionality 
functions more like a mallet that can be used to impose specific conditions on 
a candidate at specific points in time (Grabbe 2002: 263). 
 
Upon nearing one of the critical points µHQGJDPHV¶DWZKLFKDFDQGLGDWHPD\
jump from one stage to the next, such as opening accession negotiations or 
acceding to the EU, a candidate is more likely to face high domestic costs of 
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compliance,which can be balanced out by the high benefits acquired upon 
entering the next phase of negotiations (Schimmelfennig 2008: 931). 
 
In December 2004, Turkey had reached an endgame, as the European Council 
meeting was about to decide whether or not it was ready to commence 
accession negotiations. At this critical stage, Ankara pushed to the utmost for a 
settlement on Cyprus by accepting the Annan Plan. However, rather than 
stepping back or slowing down, Ankara has continued to pursue a settlement 
on the basis of the UN parameteUV7KHUHIRUHUDWKHUWKDQWKHµVL]HDQGVSHHG
RIUHIRUPV¶PRGHOE\ILQGLQJDVROXWLRQWRWKH&\SUXVSUREOHP$QNDUDWULHV
WR FOHDU RII WKH &\SUXV EDUULHU ZKLFK KDV EHFRPH D ³GH IDFWR acquis 
FRQGLWLRQ´ LQ IURQW RI 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLon into the EU. 6R WKH $.3¶V
adherence to a proactive, solution-oriented Cyprus policy even after the Greek 
Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan, not only indicates a broader normative 
mind-change from a security-oriented outlook on foreign affairs towards a 
more pragmatic solution-oriented standpoint, but also a requirement to clear 
7XUNH\¶URDGWR(8PHPEHUVKLS 
 
2.3. The Positions of the EU Member States on Cyprus and 
Turkey¶V(80HPEHUVKLS 
 
:KHQ,GLVFXVVWKH(8PHPEHUVWDWHV¶SRVLWLRQVRQ7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKip 
and the Cyprus question in the second section of the implementation chapter 
RQ WKH (8 &KDSWHU 9,, 6HFWLRQ  P\ PDLQ DUJXPHQW LV WKDW 7XUNH\¶V
eligibility for accession has been heavily based on the democratic and human 
rights situation in Turkey (Council of the European Union 2004).  
 
All other criteria based on religious-cultural, economic, geographic or 
military-strategic grounds that shaped the preferences of members and the 
GLVFXVVLRQRQ7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQKDYHEHHQRIDGLIIHUHQWRUGHURIOHJLWLmacy. 
2SHQLQJDFFHVVLRQWDONVZLWK7XUNH\UHVWHGRQ7XUNH\¶VFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKH
FRQVWLWXWLYH SROLWLFDO QRUPV RI WKH (8 7XUNH\¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH
accession criteria has been the responsibility of the European Commission. It 
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has been rare for the Commission's recommendations to be rejected and, 
logically, the more Turkey complies in fulfilling the criteria, the more the pro-
Turkey countries in the EU could push the EU to keep its conditional promise 
of membership. As progress in accession talks is bound up with compliance 
with the constitutive political norms of the EU, their violation (or failure to 
keep promises) becomes, ostensibly at least, the only, legitimate cause for the 
EU to suspend or cancel negotiations (Schimmelfennig 2009: 420-1). 
However, lack of a consensus within the EU based on various interests and 
preoccupations of the member states UHJDUGLQJ7XUNH\¶Vmembership rendered 
Turkish accession process a challenging one for the EU.  
 
$IWHUH[DPLQLQJWKHSRVLWLRQVRIWKH(8PHPEHUVWDWHVRQ7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQ
process and Cyprus by extensively drawing on the primary sources in Chapter 
VII, Section 2, I demonstrate that WKHSURFHVVRI7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ heavily 
KLQJHV RQ 7XUNH\¶V FRPSOLDQFH RU QRQ-compliance with the EU criteria. 
However, controversy within the EU as regards 7XUNH\¶VPHmbership makes 
Turkish accession a rather uneasy case for the EU.  
 
3. Emergence of a Propitious Decision-Making Context 
 
The emergence of a propitious decision-making setting is the last component 
of the theory employed in this thesis. A propitious decision-making context is 
an essential component of any foreign policy alteration. Whereas a leadership 
with a new outlook on foreign affairs relates to how a particular approach was 
embraced, a propitious decision-making context is about how the 
implementation of such a new understanding by the leadership became 
possible within a specific decision-making setting.  
 
In this theoretical framework, review the literature on decision-making and 
justify my choice of this approach. I also explain how the EU also helped the 
emergence of a propitious decision-making context in favour of the 
government by providing a focal point of cooperation and differentially 
empowering the domestic actors within Turkey and the TRNC. 7KH (8¶V
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impact on the decision-making setting is analyzed in this section as it relates to 
the decision-making context. As will be demonstrated in Chapter VIII, the 
interest groups, such as the business sector and the military, did not have a 
direct say on the decision-making process WRFKDQJH7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ 
(U\ÕOPD]. The role of such groups was confined to their efforts to 
win over the leadership and public opinion through lobbying and advisory 
activities and organization of conferences and demonstrations. As will be 
demonstrated in Chapter VIII, these units did not have a direct impact on the 
deFLVLRQWRFKDQJH7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ 
 
While the business elite did not have a member in the decision-making body, 
the military was represented by five members including the Chief of Staff, 
Commanders of the Land, Air, Navy and Gendarme Forces in the MGK, 
where 7XUNH\¶Vnew approach to Cyprus question was discussed extensively 
in an unprecedented and vibrant environment (+UUL\HW April 14, 2004). 
However, as will be shown in Chapter VIII, Chief of Staff +LOPLg]N|N the 
only member of the military who played a role in the decision-making process, 
made clear that the decision was to be taken by the government and the 
military would assume a neutral stance dHYLN $SULO   This was 
unusual given the dominant position of the Turkish military in Turkish 
politics.  
 
Other actors that came to the fore during the discussion of the Annan Plan 
ZHUH3ULPH0LQLVWHU$EGXOODK*OZKRIRUFHIXOO\EDcked the plan alongside 
(UGR÷DQ (Birand, +UUL\HW, April 03, 2004); President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, 
who opposed such a change (Dodd 2010: 240-1)8÷XU=L\DO the head of the 
Turkish diplomatic team for Cyprus (Birand, +UUL\HW, April 03, 2004), who 
informed the other members of the decision-making group about the details of 
the plan. In such a context, (UGR÷DQHPHUged as the predominant leader who 
took the lead and made the decision WR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶s Cyprus policy 
(+UUL\HW, April 13, 2004).  
 
7VHEHOLVXVHV WKH WHUPµYHWRSOD\HUV¶ WRGHVFULEH WKRVH individuals as well as 
collective actors whose consent is necessary for a change in the status quo 
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(Tsebelis 2010: 3-4). According to Tsebelis, in order to understand the degree 
of likelihood of policy change versus policy stability, it is important to first 
identify existing institutional veto players by determining how many 
institutions are involved in agreeing to a policy change. Given that both the 
number and range of veto players as well as their degree of partisanship 
influence policy stability, it can be assumed that when a country is confronted 
with a major exogenous shock ± e.g. a rise in oil prices, financial meltdown, 
prolonged social strife ± a government with multiple, vehement veto players 
will be unable to weather the crisis and will be forced to step aside to be 
replaced by a new coalition. Thus, governments with multiple or broader 
ranges of veto players will have shorter durations (Tsebelis 2010: 3-9). 
 
The same argument is mentioned by EU scholars as well. With regard to EU 
candidacy, the efficacy of conditionality is dependent upon the preferences of 
both government and veto players, who must agree if there is to be any change 
in the status quo: The more veto players exist, the more difficult to change the 
status quo (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 674-5). Domestic 
FRQVHQVXVDµZLQQLQJFRDOLWLRQ¶LVKDUGHUWRDFKLHYHZKHQPDQ\DFWRUVKDYH
a say in the decision-making. For instance, in Italy, a great number of trade 
unions and sectoral associations readily act as veto players, clogging any 
reform initiative %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH  -5). By contrast ± and not 
surprising, given the asymmetrical nature of the negotiations that take place 
within the framework of the pre-accession process ± the number of 
institutionalized veto players in candidate countries is few (Dimitrova 2002: 
176). During the pre-accession process the EU also privileges executives over 
legislatures (Grabbe 2001: 1016-7). $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH FDQGLGDWH VWDWH¶V
government becomes the main target of EU conditionality, thereby enhancing 
WKHUHOHYDQFHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFRVW-benefit evaluations over those of veto 
players (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 675).  
 
The EU may also differentially empower other domestic actors based on 
instrumental rationality. Here, the aim is to empower those domestic interest 
groups that will profit by EU norms and weaken those that dispute such norms 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 263; Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 500; 
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Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 37). If the EU presents determinate 
rules and credible conditionality and distributes rewards equally, then 
acceptance or rejection of conditions is contingent upon the extent of the 
domestic adoption costs and their distribution among domestic actors. In order 
to benefit from this process, domestic actors weigh up the costs and benefits of 
different options, consider the possible behaviour of other actors and 
endeavour to maximize their own utility %|U]HODQG5LVVH-4). Thus, 
Europeanization may offer some actors additional resources while weakening 
others.  
 
The differential empowerment of actors is based on the redistribution of power 
and interests among domestic actors and the defiance of the existing 
equilibrium rather than the prescription of the form of a new equilibrium. 
Differential empowerment implies that the EU contributes to changes in the 
domestic opportunity structures through the redistribution of power and 
resources between actors. However, rather than aiming to directly influence 
RSSRUWXQLW\ VWUXFWXUHV WKH (8 DWWHPSWV WR DOWHU WKH µFRJQLWLYH LQSXW¶ LQWR
opportunity structures in order to change the beliefs and expectations of 
domestic actors (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 259-63). EU membership provides 
a focal point of cooperation for pro-EU domestic interest groups, and 
conditionality gives them a framework to work towards, helping them 
overcome inertia and eliminating the need to construct a broad platform for 
domestic political consensus (Grabbe 2002: 262-3). 
 
In countries where governance has alternated between liberal-democratic and 
nationalist-populist political parties, the EU has made a decisive impact in 
terms of democratic reform. In these states, the prospect of EU membership 
provided a focal point and a common objective for opposition political forces, 
while criticism from the EU diminished the credibility of illiberal forces in the 
eyes of their electorate, who aspired to EU membership. Thus, in Romania 
(1997), Slovakia (1998) and Croatia (2002), illiberal governments were voted 
out, and reform-oriented liberal oppositions were voted in, after which they 
pursued a policy of pushing for EU membership (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2007: 91-2).  
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,Q WKH 6ORYDNLDQ FDVH WKH (8 PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW D µJRYHUQPHQWDO FKDQJH¶
LQYROYLQJ UHPRYDO RI 6ORYDNLD¶V UXOLQJ DXWKRULWDULDQ JRYHUQPHQW ZDV a 
necessary SUHUHTXLVLWH WR 6ORYDNLD¶V SURJUHVV LQ WKH DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV. By 
HPSRZHULQJWKRVHZKRZHUHFRQVWUDLQHGE\WKHFRXQWU\¶VH[FOXVLRQIURPWKH
EU, the EU position resulted in the re-structuring of the power equilibrium 
within the country (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 37). Coming to the 
conclusion that Western orientation was the best alternative for their countries, 
disparate opposition forces were able to join together and cooperate around the 
focal point of a pro-EU, liberal democratic, market-oriented agenda 
(Vachudova 2005: 140-1). Put differently, by providing a focal point for 
cooperation, European framing has been able to change the beliefs and 
expectations of domestic veto players in such a way that they shift their 
positions and come to support regulatory change (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 
262-3). 
 
The provision of a focal point of cooperation functioned in a similar way with 
respect to the Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus. The Cyprus question 
was a matter of contention between the backers of the Annan Plan and the 
Euro-sceptics. The pro-EU Turkish domestic political opposition supported 
the Annan Plan, asserting that it SURYLGHGDJRRGRSSRUWXQLW\WRFOHDU7XUNH\¶V
path to EU membership and to achieve a lasting settlement for Cyprus, 
whereas the Euro-sceptics emphasized that the Annan Plan was invidious and 
favoured the Greek Cypriot position, and they believed that even if the Cyprus 
issue were to be settled, Turkey would not be allowed to become a member. 
 
The common objective around which exponents of the Annan Plan rallied was 
WKHUHPRYDORI&\SUXVDVDEDUULHU WR7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLS%\EDFNLQJ
the Annan Plan, the FUHGLELOLW\RI WKHSODQ¶VRSSRQHQWV, such as the military 
and the political parties other than the AKP, faded, and they were presented as 
µDQWL-(8¶ $V SDUW RI WKH SUH-accession process, the EU redistributed power 
and resources between actor coalitions and helped to change the domestic 
opportunity structures in Turkey in order to empower pro-EU actors. In this 
way, the EU helped to tip the domestic equilibrium in favour of the backers of 
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the Annan Plan, and the dissenters were forced to take a back seat. Thus, the 
EU was able to reduce the potential costs to the AKP government stemming 
from a policy shift on Cyprus.  
 
In order to change the expectations and beliefs of domestic actors so as to 
secure their conformation with EU demands, the EU inserted a new cognitive 
input into the opportunity structures in Turkey, thereby affecting the reform 
process. EU demands vis-j-YLV &\SUXV ZHUH DW ORJJHUKHDGV ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V
traditional policy line and considered to be slanted towards the position of the 
Greek Cypriots. Although a huge gap existed between the views of the 
advocates and opponents of the Annan Plan within Turkey in terms of interests 
and opportunity structures, over time, EU policies were able to frame the 
expectations and interests of the dissidents. Accordingly, some of the veto 
players, such as President Sezer, moderated their positions.and came to see 
favourable aspects of a settlement in Cyprus. As a result, a dominant coalition 
advocating for a course of action consistent with EU demands emerged. 
Consequently, by altering the cognitive input into existing opportunity 
VWUXFWXUHV WKH (8 LQIOXHQFHG WKH SURFHVV OHDGLQJ WR 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy 
FKDQJHDVWKHXQEORFNLQJRI7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVVEHFDPHDIRFDOSRLQW
of cooperation among pro-EU actors to overcome resistance from the 
opponents of the Annan Plan. 
 
7KH(8¶V LPSDFW DV DQ DFWRUSURYLGLQJ D IRFDO SRLQWRI FRRSHUDWLRQ LV PRUH
visible in the TRNC, where there was an intransigent leader and government 
in power until December 14, 2003 elections. Whereas there was a 
compromising leadership in Ankara, which favoured a solution, the 
government in northern Cyprus led by DeQNWDú KHOG IDVW WR WKH LGHD RI D
confederation. In northern Cyprus, the possible settlement of the Cyprus 
discord, which would extricate Turkish Cypriots from international isolation 
and the prospect of EU membership, functioned as a focal point of cooperation 
for the Turkish Cypriots and culminated in the emergence of a large coalition 
DQGSXEOLFRSLQLRQDJDLQVW'HQNWDú¶VLQWUDQVLJHQWVWDWXV quo-oriented policies. 
As accurately indicated by Christou, the December 14, 2003 parliamentary 
elections in northern Cyprus turned into a campaign of endorsement or 
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rejection of the Annan Plan and EU membership (Christou 2004: 158-9). As a 
consequence of this process, the µTurkish Republican Party¶ led by Talat, the 
µPeace and Democracy Movement¶ OHGE\0XVWDID$NÕQFÕ, and the µSolution 
and the EU Party¶ led by Ali Erel formed an alliance on September 4, 2003, to 
fight on a collective goal. This was the ousting of 'HQNWDúIURPWKHSRVLWLRQRI
the negotiator and reaching a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan that 
would allow a unified Cyprus to accede to the EU (Ibid). The governmental 
change in the north gave the AKP government the opportunity to remove the 
'HQNWDúEDUULHULQIURQWRIDVROXWLRQLQ&\SUXV 
 
In this framework, in LWV LQLWLDWLYHWRXQEORFN7XUNH\¶VUoad to EU accession 
and settle the Cyprus discord, the Turkish business elite became the AKP 
JRYHUQPHQW¶V JUHDWHVW DGYRFDWH (Robins 2003: 84-6). Since 1980s, as an 
outcome of the introduction of an export-oriented economic model and the 
development of extensive commercial links abroad 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ DQG
security decisions have become increasingly influenced by economic 
calculations. Big business ± WKH 7XUNLVK ,QGXVWULDOLVWV¶ DQG %XVLQHVVPHQ¶V
AssociaWLRQ 7h6ø$' DQG WKH 7XUNLVK 8QLRQ RI &KDPEHUV DQG %XUVDULHV
(TOBB), in particular ± have begun to play major roles, making demands to 
DIIHFW7XUNH\¶V foreign policy decisions *g]FDQ-3) 
 
Regardless of the country, the business sector does not directly participate in 
governmental decision-making. Instead, it acts as an advisory body and 
highlights the interests of its members. In order to make a certain level of 
impact on the negotiations, it is crucial for interest groups to reinforce their 
ties with their government institutions, since national governments are the 
only legitimate interlocutors and have the best communication channels with 
the EU. In spite of this, communication between national governments and the 
business sector on issues related to enlargement has tended to remain limited 
(BorraJiQDQG-5). This point is confirmed in the case of Turkey 
by the absence of representatives of the business elite in the decision-making 
process. 
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As the decision-making bodies on EU accession policies, national executives 
and legislatures have become the targets of business lobbyists. In the Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC), Business Interest Associations 
(BIA) were transformed, establishing committees that specialised in EU 
matters and setting up representative offices in Brussels. In 1998, the 
Hungarian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (HCCI), which actively 
EDFNHG +XQJDU\¶V LQWHJUDWLRQ LQWR WKH (8 ODLG RXW DQ $FWLRQ 3ODQ WR
HPEROGHQ +XQJDU\¶V DFFHVVLRQ 7KH +&&, HPEUDFHG FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH
Hungarian government, passing on the views of the business interests it 
UHSUHVHQWHG ZLWK WKH DLP RI GHILQLQJ +XQJDU\¶V VWDQFH RQ HQODUJHPHQW 7KH
+&&,ORRNHGXSRQLWVHOIDVDQLQIOXHQWLDOSOD\HULQ+XQJDU\¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ
process, setting up contacts with the EU executive on matters concerning 
enlargement, thereby attenuating the disruption in EU-related policymaking. 
Along similar lines, the Polish Chamber of Commerce (PCC) acted as an 
DGYLVHU DQG DFWLYH DJHQW LQ 3RODQG¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ SURFHVV E\ LQLWLDWLQJ
sustained communication with the government and state administration while 
setting forth legislative bids aimed at improving the condition of the Polish 
business sector. BIAs with EU contacts in Brussels looked upon themselves as 
agents of change in their own countries, transferring their acquired knowledge 
and experience in consultative politics with the aim of developing a more 
participative political culture in their respective countries. Rather than 
affecting policymaking by attempting to mould legislation, business interest 
groups from the CEEC took on an increasingly significant role in mediating 
the interests of their members by engaging in lobbying and acting as advisers 
as well as agents of change in the ongoing transformation processes at home 
%RUUDJiQ-62). 
 
7h6ø$'¶V DFWLYLWLHV KDYH EHHQ VLPLODU WR WKRVH RI WKH %,$V RI WKH &((& 
(U\ÕOPD]In spite of the fact that no institutional mechanism exists 
for the direct participation of Turkish business interests in the decision-making 
process vis-j-vis EU acFHVVLRQ7h6ø$'KDVVHWXSUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIILFHV LQ
Brussels, Washington and many other capitals in order to further the interests 
of its members. Without becoming directly involved in Turkish policymaking, 
7h6ø$'KDVDFWHGDVDQDGYLVHUOREE\LVWLQWHUHst mediator and, by promoting 
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a participatory political culture in Turkey, as an agent of democratic 
transformation (U\ÕOPD]   It propounds legislative bids, lays out 
actions plans, organizes seminars and strives to maintain sustained 
communication with the government on matters related to its interests and the 
(8DQG LWKDVEHHQ WKHJUHDWHVW FKDPSLRQRI7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLS DQG
settlement of the Cyprus dispute. But as it was not in the decison-making 
body, it did not have a direct say in the decision-making process.  
 
Apart from business interests, Turkish civil society lacks both organizational 
capacity and a strong culture of civic engagement. For this reason, civil 
society has not been able to exert much pressure on state actors from below or 
persuade them to introduce reforms (%|U]HO DQG 6R\DOWÕQ  . In 
general, Turkish civil society is considered weak, passive and state-controlled 
or state-driven through corporatist structures. In Ottoman political culture as 
well as the bureaucratic-authoritarian early Turkish Republic, the state was 
treated as devlet baba WKH XQWRXFKDEOH µIDWKHU VWDWH¶ UDWKHU WKDQ DV DQ
organization needed to furnish leadership and essential services. From 1990s 
onwards, however, following considerable economic liberalization, Turkish 
civil society, such as Economic DevHORSPHQW )RXQGDWLRQ ø.9 DQG WKH
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) became more 
visible and vocal in advocating for greater political liberalization. However, 
compared to industrialized countries, civil society in Turkey remained less 
developed in areas such as membership, funding and levels of interpersonal 
trust (Kubicek 2005: 366-7). The weakness of civil society may be attributed 
WR7XUNH\¶VVWURQJVWDWH tradition and centralized governmental structure. With 
regard to relations between the government and civil society, there are still 
instances of exceeding governmental interference in and control of civil 
society organizations gQHU-1 and 13-4), while, at the same time, 
the Turkish political elite and party organizations has refused to allow civil 
society to penetrate into party structures. Consequently, the impact of pro-EU 
groups has limited influence on party preferences dDUNR÷OX-90). In 
WKLVFRQWH[WWKHFLYLOVRFLHW\DOVRGLGQRWKDYHDQLPSDFWLQFKDQJLQJ7XUNH\¶V
Cyprus policy. Instead, they were manipulated and mobilized by the 
leadership in favour of a policy change. 
  161 
 
 
Having discussed the role played by the business elite and civil society on 
$QNDUD¶V QHZ &\SUXV SROLF\ IURP D WKHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWive in the previous 
section, I will briefly look at the literature on the role that may be played in 
foreign policy by politicized militaries in general, after which I will focus on 
the role played by the Turkish military LQ WKH SDUWLFXODU FDVH RI 7XUNH\¶V
foreign-policy change on Cyprus.  
 
In terms of foreign-policy decisions, it is claimed that a politically active 
military or another influential actor has the potential to foil government 
decision-making based on its veto power, which may be rooted in either law, 
control over key resources, or moral authority on certain issues (M. G. 
Hermann 2001: 61-2). The extent and manner in which the military impacts 
upon foreign and defence policy have substantial implications for relations 
with neighbouring countries and ethnic minorities and thus for regional peace 
and security. During the period of communist rule in Central and Eastern 
Europe, for example, both national and Soviet militaries were part of the 
ancien regime. In return for their subjugation to communist rule, the military 
was granted a high level of autonomy with respect to the development and 
implementation of defence policy. As highly politicized bodies with close ties 
to their respective national communist parties, considerable bids were made by 
the communist leadership to entrench its political values and institutions 
within the national armed forces. As one of the leading elements of communist 
rule, the armed forces often intervened in domestic affairs alongside or in 
support of authoritarian and nationalist political forces (Cottey et al. 2002: 1-
2). For example, in the course of the 1991 break-up of Yugoslavia, the 
PLOLWDU\¶V OR\DOW\ WR WKH LGHD RI D µ8QLWHG <XJRVODYLD¶ FRPELQHG ZLWK Whe 
initiatives of the individual republics to set up their own paramilitary forces, 
played a crucial role in the subsequent conflict.  
 
Despite their shared communist heritage, the structure of civil-military 
relations in the CEE countries, the circumstances under which they obtained 
sovereignty and the broad patterns of their post-communist development have 
varied considerably. In the so-called non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states 
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of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, 
the allegiance of the various national militaries to their communist regimes 
was in doubt, suggesting that a democratic transition could be achieved 
relatively easily in these countries in comparison to Russia and Yugoslavia, 
where the militaries were more politicized and, in both cases, remained firmly 
entwined with the communist regime (Cottey et al. 2002: 2-5). 
 
As in the case of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia7XUNH\¶VPLOLWDU\LVKLJKO\
politicized. It has a rigid allegiance to the safeguarding of the secular structure 
and territorial integrity of the country, and with its institutionalised role at the 
National Security Council, it is considered to be an influential actor in Turkish 
foreign-policy and security decision-making. Nevertheless, despite the efforts 
of some members of the top brass to foil 7XUNH\¶V foreign policy change on 
Cyprus in the course of 2002 and 2004 &KLHI RI 6WDII +LOPL g]N|N ZKR
represented the newly emerging modernist vision within the military, made 
clear that the military would not be involved in such significant foreign policy 
decisions. This neutral attitude helped the government in its innovative 
approach (Birand April 15, 2003). 
 
As will be shown in Chapter VIII on the decision-making process, neither the 
Turkish business sector nor the Turkish military were part of the decision-
making unit in the case of foreign policy change on Cyprus. Their influence 
was confined to their efforts to bring about the emergence of a 
favourable/unfavourable public opinion as regards the Annan Plan. The only 
prominent actor from the military in the decision-making unit was Hilmi 
g]N|NZKRPDGHFOHDUWKDWWKHGHFLVLRQZDVWREHPDGHE\WKHJRYHUQPHQW 
Rather, (UGR÷DQHPHUJHGDVWKHPDLQDFWRULQ7XUNH\¶VGHFLVLRQ 
 
,QWHUPVRI+HUPDQQ¶VPRGHO(M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9; M. 
G. Hermann 2001: 56-7) in which foreign-policy decisions are understood to 
EH PDGH E\ DQ ³DXWKRULWDWLYH GHFLVLRQ XQLW´ 3rime Minister Recep Tayyip 
(UGR÷DQ DV WKH SUHGRPLQDQW OHDGHU PD\ EH GHVFULEHG DV WKH DXWKRULWDWLYH
GHFLVLRQXQLWLQ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\FKDQJHRQ&\SUXV(UGR÷DQZDVDEOH
to single-handedly take this decision without being thwarted by other domestic 
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actors because none of the actors in the Turkish political arena was in a 
position to defy him. 
 
(UGR÷DQ
s position was reinforced by the EU. By virtue of conditionality and 
the asymmetrical nature of negotiations, the EU pre-accession process raised 
few institutionalized veto points in candidate countries (Dimitrova 2002: 176). 
Any domestic veto players ± actors who incur adoption costs of 
comprehensive institutional and policy compliance ± have been absent or 
considered too weak to block change %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH D -8). 
Consequently, governments become the main targets of EU conditionality 
during the pre-accession process, and it is their cost-benefit calculations that 
comes to the fore (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004: 675).  
 
.OHLVWUD DQG0D\HU UHIHU WR D µGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ PDQGDWH¶ LH WKHQHFHVVDU\
level of authority in the decision-making process. A single policymaker might 
be the dominant actor in the policy arena, or s/he may share the decision-
making mandate with other powerful actors; in the latter case, policymaking 
capacity is restrained (Kleistra and Mayer 2001: 392). Goldmann argues that if 
decisions are taken by a single leader or autonomous group, change is more 
likely; if, on the other hand, decisions are taken in a delegate decision-making 
context, then change is less likely (Goldmann 1982: 249-50). When more than 
one actor is involved in decision-making, differences among the actors 
involved in decision-making may emerge with respect to the appropriate main 
strategies to be implemented to tackle threats. For instance, with respect to 
VXEVWDQWLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LVVXHV µKDUGOLQHUV¶ PD\ RSW IRU FRQIURQWDWLRQDO
DSSURDFKHV ZKHUHDV µPRGHUDWHV¶ PD\ IDYRXU GLSORPDWLF DFFRPmodation. In 
the absence of domestic political competition, a lack of controversy among 
actors with regard to foreign policy will allow leaders to more smoothly 
address themselves to new initiatives. Without political consensus at the 
domestic level, the government is limited to fuzzy rhetoric, which may change 
in intensity, but which by no means has the capacity to alter the basic structure 
of foreign policy (Hagan 1994: 155-6). 
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It is asserted that the most significant barrier to foreign-policy alteration is 
regime fragmentation. Domestic political divisions in the form of competing 
personalities, bureaucracies/institutions, factions, parties or political groups 
may encumber implementation of a foreign-policy shift (Hagan 1994: 152 and 
55-7). If such permanent political divisions are absent or limited, then the 
regime is considered cohesive. The high degree of cohesiveness in 
authoritarian regimes allows the government to act more freely, whereas 
democratization generates divisions of power among various political actors 
and institutions, resulting in lower regime cohesiveness and, therefore, a lower 
OHYHO RI FDSDFLW\ LQ WHUPV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DELOLW\ WR LQVWLWXWH IRUHLJQ-
policy change. Thus, the weight of organizational and bureaucratic factors in 
the foreign policy-making process increases in a democratic context (T. W. 
Park et al. 1994: 174). 
 
The Israeli-Egyptian negotiation process of 1977-1979 well illustrates the 
constraining role of decision-making structures in foreign policymaking. In 
this case, inopportune decision-making structures circumscribed the smooth 
operation of the decision-making process. Namely, the democratic character of 
the Israeli decision-making structure was problematic in terms of achieving 
success through the Oslo Peace Process: although Egyptian leader Anwar 
Sadat could disregard the recommendations of his advisors without the risk of 
being dislodged from power, Israeli leader Menachem Begin, faced with a 
difficult situation domestically, had a limited negotiating position and, 
cognizant of the fact that he was just first among equals in the cabinet of a 
parliamentary-democratic system, had to take into account the views of his 
ministers, knowing he might have to retreat from his negotiating position or be 
ousted from power should he fail to convince the other Israeli cabinet 
members to support him (Greffenius 1994: 217-8). 
 
According to Hermann, whose approach to decision-making will be used in 
this research, however, the type of regime is less important than the type of 
decision-making unit. An ³DXWKRULWDWLYHGHFLVLRQXQLW´LQKHUWHUPLQRORJ\KDV
the capacity to commit the resources of the government in foreign matters and 
the power to counteract other influential actors within and outside the 
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government to prevent them from bluntly reversing its position (M. G. 
Hermann 2001: 56). Hermann posits three types of authoritative decision 
units: a predominant leader, a single group, and multiple autonomous actors. 
The type of authoritative decision unit bears no connection to the type of 
political regime: A predominant leader may emerge with the authority to take 
a decision single-handedly in a democratic regime, whereas multiple 
autonomous actors may be required in an authoritarian regime. 
 
A predominant leader refers to a single individual with the authority to 
commit, or withhold, all the resources of the regime relevant to a particular 
issue, regardless of opposition. In this case, the foreign-policy machinery of 
the government is organized hierarchically, with one person at the top 
responsible for decisions. Such a leader actively participates in the decision-
making process without including others (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 
365-6). While predominant leaders may also arise in democratic regimes, such 
subsumption of authority is more characteristic of dictatorships and 
authoritarian regimes, which usually have predominant leaders in foreign 
affairs (M. G. Hermann 2001: 58-9).   
 
If the decision unit is a predominant leader, his/her interest in foreign policy 
matters has to be reckoned with. At times s/he might opt not to intervene in 
foreign affairs; however, high-level diplomacy and crisis situations are 
considered to be cases in which the involvement of the predominant leader is 
JXDUDQWHHG )DFWRUV UHODWHG WR WKH SUHGRPLQDQW OHDGHU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ DQG
socialization may also guarantee his/her involvement. For instance, a 
predominant leader might be highly interested in foreign affairs, or, due to 
his/her personality/political style, s/he might wish to be in charge of all aspects 
of governmental affairs, or s/he might be an expert on foreign relations, or s/he 
might use foreign policy as a tool to divert the opposition. According to 
Hermann, a OHDGHU¶V IRUHLJQ-policy decisions are influenced by six personal 
characteristics: worldview, political style, motivation, foreign-affairs 
interest/training, foreign-policy climate, and socialization. While worldview, 
political style and motivation pertain to a OHDGHU¶V SHUVRQDOLW\ WKH RWKHU
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV UHODWH WR WKH OHDGHU¶V H[SHULHQFH DQG EDFNJURXQG (M. G. 
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Hermann 1988: 59 and 68). Some leaders may be very interested in foreign 
affairs and thus become closely involved with major issues, taking part in all 
aspects of foreign policymaking, opting for personal contact with other world 
leaders, considering all the nuances of foreign-policy problems and situations 
and in general straining to control every aspect of the foreign policy arena. At 
the opposite extreme, a leader less interested and less experienced in foreign 
affairs may delegate much of the power and responsibility in foreign relations 
to others. If a leader is highly interested, but has less training in foreign affairs, 
s/he would most likely take part in foreign policy decision-making, but rather 
than experience, s/he would rely on worldview, political style and motives in 
such matters (M. G. Hermann 1988: 70-2). 
 
The second type of authoritative decision unit consists of a single group of 
individuals who form part of a common dominant policy group that makes 
decisions through the interactive participation of its members. This single 
JURXSH[HUFLVHV ILQDODXWKRULW\ WRFRPPLWRUZLWKKROG WKHUHJLPH¶VUHVRXUFHV
in grappling with a problem. Outside opposition is not powerful enough to 
alter the decisions of the single group, nor do these decisions require the 
approval of an external (foreign) entity (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 
366-7). The Politburo in the Soviet Union and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the 
United States are examples of this type of decision unit (M. G. Hermann 2001: 
60). 
 
Finally, the third type of decision unit is comprised of multiple autonomous 
actors, i.e., two or more separate, non-hierarchical individuals, groups, or 
organizations, none of whom have the sole authority to commit or withhold 
WKHUHJLPH¶VUHVRXUFHV LQDGGUHVVLQJ WKH LPPHGLDWHSUREOHPDQGZKRFDQQRW
be combined into a single decision unit. If the immediate problem being 
addressed is not of personal interest to a predominant leader, is not a crucial 
issue for the well-being of the regime or the society and is not under the 
control of a single group, then the authoritative decision unit is comprised of 
multiple autonomous actors (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9). 
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7KLVZDVWKHFDVHIRUH[DPSOHRI7XUNH\¶V1974 intervention in Cyprus. With 
the exceptiRQRIWKHH[HFXWLRQVWDJH3ULPH0LQLVWHU%OHQW Ecevit cannot be 
considered a predominant leader, as he did not possess the authority to commit 
government resources to back up his decisions, which could be reversed 
through the Turkish political system. Both according to the constitution and in 
practice, groups including the National Security Council, the military and the 
senate had to be consulted and persuaded in such critical matters, and Cabinet 
decisions had to be ratified by the Turkish Parliament. Thus, in this case, the 
dominant decision-making unit was comprised of multiple autonomous actors, 
including the Cabinet, the military, the senate and the parliament dXKDGDU-
g]ND\QDNDQGg]NHoHFL-Taner 2004: 51-2).  
 
$QNDUD¶VGHFLVLRQWRDFFHSWWKH(8RIIHUIRUFDQGLGDF\LQRQWKHRWKHU
hand, involved the leaders of the three coalition parties ± %OHQW Ecevit, Devlet 
%DKoHOL DQG 0HVXW <ÕOPD] ± DV ZHOO DV )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU øVPDLO &HP DQG
VHYHUDO PLQLVWU\ EXUHDXFUDWV ùNU Sina *UHO WKH PLQLVWHU UHVSRQVLEOH IRU
&\SUXVDIIDLUV0HKPHW$OL øUWHPoHOLN WKHPLQLVWHU UHVSRQVLEOH IRU7XUNLVK-
EU relations; and 3UHVLGHQW 6OH\PDQ Demirel, who, along with Cem, 
interacted with Ecevit by phone. However, given that neither the military nor 
the parliament was consulted in the decision-making process, the individuals 
making up the authoritative decision unit must be conceived of as a single 
group, rather than as a coalition of multiple autonomous actors dXKDGDU-
g]ND\QDNDQGg]NHoHFL-Taner 2004: 59). 
 
On the Cyprus issue, in the decision to accept the Annan Plan, the 
authoritative decision unit was Prime MinisteU (UGR÷DQ DV WKH SUHGRPLQDQW
leader. (UGR÷DQ*ODQG=L\DO were in favour of a solution on the basis of the 
Annan Plan (Birand, +UUL\HW, April 03, 2004). :KLOH g]N|N DVVXPHG D
neutral stance, despite his opposition, Sezer moderated his position. However, 
RQ-DQXDU\(UGR÷DQVLQJOH-handedly empowered the UN Secretary 
General with the power of arbitration, which granted the latter the right to fill 
in the blanks in the accord where the parties could not converge. This single-
handed decision by Erdo÷DQZHQW IDUEH\RQG WKHGHFLVLRn of the January 23 
MGK meeting. %RWK g]N|N DQG 6H]HU PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³(UGR÷DQ¶V VLQJOH-
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handed decision was in breach of the MGK decisions, which backed the talks 
on the basis of the UN mission of good offices´ (+UUL\HW April 13, 2004). 
Such a solo decision RQWKHSDUWRI(UGR÷DQ was also contributed to by the EU, 
which rendered the AKP government the only interlocutor in the pre-accession 
process and demonstrated that (UGR÷DQ KDG WKH FDSDFLW\ WR FRPPLW
governmental resources, and none of the other domestic actors within the 
Turkish policymaking structure was in a position to defy him 6|]HQD
111). Despite the fact that the President, some segments of the civilian-
military bureaucracy and all the political parties except the AKP opposed the 
Annan Plan, none of these veto players was in a position to countermand 
(UGR÷DQ¶V GHFLVLRQ DQG KH ZDV DEOH WR RYHUULGH DOO RSSRVLWLRQ WR FKDQJH LQ
7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ Thus, a propitious decision-making structure was 
able to catalyse a shift in Turkish policy towards Cyprus. 
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CHAPTER VI: FIRST DETERMINANT: A NEW 
LEADERSHIP 
 
The following three sections focus on the particular dynamics that affected 
7XUNH\¶VSROLF\VKLIWWRZDUGV&\SUXVEHWZHHQDQG:KLOH&KDSter 
9,H[SODLQVWKHOHDGHUVKLS¶VUROH&KDSWHU9,,KLJKOLJKWVWhe role played by the 
EU. Chapter VIII discovers why a propitious decision-making framework was 
DOVRDFUXFLDOFRPSRQHQWRI7XUNH\¶VSROLF\VKLIWYLV-j-vis Cyprus.  
 
The adoption of a particular policy by a particular leadership, and the change 
in the perceptions of the leadership, is the main factor bearing on 7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy change on Cyprus and is embodied in WKH $.3¶V DGYHQW WR
power and espousal of an EU-oriented foreign-policy agenda. Not only did it 
embrace an EU-oriented foreign policy agenda, following elections in 2002, 
the party renounced its Islamic roots and firmly committed itself to proactive 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation 
in line with UN criteria. In this process of ideational transformation and 
adoption of a new foreign policy on Cyprus, cost-benefit calculations of the 
AKP government ± the government considered this change a means of 
GHPRQVWUDWLQJ LWV :HVWHUQ FUHGHQWLDOV WR 7XUNH\¶V strictly secular 
establishment ± and a mind-change towards an EU-oriented party on the part 
of the AKP leadership.went hand in hand. Accordingly, the policy change on 
Cyprus can not be ascribed to simple cost-benefit calculation.  
 
This empirical chapter analyses the ideational transformation of the AKP from 
an Islamist party towards one at the centre of the Turkish political spectrum 
and reveals why such a transformation entailed a new foreign-policy vision on 
Cyprus. It begins by explicating the Turkish institutional framework, which 
has viewed Islamist parties with scepticism. Following this, it offers an 
explanation as to why the coalition government that preceded the AKP was 
incapable of implementing a policy change, and then provides a detailed look 
at the transformation of the AKP from an historical perspective, including a 
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V\QRSVLVRI$KPHW'DYXWR÷OX¶VQHZIRUHLJQSROLF\YLVLRQ, which reflects the 
new mindset of the AKP government. Finally, the chapter concludes with an 
assessment of the explanatory value of an adoption-costs model in the case of 
Turkish foreign policy change vis-j-vis Cyprus. 
 
1. Normative Account: The Advent to Power of a New Turkish 
Leadership with a New Outlook on Foreign Affairs 
 
1.1. The Turkish Ideological/Cultural Framework 
 
In order to understand why the AKP was able to transform itself into an EU-
oriented party with a new foreign-policy vision on Cyprus as well as the 
SUHYLRXVFRDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRGRVRLWLVRIXWPRVWLPSRUWDQFHWR
examine the institutional setting in which these changes did or did not take 
place. The Turkish institutional environment has been historically Euro-
sceptical and has not readily allowed bureaucratic institutions and political 
parties to transform themselves into Western-style democratic entities. In 
HVVHQFH WKH SHUVRQD RI 0XVWDID .HPDO $WDWUN Iounder of the Turkish 
Republic, represents the most important institution in Turkey, and the Turkish 
state is dominated by his political priorities and views. In contrast to other 
personality cults, the veneration of $WDWUN± a military hero and a prescient 
statesman in the eyes of the Turkish people ± is sincere and genuine. Kemal 
$WDWUN is seen as the leader who saved the Turkish people from extinction 
and the country from occupation and subjugation, and his personality is 
associated with Turkish independence and sovereignty and a sense of national 
pride and dignity 7DúSÕQDU  -5). $WDWUN¶V SUHVHQFH RQ HYHU\ ZDOO
represents the enduring influence of a mixture of nationalism and secularism 
LQ7XUNH\¶VSROLF\RULHQWDWLon. The Turkish army, bureaucracy and judiciary 
were still to a large extent act in consonance with Kemalist principles as late 
as 2002. (Cooper 2002: 126).  
 
On account of his image as the indisputable eternal leader of the country, 
$WDWUN¶V LGHRORJ\KDVKDGDSHUGXUDEOHHIIHFWRQ7XUNH\¶VSROLWLFDO FXOWXUH
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and his OHJDF\KDVEHHQRQHRI WKHPRVW LPSRUWDQWGHWHUPLQDQWVRI7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy. Kemalism has found expression in a revolutionary and militant 
version of secularism and assimilationist nationalism 7DúSÕQDU  . 
$WDWUN¶V:HVWHUQL]DWLRQZKLFKLVLQIOXHQFHGLQODUJHPHDVXUHE\WKH)UHQFK
Revolution and its anti-clerical tradition of laicite, entailed the abolishment of 
the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, Arabic letters, Islamic education and 
Sufi brotherhoods. Thus, in Turkey, religion is viewed by Kemalists as a 
symbol of backwardness and opposition to the very existence of the republic. 
Whereas religion is associated with the ancien regime, obscurantism, 
conservatism and traditionalism, the republic refers to enlightenment, progress 
and modernity. The total exclusion of religion from public life has aroused 
harsh secular reaction regarding issues such as the donning of headscarves in 
public schools 7DúSÕQDU-5). 
 
The assimilationist nationalism of Kemalism is again constructed on the 
French model, which abnegates multi-culturalism, multi-ethnicity and multi-
national cosmopolitanism. This made the policy of assimilation of Muslim 
minorities inevitable. Non-Muslim communities, on the other hand, were 
viewed as Turkish citizens, but were subjected to de facto discrimination, 
which included banning them from all public-sector employment 7DúSÕQDU
2008: 4-5). The Kemalist concept of nationalism replaced the Ottoman 
identification with Islam and dynasty with loyalty to Anatolia and the Turkish 
nation. Despite this ethnic emphasis on Turkish culture, language and history, 
the Turkish Constitution stipulates that all citizens of the Republic of Turkey 
are Turks, regardless of their ethnicity (Kushner 1997: 222). All Ottoman 
Muslims in Anatolia ± Albanians, Bosnians, Caucasians, Kurds and Laz as 
well as Turks ± were smoothly melded into a new nation defined as a 
homogeneous, Turkish nation. By means of a secular state and society, the 
shared religion of these communities was transformed into a national identity. 
While all Muslim groups were equally considered to be first-class members of 
the nation, non-Muslim groups, on the other hand, were second-class citizens 
granted the oIILFLDOVWDWXVRIµPLQRULW\¶dRODN.  
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During the first two decades following the establishment of the Republic of 
Turkey, its founding fathers viewed their Ottoman past as a µDark Age¶ in 
which Turkish history and language had been ignored. The Ottomans were 
UHSUHVHQWHGDVWKH7XUNLVK5HSXEOLF¶VµRWKHU¶ZKRKDGVXSSUHVVHGWKHVWDWH¶V
Turkish identity and striven to form a new identity built on a community of 
Islam. Ottoman imperial heritage, expansionism, irredentism and all types of 
universalism, whether Ottomanism, pan-Islamism or pan-Turkism, were 
disowned during the course of the formation of the republic in the 1920s. This 
new approach facilitated the Western-RULHQWDWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\
Since Anatolia was the last remaining territory, a concept of indivisible and 
inviolable national borders was formulated. The application of Jacobin 
secularism excluded any Islamic identity other than the official one, and non-
Muslim and non-Turkish identities were suppressed in the public domain. 
Turkishness increasingly came to be portrayed as referring to secular, Sunni 
Turkish-speakers, including Kurds (Fisher Onar 2009: 232-3). 
 
For the Kemalists, the only way to achieve their main goal of raising the new 
republic to the level of contemporary civilization was to eliminate Islam from 
all aspects of political and cultural life. The identification with religion and its 
century-long role in the Ottoman Empire were inadmissible to the new 
Turkish identity, which was constructed on the basis of the cultural 
WesternL]DWLRQ RI VRFLHW\ 7KH µRWKHUL]DWLRQ¶ of Islam and the Ottoman past 
represented the only way in which the republican elite would be able to shift 
the basis of legitimacy from religion to nationality. Since Islam and 
civilization were deemed incompatible, Islam would be excluded from all 
DVSHFWV RI SROLWLFDO DQG VRFLDO OLIH $WDWUN EHOLHYHG WKH :HVW WR EH
synonymous with contemporary civilization, and, accordingly, the 
modernization of the Turkish society would take place along Western 
European lines and include the espousal and internalization of all aspects of 
Western political, social and cultural life. Through the secularization of the 
VWDWHDQGWKHLQGLYLGXDOWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSHUVRQDOLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK,VODPWKDW
had existed under the Ottoman Empire came to be replaced by his/her 
LGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRIµ7XUNLVKQHVV¶%R]GD÷OÕR÷OX-1). 
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$WDWUNQRWRQO\EHOLHYHGWKDWFRQWHPSRUDU\FLYLOL]DWLRQKDGIRXQGH[SUHVVLRQ
in Western societies, he also believed that in order for the Turkish nation to 
rise to their level, Turkey would have to become part of the Western world 
(Walker 2007: 3). Against this backdrop, the Turkish state established along 
Kemalist lines was firmly Western-oriented, and owing to its secularism, its 
approach towards Islam was sceptical, while its nationalism made it similarly 
sceptical mistrustful of the Kurdish ethnic movement. The rejection of religion 
in the state administrative structure and the formation of a new Turkish 
language gave Turkey a new identity, distancing it from Asian and Muslim 
countries, structures and institutions (Cooper 2002: 117).  
 
The Turkish state establishment also harbours sensitivities concerning 
7XUNH\¶V WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\DVD UHVXOWRI LWVQHJDWLYHKLVtorical experiences. 
As explained by Fuller, two centuries of Western imperialism, the loss of huge 
chunks of territory in the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and the 
salvation of Anatolia only after an extraordinary war of resistance created an 
environment in which the Turkish elite had become highly sensitive on issues 
related to its national dignity and its national interests and wary regarding the 
intentionVRI:HVWHUQSRZHUV+LVWRULFDOH[SHULHQFHKDVZRYHQLQWR7XUNH\¶V
national fabric a forceful anti-imperialist nationalism together with a lasting 
suspicion towards Western motives lying just beneath the surface that has 
from time to time fiercely erupted (Fuller 2004: 55-6). 
 
7KLVPLVWUXVWWRZDUGVWKH:HVWKDVEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDVWKHµ6qYUHV6\QGURPH¶
after the treaty imposed on the defeated Ottoman Empire in 1920 at the end of 
World War I. Signed by the Ottoman Sultan, but never put into effect, the 
Treaty of Sqvres rendered the Turkish-Muslim population of Anatolia into a 
minority, leaving them with a rump state in the centre, while the Turkish 
straits were put under the administration of the League of Nations, the Greeks 
were given extensive rights in Western Anatolia, and Armenian and Kurdish 
states under the mandate of the Great Powers were established in eastern 
Turkey. Although the treaty was never carried out, the fear occasioned by it 
persists to a great extent in colouring Turkish attitudes towards the West 
(Ahmad 2004: 9). For the Kemalists, the Treaty of Sqvres demonstrated that 
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Western powers could never be trusted ± and led to the persuasion among the 
Kemalist elite that no other state can be trusted; thus, Turkey must be ready at 
any given time to fight for its territorial integrity. Kemalist circles still largely 
view the world from this perspective of endangerment ,OJÕW DQG g]NHoHFL-
Taner 2012: 15). As Hale has commented, in the minds of the founders of 
Turkey, the Treaty of Sqvres was a clear statement of entente designs on 
Turkey (Hale 2000: 45-6), and this suspicion of the West continues to be 
shared by all actors in the Turkish political spectrum today: the army, 
Kemalist nationalists, leftists and Islamists as well as most Westernized circles 
in Turkey (Fuller 2004: 55-6).  
 
Among Kemalists, the Cyprus issue is also seen for the most part from this 
unfavourable historical perspective of Ottoman suffering under the hands of 
Western imperialism, and any steps on Cyprus are rated as moves that would 
resume a process leading to the eventual breakup of the Republic of Turkey, 
just like the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the new republic disowned its 
Ottoman past and Islamic identity alongside any irredentist claims on former 
Ottoman territories (Fisher Onar 2009: 232-3). 
 
With regard to Cyprus, the historical context was intensified by the historical 
animosity between Greeks and Turks. Starting with the Greek revolution 
against the Ottoman Empire in 1821 and continuing to the end of the Balkan 
Wars in 1913, the Turks experienced a perpetual loss of territory to the 
Greeks. Such a historical process invited a perception among the common 
people as well as policymakers that Greece, a national enemy, should be kept 
from capturing Cyprus, another strategic island off the coast of Turkey. Thus, 
Cyprus became the place to halt the unremitting Greek expansionism against 
the Turks that had started in 1821. In this sense, the attitude of Turkish foreign 
policy towards Cyprus was moulded by nationalist and security considerations 
grounded in an historical setting (Uzer 2011: 106-7 and 48). This security 
FXOWXUH UHVWV RQ WKH FRQFHSWV RI µQDWLRQDO VHFXULW\¶ DQG µORVV RI WHUULWRU\¶ DV
highlighted in a slogan used extensively by .HPDOLVW FLUFOHV µ7XUNH\¶V
defence starts in Cyprus; if any concessions are made on these matters, 
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7XUNH\¶VGLVLQWHJUDWLRQZLOOIROORZ¶µ$7XUNKDVQRIULHQGRWKHUWKDQD7XUN¶ 
is another common Turkish expression.)  
 
7KH .HPDOLVWV FRQVLGHU WKH (8¶s attitude towards the Cyprus question as 
unjust and favouring the Greek perspective, and they believe that if Turkey 
consents to EU demands on Cyprus, then other demands ± such as recognizing 
the 1915 events as genocide ± will follow. On the other hand, to a large 
measure, the Kemalist elite also believe that even if the Cyprus dispute is 
settled, Turkey will not be accepted as an EU-member. 2QXU g\PHQ &+3
deputy and a senior diplomat, reflects this outlook in his parliamentary speech. 
g\PHQVWDWHGWKDW 
³Christian Democratic Union in Germany as well as some other parties 
in France and Austria publicly opposes 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS Some 
people think that if we make concessions on the Cyprus issue, the 
doors of Europe will be opened. This is not the case, but we act like 
entire Europe expects from us such concessions. For this reason, 
Turkey should not abandon its fundamental interests on national issues 
and should not make concession just to accede to the EU. Turkey 
should offer resistance against pressure aQGXQIDLUGHPDQGV´(TBMM 
Reports Journal May 29, 2003).  
Among these circles, the Annan Plan was viewed as an attempt to disrupt 
Turkish national unity, which could only be safeguarded by backing the 
independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus .HPDO .LULúoL 
2006a: 33-5). In line with this national security perspective, the cardinal 
objective of Turkish foreign policy became the maintenance of national 
independence, territorial integrity and the security and continuity of the 
Turkish state as a modernist, secularist national structure. In this regard, the 
.HPDOLVW HOLWH IHDUV WKDW 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF VHFXULW\ DQG WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\
could be disrupted by demands made by the EU within the context of the 
Europeanization process. This mindset is not peculiar to the Kemalists, but is 
shared by those with other political tendencies, including nationalists, 
Westernists, Islamists and even internationalists g]NHoHFL-Taner 2005: 62), 
all of whom have traditionally categorized the Cyprus dispute as a µQDWLRQDO
FDXVH¶ 6XFK D GRPHVWLF IUDPHZRUN has inhibited Turkish decision-makers, 
  176 
 
who have been socialized under this context, from taking a more pragmatic 
approach on the Cyprus question. From their nationalist perspective, the 
decision-makers stuck to their call for a confederal solution for the island. 
 
In addition to WKH(8¶Vstance on Cyprus, its attempts to impose its own set of 
parameters on Turkish identity discourse called forth disquiet among the 
Kemalist elite. The definition of Turkish identity and interests has been firmed 
up over time as a result of the institutionalization of these concepts by Turkish 
domestic legislation and institutions. For example, Article 3 of the Turkish 
Constitution states that ³WKH FRXQWU\ DQG QDWLRQ RI 7XUNH\ UHSUHVHQWV DQ
inseparable union, and its language is TurkisK´ (Constitution of the Turkish 
Republic 1982: Article 3), and Article 5 notes that this article, along with 
Articles 1 and 2, cannot be modified, nor can their modification be proposed 
(Constitution of the Turkish Republic 1982: Article 5). Although there are 
some overlaps between EU and Kemalist internal parameters, the Kemalist 
definition of Turkish identity has been called into question by certain EU 
parameters, such as the EU¶V calls for reform of Turkish political institutions 
and changes in Turkish political culture, including greater religious freedom 
and political pluralism (Lynott 2009: 11). 7KH µLGHQWLILFDWLRQ¶ K\SRWKHVLV
alleges that strong governmental identification with the EU community of 
FRXQWULHVµFRPPLWPHQWWR(XURSH¶IDFLOLWDWHVFRPSOLDQFHZLWKFRQGLWLRQDOLW\
(Schimmelfennig et al. 2003: 500) +RZHYHU IRU DOO 7XUNH\¶V VWDXQFK
identification with the West, as late as the early 2000s, the notion of Turkish 
nationalism was at variance with the pluralist notion of nationality within the 
EU framework. The understanding of the Turkish state defied the protection of 
ethnic minorities and accentuated the homogeneity, unity and indivisibility of 
the state, its people and its soil. Turkish Europeanization was based on the 
authoritarian model of modernist nationalism and uniform identity that paved 
the way for the establishment of a monolithic Turkish nation-state that was 
entirely at odds with the post-modern state that had been evolving in Europe 
since the early 1990s. The cachet of the post-modern state under the EU 
framework has been its recognition of multiple identities and promotion of 
minority rights (Sotiris 2008: 9). 
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However, the Turkish Europeanization based on an authoritarian model of 
modernist nationalism and uniform identity has been defied with a new 
definition within the EU process. In the course of the accession process, a new 
debate emerged between the Euro-sceptics and pro-EU actors that was 
JURXQGHG LQ WKH FRQFHSWV RI 7XUNH\¶V WKUHDW assessments, geographical 
determinism and overall strategic culture. Euro-sceptics, who are made up of 
traditionalists form the civilian-military elite, emphasize the unfavourable 
implications that the EU process might have in Turkey. This persuasion is 
rooted in the traditional security preoccupations of the Kemalist elite, who 
stress geo-strategic calculations and concerns over territorial disintegration 
and loss of land. In this discourse, the Kemalists project the µ6qYUHVV\QGURPH¶
onto the EU reform process, which is seen as entailing the adoption of 
regulations that could undermine Turkey¶V territorial integrity and secular 
nature. Pro-European actors, who are comprised of business circles, civil 
society organizations and non-governmental actors bring to the forefront the 
need for a re-FRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRI7XUNH\¶VVWUDWHJLFFXOWXUHDQGPRYLQJDZD\
from security-oriented definitions towards economic and human-resources-
based approaches. They champion a reduction in military outlays and an 
investment in education and human resources (Aybet 2006: 544), and they 
have pushed hard for Turkish acceptance of the Annan Plan with the backup 
of the EU.  
 
1.2. Why a Policy Change on Cyprus Did Not Take Place under the 
Coalition Government (1999-2002) 
 
Whereas the FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V ILUP DGKHUHQFH WR WKH LGHDV
institutionalized in the Turkish domestic context, based on negative historical 
experiences and fear of disintegration, precluded policy change on Cyprus, the 
AKP government, facing constant policy failures, was able to transform its 
Islamist identity towards an EU-oriented one and espouse a new pragmatic 
vision on Cyprus. 
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Even though the 1999-2002 coalition government had enacted several 
legislative packages to harmonise with the EU acquis, the coalition leaders ± 
%OHQW (FHYLW RI WKH 'HPRFUDWLF /HIW 3DUW\ '63 'HYOHW %DKoHOL RI WKH
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and MesuW <ÕOPD] RI WKH 0RWKHUODQG
Party (ANAP) ± ZHUH GLVLQFOLQHG WR FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ Even 
DIWHU7XUNH\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQ as a candidate for full EU membership in December 
1999, Ecevit, then the Turkish Prime Minister H[SUHVVHG WKDW ³7XUNLVK
Cypriots should not be concerned as the presence of the TRNC is not only 
LQHYLWDEOHIRUWKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWVEXWDOVRIRU7XUNH\¶VVHFXULW\´6LPLODUO\
0HVXW <ÕOPD] then the Deputy Prime Minister, stated in March 2002 that 
³there are two distinct nations and two sovereign states in Cyprus´ and 
³7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS SURVSHFWV FDQQRW EH DVVRFLated with a solution in 
&\SUXV´ (Kyris 2011: 97-8). 
 
On this issue, the coalition government was dominated by the ideas of the DSP 
and MHP. Prime Minister Ecevit, who had become chairman of the 
5HSXEOLFDQ 3HRSOH¶V SDUW\ LQ  after øVPHW øQ|Q D ZDU KHUR ZKR KDG
WDNHQRYHUWKHSRVLWLRQIURP$WDWUNKDGEHOLHYHGWKDW7XUNH\FRXOGHPSOR\D
more assertive foreign policy independent of the superpowers of the time 
$\GÕQ  . Thus, Ecevit did not waver in unilaterally interfering in 
Cyprus in July 1974 to halt a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Turkish 
Cypriots by a Greek and Greek Cypriot partnership intent on enosis. With 
YHVWHG LQWHUHVWV UHJDUGLQJ 7XUNH\¶V UHODWLRQV ZLWK &\SUXV DQG *UHHFH Dnd 
known as a hawk on both matters (Robins 2003: 67-8), Ecevit was initially 
half-KHDUWHGUHJDUGLQJWKH(8¶VRIIHURIFDQGLGDF\IRU7XUNH\ (Robins 2003: 
111-2) out of the apprehension that EU norms would undermine the territorial 
integrity and secular nature of the Turkish state. The MHP was similarly 
dubious on ERWKWKH(8PHPEHUVKLSSURFHVVDQGWKH(8¶VDSSURDFKWR&\SUXV
by virtue of its provenance, which was grounded in nationalism and 
xenophobia. ANAP, for its part, was considered an internationalist party, and 
LWV OHDGHU <ÕOPD] ZDV WKH GULYLQJ IRUFH EHKLQG 7XUNH\¶V SUR-EU reforms 
gQLú,QVSLWHRIKLV(8DUGRXU<ÕOPD]DORQJVLGH(FHYLWZDVDOVR
a solid advocate of the TRNC. <ÕOPD] discounted any linkages between 
7XUNH\¶V (8 SURVSHFWV DQG WKH &\SUXV LVVXH, and he stressed that both the 
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Cyprus constitution and Article 8 of the London-Zurich Agreements forbid 
Cyprus from joining any international organization that did not include both 
Greece and Turkey as members (Dodd 2010: 190-2). In brief, despite a 
substantial Western propensity in the ideologies of both the DSP and ANAP, 
all of the coalition leaders were highly scepWLFDO ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH (8¶V
intentions in its relations with Turkey, including the Cyprus issue, and were 
DJDLQVW FKDQJLQJ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ ZLWKLQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH (8
accession process. 
 
According to the social-learning model, the coalition goveUQPHQW¶V IDLOXUHWR
undertake a more pragmatic approach on Cyprus can be explained in relation 
WRWKHQRWLRQRIµLGHQWLW\¶DQGWKHGLIILFXOWLHVRIWKHµDUJXPHQWDWLYHSHUVXDVLRQ¶
of political elites who hold preconceived notions that contradict the messages 
emitting from the EU. Not only are persuadees with fewer cognitive 
preconceptions more likely to be open to argumentative persuasion than 
RWKHUVLQOLQHZLWKWKHDUJXPHQWWKDWLGHQWLW\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRFFXUVDWµFULWLFDO
MXQFWXUHV¶ SHUVXDVLRQ LV PRUH OLNely to succeed when the persuadee is in a 
novel, uncertain environment, provoked by a new issue, crisis or grave policy 
failure (Checkel 2005: 812-3). Within this framework, it is understood that the 
FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V ILUP DGKHUHQFH WR WKH LGHDV LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HG LQ WKH
Turkish domestic context precluded any change in Cyprus policy under its 
tenure.  
 
Filled with preconceptions vis-a-vis European designs on Turkey based on 
negative historical experiences and fear of disintegration, the vast majority of 
the Turkish political elite believed that Turkey had a rightful stake in Cyprus 
in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots and that it was the Greek-Greek 
Cypriot partnership that invited the status quo on the island by scrambling to 
ethnically cleanse Turkish Cypriots, whom was seen as the main impediment 
DJDLQVWWKHJRDORI³enosis´E\WKH*UHHN&\SULRts (Interview 5 September 29, 
2011), thereby inducing the Turkish military intervention of 1974. This 
impression is shared by all mainstream political parties in Turkey. Socialised 
LQ DQ HQYLURQPHQW RI GRXEW UHJDUGLQJ WKH :HVW¶V LQWHQWLRQV LQFOXGLQJ WKRVH
relevant to Cyprus and Kurdish rights, the highly sceptical leaders of the 
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coalition government were unable to assume a pragmatic outlook for the 
resolution of the Cyprus dispute, even if it would, to a degree, clear the way to 
7XUNH\¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS Put another way, despite their identification with 
the West, messages emitting from the EU conflicted with their deeply rooted 
persuasions that some aspects of Europeanization, such as minority rights, 
ZRXOGXQGHUPLQH7XUNH\¶V WHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\DQGGRPHVWLFVWUXFWXUH (Fuller 
2004: 55- ,OJÕW DQG g]NHoHFL-Taner 2012: 15). Such an understanding not 
RQO\NHSW7XUNH\IURPDGRSWLQJDQHZ&\SUXVSROLF\LWHQFXPEHUHG7XUNH\¶V
rapid transformation into a post-nationalist democracy.  
 
In comparison to previous coalition governments, the programme of the 
ANAP-DSP-MHP coalition gave special emphasis to domestic and external 
enemies of Turkey. The nationalistic ideational background of the DSP and 
0+3ZDV HYLGHQW LQ WKHFRDOLWLRQ¶VKDUVKDQGXQSUHFHGHQWHG UHDFWLRQ WR WKH
enactment RI ³$UPHQLDQ *HQRFLGH´ UHVROXWLRQV E\ )UDQFH DQG WKH 86 
g]NHoHFL-Taner 2005: 274-5), but the response was also supported by the 
internationalist ANAP, perhaps in a reflection of the compromise and 
harmony between partners with regard to the decision-making process. 
Similarly, the coalition only agreed to accept the EU offer of candidacy status 
for Turkey on the understanding that it would issue its own memorandum 
VWDWLQJWKDW7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVVZRXOGEHGLVVRFLDWHGIURPDVHWWOHPHQW
on Cyprus.  
 
Thus, notwithstanding their firm cognitive priors with respect to EU designs 
towards Turkey, from 1999 onwards, boosted by a credible membership 
perspective for Turkey ± it was under the coalition that Turkey had finally 
been granted candidate status at the Helsinki Summit ± the coalition 
government took substantial steps in complying with EU conditionality. With 
WKH (8¶V FUHGLELOLW\ HQKDQFHG ZLWKLQ 7XUNH\ the Post-Helsinki period 
witnessed a genuine studiousness on the part of the coalition government, 
XQGHU WKH OHDGHUVKLS RI <ÕOPD] WR PHHW WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI (8 PHPEHUVKLS
Turkey threw itself into an unprecedented wave of reform in an effort to 
comply with conditionality, passing in October 2001 a broad constitutional 
amendment package in line with EU criteria within the framework of the 
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National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). The package 
increased the number of civilian members on the National Security Council to 
a majority voting position by incorporating the deputy prime minister and the 
minister of justice in addition to the extant prime minister, ministers of 
national defence, interior and foreign affairs and changed Article 118 in order 
to underscore the advisory nature of council decisions (Robins 2003: 75-7). 
Even more promising for Turkish democracy than the significant achievement 
of amending 34 articles of the constitution was the broad inter-party consensus 
in parliament regarding the passage of these reforms g]EXGXQ. 
 
However, the coalition government collapsed when another reform package 
passed through parliament in August 2002 .HPDO.LULúoLD-4). In this 
second package, the coalition government carried through crucial and costly 
reforms on sensitive issues such as the limitation of capital punishment to 
terror and war crimes, in line with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the allowance of education and broadcasting in traditionally used 
languages and dialects in the daily lives of Turkish citizens and the relaxation 
of obstacles in front of their learning (Prime Ministry Secretariat General for 
the European Union Affairs 2007: 3-4 and 59). Interestingly, whereas the first 
reform package was silent with respect to EU demands such as ratifying 
ECHR Protocol No. 6 and lifting the death penalty, allowing broadcasting and 
education in mother-tongue languages and reducing the military¶VLQIOXHQFH in 
the political sphere, the August 2002 reform package exceeded the objectives 
envisioned in the first NPAA (Prime Ministry Secretariat General for the 
European Union Affairs 2007: 42-3). In spite of this, the legislation passed 
under the coalition made no mention of settlement of the Cyprus question, 
ZLWKRXWZKLFK7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSSHUVSHFWLYHZDVGRRPHGWREORFNDJH 
 
Due to their forceful cognitive priors, the coalition government was less 
committed to EU reforms than the AKP, and settlement of the Cyprus question 
ZDVQRWHYHQRQWKHLUDJHQGD,Q(FHYLW¶VZRUGV³WKH(8JRDOZDVLPSRUWDQW
but non-realization thereof was not the end of the world. As a dynamic 
country, from its social structure to its economy, Turkey could find new 
RXWOHWV´ (Office of the Prime Minister June 6, 1999). Ecevit further stated 
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³GHVSLWH XQLQWHUUXSWHG SHDFH LQ &\SUXV VLQFH WKH  7XUNLVK 3HDFH
Operation, the serenity on the island discomforts some circles and Turkey 
ZRXOG QRW PDNH DQ\ FRQFHVVLRQV LQ &\SUXV´ (Office of the Prime Minister 
June 21, 1999). Along similar lines, +DNNÕ $NDOÕQ, CHP dHSXW\ RI ø]PLU
evaluated the decision of the EU to accept the Republic of Cyprus as a 
member in the name of the entire island as ³a pre-concieved international 
FRQVSLUDF\´ (TBMM Reports Journal January 14, 2003). Bayram Ali Meral, 
CHP deputy of Ankara, publicly accused WKH$.3JRYHUQPHQWRI³VHOOLQJRXW
WKH751&LQUHWXUQIRUPDWHULDOEHQHILWV´ (TBMM Reports Journal March 13, 
2003). Meral also qualified ³the Cyprus question and the activities of the US 
officials in Turkey as the most significant problems of Turkey´ +H DOVR
criticized the activities of Western experts as regards the Turkish economy 
expressing the opinion WKDW ³7XUNH\¶VEXGJHW LV XQGHU WKHFRQWURORI IRUHLJQ
H[SHUWV MXVW OLNHWKH2WWRPDQ(PSLUH¶VODVWGD\V´ likening Turkey¶VVLWXDWLRQ
to a colony reflecting the mindset of Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey (TBMM 
Reports Journal March 15, 2003).      
 
Despite amendments in the Turkish constitution and legislation consonant 
with the EU conditionality, espousal of a more pragmatic approach on the 
Cyprus question was lacking under this coalition. The deeply entrenched fear 
among the coalition leaders regarding the scope of Western interests in Turkey 
and their fear of territorial fragmentation and modification of the character of 
the Turkish regime within the framework of the EU pre-accession process 
circumscribed their commitment to the process and a pragmatic policy change 
on Cyprus. 
 
1.3. Ideational Transformation of the AKP from Islamism towards an 
EU-Oriented Political Party 
 
In this section I will expound on the basis of a cognitive learning process why 
such a policy shift became possible under the AKP government, which 
renounced its Islamist identity and espoused an EU-oriented political agenda. 
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This ideational transformation on the part of the AKP is one of the crucial 
components of Turkish foreign policy change on Cyprus.  
 
From the 1990s onwards, the old definition of the Turkish state started to face 
challenges, which culminated in the advent to power of the AKP. The AKP 
contested the insistence on the principles of nationalism and secularism and 
was disposed to redefine Turkish identity. In contrast to the coalition 
government, whose adherence to a traditional policy line vis-j-vis Cyprus is 
consistent with their firm ideological priors, the AKP government was able to 
embrace a new policy on Cyprus due to their weak cognitive priors and re-
construct its identity that followed the washout of Islamist politics in Turkey 
in the late 1990s and subsequent identity crisis within the movement. 
 
The transformation of the AKP from political Islamism towards the centre of 
Turkish political spectrum 7DúNÕQ is of utmost import in terms of 
7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FKDQJH vis-j-vis Cyprus. For the supporters of the 
Milli *|Uú (National View), the rigidly anti-Western, anti-EU mainstream 
Turkish Islamist Movement from which the AKP split, the Cyprus issue was 
of particular value. The Islamist 1DWLRQDO6DOYDWLRQ3DUW\KDGEHHQ(FHYLW¶V 
coalition partner at the time of the July 1974 military intervention, and its 
leader, Necmettin Erbakan, had criticized Prime Minister Ecevit for not 
occupying the whole of Cyprus. While the National Viewers had been major 
proponents of both the TRNC and long-time TRNC President Rauf 'HQNWDú
following its election in 2002, the AKP made a sharp turn on the Cyprus issue, 
which included SXUJLQJ'HQNWDúZKRZDVDOVR a commanding figure among 
the Turkish bureaucratic elite and in the eyes of large segments of Turkish 
society (Uzgel 2009: 30). In fact, the ideological transformation of the Turkish 
Islamist movement is one of the essential elements of 7XUNH\¶Vpolicy shift on 
Cyprus. In order to better understand this transformation, the subsequent sub-
sections provide a historical perspective that includes a discussion of the 
PRYHPHQW¶V URRWV LQ 2WWRPDQLVP DV ZHOO DV WKH QHR-Ottomanism of Turgut 
g]DO ZLWK ZKRP WKH $.3 VKDUHV ILUP DIILQLWLHV LQ WHUPV RI LWV RZQ QHR-
Ottomanist foreign-policy vision, which envisions interdependent and good 
neighbourly relations in the former Ottoman territories on the basis of 
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commercial inter-dependencies. The AKP also adopted an EU-oriented policy 
agenda prior to coming to power in the 2002 elections, treating EU 
membership as well as settlement of the Cyprus disagreement as its foreign-
policy priorities (Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37). 
 
1.3.1. The Ideological Background of the AKP, Ottomanism and Neo-
Ottomanism 
 
The Ottoman military defeats of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
pushed the Empire to acquire European technological and scientific 
knowledge through the introduction of a secular, positivist education system. 
The foundation of Western-style schools teaching engineering, medical and 
military science did not aim to bring Western culture or ideas to the Empire. 
However, in addition to Western material assets, the cultural aspects of 
Western life and a positivist way of thinking came to infiltrate the minds of a 
newly emerging secular Ottoman elite %R]GD÷OÕR÷OX-7). 
 
From the 1860 onwards, the alienation of its non-Muslim communities 
induced the empire to promote the doctrine of Ottomanism as a means of 
creating a modern nation-state constructed on the basis of a multi-cultural 
citizenship. Thus began the many modernization and secularization initiatives 
that took place within the framework of the Tanzimat reforms (Kushner 1997: 
219). Ottomanism was designed to lift the empire out of its crisis of 
technological backwardness and stem the loss of its Christian populations by 
constructing a common political identity that would undermine ethnic, 
religious and community-based affiliations by promoting unity and equality 
among all Ottoman citizens in a secular notion based on a new concept of 
minority/majority in place of Muslim/non-Muslim. However, setbacks in 
earning the loyalty of non-Muslim subjects and the foundation of new states 
on Ottoman territories in the Balkans following the 1877-78 war with Russia 
marked the end of this trend.  
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Having lost most of its &KULVWLDQWHUULWRULHVLQWKH%DONDQV6XOWDQ$EGOKDPLW
II strove to stall further fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire during his reign 
(1876-1907) by maintaining the allegiance of non-Turkish Ottoman Muslims 
through an Islamic universalism that underpinned a pan-Islamic construction 
of civilization with the Sultan as the caliph of all Muslims. At the same time, 
however, the new Western-educated Ottoman elite came to visualize Islam as 
the source of backwardness and instead started to lay claim to the Central 
Asian territories, with a view to uniting all Turkic people (Fisher Onar 2009: 
231-2). This new generation of Westernized elite, educated in the new secular 
and positivist system, in 1889 founded the øWWLKDW YH 7HUDNNL &HPL\HWL, the 
µ&RPPLWWHH RI 8QLRQ DQG 3URJUHVV¶ øTC), a Turkish movement that would 
become known as the Young Turks. By the turn of the 20th century, although 
Ottomanism and Islamism were the official ideologies of the empire, most of 
the intellectuals came to define themselves as Turks in cultural terms, if not in 
political ones (Kushner 1997: 221). 7KH <RXQJ 7XUNV¶ RSSRVLWLRQ WR
$EGOKDPLW ,, EURXJKW WKHP WR SRZHU LQ  thus initiating the second 
constitutional era in Turkish history. The Young Turks formed modern 
7XUNH\¶V QDWLRQDO DQG VHFXODU RIILFLDO LGHRORJ\ DQG WKHLU LQIOXHQFH VWLOO
perpetuateVLQPRGHUQ7XUNH\¶VSROLWLFDOOLIH%R]GD÷OÕR÷OX. By the 
1910s, the Turkish nationalists got the upper hand in the Ottomanism-
nationalism debate, and nationalism became the cardinal ideology among all 
non-Muslim ethnic communities in the Ottoman territories dRODN-
90).  
 
The victory in the War of Independence in the early 1920s under the 
OHDGHUVKLS RI $WDWUN IXUQLVKHG 7XUNH\ ZLWK WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR FDUU\ RQ WKH
reform process that had started under the øTC between 1908 and 1918. Like 
WKH7XUNLVWV$WDWUN asserted that civilization and culture cannot be separated. 
$FFRUGLQJ WR $WDWUN WKH IDLOHG 2WWRPDQ VWDWH DQG VRFLHW\ KDG WR EH
abolished, and he thus launched a sweeping reform programme to transform 
the state as well as the individual along secular lines in order to found a new 
society, a new state and a new individual with a new Western identity 
%R]GD÷OÕR÷OX  -60). The nationalistic and secular character of the 
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republic was more or less undisputedly perpetuated until the late 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
1.3.2. g]DO¶V1HR-Ottomanism 
 
Attempts to secure a place for Islam in both state and foreign policy came to 
FRQWHVW 7XUNH\¶V ULJLG VHFXODU HVWDEOLVKPHQW VWDUWLQJ LQ WKH ODWH V DQG
intensifying in the1970s. This was reflected in the success of the Islamist 
National Salvation Party, which took part in several coalition governments 
from the 1970s onwards. This new interest in Islamic identification was 
strengthened by compulsory religious education in elementary and secondary 
schools introduced by the 1982 constitution following the 1980 military 
intervention (Kushner 1997: 228-9). 
 
By the time Turgut g]DO D OLEHUDO QDWLRQDOLVW EHFDPH prime minister in 
November 1989, the international environment was undergoing a drastic 
transformation due to the breakdown of communism (Danforth 2008: 88-9). In 
witnessing the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia ± including 
Serbian nationalist attempts at ethnic cleansing of Bosnians and Albanians, 
who self-qualified as either Turk, Muslim or Ottoman ± Turkey was reminded 
of its Balkan and Caucasian heritage. The never-ending ethnic tensions in the 
Balkans, the well-broadcast destruction of Ottoman architecture in addition to 
the atrocities in both the Balkans and the Caucasus recalled to the people of 
the Turkish Republic their shared historical consciousness and Ottoman 
heritage dRODN. 
 
Turgut g]DO¶VQHR-Ottomanism referenced Ottoman cosmopolitanism in order 
to carve out a new pluralistic definition that woXOG DSSHDO WR WKH FRXQWU\¶V
collective cultural memory as a solution to the growing debate on identity 
taking place inside Turkey. It would also serve as a means of promoting a 
more active diplomatic role for Turkey vis-j-vis the newly independent post-
communist states of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle 
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East (Fisher Onar 2009: 233). This re-construction of the past aimed to 
UHGHILQH7XUNH\¶VVKDUHGKLVWRU\ZLWKLWVQHLJKERXUV)URPg]DO¶VSHUVSHFWLYH 
 
³7XUNH\¶V2WWRPDQOHJDF\ZDVQRWRQO\DJRRGPRGHOWREHORRNHGDW
for determining Turkish foreign policies towards the Balkans, Central 
Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East, but also for settling internal 
socio-cultural tensions: the Islamic opposition to the sternly secular 
official policy, the Kurds, some segments of whom had questioned 
since the beginning of 1980s the homogeneous definition of Turkish 
identity; and Alevis, who disapproved of the unilateral Sunni approach 
of the Presidency of Religious $IIDLUV´dRODN.  
 
g]DO¶s main arguments for a localized common identity resting on neo-
Ottomanism were that it opposed anti-Westernism, referencing Western 
universalist ideals, with an emphasis on globalization, liberal democracy and a 
free-market economy, while at the same time defining the Ottoman past as an 
age when tolerance for diversity reigned and the Balkans, Caucasus and 
Middle East were united in economic union while retaining their political 
boundaries intact. The radical FKDQJHVLQ WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOVSKHUHOHGg]DO WR
adopt a new approach to foreign policy that represented a synthesis between 
traditional Muslim cultural forms and Western values to counterpoise the 
potentially unfavourable consequences of the nationalist movements emerging 
throughout the former Soviet-bloc countries. Criticising the traditional neutral 
approach of Turkish foreign policy as too passive, he believed that Turkey 
could be more influential in these regions only by emphasising a specifically 
Muslim-national identity instead of a merely national identity dRODN 
593). 
 
During this period7XUNH\¶VRIILFLDO LGHQWLW\ZDVKDYLQJGLIILFXOWLHVPHHWLQJ
the rising ethnic and religious demands of its own population, while the 
Bulgarian government was implementing policies of assimilation of its 
Turkish minority. Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were also fragmenting, 
with new Turkic states emerging in Central Asia as a result. Against this 
GRPHVWLF DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQWH[WRI WKH ODWHVg]DOSURSRVHGDQ DQWL-
establishment initiative to carve out a democratic system in which all kinds of 
differences could be expressed without any intervention by the state. g]DO
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propounded on the significance of cultural pluralism, relying on the Ottoman 
vision of Islam to enable Turkey to manage its internal identity crisis. 
Contrary to the Kemalist notion of Turkish identity, he put forward Turkey as 
a cultural and ethnic mosaic, comprised of Turks, Alevis, Arabs, Kurds, 
Bosnians, Albanians, Caucasians and Pomaks that was the result of massive 
PLJUDWLRQIURPIRUPHU2WWRPDQWHUULWRULHVWR$QDWROLDg]DO claimed that these 
groups had been forced to describe themselves homogenously under a 
common national Turkish identity. Now, instead of Turkishness, the shared 
Ottoman historical experience would serve as the basis for a new Turkey. 
0RUHRYHU DFFRUGLQJ WR g]DO QRt only was the transformation of a Turkish 
national identity into a neo-Ottomanist imperial identity necessary to counter 
the national and regional tendencies that might arise as a result of the shifting 
global and domestic environment, such a transformation would also enable 
Turkey to become a regional superpower dRODN. 
 
As an anti-HVWDEOLVKPHQW SHUVRQDOLW\ g]DO GHILHG WKH WUDGLWLRQDO FRQFHSWV RI
the Turkish state and identity and strained to re-construct a new multi-
culturalist Turkish identity. He took a notably pragmatic approach towards 
7XUNH\¶V foreign relations in general and towards the Cyprus issue in 
particular, proposing that Turkey establish relations on the basis of trade and 
interdependence g]DO LQWHQGHG WR DGGUHVV 7XUNH\¶V RVVLILHG problems with 
Greece, and in the early 1990s, he attempted to tackle the Cyprus dispute as 
well; however, neither the international nor the domestic Turkish political 
HQYLURQPHQWZDVSURSLWLRXVIRUVXFKDGUDVWLFFKDQJHDWWKDWWLPH:KHQg]DO
SUHVVXUHG'HQNWDú WREHPRUH IOH[LEOH WRZDUGVD VHWWOHPHQWKLVYHQWXUHZDV
thwarted by the Turkish bureaucratic and military elite, who sided with 
'HQNWDú In this context, the decision-making context was not propitious for 
pushing for change and the EU was not a dynamic. 
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1.3.3. From Political Islamism to Conservative Democracy: From the 
Welfare Party to the AKP 
 
With 21 percent of the vote, the Islamist Welfare Party narrowly won the 1995 
general elections and formed a coalition government with the centre-right True 
Path Party, which had obtained just under 20 percent of the vote. Thus, 
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of both the Welfare Party and of the mainstream 
Islamist movement the National View, became the first Islamist Prime 
Minister of Turkey %DFÕN-4). The 1996-97 government was marked 
E\ WKH :HOIDUH 3DUW\¶V g]DOLDQ QHR-Ottomanism with a more Islamic 
FRORUDWLRQ/LNHg]DO(UEDNDQ conceived of an empire stretching from Europe 
to Central Asia, but with his avowedly anti-Western, anti-secular stance, he 
had in mind a departure from Western institutions and a slant towards the 
Islamic world, which, in turn was expected to generate a multi-cultural, multi-
religious, multi-cultural society. During its tenure, the Welfare Party pursued a 
foreign policy that combined Ottomanism and Islam with the aim of rendering 
Turkey a regional power. This process, however, ended up in a fiasco for 
Erbakan, owing to the Arab rejection of Turkey as the regional leader of the 
Muslim world dRODN. Through his mid-1996 tour of the Muslim 
world, (UEDNDQ KDG DLPHG WR FUHDWH D ³0XVOLP FRPPRQ PDUNHW´ KRZHYHU 
the trip only served to weaken him politically. In Egypt and Iran, he was 
FULWLFL]HGIRU7XUNH\¶VFORVHUHODWLRQVZLWK,VUDHODQGGXULQJKLVYLVLWWR/LE\D
Qhaddafi bluntly eulogized the PKK, the Kurdish organization waging war 
against Turkey, and demanded independence for Kurdistan (Kepel 2000: 545-
6).  
 
The coalition ruled by Erbakan soon began to elicit concerns among secular 
circles. It lost its control over the civil and military bureaucracy. The military 
became an outright opposition power, and joined in a powerful media 
campaign against the government. In the infamous National Security Council 
meeting of February 28, 1997, harsh measures were taken against the 
government, and on June 18, 1997, Erbakan, under pressure, stepped down 
from office. In 1998, the Welfare Party was shut down by the Turkish 
Constitutional Court for being the focus of anti-secular activities, and Erbakan 
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was banned from politics. The period from 1997-1999 was a traumatic one for 
WKH ,VODPLVWV :KDW EHFDPH NQRZQ DV µWKH )HEUXDU\  SURFHVV¶ ZDV
unprecedented in that, for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, 
Islamic groups became the target of a military intervention that aimed to purge 
the alleged Islamic threat and went so far as to disrupt the day-to-day religious 
practices of devout Muslims %DFÕN-4). 
 
This last intervention by the military-civil secular establishment for the 
protection of the regime represented a crucial point in the transformation of 
7XUNH\¶V ,VODPLVW PRYHPHQW IURP ,VODPLVP WR FRQVHUYDWLYH GHPRFUDF\
7XUNH\¶VGHPRFUDWLFDQGVHFXODULQVWLWXWLRQVDQGLWVKLVWRULFDOH[LVWHQFHZLWKLQ
Western organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and the Council of Europe (CoE) rendered it impossible for any political 
Islamist movement to resist the transformation towards a moderate approach 
$OWXQÕúÕN   ,Q 5LVVH¶V WHUPV WKH 7XUNLVK SROLWLFDO VHWWLQJ ZDV
inappropriate for the construction of an Islamist political identity, and the 
latter did not resonate well within the Turkish domestic context. 
 
The failure of their policies impelled the Islamists to espouse a new strategy 
that would avoid militant secular attack and carry them through the adversities 
they were facing. They took stock of the fact that without the necessary 
networks in crucial fields such as the economy, they were thoroughly 
unprotected against a sophisticated secular bloc. Although the military played 
the primary role, the Welfare-True Path coalition faced a vast and heavy 
RSSRVLWLRQ LQ ZKDW ZDV DERYH DOO D SV\FKRORJLFDO EDWWOH 6HFXODU ZRPHQ¶V
organizations, members of the Alevi sect, civil society groups, political 
parties, the urban middle classes and prominent media organizations stood out 
against the soidisant ascending political Islam. Trade unions and business 
associations, save the Islamic ones, IRUPHG D µFLYLOLDQ LQLWLDWLYH¶ DJDLQVW WKH
allegedly escalating Islamist threat. Within a few months of the Welfare 
3DUW\¶VFRPLQJWRSRZHULWZDVREYLRXVWKDWVHFXODULVP rather than simply an 
LGpH IL[H for the military, was a major issue for broad sections of Turkish 
society (Ayata 2004: 245) The docile public reaction to the prohibition of the 
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Welfare Party in particular and Islamist parties in general demonstrated 
approbation on the part of the Turkish people for the continuation of the 
established democratic institutions of the state (Cooper 2002: 121). 
 
The argument that widespread approval for the closing down of Islamist 
parties demonstrated popular support for the democratic regime and an 
aloofness to Islamist ideology is confirmed by the fact that the AKP came to 
power only after recanting its Islamist credentials and seizing upon an EU-
oriented political agenda. Political Islam did not resonate well within the 
Turkish domestic political context; therefore, the AKP was constrained 
towards a conservative/centre-right policy line. Given that the secular military-
judiciary establishment, ZLWK WKH SXEOLF¶V EDFNLQJ KDG EDQQHG DOO LWV
predecessors, the AKP needed to latch onto a more moderate stance. The 
February 28 process was crucial in demonstrating to prominent figures within 
the Islamist movement that they would come to terms with the domestic and 
IRUHLJQ SRZHU FHQWUHV LQ RUGHU WR UHPDLQ LQ SRZHU 0RUHRYHU µ$QDWROLDQ
FDSLWDO¶QHHGHGDSROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWKDWZDVFRQVRQDQWZLWKWKHV\VWHP
Consequently, there was a need to tear loose from Erbakan, who was still 
inclined to maintain a Cold-War worldview in the 1990s (Uzgel 2006: 10).  
 
Recognizing the need to generate new instrumental capacity in areas from 
which they had previously shied away, such as the market and the media, the 
Islamists adopted a new strategy that embraced concepts such as globalism, a 
market economy, and even democracy. Next, as a pragmatic move to stem the 
secular attack, they were constrained to defend the potential benefits of EU 
membership. After the 1999 Helsinki Summit, the transformative impact of 
the EU on Turkey became conspicuous by virtue of the requirement that 
candidate countries adopt the acquis communautaire. The Islamists took 
notice of the opportunity spaces originating from EU pressure to force the 
Turkish state into making radical alterations to bolster democratization and to 
expand freedom spaces for the Islamists, such as wearing headscarves at the 
universities. In other words, the Islamists discerned that the EU could offer 
them the opportunity to force a change in the structure of the Turkish state 
expanding areas of freedom for the Islamists %DFÕN-5). 
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When the Welfare Party was closed by the Constitutional Court in December 
1997, the Islamists established the Fazilet, or Virtue Party. However, the 
February 28 process had crystallized already existing divisions among the 
Islamist elite %DFÕN  -4), and contrary to earlier parties in which 
Erbakan had exercised solid control, this new formation was characterized by 
forceful opposition between backers of Erbakan and a new generation of 
µUHIRUPLVWV¶ ZKR KHOG KLP UHVSRQVLEOH IRU WKHLr failure. The Virtue Party 
expressed its support for accession into the EU and made democracy a 
political imperative. The reformists abandoned all references to Islamist 
ideology, which had reduced their popularity and had served as evidence of a 
rupture from secularism and the West. Instead, they came to view a liberal 
market economy and a democratic political environment as presenting the best 
opportunities for financial profit and political power. An Islamist ideology was 
unable to offer any tangible gains to discontented urban youth, who 
represented a potential enlargement of the power base of any political Islamist 
movement. Thus robbed of the backing of disgruntled urban youth, the 
Islamists lost their strongest asset with which to contend with the secular 
regime, which regarded itself as the master of negotiations and was inclined to 
impose its own conditions on the Islamists (Kepel 2000: 550-1). 
 
After the closure of the Welfare Party, even prior to the AKP was established, 
WKH9LUWXH3DUW\)3WKH:HOIDUH3DUW\¶VVXFFHVVRUGURSSHGLWVLQWHUHVWLQDQ
Islamist foreign policy against a Western-oriented one. In the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the Islamist movements were declining in terms of power, 
prestige, inspiration and support base. In such an environment, the foreign-
policy goal of creating an alternative Islamic foreign policy resting on an 
alternative Islamic world order was dropped by the Turkish Islamist 
movement. When such a foreign-policy objective came unstuck, the domestic 
project of carving out a country resting on Islamic principles also fell through. 
This contributed to the moderation of the Turkish Islamic movement.(Ayata 
2004: 272) 
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$WWKHVDPHWLPH7XUNH\¶VULVLQJ,VODPLFFDSLWDOZDVVFUDPEOLQJWRLQWHJUDWH
with the global system and was seeking representation alongside 7h6ø$'WKH
7XUNLVK ,QGXVWULDOLVWV DQG %XVLQHVVPHQ¶V $VVRFLDWLRQ WKH PDLQ RUJDQL]DWLRQ
RI EXVLQHVVPHQ DQG LQGXVWULDOLVWV LQ 7XUNH\ 7KXV 0h6ø$' WKH ,QGLYLGXDO
Industrialists and Businessmen Association, was set up in 1990 as the 
representative of religiously-oriented businessmen. After the February 28 
process, these segments began to assimilate the concepts of human rights and 
democracy, which they had previously ignored, and they awakened to the 
notion that integration with the global capitalist system involved combining 
with it politically. Turkish Islamic capital was already in the process of 
integrating with international capital (Uzgel 2006: 12), and this process 
expedited the re-definition of the identity and interests of the Turkish 
Islamists.  
 
At the international level, the Western attitude towards political Islam was also 
unfavourable. The Welfare Party appealed to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) by the late 1990s hoping that it would reverse the Turkish 
&RQVWLWXWLRQDO &RXUW¶V 1998 decision with respect to closure of the party. 
However, in July 2001, the Third Chambre and in February 2003, the Grand 
Chambre of the ECHR upheld the Turkish FRXUW¶Vdecision, pointing out that 
³LQ WKH ORQJ-term, the RP aimed at undermining democracy and pluralism in 
Turkey by imposing a Muslim identity on the nation, which was against the 
principles of democracy.´ As a result, the Turkish Islamists had to distance 
themselves from Islamism and assimilate a more pluralistic party identity 
(Lynott 2009: 41). The appeal by the Turkish Islamists also implied that they, 
for the first time, recognized the legitimacy of EU norms and institutions and 
were awakening to the idea that sticking to Islamism would not offer them 
much in terms of power and wealth in the 21st century in a growingly 
globalizing world.  
 
The Virtue Party was eventually dissolved by the Turkish Constitutional Court 
in June 2001. Once that occurred, it became urgent for the Islamists to find a 
new ideational and political outlook. In August 2001, Recep Tayyip (UGR÷DQ
a reformist and former mayor of Istanbul, established the Justice and 
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Development Party, which quickly re-LGHQWLILHG LWVHOI DV D µFRQVHUYDWLYH
GHPRFUDW¶ UDWKHU WKDQ DQ µ,VODPLVW¶ SDUW\ 7KH $.3¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR PRYH
towards the centre of the Turkish political spectrum, their reconciliation with 
the secular constitutional order and their espousal of an EU-oriented political 
agenda rendered them the most popular party in Turkey in the 2002 general 
elections $OWXQÕúÕN.  
 
Cognizant of the need to reinforce itself against the powerful and vigilant 
secular forces of Turkey, the AKP government pragmatically fell back on 
Western values of democracy and human rights, Western institutions, 
governments and public opinion, rather than sticking to Islamic values, as a 
defence against the 28 February process (Ayata 2004: 272). This was a 
strategic milestone for the Turkish Islamists in that it represented the first time 
that an Islamic-rooted movement seized upon European values of democracy 
and human rights. AKP officials put special emphasis on their divergence 
from ,VODPLVP(UGR÷DQin a conversation with the press, stated that the AKP 
was not a religiously-oriented party, and he underscored that the Republic of 
Turkey was erected on the principles of ³democracy, laicism, social state and 
rule of law´ (Office of the Prime Minister November 4, 2002). As stated by 
8÷XU DQG <DQND\D between 2001 and 2004, a mighty political innovation 
occurred that hinged on a stringent commitment to EU reforms and 
PHPEHUVKLS(UGR÷DQZKRKDGSLFWXUHGWKH(8DVD³&KULVWLDQFOXE´LQ
QRWRQO\GHYLDWHGIURP7XUNH\¶V(8-sceptic bloc, but also from the traditional 
OLQHRIKLVSDUW\¶Vearlier Islamist predecessors 8÷XUDQG<DQND\D. 
 
As a result of these moves, the AKP enlisted the supporWRI7h6ø$'DVZHOO
as Anatolian capital at the domestic level and, through its contacts and 
messages regarding completion of the neoliberal transformation of Turkey, the 
backing of the United States and the European Union on the international 
level. The AKP spearheaded the neoliberal transformation of Turkey that had 
begun in the early 1980s but had stalled during the 1990s due to political and 
economic instability. Apart from the Customs Union, neither privatization nor 
the process of undermining the statist power base progressed during the 1990s. 
The AKP was more zealous than previous parties in this respect. Speeding up 
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the EU process, which bolstered the neoliberal transformation, was a move by 
the AKP to consolidate its position within the Turkish political framework, 
downgrade the clout of the military in Turkish politics and enlist the backup of 
the European Union for such freedoms as the repeal of the headscarf ban. In 
its transformation from anti-Semitism to a strong affinity with the Jewish 
lobby, from national development to a penchant for privatization, from 
demanding all of Cyprus to supporting the Annan Plan, the Turkish post-
Islamists fulfilled the expectations of business circles, the EU and the US all at 
once (Uzgel 2006: 15-6). 
 
In the 1990s, as well as political and economic instability, Turkey lacked a 
SROLWLFDO OHDGHUVKLS WKDW FRXOG OHDG WKH SURFHVV RI 7XUNH\¶V OLEHUDO
transformation and integration of Turkish economy with the global economy. 
When the AKP came to power in 2002, the security-oriented civilian-military 
bureaucratic establishment of Turkey, which had a hardline stance on the 
Cyprus issue, was still overly powerful. With its neo-liberal economic and 
foreign policy agenda, the AKP leadership was committed to completion of 
7XUNH\¶VOLEHUDOL]DWLRQSURFHVV7XUNLVKHFRQRP\¶VLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKWKHZRUOG
HFRQRP\ 7XUNH\¶V (8 SURFHVV DQG VHWWOHPHQW RI WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ $OO
these policy objectives were shared by the Turkish business circles and 
international power centres, such as the US and the EU. Accordingly, the AKP 
and its policies were supported by both Turkish business sector and influential 
international actors, which aimed at keeping Turkey within the trajectory of 
Western alliance. 
 
:KHQ 5LVVH¶V ³UHVRQDQFH´ DQG ³FULWLFDO MXQFWXUHV´ PRGHO LV DSSOLHG WR WKH
Turkish case, the February 28 process that culminated in the closure of the 
$.3¶VSUHGHFHVVRUDQGWKHVXEVHTXHQWXQSUHFHGHQWHGFUDFNGRZQRQ,VODPLVWV
were the ³critical junctures´ that demonstrated to the Islamists that political 
,VODPLVPGLGQRWUHVRQDWHZHOOLQ7XUNH\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODQGOHJDOFRQWH[WDQG
ZKHQWKH7XUNLVKFRXUW¶V1998 decision was upheld by the ECHR in 2001 and 
2003, this attested to the fact that Islamism did not resonate well within the 
legal and institutional framework of the EU, either. Accordingly, the AKP, 
sizing up the cost-benefits of persisting on Islamist politics, needed to embrace 
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a more moderate stance, pragmatically adjusted its party programme and 
identity in consonance with EU requirements, seizing upon an EU-oriented 
political DJHQGD ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV WKH $.3¶V VRFLDO OHDUQLQJ process was 
H[SHGLWHGE\7XUNH\¶VGRPHVWLFDVZHOODVWKH (8¶VLQVWLWXWLRQDODWWULEXWHVDQG
critical junctures, which evidenced the failure of Islamist politics. 
 
This orientation towards Western standards was pragmatic in the first instance. 
The Islamists of Turkey took notice that in the Turkish context, the Islamist 
politics was doomed to failure and they had to embrace a new cause instead of 
accentuating Islamic values and principles that had gained them the backing of 
only a marginal percentage of voters. They recanted their Islamist discourse 
and embraced EU membership as their primary objective in order to expand 
their electoral base. While previously voicing their demands for Islamic 
freedoms within the framework of an Islamic rhetoric, they began to declaim 
that religious freedoms were part of European values and freedoms such as 
democracy, human rights and secularism, which they had avoided in the past. 
 
Following its advent to power, the AKP perpetuated and accelerated the 
ongoing reforms in line with the EU pre-accession process. The AKP 
embraced an EU-oriented political agenda on pragmatic grounds, while at the 
same time transforming itself into a centrist party. An Islamist agenda had 
gained them only a marginal percentage of votes, and it would not keep them 
in power in the rigidly secular Turkish political context. Moreover, an anti-
Western political agenda did not resonate well among Western circles. 
$FFRUGLQJO\ LQ RUGHU WR FRPH WR DQG UHPDLQ LQ SRZHU JLYHQ 7XUNH\¶V
LQVWLWXWLRQDO IUDPHZRUN WKH $.3¶V ,VODPLVW LGHRORJ\ ZRXOG KDYH WR WDNH D
back seat, and a political agenda that played to EU norms and values as 
legitimate standards would need to come forward.  
 
1.3.4. 7KH$.3¶V1HR-Ottomanism and New Foreign Policy Vision  
 
In this ideological debate, it is important to understand the notion of neo-
Ottomanism, which was closely intertwined with the new foreign policy 
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FRQFHSWRI³VWUDWHJLFGHSWK´GHYHORSHGE\Ahmet 'DYXWR÷OXwho has forged 
WKH$.3¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VLQFHThis new foreign policy vision alongside 
the EU and decision-making dynamics was one of the key causes RI7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy change on Cyprus. The National Viewers had a plainly Islamist 
and anti-Western stance, and they held the traditional nationalist line of 
Turkish foreign policy on Cyprus. The AKP not only renounced Islamism as a 
political purpose, they also developed a new liberal foreign-policy notion 
rather than sticking to a nationalist zero-sum position. 
 
7KH $.3¶V QHR-Ottomanism differed sharply from WKH 1DWLRQDO 9LHZHUV¶
approach to foreign policy. For the National Viewers and the Islamist-based 
National Salvation Party (MSP), the Cyprus issue had particular import. 
During the Cyprus military intervention of July 1974, the MSP was in 
coalition with Prime Minister Ecevit. Erbakan, the leader of the MSP, had 
criticized Ecevit for not occupying all of Cyprus. The AKP, on the other hand, 
made a sharp turn on the Cyprus issue, purging 3UHVLGHQW'HQNWDúZKRZDVD
commanding figure in the eyes of the Turkish bureaucratic elite and large 
segments of Turkish society in general. Ankara, which had been carrying out 
LWV SROLFLHV LQ OLQHZLWK'HQNWDúSXOOHGEDFN LWV VXSSRUW GHFLGLQJ LWGLGQot 
want him to run in the TRNC presidential elections of 2005. On December 14, 
 'HQNWDú¶V National Union Party (UBP), lost the elections obtaining 
32.93% of the votes, with $QNDUD¶V HQGRUVHPHQW of the opposition. The 
liberal/leftist Republican Turkish Party won the elections by garnering 35.18% 
of the votes, and its leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, became prime minister in 
January 2004 and  president in April 2005 (Uzgel 2009: 30). 
 
In contrast to the Welfare Party, the AKP has not relied on its Islamist 
FUHGHQWLDOVLQIRUHLJQSROLF\'DYXWR÷OX¶Vµ]HURSUREOHPSROLF\¶has not made 
DQ\GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQDQ\RI7XUNH\¶VQHLJKERXUV, but has aimed to bring to 
DQ HQG 7XUNH\¶V H[LVWLQJ GLVDJUHHPHQWV ZLWK DOO RI WKHP 7KH $.3¶V
initiatives to settle the Cyprus and Armenian problems and its maintenance of 
good relations with Georgia evidence the non-Islamic character of the $.3¶V
IRUHLJQ SROLF\ 0RUHRYHU 7XUNLVK RIILFLDOV¶ LQFHVVDQW FDOOV IRU
democratization and liberalization in the Middle East region are good 
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examples of the AKP¶V estrangement IURP WKH :HOIDUH 3DUW\¶V ,VODPLVW
foreign policy 2÷X]OX. 
 
Whereas (UEDNDQ¶V DLPZDV DQ ,VODPLF alliance among Muslim countries as 
an alternative to an alliance with the West, the AKP has not intended to 
,VODPL]H7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\EXW has aimed to strike a balance between 
7XUNH\¶VVWDWHHVWDEOLVKPHQW¶VRYHU-REVHVVLRQZLWK7XUNH\¶V:HVWHUQLGHQWLW\
and oULHQWDWLRQ E\ H[WHQGLQJ 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy spectrum to former 
Ottoman areas of influence 'DYXWR÷OX-3, 55-7 and 62). The AKP 
has endeavoured WR PDNH 7XUNH\¶V 2WWoman and Islamic heritage visible at 
home and abroad. Neo-Ottomanism has not had a latent imperialist agenda 
abroad or an undisclosed Islamist agenda at home; rather, it has privileged a 
more moderate form of secularism at home, and a more activist foreign policy 
that has leant RQ$QNDUD¶Vµsoft power¶ in former Ottoman territories as well 
as other regions in 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ-policy spectrum. According to the AKP 
leadership, the 2WWRPDQ³Great PRZHU´OHJDF\KDVWREHrecalled and 7XUNH\¶V
strategic and national identity have to be redefined with a view to achieving 
these goals 7DúSÕQDU-5). 
 
While the National Viewers accepted the idea of adopting Western technology 
but not its values and norms, the AKP re-constructed the mRYHPHQW¶VIslamist 
identity pursuant to Western concepts such as human rights, democracy and 
secularism while marginalizing the radical version of 7XUNH\¶V Islamist 
movement, which has an electoral base of only 2-3 percent. While the Welfare 
Party was firmly anti-Western and anti-EU, the AKP pragmatically renounced 
these policies, wising up to the facts that maintaining friendly relations with 
centres of power like the US and EU was crucial for coming to and remaining 
in power and that 7XUNH\¶V (8 SURFHVV Zas irreversible. This ideational 
transformation was a consequence of a learning process that originated from 
cost-benefit considerations, yet went in hand in hand with a virtual mindset 
shift on the part of the leadership. 
 
,Q WKLV VHQVH WKH $.3¶V QHR-Ottomanism had VWURQJ DIILQLWLHV ZLWK g]DO¶s 
foreign-policy vision of the 1980s. g]DOUHIHUUHGWRXQLYHUVDOLVWLFLGHDOVRIWKH
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West, globalization, liberal democracy, a free-market economy and opposition 
to anti-Westernism and defined the Ottoman past as an age when tolerance for 
diversity reigned and the Balkans, Caucasus and Middle East were united in 
economic union. He proposed a synthesis between traditional Islamic forms 
and Western values to counteract potentially unfavourable consequences of 
the newly emerging nationalist movements throughout former Soviet territory. 
dRODN   /LNH g]DO WKH $.3 has emphasized a cultural form of 
Islam, rather than a political one, and has envisioned a stable, conflict-free, 
trade-oriented neighbourhood for Turkey. 
 
This re-definition of political identity found expression in Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet 'DYXWR÷OX¶V GRFWULQH RI µstrategic depth¶. 'DYXWR÷OX
propounds a new paradigm for Turkish foreign policy, which would turn 
7XUNH\IURPD³SHULSKHUDO´FRXQWU\WRZDUGVDµSLYRWDO¶FRXQWU\DQGHYHQWXDOO\
WRDµJOREDODFWRU¶LQWKHSRVW-Cold War era 6|]HQD. He states that 
until the early 2000s, Turkey had erased its cultural and historical background, 
ZKLFKPLJKWKDYHJLYHQLWµVWUDWHJLFGHSWK¶ 'DYXWR÷OX-3, 55-7 and 
62). He asserts that Turkey is situated at the geographic centre of the world 
and the birthplace of human history; thus, Turkey cannot maintain a one-
dimensional outlook on any of the international-relations phenomena it 
confronts. Countries such as Turkey do not have the option of shutting 
themselves off from the rest of the world, but must overcome their troubles by 
reclaiming their confidence and opening up to the outside world. 'DYXWR÷OX
maintains that as one of eight empires that entered the 20th century 
'DYXWR÷OX  -3, 55-7 and 62) comprising various geo-politic, geo-
economic and geo-cultural components, Turkey has to undertake its 
geographical and historical responsibilities. He believes that relations with the 
EU are important, but Turkey has also to realize its political and economic 
potential in Asia to be more appealing in the eyes of the EU. 'DYXWR÷OX
552-3, 55-7 and 62). According WR'DYXWR÷OXwhile 7XUNH\¶VPDLQVWUDWHJLF
objective is integration with the EU, and this policy cannot be replaced with 
another, the Muslim World, the US and Russia cannot be ignored, as all these 
dimensions are complementary, rather than conflictual 'DYXWR÷OX . 
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'DYXWR÷OX IDYRXUV PDLQWHQDQFH RI WKH (8 PHPEHUVKLS JRDO DQG PHQGLQJ
fences with the Muslim world at the same time 6|]HQD. 
  
'DYXWR÷OXPDLQWDLQVWKDW 
³7XUNH\
V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ ODFNHG WKH PXOWL-dimensional outlook it 
should have because of the Western fixation of the Kemalist traditional 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ 1R RWKHU FRXQWU\ LQ WKH ZRUOG KDV 7XUNH\¶V FHQWUDO
unique position. For instance, Germany, Russia and Iran are also 
central countries but Germany is far from Asia and Africa, Russia is 
far from Africa and Iran is far from Europe and Africa. Thus, their 
political effectiveness in these regions is limited by geography. Having 
the most optimal position in the world, Turkey has to re-claim its 
central position and pursue more assertive policies towards its 
VXUURXQGLQJ´'DYXWR÷OX. 
 
Much later, in 2010, in line with this new vision, 'DYXWR÷OX advocated 
excellent relations with neighbours by reducing security risks and maximizing 
joint interests and high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence, a 
common understanding of security and multi-cultural co-existence for the 
VHWWOHPHQW RI UHJLRQDO FRQIOLFWV $ORQJ VLPLODU OLQHV 'DYXWR÷OX HQYLVLRQHG
Turkey as a rising economic power and a cultural model based on soft power, 
cultural inclusivity, economic prosperity and an ability to provide security in 
military terms 'DYXWR÷OX.   
 
7KH $.3¶V µ]HUR SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERXUV¶ VWUDWHJ\ UHIOHFWV WKLV QHZ
pragmatic understanding 2÷X]OX   and Ankara addressed all its 
SUREOHPV ZLWK LWV QHLJKERXUV $V 'DYXWR÷OX H[SODLQHG to the Institute of 
International and European Affairs Conference in Ireland in March 2010 in a 
talk on Turkish Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe, in February-March 
2004, the government had worked very hard to resolve the Cyprus issue, 
conducting joint cabinet meetings with Greece. With respect to Armenia, 
Turkey undertook some unilateral gestures, such as opening Turkish airspace 
in 2003 to planes flying to and from Armenia, overlooking illegal Armenian 
workers in Turkey and, in 2005, offering to set up a historical commission to 
deal with the incidents of 1915. After the success of confidential negotiations, 
two protocols were signed between Armenia and Turkey in October 2009. 
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7XUNH\¶V REMHctive was underlined by 'DYXWR÷OX KLPVHOI DV ³DFKLHYLQJ D
comprehensive settlement in Cyprus and normalization of relations with 
$UPHQLD´'DYXWR÷OX.  
 
The AKP was able to create an appropriate environment for the promotion of 
Turkey as a soft power because of its different approach from the 1999-2002 
coalition government, which had viewed the international context from a 
security-oriented perspective. The AKP government changed this 
understanding, redefining some issues as political rather than security matters. 
For example, the AKP government delinked terrorism, which was seen as a 
security problem, from the Kurdish issue, which was considered a political 
issue 2÷X]OX  . Due to its shift in perceptions regarding regional 
threats, Ankara was able to assume a more constructive role in providing 
peace and stability in the region. An understanding constructed on security 
state apparatus was forgone and the framework for internal and foreign policy 
has changed. Turkey has constructed a new geographical imagination of its 
neighbourhood on the basis of a more constructive role for Ankara as a 
promoter of peace and stability in its periphery (Aras 2009: 40-1). 
 
The evolution of the AKP from an Islamist party towards one at the centre of 
the Turkish political spectrum was initially motivated by the cost-benefit 
calculations of the party leadership. However, after this initial impetus, the 
$.3¶VQHZLGHQWLW\VWXFNDQG WKHSDUW\QHYHUUHYHUWHG WRSROLWLFDO ,VODPLVP
and carried on with the EU accession criteria. Accordingly, the following 
section touches upon how such an ideational transformation was motivated by 
the cost-benefit considerations of the leadership in the first place. 
 
1.4. Cost-Benefit Analysis as an Initial Impetus 
 
As a consequence of social learning, the ideational transformation of the AKP 
described above has been a lasting one; however, the iPSHWXVIRU WKHSDUW\¶V
initial change in orientation may be attributed to an evaluation of the adoption 
costs and an understanding of the benefits of change. The adoption costs 
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PRGHO DVVXPHV WKDW ³WKH PRUH WKH FRVWV IRU D SROLF\ FKDQJH OHVVHQ IRU D
governmHQW WKH PRUH OLNHO\ WKDW JRYHUQPHQW DGRSWV SROLF\ FKDQJH´
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 225). Low adoption costs are regarded 
as a necessary and sufficient condition for compliance with EU criteria 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 49-50). Moreover, if EU demands 
align with the political preferences or survival strategy of the elites in a target 
country, the latter can use EU policies and institutions to push their own 
political agenda and consolidate their power, demanding domestic change and 
sizing up policies and institutions with a view to meeting their goals %|U]HO
and Risse 2012b: 11). In this regard, the role of agency in transforming EU 
stimuli into domestic impact has been found essential in terms of compliance 
to EU demands in the rule of law, for example 1RXWFKHYDDQG']JLW
61-2 and 75), which have shown that amelioration in this area comes about 
when EU incentives for reform align with the domestic interests of ruling 
elites.  
 
Cost-benefit calculations can account for both WKH $.3¶V LQLtial ideational 
transformation from political Islamism to conservative democracy 7DúNÕQ
2008: 53) and its adoption of a new foreign policy on Cyprus, as the new 
leadership in Turkey weighed up whether or not an EU-oriented policy agenda 
would earn them the backing of EU circles necessary to remain in power in a 
domestic environment that had not previously allowed any Islamist party to do 
so. In view of the fact that the Turkish Constitutional Court had already closed 
down five Islamist parties on the grounds that they had become loci of anti-
secular activity, the AKP leadership, emerging from an identity crisis brought 
on by policy failure, made the pragmatic choice of abandoning Islamist 
politics in favour of conservative democracy. 1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH SDUW\¶V
solemn ideational transformation, the highly institutionalized secularism of the 
Turkish bureaucracy and judiciary prevented them from viewing the AKP as 
anything other than inheritors and sustainers of Islamist politics. The AKP, 
WDNLQJLQWRFRQVLGHUDWLRQ7XUNH\¶VKLJKO\LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]HGVHFXODUIUDPHZRUN
intended to gain legitimacy and remain in power by espousing an EU-oriented 
policy agenda. The AKP leadership judged that it could profit by the EU 
accession process to undermine the power base of the rigidly secular civil as 
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well as military establishments. Thus, for example, in the manner of previous 
Turkish ruling elites, the AKP introduced selective changes in the judicial 
system, i.e. changes that served their political interests 1RXWFKHYDDQG']JLW
2012: 61-2 and 75). 
 
The AKP leadership capitalized on the Cyprus issue as a means of 
differentiating itself from other parties. It proactively endorsed the UN plan 
for the resolution of the Cyprus dispute not only in order to boost its 
popularity abroad, but to prolong its term in office by rooting out domestic 
VFHSWLFLVP ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH SDUW\¶V DOOHJHG latent Islamist agenda. 
Recognizing that achieving a settlement on Cyprus would move Turkey 
forward significantly in terms of the EU accession process, even before its 
advent to power, the AKP pledged to settle the Cyprus dispute in order to 
HQVXUHWKHVPRRWKSURJUHVVRI7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSSURFHVV7KH$.3¶V
2002 election manifesto flatly accentuated EU membership as a political goal 
alongside the resolution of the Cyprus disagreement by any means necessary 
(Election Manifesto of the AKP 2002: 3-4 and 37). These clear policy 
REMHFWLYHVHYLQFHGWKH$.3¶VHQWKXViasm for a conciliatory stance on Cyprus 
that would earn the party the prestige of good relations with the European 
Union, and, in fact, 7XUNH\¶V VXSSRUW IRU WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ ZDV PXFK
appreciated among European and US circles and gained the AKP leadership 
international legitimacy. 
 
8SRQKLVHOHFWRUDOYLFWRU\(UGR÷DQHPSKDVL]HGWKHPDMRUZHLJKWDWWDFKHGWR
EU relations and said Turkey would do its best to obtain a firm date for 
commencing negotiations (Office of the Prime Minister November 4, 2002). 
The AKP carried on with EU reforms, and during his tour of the major EU 
FDSLWDOV(UGR÷DQSOHGJHGWR(XURSHDQOHDGHUVWKDWKHZRXOGVHWWOHWKH&\SUXV
dispute .ÕQDFÕR÷OXDQG2NWD\-4). Following a meeting with British 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU7RQ\%ODLU(UGR÷DQUHPDUNHGWKDWKHKDGVXJJHVWHGDSDFNDge 
IRU³WKHVHWWOHPHQWRIWKHµ(XURSHDQ6HFXULW\DQG'HIHQVH3ROLF\¶(6'3WKH
date for initiation of EU-7XUNLVKDFFHVVLRQWDONVDQGWKH&\SUXVSUREOHP´DQG
FODLPHG WKDW KH KDG WROG %ODLU WKDW ³7XUNH\ KDG WR EH JLYHQ D GDWH IRU WKH
initiation of accessioQWDONVDWWKH&RSHQKDJHQ6XPPLW´(UGR÷DQVWDWHG
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WKDW ³(YHU\ZKHUH WKH\ ZHQW WKH\ IDFHG WKH VDPH DSSURDFK ZKLFK ZDV WKDW
without a solution of the Cyprus dispute, Turkey cannot obtain a negotiation 
GDWHDWWKH&RSHQKDJHQ6XPPLW´ (Haber Vitrini 2002). 
 
Meanwhile, the EU was putting pressure on Turkey to take the initiative in 
solving the Cyprus dispute. On November 5, 2003, the EU Commission 
UHOHDVHG LWV 5HJXODU 5HSRUW RQ 7XUNH\¶V SURJress towards accession during 
2003, accompanied by a Strategy Paper WKDWXQGHUVFRUHGKRZ³failure to reach 
D VHWWOHPHQW LQ &\SUXV ZRXOG EH D PDMRU KLQGUDQFH IRU 7XUNH\¶V (8
SURVSHFWV´ (European Commission November 5, 2003). The next day, 
DGGUHVVLQJ WKH (XURSHDQ 3DUOLDPHQW RYHU 7XUNH\¶V (8 3URJUHVV 5HSRUW
Verheugen pointed out WKDW³Turkey had to take the initiative for the solution 
RIWKHSUREOHPFRQVRQDQWZLWKWKH81SODQ´VXJJHVWLQJWKDW$QNDUDWXUQRQ
WKHKHDWIROORZLQJWKHHOHFWLRQVLQ WKHQRUWKZKHUH'HQNWDú¶VRSSRQHQWVKDG
vowed to sideline him and push for a solution if they could win at the polls 
(Radikal November 6, 2003). Accordingly, the AKP government calculated 
WKDWDVROXWLRQRQ WKHLVODQGZRXOGFOHDU7XUNH\¶VSUH-accession path and, in 
turn, undermine the power base of the civil-military bureaucracy.  
 
$OWKRXJKWKHLQLWLDOFKDQJHLQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\PD\KDYHEHHQLQVSLUHG
by a cost-benefit analysis, such cost-benefit calculations cannot alone account 
IRUWKH$.3JRYHUQPHQW¶VRQJRLQJ pro-EU orientation and pro-active support 
for a settlement of Cyprus on the basis of UN parameters. In this learning 
process, cost-benefit calculations as well as the major ideational 
transformation of the AKP alongside its re-GHILQLWLRQRI7XUNH\¶VLQWHUHVWVDnd 
identity went hand in hand. As Risse points out, once the consensus is reached 
on the collective identity, it sticks (Risse 2001: 213). The AKP was 
established by the modernisers within the Islamist Turkish View Movement. 
The members of the new party predominantly believed that the project of 
³Solitical Islam´, which led to the marginalisation of the Islamists and to many 
party closures, had to be replaced by a more pragmatic understanding defined 
as ³FRQVHUYDWLYHGHPRFUDF\´ and they had to move to the centre of Turkish 
political spectrum. Therefore, the members of the newly formed AKP were 
predominantly in favour of EU membership and thus a policy shift on Cyprus. 
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The AKP did not revert to Islamist politics or call into question the secular-
democratic institutions of Turkey after its advent to power in 2002, but kept up 
to maintain the ongoing EU refoUP SURFHVV 7KH $.3¶V GLOLJHQFH LQ
attempting to settle the Cyprus dispute along UN parameters outlived the 
SDUW\¶VLQLWLDOSUDJPDWLFFDOFXODWLRQVDQGLWV(8SURFOLYLW\LQJHQHUDOEHFDPH
WKHQHZQRUPVRIDQHZIRUHLJQSROLF\YLVLRQ,QVXP7XUNH\¶VQHZ&\prus 
policy can best be accounted for by the advent to power of a leadership, who, 
emerging from contant policy failur ans subsequent ideational crisis, redefined 
its identity and its interests to promote EU membership as its ultimate 
objective on instrumental and pragmatic grounds in order to weaken the clout 
of the Turkish bureaucracy and military by exploiting the pre-accession 
SURFHVV +RZHYHU DIWHU WKLV LQLWLDO SKDVH WKH $.3¶V Cyprus policy was 
sustained out of new pragmatic and conciliatory norms laid out by the new 
leadership. 
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CHAPTER VII: SECOND DETERMINANT: THE ROLE OF 
THE EU 
 
The European Union was the second crucial factor involved in the Turkish 
foreign-policy change on Cyprus. The AKP government also used the 
accession process as a means of legitimising and expediting its new Cyprus 
SROLF\ %|U]HO DQG 6R\DOWÕQ  %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH  .DOLEHU  ,Q
fact, the EU has never had a specific Cyprus policy of its own; rather, unable 
to formulate, operationalise, or implement a model to settle the strife on the 
island, it has been confined largely to the role of backer for the UN Secretary 
*HQHUDO¶V PLVVLRQ RI JRRG RIILFHV LQ PHGLDWLQJ between the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots (Tocci 2007: 30). However, with the crystallization of 
Turkish and Cypriot membership perspectives in the late 1990s, the EU started 
WRLQIOXHQFH$QNDUD¶V&\SUXVSROLF\7KHFUHGLELOLW\RI7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLS
during 1999-2004 helped to mitigate any costs that might be incurred by a 
policy change on Cyprus, whereas WKH 5HSXEOLF RI &\SUXV¶V  (8
accession effectively required a settlement of the dispute if Turkey was to 
fulfill its EU aspirations. This chapter engages in separate discussions of, 
respectiYHO\ KRZ WKH &\SUXV GLVSXWH XQGHUZHQW µEuropeanization¶ and how 
this effectively required Turkey to secure a settlement on Cyprus in order to 
fulfil its own aspirations of EU membership. 
 
The chapter also examines the positions of the individual member countries 
and the European Commission and how they interacted with each other in the 
course of 2002-2004. I conclude that, rather than the backing or opposition of 
the individual member states, the European Commission, who assumed a 
position in favour of TurNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS after 1999 provided that it 
honoured the Copenhagen and acquis criteria, played the key role as the 
overarching actor in the pre-accession process for Turkey. 
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1. Europeanization of the Cyprus Issue 
 
As numerous scholars have noted, settlement of the Cyprus dispute eventually 
became the greatest obstacle to 7XUNH\¶V progress in the EU accession talks 
6XYDULHUROdDUNR÷OXDQG.DOD\FÕR÷OXgQLú6LPSOHPRGHOV
related to conditionality or to adoption costs cannot sufficiently account for 
WKH 7XUNLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V decision to back the UN parameters and active 
support for the plan laid out by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Rather, it 
was the entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU in the absence of a 
solution that made a solution a de facto acquis FULWHULRQ RI WKH (8¶V acquis 
communutaire for Turkey to fulfil in order to advance its own accession 
process. In the following chapter, I will justify how I reached such a 
conclusion by evaluating the Europeanization models and demonstrating how 
they fall short LQH[SODLQLQJ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VKLIW 
 
1.1. Democratic and Acquis Conditionality 
 
As GLVFXVVHGDWOHQJWKLQ&KDSWHU9µdemocratic conditionality¶UHIHUVWRWKH
general conditions that must be met for a candidate to become an EU member, 
namely, ³VWDELOLW\ RI LQVWLWXWLRQV JXDUDQWHHLQJ GHPRFUDF\ WKH UXOH RI ODZ
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive 
SUHVVXUH DQG PDUNHW IRUFHV ZLWKLQ WKH 8QLRQ´ (European Council 1993). 
Acquis conditionality, on the other hand, refers compliance with the specific 
rules of the acquis communautaire, to which candidate countries must adjust 
their legislation as explicitly specified by the EU as a precondition for 
membership (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 211). Clearly, the issue 
of Cyprus had nothing to do directly with either democratic or acquis 
conditionality.  
  
,QDQDGGUHVVWRWKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQWUHJDUGLQJ7XUNH\¶V3URJUHVV5Hport 
DQGWKH6WUDWHJ\3DSHURI*QWHU9erheugen, the EU commissioner for 
HQODUJHPHQW EOXQWO\ VWDWHG WKDW ³D UHVROXWLRQ LQ &\SUXV ZDV QRW D SUH-
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FRQGLWLRQ EXW D SROLWLFDO PHVVDJH LQVHUWHG LQWR WKH GRFXPHQWV ZLWWLQJO\´ 
(Radikal November 6, 2003). AKP officials also underlined that settlement of 
the Cyprus issue was not an accession criterion for Turkey. Foreign Minister 
and Vice-Prime Minister $EGXOODK*Omade this point at the parliament when 
KH H[SUHVVHG WKDW ³D VROXWLRQ WR WKH &\SUXV GLVSXWH LV QRW D FULWHULRQ IRU
7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ LQWR WKH (8 $FFRUGLQJO\ WKH RQO\ criteria that Turkey 
needs to fulfil are the Copenhagen political criteria. Cyprus issue is not one of 
these. However, we will do our best to find a settlement in Cyprus.´ (TBMM 
Reports Journal May 23, 2003). *ODOVRcriticized the Cyprus section of the 
(8¶V1RYHPEHU6WUDWHJ\ Paper, stating that Cyprus was not a political 
criterion and that Turkey had been given guarantees to this respect as far back 
as 1999 (Office of the Prime Minister November 5, 2003). Prime Minister 
(UGR÷DQ VLPLODUO\VWUHVVHGWKDWWKH³&RSHQKDJHQ&ULWHULDGRQRWVWLSXODWHDQ\
REOLJDWLRQV IRU 7XUNH\ RQ WKH &\SUXV LVVXH´ (Office of the Prime Minister 
November 6, 2003).  
 
In 1999, tKH (8¶V +HOVLQNL &RQFOXVLRQV PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW 7XUNH\ ZDV D 
candidate for EU accession on the basis of the same criteria ± democracy, 
human and minority rights and the rule of law ± as the other twelve candidates 
at the time. The European Council accentuated the fact that accession 
preparations should focus on the (8¶Vpolitical and economic criteria as well 
as a national programme for the adoption of the acquis (Council of the 
European Union 1999: Paragraph 12). The Helsinki Conclusions also 
stipulated that all candidate countries were participating in the accession 
process on an equal footing ,WVSHFLILHG³the principle of peaceful settlement 
of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter´ and urged 
candidate states ³to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border 
diVSXWHV DQG RWKHU UHODWHG LVVXHV´ (Council of the European Union 1999: 
Paragraph 4), noting that the European Council supported the UN Secretary-
*HQHUDO¶V LQLWLDWLYHWRUHDFKa comprehensive solution for a settlement of the 
Cyprus issue and the commencement of negotiations at UN headquarters in 
New York in 2002 (Council of the European Union 1999: Article 9/a). 
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At its December 2002 meeting in Copenhagen, the European Council 
reiterated both its decision in 1999 in Helsinki that ³&\SUXVZRXOGEHDFFHSWHG
DV D PHPEHU HYHQ ZLWKRXW D VROXWLRQ DV LW KDV FRPSOHWHG WKH WDONV´ DQG 
³Turkey is a candidate state destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate states.´7KH2002 summit emphasized 
the Copenhagen political criteria of 1993 as the valid criteria to be fulfilled by 
Turkey, stating that if, upon the report and recommendation of the European 
Commission, the European Council decided at its December 2004 meeting 
that Turkey had satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria, then accession 
negotiations would be opened without delay (Council of the European Union 
2002). 
 
In fact, the EuropeaQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V  5HJXODU 5HSRUW FRQFHGHG WKDW
Turkey had made substantial legislative progress by enacting significant 
legislative reform packages that included a new Penal Code as well as 
constitutional changes, which were mentioned as priorities in both the 
SUHYLRXV\HDU¶VUHSRUWDQGthe Accession Partnership agreement (Commission 
of the European Communities 2004a: 55). The decision was manifest: ³In 
view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into 
force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission considers 
that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that 
acFHVVLRQ QHJRWLDWLRQV EH RSHQHG´ (Commission of the European 
Communities 2004b: 3). Notably, among the expected constitutional and 
legislative changes laid out by the European Commission as consonant with 
democratic conditionality, there was no mention of Cyprus. 
 
When, in December 2004, the EU Council followed the recommendations of 
the Commission and offered to open accession negotiations with Turkey, it did 
so with the caveat that ³LWH[SHFWVTurkey to actively pursue its efforts to bring 
LQWRIRUFHWKHVL[VSHFLILF LWHPVRIOHJLVODWLRQLGHQWLILHGE\ WKH&RPPLVVLRQ´
and that $QNDUD DJUHHV WR ³VLJQ WKH3URWRFRO UHJDUGLQJ WKHDGDSWDWLRQRI WKH
Ankara Agreement between the EU and Turkey, taking account of the 
DFFHVVLRQ RI WKH WHQ QHZ PHPEHU VWDWHV´ (Council of the European Union 
2004: 5). Again, the conditions propounded by the EU Council were heavily 
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related to the promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in 
Turkey and the implementation of the acquis communutaire, not RQ7XUNH\¶V
fervency regarding resolution of the Cyprus question, amounting to the fact 
that solution in Cyprus was not a pre-condition. However, the lack of a 
FRQVHQVXVDVUHJDUGV7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSDPRQJWKHPHPEHUVWDWHVbased on 
their various interests and preoccupations rendered Turkish accession process 
problematic.  
 
On July 29, 2005, Ankara signed the Additional Protocol, which meant Turkey 
would be required to extend the Customs Union it had signed with the EU to 
its ten new members, including Cyprus; thus, Greek Cypriot vessels and 
aircraft would be granted the right to use Turkish ports and airports. However, 
the third article of the protocol stressed that its signing, ratification and 
implementation would not amount to recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, 
and Ankara made clear that conclusion of the protocol would not compromise 
7XUNH\¶VULJKWVYLV-j-vis Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of 
Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment concluded in 1960. Moreover, the 
VHFRQG DUWLFOH RI WKH SURWRFRO EOXQWO\ VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH 5HSXEOLF RI &\SUXV
referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership state established in 
´,QRWKHUZRUGV$QNDUDUHJDUGHG*UHHN&\SULRWDXWKRULW\DVYDOLGRQO\
in the south, not over the Turkish Cypriots in the North (Declaration by 
Turkey on Cyprus 2005).  
 
On September 21, 2005, the European Community responded to $QNDUD¶V-XO\
29 Protocol by demanding that Turkey fully and non-discriminatorily 
implement the EU Additional Protocol, including free movement of goods and 
transport, and it tied the opening of accession talks on relevant chapters to 
7XUNH\¶V H[WHQVLRQ RI WKH SURWRFRO WR DOO QHZ (8 PHPEHUV VWUHVVLQJ WKDW
7XUNH\¶VRYHUDOOSURJUHVVLQWDONVZLWKWKH(8ZRXOGEHDIIHFWHGE\LWVIDLOXUH
to carry out its obligations under the Additional Protocol. The EU also noted 
that the accession process involves the recognition of all EU members ± which 
by May 1, 2004 would include Cyprus (European Community 2005). 
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Prior to the opening of negotiations with Turkey on October 03, 2005, France, 
backed by Austria and Denmark proposed RIIHULQJ 7XUNH\ D µSULYLOHJHG
SDUWQHUVKLS¶ UDWKHUWKDQIXOOPHPEHUVKLS (Zaman December 17, 2004). Apart 
from the proposal of µSULYLOHJHG SDUWQHUVKLS¶, the Greek Cypriot 
Administration attempted to set recognition of the Republic of Cyprus as a 
FRQGLWLRQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ +RZHYHU WKH *UHHN &\SULRW GHPDQG IRU
recognition was watered down. The European Commission emphasized that 
the recognition of Cyprus was not a precondition for the initiation of accession 
talks and the sole aim of the taONVZLWK7XUNH\ZDV³DFFHVVLRQ´&RPPLVVLRQ
of the European Communities 2006: 5) Therefore, Turkey was allowed to 
commence accession talks on October 03, 2005. The December 2006 EU 
Council decided to merely suspend eight chapters and to close none until 
Turkey honoured its obligations under the acquis instead of suspending the 
talks altogether as demanded by the Greek Cypriots. The EU refrained from 
taking sides and urged Ankara to honour its obligations under the Ankara 
Protocol of July 2005. The Greek Cypriot demand for suspension of the talks 
with Turkey in the run up to the December 2006 EU Council was backed by 
Germany and the 1HWKHUODQGV ZKLFK GHVLUHG D ³SULYLOHJHG SDUWQHUVKLS´ IRU
7XUNH\ $XVWULD FDOOHG IRU D ³EUHDWKLQJ SHULRG´ SULRU WR 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ
while France favoured suspension of 17 chapters with Turkey (Faustmann 
2011: 161-2 and 70).  
 
 In its 2006 Progress Report for Turkey, the European Commission pointed 
out that ³7XUNH\¶VUHIXVDOWRJLYHDFFHVVWRLWVVHDSRUWVDQGDLUSRUWVWRYHVVHOV
and aircraft under the flag of the Republic of Cyprus is in contravention of the 
Customs 8QLRQ DJUHHPHQW DQG D KLQGUDQFH WR IUHH PRYHPHQW RI JRRGV´
(Commission of the European Communities 2006: 5). Once again, the 
European Commission emphasized that Turkey must extend the Additional 
Protocol to the Republic of Cyprus, as failure to do so was an infraction of the 
acquis communautaire. But, the Greek Cypriot demand for a suspension of the 
talks altogether, the French demand for suspension of 17 chapters and the 
demands for privileged partnership for Turkey were not accepted. Such 
hostility to Turkey's accession and the ambivalence of others rendered Turkish 
accession a controversial issue within the Council. While 7XUNH\¶V SURJUHVV
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was evaluated by the European Commission strictly in accordance with its 
implementation of the democratic and acquis criteria, the controversy on 
7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVion among the member states complicated its task. The entry 
of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU and Turkey¶V FDQGLGDWH VWDWXV 
Europeanized the Cyprus question. Because of the need for Turkey to open its 
ports and airports to the Greek Cypriot vessels and aircraft, a solution in the 
island became a sine qua non for Turkey as part of the acquis conditionality. 
 
1.2. Determinacy and Legitimacy of Conditions 
 
Was the settlement of the Cyprus discord a determinate or legitimate condition 
for Turkey¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS? In light of the earlier discussion on the 
determinacy and legitimacy of EU conditionality (See Chapter 5, Section 2), it 
must be concluded that, in fact, settlement of the Cyprus question was neither 
a determinate nor a legitimate condition, but a political strategy devised by the 
European Union. 
 
Determinacy is defined by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier as the clarity and 
formality of a rule: The clearer the behavioural implications of a rule and the 
more legalized and binding its status, the greater is its determinacy, and the 
more likely it is to be adopted. Legitimacy refers to consistency of rules: As a 
UXOH¶V DPELJXLW\ DQG LQFRQVLVWHQF\ LQFUHDVHV WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI FRPSOLDQFH
GLPLQLVKHV 0RUHRYHU LI WKH UXOH LV ERXQG XS ZLWK WKH FRPPXQLW\¶V
constitutive values and norms and the rule making-process is legitimate, then 
the legitimacy of the rule is boosted (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 
12 and 18-9). In view of these definitions, the EU conditionality vis-j-vis 
Turkey showed varying degrees of determinacy and legitimacy. For example, 
abolition of the death penalty is one of the most legitimate and determinate 
European human rights norms, and limiting the role of the military, although 
to a lesser degree than the abrogation of capital punishment, is also a 
legitimate and determinate EU norm, since both form part of the democratic 
conditionality on which EU membership is based. In contrast, the settlement 
of the Cyprus issue was part of neither the democratic nor acquis elements of 
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conditionality, and consequently, it was not a determinant or a legitimate 
condition for 7XUNH\¶V (8DFFHVVLRQ. Therefore, neither the opening nor the 
FRQFOXVLRQRI7XUNH\¶V(8DFFHVVLRQ WDONVFRXOGEHPDGHGHSHQGHQWXSRQD
settlement in Cyprus.  
 
So, if a settlement on Cyprus was part of neither µdemocratic conditionality¶ 
nor µacquis conditionality¶ ± neither a µlegitimate¶ QRU D µdeterminate¶ EU 
norm to be applied to 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ SURFHVV ± how, exactly, did the 
Cyprus issue come to DIIHFW 7XUNH\¶V UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH (8? The problem 
stems directly from the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU 
without a settlement on the island, which made it impossible for Turkey to 
fulfil the acquis communutaire. To do so would require Turkey to extend its 
Customs Union Agreement with the EU to the Greek Cypriot Administration, 
which Turkey does not recognize as the legal representative of the whole of 
Cyprus. As long as Turkey is unable to extend the Additional Protocol to the 
Republic of Cyprus, accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey will 
remain blocked. In this sense, a resolution on the island has become a de facto 
condition IRU 7XUNH\¶V SURJUHVV in the accession process. In other words, 
Turkey was not directly judged on its contribution to the resolution process in 
Cyprus, but on the progress it achieved towards meeting the Copenhagen 
Criteria, which, within the framework of the acquis, required Turkey to extend 
the Customs Union agreement between the EU and Turkey to the Republic of 
Cyprus as a new EU member. Accordingly, this µEuropeanization of the 
Cyprus disSXWH¶ UHTXLUHGDQ\pro-EU government to tackle the Cyprus issue 
and force the Greek Cypriot side into a settlement.  
 
1.3. Credibility of Conditionality 
 
As described above (See Chapter 5, Section 2), the credibility of conditionality 
refers to the consistency of EU rules and the fact that rewards must be bound 
to compliance, not tied to additional criteria, not withheld if compliance is 
met, and not doled out until then. On the contrary, tKH (8¶V GHPDQG that 
Ankara contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus dispute was highly political, 
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rather than pertinent to the Copenhagen Criteria or the acquis communutaire, 
and thus lacked consistency as well as credibility. In spite of the fact that the 
evaluation of candidate countries was supposedly based on their progress in 
fulfilling the criteria and the acquis, the Strategy Paper that accompanied the 
EU &RPPLVVLRQ¶VNovember 2003 Regular Report on Turkey emphasised that 
³failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus would be a major hindrance for 
7XUNH\¶V(8SURVSHFWV´ Ankara complied with tKH(8¶VGHPDQGVRQ&\SUXV, 
despite its lack of determinacy and legitimacy; however, as it was neither a 
democratic nor an acquis criteria for accession, compliance did not unblock 
7XUNH\¶VEU negotiation process.  
 
The credibility of EU incentives dropped substantially when France and 
Germany started to put up resistance WR7XUNH\¶VIXOOPHPEHUVKLS even though 
$QNDUD OHQW LWV VXSSRUW WR WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ 'HEDWHV DERXW 7XUNH\¶V
µGHVLUDELOLW\¶ DQG LQWHUQDO LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV ZLWKLQ WKH (8 continued to 
increasingly lower the effectiveness of conditionality (Schimmelfennig 2008: 
931-3). Despite the EU¶V equivocal stance and the low level of credibility 
regarding 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ SURVSHFWV $QNDUD SHUVLVWed in calling for a 
solution based on the UN parameters; thus, the credibility of conditionality, 
now lacking, cannot account for 7XUNH\¶Vchange in policy towards Cyprus. It 
must be mentioned, however, increased credibility would likely to boost the 
governmental efforts to find a settlement. 
 
1.4. Size and Speed of Rewards 
 
Domestic compliance costs for the government of a candidate country are 
most likely to increase as the candidate draws closer to an endgame, i.e. a 
critical points at which it may jump from one stage to the next in negotiations. 
These high costs may cancel out the benefits to be acquired upon entry into the 
next stage (Schimmelfennig 2008: 931).Turkey was at just such an endgame in 
the run up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, as the European Council was 
on the verge of deciding at its December 2004 meeting whether or not to 
commence accession talks with Turkey. At this critical stage, Ankara pushed 
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its utmost for a settlement on Cyprus, demonstrating that it was not the 
intransigent party.  
 
Currently, although there is no endgame for Turkey looming on the horizon, 
Ankara has maintained its position with regard to settling the Cyprus dispute 
on the basis of UN parameters, making clear that 7XUNH\¶VSUR-active efforts 
cannot be explained by the size and speed of EU rewards. Rather, its 
initiatives for a solution on Cyprus represent a change in the mindset of the 
Turkish leadership, who believe that a win-win solution on the basis of the UN 
parameters would be in the best interests of the Cypriots as well as the Turks, 
Greeks and other regional countries. Moreover, it seems that the next endgame 
is intertwined with the initiatives of the government to find a solution to the 
Cyprus dispute, rather than the other way around. 
 
5DWKHUWKDQH[SODLQLQJWKHFKDQJHLQ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\µVize and speed 
of rewards¶ FDQ EHWWHU explain the AKP JRYHUQPHQW¶V current slow pace in 
attempting to meet EU criteria after 2005. Far away from the next endgame, 
Turkey is under no immediate pressure to decide on complying with EU 
requirements vis-j-vis the Copenhagen Criteria or losing all the benefits of 
jumping to the next phase in negotiations. ,QVWHDG WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW¶V
domestic power calculations have come to the fore, as the EU accession 
endgame had now moved so much further away. It is possible, however, that 
WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V HIIRUWV WRZDUGV Fompliance with the Copenhagen Criteria 
may speed up when the next endgame approaches. 
 
2. The Positions of the Member States and the United States on 
Cyprus  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
In this section, I will analyze the role of the EU players as well as the US, 
which played an important role in the process. I argue in this section that 
without institutionalized norms to force Ankara to make substantial changes in 
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its Cyprus policy, the efforts of the individual states did not go beyond their 
efforts to facilitate the UN initiatives for a solution in Cyprus. The EU, on the 
other hand, had the institutional tools to force Ankara to shift its policy due to 
7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVV The European Commission, as the executive body 
of the EU, was able to push Ankara to change its position on Cyprus due to the 
need for Turkey to implement the acquis communautaire as an EU candidate 
state. The US, on the other hand, lacked the institutional tools to to play a 
direct role in shifting AQNDUD¶V&\SUXVSROLF\7KH86UROHUHPDLQHGFRQILQHG
to its efforts to back the UN initiative. 
 
7KHSROLF\RIWKH86WRZDUGVWKH&\SUXVTXHVWLRQDQG7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLS
process is examined here as its role is intertwined with the EU process and 
efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus question. While the US and the UK 
tried to facilitate the UN efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus question, the 
other EU members DVVXPHGYDU\LQJSRVLWLRQVRQ7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQSURFHVV. 
Except for Greece and Britain, none of the other EU member states had a 
particular vision for a settlement in Cyprus. After analyzing the positions of 
the EU actors and the US by extensively drawing on the primary sources on 
the Cyprus question between 2002 and 2004, I will conclude that while the US 
and the UK strove hard to facilitate the UN initiative, the EU Commission 
played a crucial role by making clear that 7XUNH\¶Vaccession process would 
keep on provided that it met the Copenhagen and acquis criteria. 
 
2.2. The United States 
 
In the wake RIWKH&ROG:DU:DVKLQJWRQ¶V7XUNLVKSROLF\FDQEHVXPPDUL]HG
as seeking 7XUNH\¶VLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKWKH(8SROLWLFDOV\VWHPQRUPDOL]DWLRQRI
its relations with Greece and a solution to the Cyprus discord. This was 
considered by Washington as the most effective way to stabilize the oil-rich 
and strategic Middle East and Transcaucasia. (Pericleous 2009: 21-3) The US 
officials qualified Turkey DV D ³SLYRWDO VWDWH´ DQG WKRXJKW WKDW LI stability is 
acvhieved in Turkey, this would spill over to the neighboring states and thus 
contribute to international stability (Ibid). Accordingly, Turkey was 
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considered as a key country to stabilize the Black Sea, Mediterranean and 
Caucasus. Washington also thought that Turkey would also provide an 
antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and function as the southern anchor of 
NATO after the US war against Iraq in 2003 (Ibid). As the largest and most 
powerful country in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey was the sole country 
with the potential to be fully incorporated into the Western political system, 
the EU, and thus reverse the potential unfavorable consequences of Islamic 
fundamentalism. For this to materialize, the establishment of peaceful 
UHODWLRQV ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V QHLJKERUV QRWDEO\ *UHHFH DQG VHWWOHPHQW RI WKH
Cyprus dissension was viewed as essential (Ibid). 
 
This US vision was shared by the EU in the later 1990s, especially with the 
coming WRSRZHURI6FKU|GHU¶V6ocial Democratic Party (SDP) in Germany in 
DQG6LPLWLV¶3$62.LQ*UHHFHLQ1996. Social Democrats in Germany 
and Greece have been strong supporters of Turkey's campaign to win a date 
from the European Union in December for the start of accession negotiations 
(Mr Erdogan's Greek friend Chumminess will help August 12, 2004). After 
the September 11, 2001 attacks, Germany, like the US, came to believe that 
the best way to fight Islamic fundamentalism was to accept Turkey as an EU 
member state to stabilize the Muslim Middle East, which was thought to be 
the source of fundamentalist threat. This was a radical transformation in the 
positions of the EU that paved the way for the EU to grant Ankara candidate 
status in 1999 at the Helsinki summit.   
 
Against this general setting, in the wake of the Cold War, in January 1996, 
Greece and Turkey came to the brink of war in the Aegean over the 
uninhabited islands of Imia/Kardak. The troops of the two NATO allies came 
face to face. Only a timely American intervention prevented the escalation of 
the crisis. Washington admonished WKHWZRFRXQWULHVWKDW³WKHRQHWKDWVKRRWV
ILUVW ZRXOG EH LQ WURXEOH ZLWK WKH 86´ (Milliyet January 31, 1996). Another 
crisis broke out when the Greek Cypriots ordered S-300 ground to air missiles 
from Russia to be installed on the island. Again the crisis was overcome by an 
American intervention. The S-300 missiles were deployed to Crete, rather than 
Cyprus (Turkish Daily News February 3, 1997, January 21, 1997).  
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The Imia and S-300 Crisis were watershed developments to convince the 
American government that there was the constant risk of a war in the Eastern 
Mediterranean between the two NATO allies. This culminated in a new 
American bid to integrate Turkey with the EU structures by a solution in 
Cyprus with a view to providing stability and security in the Middle East and 
Transcaucasia where major energy resources were located, and thus to 
maintain the ability to access and control them. As a result, Richard Holbrooke 
ZDVDSSRLQWHG3UHVLGHQW&OLQWRQ¶VVSHFLDOHQYR\WR&\SUXVLQ (Pericleous 
2009: 21-3).  
 
The US strategy to integrate Turkey with the EU structures did not change 
during the presidency of George Bush (2001-2009). During the Cyprus 
negotiations of 2002-4, President Bush and Colin Powell, U.S. Secretary of 
State, stepped in whenever necessary to facilitate the efforts of the UN. 
7KRPDV:HVWRQZDVWKH3UHVLGHQW¶V6SHFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYHIRU&\SUXVDQGKH, 
alongside David Hannay, the British Special Representative for Cyprus, 
endeavored to facilitate the talks under the auspices of the UN without 
themselves initiating or pursuing a British or American solution to the 
problem.  
 
The Bush administration made an extraordinary effort to ensure that Turkey 
got a "date" from the European Union in 2003. President Bush personally 
made telephone calls, and Colin Powell wrote letters to the foreign ministers 
of each country (Birand December 21, 2002). In the eyes of Washington, 
"Turkey, a country which has become all the more important strategically, 
should be given the closest date, that is 2003." (Ibid). With the support they 
enlisted from the Bush Administration, (UGR÷DQ DQG *O pressed hard for 
2003. The more Washington pressed on, the tenser the EU ± notably France-
Germany and the Scandinavians ± became. They looked upon Turkey as closer 
to the US-British-Italian-Spanish camp. However, the "rejection front" was 
unable to resist for long and the German-French proposal of 2005 was adopted 
rather than US-UK proposal of 2003. Had the Bush Administration not exerted 
that pressure, Turkey could hardly get even the "December 2004" date. Turkey 
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was protected mostly by Britain, Italy and Spain, countries considered to be 
close to US' policies. While Germany and France, who were disturbed by the 
86¶,UDTSROLF\FXUEHGWKH$PHULFDQ offer of 2003, they still settled for a date 
in 2004. The Scandinavians, who were at loggerheads with the 86¶VWDQFHRQ
Iraq, strove to impede the EU from giving a date altogether (Ibid). 
 
In the course of the talks on the Annan Plan, the Turkish government often 
asked for help from :DVKLQJWRQ WR IDFLOLWDWH WKH WDONV ,Q 0DUFK  *O
called Powell and asked for effective support from the US with regard to two 
crucial points for Turkey, namely, the provision of legal protection for the 
accord and bi-zonality. Powell replied that he would talk with Annan and 
Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, to meet Turkey¶V FRQFHUQV (Milliyet 
March 29, 2003).  
 
Washington stepped in whenever necessary to promote the parties to accept 
the Annan Plan. Prior to the Bush-(UGR÷DQPHHWLQJVFKHGXOHGWREHKHOGRQ
January 28, 2004, in Washington, Bush, on January 21, sent Thomas Weston 
WR$QNDUDWRWDONZLWK8÷XU=L\DOWKHKHDGRIWKH7XUNLVKGLSORPDWLFWHDPIRU
&\SUXV:HVWRQSOHGJHGWKDW³:DVKLQJWRQLVUHDG\WRGRLWVEHst to facilitate 
WKHWDONV´ (Milliyet January 23, 2004) :HVWRQDOVRH[SUHVVHGWKDW³3UHVLGHQW 
Bush wants the Cyprus discord to be settled by the NATO summit in June 
 LQ øVWDQEXO´ (Ibid). :HVWRQ DOVR VDLG ³QRW JLYLQJ 7XUNH\ D GDWH WR
commence accession talks by the EU is unacceptable for Washington in case 
RI D VROXWLRQ LQ &\SUXV´ 7R UHOLHYH WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW :HVWRQ DOVR
PHQWLRQHGWKDW³:DVKLQJWRQFRXld intervene for the delay of the referenda on 
the plan in case a compromise is reached by the parties.´ (Ibid). Bush also sent 
letters to Prime Minister Simitis and Greek Cypriot President Papadopolous 
calling for the acceptance of the Annan Plan (Ibid). 
 
Powell also worked hard and played an influential role in convincing the 
parties via Thomas Weston (Birand April 03, 2004). In early April 2004, when 
the referendum was drawing near, Colin Powell firmly supported the Annan 
Plan and called on both Cypriot communities to approve the plan in the 
referenda on April 24, 2004. Powell asserted that "this is an historic moment 
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and a powerful signal of reconciliation." (Turkish Daily News April 2, 2004). 
3RZHOOVWDWHGWKDW³WKH86LVFRPPLWWHGWRVXSSRUWLQJIXOOLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI
this settlement and do all we can to help in all respects." (Ibid). Colin Powell 
was one of tKH PDLQ EDFNVWDJH SOD\HUV WKURXJKRXW WKH %UJHQVWRFN
negotiations in early March 2004 and had countless telephone talks with 
$QQDQDQG3HWURV0RO\YLDWLVDQG$EGXOODK*OWKH*UHHNDQG7XUNLVK3ULPH
Ministers, to embolden them to reach an accord (Ibid). In June 2004, in an 
DGGUHVV DW øVWDQEXO 8QLYHUVLW\ %XVK UHLWHUDWHG WKH 86 SRVLWLRQ DV UHJDUGV
7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8DQGcalled for the European Union to to set a 
date for Turkey to start entry talks into the union despite criticism by France's 
President Jacques Chirac that he was meddling in EU affairs. Bush said that 
Turkey belongs in the EU and that Europe is "not the exclusive club of a 
single religion" (Bush rebuff to Chirac over Turkey June 29, 2004).  
 
Since 1996, Washington pressed hard for the solution of the Cyprus question 
and to achieve its eventual and broader objective of accession of Turkey into 
the EU to secure the Middle East and Transcaucasia. The US put pressure on 
the EU for acceptance of Turkey as a full member. As the date for a solution 
GUHZ QHDUHU LQ &\SUXV LQ $SULO  WKH 86¶ efforts multiplied. In 1997, 
GHVSLWH:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSUHVVXUHRQWKH(8WRJUDQW7XUNH\FDQGLGDF\VWDWXVDW
the Luxembourg summit, the EU denied candidacy, which materialized in 
GXHWRWKH(8¶VGRPHVWLFG\QDPLFVUDWKHUWKDQWKH86GXUHVV7KH(8
changed this position in the run up to the Helsinki summit in 1999 and decided 
to grant Turkey candidate status with similar concerns to that of the US in 
mind, to stabilize its neighbourhood. When the US and the EU converged on 
WKH DLP RI 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ LQWR the EU, the EU efforts became more 
HIIHFWLYHZLWKWKH86¶VIXOOVXSSRUWIRUDVROXWLRQLQ&\SUXVDQGDFFHVVLRQRI
Turkey into the EU. 
 
However, Washington did not have the institutional tools to single-handedly 
force a settlement on Ankara. While the US endeavoured to facilitate the 
peace initiatives led under the auspices of the EU without setting forth any 
suggestions, the EU became the essential actor to push Turkey for a solution in 
Cyprus from 1999 onwards, after Turkey was granted candidate status. The 
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need for Ankara to find a solution to the Cyprus disagreement to proceed with 
its own EU accession process forced Ankara to make substantial changes in its 
Cyprus policy. This was due to the institutionalisation of the EU norms within 
the Turkish domestic legal framework. To become an EU member state, 
Ankara had to transpose the acquis communautaire into its domestic 
structures. This transposition also called for a solution to the Cyprus dispute. 
In this framework, the European Commission, as the executive body of the 
EU, came to the fore. As an organization functioning on technical procedures, 
rather than political considerations, the European Commission made clear that 
as long as Ankara complied with the acquis criteria, its pre-accession process 
would keep on.  
 
2.3. The EU and its Member States 
 
Except for Greece and the UK, other members of the EU paid only sporadic 
attention to the disagreement on the island. When they paid attention no 
member state has ever pushed for an active EU involvement in the dispute. 
Since the frozen conflict did not pose any immediate threat to regional 
stability and the EU members did not desire to compromise their relations with 
the parties concerned, they did not meddle in the dispute. Therefore, the EU 
had not developed a particular and independent policy towards the dispute, 
which was never the subject of high-level political debate and the EU never 
set forth a settlement formula to the dispute. The EU confined itself to backing 
the UN good offices mission and the mediation of the Secretary General 
(Prodi presses Turkey over Cyprus January 15, 2004). The EU committed 
itself to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and 
called for the unification of the island in line with the UN Resolutions. The 
EU also unreservedly and outspokenly supported UN Secretary General 
$QQDQ¶VPHGLDWLRn initiatives between 2002 and 2004. (Tocci 2007: 30).  
 
7KH (8¶V LQWHUHVWV ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH &\SUXV LVVXH DUH GHIÕQHG within its 
broader concerns for peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean. On 
account of the proximity of the EU to the strategic and turbulent Middle East, 
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peace and stability in the region is of weight for the EU. A settlement in 
Cyprus would also embolden normalization of relations between NATO ally 
and EU candidate Turkey and Greece (Tocci 2007: 28).  
 
At the end of the 1990s, important changes took place in the international and 
European arena. Abiding strains in the Balkans and notably the Kosovo crisis 
pushed Europe towards a more geo-political approach in the Balkans, which 
supposed a more inclusive policy vis-a-vis Turkey. The advent to power of 
social democrat governments in the EU, who favoured Turkish membership, 
was a momentous GHYHORSPHQW LQ 7XUNH\¶V ELG for membership and the 
&\SUXV TXHVWLRQ ,Q *HUPDQ\ 6FKU|GHU¶V 6'3 -2005) and in Greece 
6LPLWLV¶ 3$62. - FDPH WR SRZHU DQG ERWK EDFNHG 7XUNH\¶V (8
membership.  
 
As a result of the HPHUJHQFH RI D IDYRXUDEOH HQYLURQPHQW IRU 7XUNH\¶V (8
membership, Turkey was granted candidacy status in 1999. After this 
development, WKH(8&RPPLVVLRQEHFDPHWKHSULPDU\DFWRULQ7XUNH\¶VSUH-
accession process. The high-level officials of the EU Commission outspokenly 
EDFNHG 7XUNH\¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH (8 DQG a settlement in Cyprus. The 
Commission publicly voiced WKDW ³Turkey would be accepted as a member 
provided that it meets the Copenhagen and acquis criteria´. However, the 
ambivalent stance of some PHPEHU VWDWHV DV UHJDUGV 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ
rendered its membership controversial indicating that the accession process 
would not be as smooth as the other candidates even in case of a settlement in 
Cyprus.  
 
The need for a solution in Cyprus was mentioned by EU officials several 
times. At a speech in the European Parliament on November 08, 2000, *QWHU
Verheugen, EU Commissioner for enlargement, VDLG WKDW ³we are still 
concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights and the rights of 
minorities as well as about the constitutionally enshrined role played by the 
armeG IRUFHV LQ SROLWLFDO OLIH YLD WKH 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO´ (Strategy 
Paper Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports November 08, 
2000). He also stated that ³&\SUXV ZLOO EH D PHPEHU ZLWK RU ZLWKRXW D
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settlement, but if a solution cannot be found in Cyprus, commencement of 
accession talks with Turkey would put in risk.´ (Milliyet March 5, 2003). 
9HUKHXJHQPDGHFOHDUWKDW³LQFDVHRIIDLOXUHWRILQGDVROXWLRQWRWKH&\SUXV
question, Turkey would be in a situation of not recognizing an EU member 
VWDWH´ (Ibid) -HDQ &KULVWRSKH )LORUL 9HUKHXJHQ¶V VSRNHVPDQ TXDOLILHG
membership of Turkey in the absence of a settlement in Cyprus as 
³XQDFFHSWDEOH´DQG³VXUUHDOLVW´ (Ibid).   
  
The Commission made clear iQ LWV 5HJXODU 5HSRUW RQ 7XUNH\¶V SURJUHVV
WRZDUGV DFFHVVLRQ IRU  WKDW ³failure to reach a settlement in Cyprus 
would be a major hindrance for TXUNH\¶V (8 SURVSHFWV´ (European 
Commission November 5, 2003). VerheugHQ VWDWHG WKDW ³Nobody in Europe 
could imagine a situation where we would start negotiations with Turkey 
when the conflict in Cyprus is not resolved. It's not a condition, but we're 
simply stating the fact that this could become an obstacle." (O'Rourke 
November 05, 2003). The following day, in addressing the European 
3DUOLDPHQWLQUHODWLRQWR7XUNH\¶V(83URJUHVV5HSRUW*QWHUVerheugen said 
WKDW³7XUNH\QHHGVWRWDNHWKHLQLWLDWLYHWRVROYHWKHSUREOHPLQOLQHZLWKWKH
81SODQ´(Radikal November 6, 2003). 
 
Speaking at the Turkish General Assembly, Romano Prodi, the President of 
the EU Commission, stated that ³DVROXWLRQLQ&\SUXVZLOOJUHDWO\ease the EU 
membership expectations of Turkey. This is not a condition, but a political 
reality´ (TBMM Reports Journal January 15, 2004). Bertie Ahern, the Irish 
Prime Minister and holder of the EU Presidency, reiterated the same position. 
³7Hchnically, it is not a condition for beginning negotiations, but is bound to 
play a role when the then 25 EU leaders decide at their December summit 
whether to approve the start RI WKH SURFHVV´ (Black January 15, 2004). To 
dissipate the fears of the Turkish side to secure the bi-zonality aspect of the 
Annan Plan, Romano Prodi assured the Turkish government that the accord 
reached in Cyprus would be rendered congruous with EU law (Zaman 
February 15, 2004) . 
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At the Bertelsmann Forum held to promote European dialogue since 1992, 
*QWHU 9HUKHXJHQ LQGLFDWHG WKDW ³7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS LV HVVHntial for 
(XURSH¶VVHFXULW\, LQQRWLPHLQ7XUNH\¶VKLVWRU\VXFKFonsequential changes 
took place and 7XUNH\PXVWEHJLYHQDQ(8SHUVSHFWLYH´ (Zaman January 10, 
2004). Verheugen, in his delivery to the German Deutschlandfunk radio, 
XQGHUOLQHG WKDW ³KH VXSSRUWV 6FKU|GHU's policy of backing Turkey's 
membership (Turkish Daily News February 25, 2004). Verheugen said: "What 
lies behind this approach of 6FKU|GHU are the big strategic thoughts shared by 
all European heads of state and governments. To have a strong and stable 
partner in Turkey would play a very important role in the political and 
economical future of Europe" (Ibid). 
 
Verheugen also strongly backed the UN efforts and called on the Greek and 
Turkish Cypriot leaders to do all they can to try and persuade the population of 
WKH LVODQG +H VWDWHG WKDW ³WKH SUHVHQW SODQ UHSUHVHQWV WKH EHVW DQG PRVW
balanced solution that can possibly be achieved" (Turkish Daily News April 2, 
2004). To encourage the parties to endorse the plan, Verheugen said "the 
alternative is not this plan or another plan. The alternative is this plan or 
nothing, no solution at all." He added that "Turkey played a very constructive 
and cooperative role in the negotiations. I would like to say that expressly" 
(Ibid).  
 
The EU also refrained from taking sides in the talks and declined the Greek 
Cypriot desire for the participation of the EU to the negotiations as a party. In 
his meeting with De Soto, the 816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶V6SHFLDO5HSUHVHQWDWLYH
for Cyprus, Verheugen stated WKDW ³WKH VROXWLRQ RI WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ LV D
matter of high priority for the EU. We participate in the negotiations not as a 
GLUHFW SDUW\ EXW DV D FRQWULEXWRU\´ (Milliyet February 18, 2004). After 
clarifying its impartiality, the EU made the crucial contribution to a settlement 
in Cyprus when Verheugen pronounced in the island in the run up to the 
negotiations in New York in front of the tZROHDGHUVWKDW³WKHHPHUJLQJDFFRUG
will not be breached or watered down by the (8ODZ´ (Milliyet February 21, 
2004). 9HUKHXJHQPHQWLRQHGWKDW³ZHDVVXUHWKDWWKHDFFRUGWREHDJUHHGDQG
put to referenda by the parties will be rendered a legal provision as effective as 
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WKH (8 SULPDU\ ODZ E\ EHLQJ XQDQLPRXVO\ DSSURYHG E\ WKH (8 &RXQFLO´ 
(Ibid). By this pronouncement, the EU addressed the greatest misgiving of 
Ankara and the Turkish Cypriots of the accord being diluted within the EU 
framework by the cases to be brought by the Greek Cypriots in front of the EU 
courts (Ibid). This move not only demonstrated tKH(8¶VLPSDUWLDODQGHYHQ-
handed stance on the Cyprus question, but also evidenced the European 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V OHDGLQJ UROH LQ WKH efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus 
disagreement. 
 
Verheguen also warned the Greek Cypriot side, in which the surveys showed a 
QHJDWLYHYRWHLQWKHUXQXSWRWKHUHIHUHQGXPRQWKH$QQDQ3ODQWKDW³LQFDVH
WKH *UHHN &\SULRWV VD\ µQR¶ WR WKH SODQ WKHQ WKH *UHHQ /LQH VHSDUDWLQJ WKH
two Cypriot communities would be the de facto border of the EU and I would 
do anything I could to surmount the isolations on the north. In such a case the 
Turks could not be accused of occupying DQG GLYLGLQJ WKH LVODQG´ (Milliyet 
April 16, 2004).  
 
In short, led by Verheugen, and Romano Prodi, the EU worked hard to find a 
formula satisfactory to the both sides. Prodi said Turkey was "closer than 
ever" to the EU (Prodi presses Turkey over Cyprus January 15, 2004).  
Verheugen assumed a neutral position on the Cyprus question and never 
disappointed the Turkish side. Verheguen did everything in his power to 
encourage the parties to accept a solution. He not only plainly underlined that 
³IDLOXUH WR ILQG D VROXWLRQ WR WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ ZRXOG EH D PDMRU
impediPHQWWR7XUNH\¶V(8DVSLUDWLRQV´ (European Commission November 5, 
2003), but also warned the Greek Cypriot side for the unfavourable 
consequences of a no vote in the referendum. The European Commission went 
as far as to pronounce that the EU Council would unanimously approve the 
accord to be signed by the parties to render the agreement as effective as the 
(8 SULPDU\ ODZ 7KLV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKH (8¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR ILQGLQJ D
VROXWLRQ WR WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ DQG WR 7XUNH\¶ PHPEHUVKLS Therefore, the 
(8¶VFRPPLWPHQWDnd its initiatives to a settlement in Cyprus, which would 
clear the PRVWLPSRUWDQWEDUULHURQ7XUNH\¶VURDGWR(8membership, was the 
most essential element, alongside the leadership and a propitious decision-
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making setting in Turkey, LQFKDQJLQJ7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ 
 
2.3.1. The UK: 
 
Britain was one of the important countries that has supported the UN 
endeavours to find a settlement in Cyprus (Kramer 1997: 16). British interests 
are associated with its colonial past, its strategically located two sovereign 
bases close to the Middle East on the island, by its role as a guarantor power 
under the 1960 constitution, by its permanent seat at the UN Security Council, 
and by its close relationship with Turkey. Since 1974, the UK has backed 
good offices mission of the UN Secretary General and its initiatives to induce 
a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. British interests in Cyprus was 
pursued both via bilateral relations with the conflicting parties (through the 
British representative or the High Commissioner in Cyprus) or through the 
UN. The UK backed C\SUXV¶DFFHVVLRQLQto the EU, yet it adamantly opposed 
an EU involvement in the dispute (Tocci 2007: 28-30).  
 
In the last UN bid to find a settlement to the conflict, David Hannay had been 
appointed as the British Special Representative for Cyprus in 1996, 
endeavoured to put more clout into the UN efforts. At no stage of the 
negotiations, did the UK initiate or pursue a solo British or even a UK/US 
approach to the problem as Britain¶V remarkable but fraught relationship with 
all the parties concerned would have probably led to failure from the outset. 
Accordingly, only the UN was acceptable as a medium to lead the talks. 
Secondly, the enlargement of the EU was a major aim of British foreign policy 
which should in no way be derailed by developments in Cyprus. Thirdly, 
while Britain was prepared to strive to find a solution prior to the entry of the 
Republic of Cyprus into the EU, this could not be pursued in such a way as to 
MHRSDUGL]H%ULWDLQ¶V close relations with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey (Hannay 
2005: 50-1).  
 
Prime Minister 7RQ\%ODLUZDVRQHRI7XUNH\¶VPRVW IHUYHQWSURSRQHQWV IRU
accession. In British newspapers there are hardly any reports DJDLQVW7XUNH\¶V
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membership. During his visit to Turkey, Tony Blair agreed on cooperation 
between the UK and Turkey on WKH ODWWHU¶V bid for membership into the EU 
DQG UHPRYDO RI WKH LVRODWLRQV RQ WKH 751& %ODLU H[SUHVVHG WKDW ³DV LQ WKH
past, the UK is one of the leading advocates RI7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEership bid´ 
+UUL\HW0D\.  
 
Jack Straw, British Foreign Secretary, also played an important role. He 
manipulated the parties and the European capitals in favor of a solution in 
&\SUXV DQG 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS (Birand April 03, 2004). Straw on a TV 
SURJUDPPH LQ 7XUNH\ LQ 0DUFK  PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³LQ FDVH WKH *UHHN
&\SULRWVVD\µQR¶DQGWKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWVVD\µ\HV¶DWWKHUHIHUQGXPWKHQWKH
GreHN &\SULRWV ZLOO RQO\ UHSUHVHQW WKH VRXWKHUQ VHFWLRQ RI WKH LVODQG´ 
(+UUL\HW March 03, 2004). 
 
Accordingly, Britain has always been one of the most ardent and significant 
EDFNHUVRI7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8%ULWDLQKDd similar concerns as that 
of the US: Stabilization of the region where rich oil and gas resources are 
located and to counter fundamental Islam by integrating Turkey into the EU 
structures. Cognizant of the need to reach a solution in Cyprus for progress of 
7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ WDONV D %ULWLVK 6SHFLDO 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH IRU &\SUXV ZDV
appointed in the course of the negotiations of the Annan Plan to facilitate the 
talks. When Turkey complied with the Copenhagen and acquis criteria, Britain 
EHFDPHPRUHYRFDOLQLWVVXSSRUWIRU7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQ:KHQ7XUNH\IDLOHG
WRKRQRUWKHFULWHULDKRZHYHU%ULWDLQZDVQRWDEOHWRSXVKIRUZDUG7XUNH\¶V
accession process effectively (Schimmelfennig 2009: 420-1).  
 
2.3.2. Greece: 
 
Greece is the EU member state whose national interest with regard to Cyprus 
has been most closely associated with the dispute by virtue of its kin-Greek 
Cypriot community, its historical role in the dissension, and owing to the 
salience of Cyprus in the broader Greek-Turkish strife. Leaving aside the 
policy of enosis, Athens policy of backing the Greek Cypriot cause has 
  228 
 
endured. For this reason, the Greek policy towards Cyprus has aimed at 
reunification of Cyprus under a tight federal (akin to a unitary state) structure, 
considerable territorial adjustments, the liberalization of rights and freedoms, 
DQGPXFK UHGXFHG7XUNLVK UROH LQ WKH LVODQG¶V VHFXULW\ DUUDQJHPHQWV8QGHU
3DSDQGUHRX¶V3$62.LQWKHVDQGV$WKHQVDVVXPHGDPRUHDctive 
and hands-on stance on the issue (Tocci 2007: 55).  
 
In February 1999, George Papandreou replaced anti-Turkish Theodore 
Pangalos as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Papendreou and Simitis shifted 
Greek policy towards Turkey to a great extent in that Athens became one of 
the champions of Turkish membership in the EU, which it presumed was a 
more convenient setting to root out Turkish-Greek disputes, including Cyprus, 
rather than bilateral talks with Ankara. This would ill enable Greece to reduce 
its defence spending, attract foreign investment and boost cross-border trade. 
Greece has realised, in such a case, that a European Turkey will be a less 
threatening Turkey (H. Smith May 08, 2004). The Helsinki summit of 1999 
that granted Turkey candidate status enhanced the distinctiveness of the EU on 
the Cyprus issue. It was affirmed that the prospects of EU membership for 
both Turkey and Cyprus would expedite a settlement. However, although the 
Helsinki summit made the solution of the Cyprus dispute a precondition for 
Turkish membership, this was not the case for the Republic of Cyprus (Eralp 
2009: 6-7). Kostas Karamanlis, whose New Democracy Party won power in 
March 2004, pledged to actively support Turkey's EU membership, even the 
Cyprus dispute remained unresolved (H. Smith May 08, 2004).  
 
After his meeting with Papadopoulos in February 2004, Prime Minister Kostas 
6LPLWLVVDLGWKDW³$WKHQVLVUHDG\IRUDVROXWLRQLQ&\SUXVXQGHUWKHDXVSLces 
RIWKH81DQGWKHDUELWUDWLRQUROHRIWKH81GRHVQRWGLVWXUEWKHP´ (+UUL\HW 
February 9, 2004). In contrast to the previous elections, which circulated 
DURXQG³KRVWLOLW\WRZDUGV7XUNH\´LQWKH0DUFK*UHHNJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQV
between PapandreoX¶V6LPLWLVVWHSSHGGRZQLQ)HEUXDU\3$62.DQG
.DUDPDQOLV¶ 1HZ 'HPRFUDF\ 3DUW\¶V ³IULHQGVKLS ZLWK 7XUNH\´ FDPH WR WKH
IRUHIURQW:KLOH3DSDQGUHXVDLGWKDW³,VHWXSSHDFHIXOUHODWLRQVZLWK7XUNH\´
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.DUDPDQOLV DFFHQWXDWHG WKDW ³, KDYH JRRG UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH 7XUNLVK
JRYHUQPHQW , DP WKH RQH WKDW FRXOG GHHSHQ WKH SHDFH´ (Birand March 9, 
2004). Both the Simitis-Papandreou duo and Karamanlis agreed to grant the 
UN Secretary General the authority of arbitration. Both showed maturity and 
even refrained from rendering the Cyprus issue an election material (Ibid). For 
the first time there was a consensus between the government and opposition in 
Greece on the acceptance of the UN plan to settle the Cyprus question. 
Moreover, the Greek government and opposition were not annoyed by 
granting the UN Secretary General the authority of arbitration, which proved 
to be the most effective medium in the hands of the Secretary General to forge 
a solution in the island. 
 
Simitis and Papandreu (SP) displayed courage and vision in the run up to the 
election on March 7, 2004 and despite being aware that they were going to 
lose, they endorsed the New York agreement. Eventually, they lost the 
elections. Kostas Karamanlis, the leader of the newly elected New Democracy 
Party (March 10, 2004-October 6, 2009), did not support the uncompromising 
position of the Greek Cypriots LQ %UJHQVWRFN ,QVWHDG KH NHSW D GLVWDQFH
from them (Birand April 03, 2004). 
 
6LPLWLV¶ accession to the leadership of PASOK in 1996 was a momentous 
development in Greek-Turkish relations. He removed the nationalist and anti-
Turkish members from the party, such as Theodore Pangalos as the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs .HPDO   .LULúoLE. +HUHGHILQHG*UHHFH¶V LQWHUHVWV
and changed Greece¶V GHFDGHV-long policy of hostility towards Turkey and 
RSSRVLWLRQ WR 7XUNH\¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH (8 (H. Smith May 08, 2004). In this 
sense, Turkish accession into the EU was seen as a transformative process.  He 
argued that a Europeanized Turkey as an EU member would be a better 
solution to the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus and would 
VHUYH*UHHFH¶VLQWHUHVWVEHWWHU (KerǦLindsay 2007: 71). He strongly backed the 
81¶V ODVW LQLWLDWLYH WR ILQG D VROXWLRQ LQ&\SUXV DQG ZDUQHG *UHHN &\SULRWV
DJDLQVW WKH XQIDYRXUDEOH FRQVHTXHQFHV IRU WKHP RI D ³QR´ YRWH LQ WKH
referendum. Simitis also did not oppose granting the UN Secretary General the 
power of arbitration going beyond the mission of good offices and thereby 
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VWURQJO\ HQKDQFLQJ WKH RGGV RI D VHWWOHPHQW LQ &\SUXV 6LPLWLV¶ VWURQJ
OHDGHUVKLS LQ IDYRXURI7XUNH\¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH(8DQGD VROXWLRQ LQ&\SUXV
was a remarkable development in the course of 2002 and 2004 that helped 
7XUNH\¶VQHZSROLF\RQ&\SUXV 
 
2.3.3. Germany 
 
In Germany, a coalition of Social Democrat and Greens, who played to the 
economic-political criteria rather than religious-cultural factors as EU 
conditions, came to power in 1998 elections. German Chancellor Gerhard 
6FKU|GHU DQG Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer constantly backed Turkey¶V
membership in the EU. The Social Democrats and Greens held the view that 
the EU should keep its promises to Turkey to start accession talks if it fulfilled 
political criteria. The second reason is regional circumstances. According to 
WKHP ³Turkey had a unique situation in the unstable Middle East region as 
UHJDUGV (XURSH¶V LQWHUHVWV´ ,QDO DQG <H÷HQR÷OX -XQH  . As an EU 
member Turkey would function as a model to the Muslim countries of the 
Middle East and would help stabilize the region. However, the Christian 
'HPRFUDWV XQGHU $QJHOD 0HUNHO DGYRFDWHG D ³SULYLOHJHG SDUWQHUVKLS´ for 
Turkey. Merkel stated that ³7XUNH\ would place too much economic and 
cultural pressure on current EU states if it were admitted to the union´ (Merkel 
Calls For Petition Against Turkish Membership October 11, 2004).  
 
At the Bertelsmann Forum in January 2004, Joschka Fischer underlined that 
³7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSLQWRWKH(8DVDGHPRFUDWLFDQG0XVOLPFRXQWU\ZLOO
be a good sign to the Arab countries and the EU has to keep its promises to 
7XUNH\´ (Zaman January 10, 2004). *HUKDUG 6FKU|der, before his visit to 
Turkey in February 2004, YRLFHG WKDW ³LI 7XUNH\ PHHWV WKH &RSHQKDJHQ
FULWHULD WKH(8ZLOONHHS LWVSURPLVH´+HDOVR LQGLFDWHG WKDW³$VROXWLRQ LQ
&\SUXVSULRUWR0D\ZLOOEHDSRVLWLYHVLJQDODQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVWDQFHRQ
CyprXV LVYHU\ LPSRUWDQW´ (Radikal February 22, 2004). In Turkey, 6FKU|GHU 
repeated the messages he delivered prior to his visit 6FKU|GHU said that 
³*HUPDQ\¶VDWWLWXGHLVFOHDUDQG7XUNH\FDQWUXVW*HUPDQVXSSRUW2XUview 
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IRU7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLVDIILUPDWLYH7KHWDONVZLWK7XUNH\PXVWEHLQLWLDWHG
DV VRRQ DV SRVVLEOH LI 7XUNH\ VDWLVILHV WKH FULWHULD´ (Radikal February 24, 
2004) 6FKU|GHU DOVR HPSKDVL]HG WKH ZHLJKW RI D VHWWOHPHQW LQ &\SUXV DQG
SUDLVHG (UGR÷DQ¶V FRQVWUXFWLYH VWDQFH LQGLFDWLQJ WKDW WKLV VWDQFH ZDV
appreciated among the EU circles and this will make a positive impact in the 
decision on beginning accession negotiations with Turkey (Ibid).  
 
*HUKDUG6FKU|GHUVDLGDWWKH)HGHUDO3DUOLDPHQWWKDW,  
³IXOO PHPEHUVKLS RI 7XUNH\ LV D PDMRU DVVHW IRU WKH (8¶V VHFXULW\
Commencement of reconciliation between a non-fundamentalist Islam 
DQG :HVWHUQ HQOLJKWHQPHQW ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V PHmbership is the most 
eventful asset for the EU. The stability in the Middle East will be 
attained via the accomplishment of the reform process in Turkey. This 
can be possible if we have the courage to say to Turkey that we will 
keep our promise.´ (Zaman May 1, 2004).  
 
At the Franco-German Summit in Strasbourg in October 2004, 6FKU|der 
underlined the same points: "This region is remarkably not stable : Iran, Iraq, 
Middle-East, etc.", he pointed out. But he argued that "If we manage to 
establish an effective link between European values and moderate Islam, this 
would be something" (Strasbourg Franco-German Summit Chirac-SFKU|GHURQ
Turkey October 02, 2004) (Strasbourg Franco-German Summit Chirac-
6FKU|GHURQ7XUNH\2FWREHU.  
 
Joschka Fischer underlined that consequential reforms were undertaken in 
Turkey and it should not be kept outside the EU. Fischer adduced the weighty 
policy shift of Turkey with regard to Cyprus, which he presumed was arduous 
to achieve. Angela Merkel, the leader of the Christian Democrat Union, 
however, opposed 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS DQG PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³WKH
commitments to Turkey cannot bH NHSW´ (Zaman May 1, 2004). Merkel 
SURSRXQGHGD³SULYLOHJHGSDUWQHUVKLS´IRU7XUNH\DVVHUWLQJWKDW7XUNH\¶VIXOO
membership would cause problems with regard to funding, free movement and 
integration (Milliyet February 17, 2004). 
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6FKU|GHU, alongside British Prime Minister Blair and French President Chirac, 
became one of the SURSRQHQWVRI7XUNH\¶VHQWU\LQWRWKH(8WKURXJKRXW-
4. 6FKU|GHU VDLGYHU\FOHDUO\WKDW³LI7XUNH\IXOILOOV WKH&RSHQKDJHQFULWHULD, 
WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV ZRXOG EHJLQ LQ WKH ILUVW KDOI RI ´ (Turkish Daily News 
February 25, 2004). 6FKU|GHU was the first European leader to speak about 
concrete dates for the beginning of the negotiations. 6FKU|GHU travelled to 
Turkey just after his meeting with Jacques Chirac and Tony Blair in Berlin 
implying that the dates were articulated after 6FKU|GHU¶VGHEDWHRQ³7XUNH\¶V
SODFHLQWKHIXWXUH(XURSH´ZLWK&KLUDFDQG%ODLUGXULQJWKLVVXPPLW (Turkish 
Daily News February 25, 2004). 
 
German foreign policy towards Turkey under the Social Democratic Party 
(1998-2005) was congruous with the American foreign policy towards Turkey. 
Both thought after the Cold War that the Muslim Middle East could create 
potential risks for the interests of the United States and the EU and had to be 
stabilized. Both envisioned Turkey as a model for the region. Turkey was 
regarded as a secular Muslim democracy and a crucial ally for the West as the 
eastern flank of NATO. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Turkey 
continues to be a pivotal partner in the fight against al Qaeda and other 
terrorist groups (Phillips 2004).  
 
For this reasonXQWLO*HUPDQ\DFWLYHO\EDFNHG7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWR
the EU. After the advent to power of the Christian Democratic Union in 2005, 
WKH *HUPDQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWDQFH RQ 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS FKDQJHG WRZDUGV
³SULYLOHJHG SDUWQHUVKLS´ UDWKHU WKDQ IXll membership. Throughout 2002 and 
$SULO  *HUPDQ\¶V DFWLYH EDFNLQJ IRU 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS DQG
VWDWHPHQWVLQWKLVGLUHFWLRQE\*HUPDQRIILFLDOVXQGHUWKH6'3JDYH7XUNH\¶V
Cyprus policy a boost and strengthened the hands of the government vis-j-vis 
the dissidents in search for a solution in Cyprus. Germany, under both the SDP 
and the CDU, refrained from actively involving in the efforts for a solution in 
Cyprus and rather backed the UN initiatives.  
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2.3.4. France 
 
In the course of the 2002-4 Cyprus negotiations, while President Chirac 
VXSSRUWHG 7XUNH\¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH EU, even his own party, the Union for a 
Popular Movement (UMP)ZDVDJDLQVW7XUNH\¶VHQWU\LQWRWKH(8 The Euro-
deputies of the French majority party, UMP, announced at the European 
Parliament RQ$SULOWKDWWKH\ZHUHDJDLQVW7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH
(87KLVZDVDUXSWXUHIURP)UDQFH¶VWUDGLWLRQDOSROLF\RIIDYRULQJ7XUNH\¶V
entry (Le Monde April 4, 2004). 6XEVHTXHQWO\ WKH LGHD RI D ³SULYLOHJHG
SDUWQHUVKLS´IRU7XUNH\ZKLFKKDVEHHQcirculating around for some time, was 
formally adopted by the UMP. This stance was at odds with the position 
adopted by President Chirac (1995-2007), who favoured full membership for 
Turkey in the long term (Chirac: Turkey not ready for EU membership April 
29, 2004). Chirac admitted that Turkey had made considerable progress and 
³LW VKRXOG FRQWLQXH DQG LQWHQVLI\ WKH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI GHPRFUDWLF DQG
HFRQRPLFUHIRUPV´ (Chirac encourages Turkey EU bid July 20, 2004). Alain 
-XSSp WKH SUHVLGHQW RI WKH 803 DQQRXQFHG RQ $SULO   LQ 3DULV WKH
SDUW\¶VUHIXVDORI7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8LQDSUHVVFRQIHUHQFHKHOGDW
WKHSDUW\¶VKHDGTXDUWHUV (Le Monde April 9, 2004).  
 
Michel Barnier, Foreign Minister from the UMP, expressed concerns as 
regards Turkey¶V PHPEHUVKLS &KLUDF LQGLFDWHG WKDW )UDQFH¶V VWDQFH RQ
7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS SURFHVV KDV QRW FKDQJHG DQG )UDQFH ZRXOG DFW LQ
accRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH (8 &RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHSRUW LQ 'HFHPEHU  (Milliyet 
April 04, 2004). $EGXOODK *O LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR PLQLPL]H WKH XQIDYRUDEOH
HIIHFWVRIWKH803GHFLVLRQIRU7XUNH\¶V lack of a date for the talks, said on 
$SULOWKDW³VRPHZRUGVPD\EHXVHGIRUGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDOSXUSRVHV´
indicating that Turkey would persist in its efforts to get a positive report from 
the Commission at the end of the year (Le Monde April 10, 2004). 
 
$V WKH 803 ZDV DJDLQVW 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ DQG Chirac was alone in his 
VXSSRUW IRU 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ LQWR WKH (8, he put forward the idea of 
changing the constitution to allow a popular referendum on the issue at the end 
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of negotiations with Turkey to appease the UMP. Chirac was in favour of a 
debate RQ 7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ EXW QRW D YRWH Dominique Paillet, from the 
UMP, said that a ³PDMRULW\RIWKHSDUOLDPHQWDULDQVDUHDJDLQVWWR7XUN\¶V(8
membership. Debating is good, but real democracy would require a vote." 
Laurent Fabius from the opposition socialists VLPLODUO\SRLQWHGWKDW³DYRWHRQ
Turkey¶VDFFHVVLRQZRXOGEHQHFHVVDU\´ (French Lawmakers Debate Turkish 
EU Bid October 14, 2004). Public surveys in France also confirmed public 
opposition to Turkish accession, showing nearly 67% of the French  
GLVDSSURYLQJ7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLS The reservations most commonly cited by 
the French voters are the risk of Turkish immigrants entering the EU job 
market, and the fact that most of Turkey's 70 million citizens are Muslims. 
(Henley December 15, 2004) 
 
In the run up to October 2005, when the talks with Turkey was scheduled to 
begin, France, backed by Austria and Denmark proposed offering Turkey a 
µSULYLOHJHGSDUWQHUVKLS¶UDWKHUWKDQIXOOPHPEHUVKLS$IWHUWKHFRPPHQFHPHQW
of accession talks, when Ankara refused to open its ports and airports to the 
planes and vessels of the Republic of Cyprus, Paris favoured suspension of 17 
chapters with Turkey in the run up to the December 2006 EU Council. In 
EULHIDSDUWIURP3UHVLGHQW&KLUDF¶VVXSSRUWIRU7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQWKH)UHQFK
DWWLWXGHGLGQRWKHOS7XUNH\¶VSROLF\VKLIWRQ&\SUXVDVWKH803JRYHUQPHQW
IDYRUHGD³SULYLOHJHGSDUWQHUVKLS´IRU7XUNH\ rather than full membership. 
 
2.3.5. The Other EU Members 
 
In the course of 2002-4, Jan-Peter Balkenende, the EU President and Prime 
Minister of Netherlands and Ben Bot, Minister of Foreign Affairs, backed 
7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS GHVSLWH RSSRVLWLRQ IURP VRPH FDELQHW PHPEHUV
Balkenende met with 6FKU|GHU in Berlin to discuss the EU Council scheduled 
to be held on December 17, 2004 in Brussels. They PHQWLRQHG WKDW³7XUNH\
will get a negotiation date with the aim of full membership, but the talks will 
be open-HQGHG´ (+UUL\HW December 13, 2004). %HQ %RW H[SUHVVHG WKDW ³WKH
(8¶VGHFLVLRQLVQRWLQIOXHQFHGE\7XUNH\being a Muslim country. What only 
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matters is whether or not the Copenhagen Criteria is met.´ 'R÷DQDQG<D÷FÕ
February 25, 2004)+H VDLG WKDW ³ZHZLOOZDLW IRU WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHSRUW
DQGDFWDFFRUGLQJO\LQ1HWKHUODQGV¶SUHVLGHQF\DVRI-XQH.´ 'R÷DQDQG
<D÷FÕ )HEUXDU\  . %RW DOVR SUDLVHG 7XUNH\¶V FRQVWUXFWLYH VWDQFH RQ
the Cyprus LVVXH DQG XQGHUOLQHG WKDW ³&\SUXV LV QRW D FRQGLWLRQ IRU
membership as it is not pDUWRI WKH&RSHQKDJHQ&ULWHULD´ 'R÷DQDQG<D÷FÕ
February 25, 2004).  
 
In Italy, 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU %HUOXVFRQL EDFNHG 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS GXH WR
7XUNH\¶VHFRQRPLFSRWHQWLDO In Spain, ex-Prime Minister Aznar (2000-2004) 
KDGPHQWLRQHG WKDW ³WKH(8ZDVQRW D&KULVWLDQ FOXE.´ (+UUL\HW November 
17, 2004). Zapatero, from the Spanish Socialist Workers Party, who was 
Prime Ministre from 2004-2011, also held to this line. King Juan Carlos also 
backed Turkey¶VPHPEHUVKLS7KHUHZDs not a polarization in society either. 
In Spain, both government and the opposition backed 7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQ In 
Poland, there was no concern among the Polish people that the Turkish 
membership would jeopardize a European identity. Both government and 
opposition presumed that Turkey¶V membership into the EU would strengthen 
NATO. In Poland, the consolidation of the US¶s position within the EU - 
Turkey is viewed as close to the US - is regarded as a reassurance against 
Russian influence. In Belgium, the social-liberal government indicated that it 
would back the advice of the European Commission. Ultra-rightist Vlaams 
Belang waVDJDLQVW7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSThere were grave reactions on the 
Flemish side. Portugal, Ireland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Finland, Estonia, 
Letonia, Lituania and Slovenia supported 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS (+UUL\HW 
November 17, 2004).  
 
Throughout 2002-4, the Austrian Prime Minister and Minister of Domestic 
Affairs favoured D ³SULYLOHJHG SDUWQHUVKLS´ IRU 7XUNH\ The Austrian Prime 
0LQLVWHU:ROIJDQJ6FKVVHOVWDWHG at a conference in February 2004 WKDW³WKH
decision about the beginning of negotiations with Turkey should be taken after 
the calculation of all the costs of Turkish membership" (Turkish Daily News 
February 25, 2004).  
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In Malta, Prime Minister Gonzi expressed that they would adopt the line of the 
Christian Union Parties in other European countries. Initially, Sweden 
FULWLFL]HGWKH(8¶V pro-Turkish policy, but subsequently adopted it. Only the 
Social Democrats, who were concerned about the minority, especially the 
Kurdish rights in Turkey (+UUL\HW November 17, 2004), criticized the 
opening of accession talks. 'HQPDUN UHJDUGHG 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS
doubtfully for a long time. Both government and opposition were against 
7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS Slovakia and Luxembourg SUHVXPHG WKDW ³WKH
negotiations must be open-HQGHG´ (+Uriyet November 17, 2004). 
 
In brief, throughout 2002-4, Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain and Greece backed 
7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS 3UHVLGHQW &KLUDF LQ )UDQFH DQG 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU
%DONDQHQGH LQ 1HWKHUODQGV VXSSRUWHG7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ, though they faced 
party divisions :KLOH $XVWULD DQG 'HQPDUN UHMHFWHG 7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS
6ZHGLVK VRFLDO GHPRFUDWV KDG VRPH FRQFHUQV DV UHJDUGV 7XUNH\¶V KXPDQ
rights record. Luxembourg and Slovakia expressed the view that the talks with 
Turkey should be open-ended. There was a propitious environment within the 
(8IRU7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLSSURVSHFW DQGD VROXWLRQ LQ&\SUXVDV WKHPRVW
significant actors in the EU supported Turkey and a solution in Cyprus. This 
situation empowered the Turkish government vis-a-vis its domestic dissidents 
of a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan within Turkey.  
 
Apart from Greece, none of the EU members had a preference for the type of a 
solution in Cyprus and they all backed the settlement initiatives of the UN. 
While France, Netherlands and Austria RSSRVHG7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ Britain, 
,WDO\6SDLQDQG3RODQG UHPDLQHGDGYRFDWHVRI7XUNH\¶VPHPEHUVKLS While 
the European Commission played the main role in HYDOXDWLQJ 7XUNH\¶V
performance in meeting the criteria in its Regular Reports, the opposition by 
VRPHPHPEHUVWDWHVWR7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQPDGHLWuneasy for the Council to 
assume a clear stance as regards Turkish membership. This demonstrated that 
even in case of a settlement in Cyprus, Turkish accession would remain a 
controversial issue within the EU.  
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CHAPTER VIII: THIRD DETERMINANT: DECISION-
MAKING PROCESS, HOW THE DECISION WAS MADE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the interaction among the decision-making actors 
within Turkey, which led to the emergence of a new policy on Cyprus. 
Without such a propitious decision-making setting, a policy change on Cyprus 
would not have been possible. The chapter explains how such a propitious 
decision-making context enabled (UGR÷DQDQG3ULPH0LQLVWHU*OZKRZHUH
convinced of the need for change, to alter 7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ to change 
7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ 6XFK D SROLF\ VKLIW RFFXUUHG after an interactive 
process with other actors in the decision-making structure of Turkey. 
 
Through the differential empowerment of domestic actors in Turkey, the EU 
also helped to swing the domestic pendulum in favour of pro-EU actors and 
proponents of the Annan Plan. The EU¶V GLIIHUHQWLDO empowerment of 
domestic actors within Turkey; which allowed the Turkish leadership - the 
AKP-led government and (UGR÷DQ - to single-handedly implement a non-
UHYHUVLEOH FKDQJH LQ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\, will also be examined in this 
chapter as it is firmly intertwined with the decision making-process. 
 
Differential empowerment refers to the degree to which the EU contributes to 
a change in domestic opportunity structures by redistributing power and 
resources between actor coalitions through the mechanism of Europeanization 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002: 263). Within this framework, the EU empowered 
pro-EU actors such as the AKP and the 7h6ø$', which backed the EU 
process and the Annan Plan, and weakened the Euro-sceptic veto points, such 
as the military and other political parties in Turkey, which expedited a foreign 
policy change on Cyprus. Thus, the EU facilitated the emergence of a new 
equilibrium within Turkey that was in favour of the Annan Plan. In Cyprus, 
WKH(8VWDWHG WKDW WKHSURJUHVVRI7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQZRXOGEHKHOSHGE\ D
solution on the island, despite the fact that settlement was not a criteria. In this 
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way, the EU aimed to tip the domestic balance of power in Turkey in favour of 
the pro-settlement, pro-EU actors.  
 
Rather than striving to have a direct impact on opportunity structures, the EU 
intends WR DOWHU WKH µFRJQLWLYH LQSXW¶ LQWR WKHVH VWUXFWXUHV FKDQJLQJ
expectations and beliefs of domestic actors in such a way as to promote 
GRPHVWLF LQVWLWXWLRQDO FKDQJH (XURSHDQ EHOLHIV DQG LGHDV SURYLGH D µIRFDO
SRLQW¶ RI FRRSHUDWLRQ perhaps even changing the position of domestic veto 
players, and thus securing the emergence of a dominant advocacy coalition 
consistent with EU ideas %|U]HODQG5LVVH-3).  
 
With regard to Turkish foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus, there was no 
FRQVHQVXVDPRQJ7XUNH\¶VGRPHVWLFSROLWLFDODFWRUVRQWKH&\SUXs issue and 
GHYLDWLRQ IURP WUDGLWLRQDO SROLF\ GLG QRW UHVRQDWH ZHOO ZLWK HLWKHU 7XUNH\¶V
political elite or public opinion. The overall lack of consensus allowed the EU 
to function as a focal point for domestic change by altering the cognitive input 
into existing opportunity structures, enabling the emergence of a dominant 
coalition advocating policy change and support for the Annan Plan. Weakened 
by the EU process, dissenting political actors were not equal to standing up to 
such a policy change. Thus, for all its reservations about the Annan Plan, the 
veto points remained silent. 
 
The sensitive nature of the Cyprus issue within the Turkish domestic setting 
made policy change difficult. In Turkey, Cyprus was viewed as a µnational 
cause¶ by all the mainstream political parties and the Turkish civilian-military 
bureaucracy at large. The holders of this nationalist perspective believed, for 
the most part, that when the partnership state broke up in 1963, what emerged 
were two full-fledged, separate unitary states, each possessing the essential 
qualities of an independent nation under international law and that any 
pretence towards a solution on the island should be cognizant of the fact that 
there are two peoples on the island, each of whom is represented by a 
democratically elected government (Olgun 1999: 6-8). øQDO%DWX&+3GHSXW\
and a senior diplomat, exemplified this mindset in a parliamentary speech. He 
stated that ³&\SUXV SUREOHP LV DERYH DOO D TXHVWLRQ RI WKH ULJKW RI VHOI-
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determination, social development, economic growth which is not recognised 
in the case of Turkish Cypriots. (TBMM Reports Journal December 22, 2003). 
Accordingly, advocates of this nationalist view have favoured a confederal, 
two-state solution rather than the federal solution contained in the UN 
parameters. Holders of the aforementioned viewpoint also believe that the EU 
has been H[SORLWLQJWKH&\SUXVLVVXHLQRUGHUWREORFN7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQDQG
that even if the Cyprus dispute were to be settled, other obstacles would be 
placed in front of Turkey¶VDFFHVVLRQ (Robins 2003: 83-4).  
 
On the opposite side, proponents of change contend that the Annan Plan 
represented a balanced and just plan for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict 
that would unblock the road to EU accession for Turkey (Interview 16 
September 6, 2011). Of the various political parties in Turkey, the AKP was 
the only party that rendered EU membership and a resolution on Cyprus 
among its leading objectives.  
 
As will be analysed in detail, in northern Cyprus, the possibility of a 
settlement to the Cyprus discord, which would extricate Turkish Cypriots from 
international isolation and provide an EU membership prospect, functioned as 
a focal point of cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots and culminated in the 
HPHUJHQFH RI D ODUJH FRDOLWLRQ DQG SXEOLF RSLQLRQ DJDLQVW 'HQNWDú¶V
intransigent status quo-oriented policies on Cyprus.  
 
7KH $.3¶V 002 Election Manifesto clearly expressed EU membership and 
VROXWLRQ RI WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ DV WKH SDUW\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SULRUities. 
Throughout November 2002 to April 2004, the Cyprus question was 
extensively discussed among the proponents of the Annan Plan on the one 
side, and dissidents of the plan on the other side :KLOH (UGR÷DQ *O WKH
business world and Mehmet Ali Talat were strongly pro-EU and pro-solution, 
'HQNWDúDQGSROLWLFDOSDUWLHVLQ7XUNH\ZHUHRSSRVHGWRWKHDFFHSWDQFHRIWKH
$QQDQ 3ODQ 6H]HU ZDV VNHSWLFDO DERXW WKH SODQ g]N|N RQ WKH RWKHU KDQG
assXPHGDQHXWUDOVWDQFHDQGGHFODUHGWKDW³LWZDVWKHJRYHUQPHQWWRPDNHWKH
GHFLVLRQ´DIWHUH[SUHVVLQJWKHPLVJLYLQJVDQGFRQFHUQVRIWKHPLOLWDU\ (Birand 
April 15, 2003 ).  
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The membres of the AKP, who were the modernizers and post-Islamists 
within the Islamist National View Movement, formed the AKP in 2001. As 
explained in Chapter VI in detail, the modernisers have undergone an 
ideational transformation as a consequence of policy failure, which led to the 
formation of post-Islamist AKP. The failure of the Islamists to obtain a 
considerable percentage of the votes and constant closure of the Islamist 
parties in Turkey by the Constitutional Court led the Islamists over the years 
to recognize the need for a re-consideration of the validity of their identity and 
politics. As a result, the modernizers, who were in favour of EU membership 
and thus were pro-settlement in Cyprus, emerged within the Islamist 
Movement. 
 
I first analyze the abortive attempt by the AKP government to change 
Ankara¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ EHWZHHQ 1RYHPEHU  DQG 0DUFK  ZKHQ
'HQNWDúrejected the Annan Plan in the Hague on March 10, 2003. According 
to the model employed in this thesis, this policy failure was a consequence of 
a lack of a propitious decision-making context in this period despite the 
presence of components of leadership and EU dynamics. Subsequently, I 
move on to the successful policy shift in the course of December 2003 and 
April 2004 when the three components of the model in this thesis for a 
successful foreign policy alteration, leadership, the EU and propitious 
decision-making setting, converged. 
 
1.1. An Abortive Attempt to Change the Cyprus Policy 
 
The Copenhagen Presidency conclusions Paragraph 10 reads that Cyprus 
would be accepted as a member even without a settlement, the draft plan 
would be finalized by the parties by February 28, 2003 and it would be 
submitted to referenda on March 30, 2003 (Council of the European Union 
2002). On February 26, 2003, UN Secretary General submitted the Annan III 
to the two Cypriots leaders, Papadopoulos (who replaced Clerides on February 
16, 2003 after the presidential elections in the south) and DenkWDúDQGDVNHG
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them to decide whether to submit or not the plan to referenda and reply at the 
Hague meeting on March 10, 2003 (Pericleous 2009: 234-5). 
 
7R PDNH D GHFLVLRQ RQ $QQDQ¶V VXJJHVWLRQ D two-round summit at the 
7XUNLVK3UHVLGHQW¶V3DODFHUHJDUGLQJ&\SUXVZDVKHOGDQGWZRGHFLVLRQVZHUH
taken. At the first round of the meeting on March 06, 2003, President Sezer, 
3ULPH0LQLVWHU*O&KLHIRI6WDIIg]N|NDQG)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU<DúDU<DNÕú
participated$WWKHVHFRQGURXQG'HQNWDúDQGKLVGHOHJDWLRQMRLQHGWKHILUVW
group. The final declaration of the meeting made cleaU WKDW³WKH$QQDQ3ODQ
was inadequate to meet the concerns and expectations of the Turkish side and 
WRSXWWKHSODQWRUHIHUHQGXPLVDGHFLVLRQWREHWDNHQE\WKH&\SULRWSDUWLHV´ 
(+UUL\HW March 05, 2003) 7KH GHFODUDWLRQ DOVR XQGHUVFRUHG WKDW ³7XUNH\
ZRXOG FRQWLQXH WR VXSSRUW DQG EH LQ FORVH FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK 'HQNWDú LQ Whe 
QDWLRQDO FDXVH RI &\SUXV´ (Ibid). All the influential-conservative circles in 
Turkey were opposed 'HQNWDú KDG WKH EDFNLQJ RI WKH SRZHUIXO PLOLWDU\
which argued that "with this plan we cannot form a defensive line" (Birand 
February 28, 2003). President Sezer voiced his view WKDW ³RQH FDQQRW JHW
an\ZKHUHZLWKWKLVSODQ´6RPHVHFWLRQVRIWKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\criticised the 
plan as "unacceptable" (Birand February 28, 2003). 
 
On MarcK'HQNWDúDGGUHVVHG the Turkish Parliament and declared 
WKDW³WKHSODQZLOOQXOOLI\ WKHULJKWVRI WKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWVDQGUHGXFHWKHLU
status into the leveORI WKH3DOHVWLQLDQV LQ ,VUDHO´DQGDGYRFDWHGDFRQIHGHUDO
solution. He received a standing ovation from the Parliament, which issued a 
declaration giving unanimous VXSSRUWWR'HQNWDú (Zaman March 7, 2003).  
 
(UGR÷DQRQWKHRWKHUKDQGEDFNHGWKHSODQ+HWROGWKHSDUOLDPHQWDU\JURXS
PHHWLQJ RI KLV $. 3DUW\ WKDW ³LW LV QDWXUDO WKDW WKH GRFXPHQW LQFOXGHV
acceptable elements, as well as unacceptable elements but the plan aimed at 
soothing the worries and concerns of both sides on the island as much as 
SRVVLEOH´ (Turkish Daily News February 26, 2003). He said ³:HDUHFORVHUWR
DQDFFRUG WKDQHYHU+HVDLG³WKH81SODQ LV WKHEHVWQegotiable document 
ever submitted for a Cyprus deal´ (Ibid). (UGR÷DQ DOVR XQGHUOLQHG WKDW
³'HQNWDúhas WRUHPDLQDWWKHQHJRWLDWLQJWDEOH+HGLGQRWZDQW'HQNWDúWREH
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seen as the party that rejected the plan. He said, "Let the Greek Cypriots reject 
it. You negotiate and seek a solution." (Turkish Daily News February 26, 
2003).   
 
6LPLODU YLHZV ZHUH H[SUHVVHG E\ (UGR÷DQ DW KLV PHHWLQJ ZLWK 'HQNWDú LQ
$QNDUD SULRU WR WKH +DJXH PHHWLQJ $W WKH PHHWLQJ (UGR÷DQ LQGLFDWHG WKDW
³7KHUHLVDSUREOHPLQWKHLVland and it has to be solved. Non-solution curbs 
7XUNH\¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS´ (Milliyet March 7, 2003) 'HQNWDú, on the other 
KDQGPHQWLRQHGWKDW³7KHSODQLVXQDFFHSWDEOHDQGLPSRVLWLRQRILWZLOOOHDG
to chaos´. But, he also added the ³Oast word belongs to Turkey´ (Ibid). 
 
(UGR÷DQ ZDV not in a position to exert influence on the Turkish civilian-
military bureaucracy. (UGR÷DQ was not even Prime Minister due to his 
punishment on the grounds that he breached article 312 of the Turkish Penal 
Code because of a speech he delivered in Siirt in 1997. After a meeting on 
0DUFKZLWK3ULPH0LQLVWHU*O)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU<DNÕú8÷XU=L\DO
and foreign ministry bureaucrats, ErdR÷DQDSSURYHGWKHGHFLVLRQWREORFN the 
plan at the Hague (Milliyet March 09, 2003). 
 
'HQNWDúUHWXUQHGIURPKLVFRQVXOWDWLRQVLQ$QNDUDZLWKDIUHHKDQGWRSXUVXH
his confederalist policies at the Hague meeting on March 10, 2003. At the 
meeting while Papadopoulos conditionally agreed to put Annan III to a 
referendum 'HQNWDú IODWO\ opposed, demanding recognition for the Turkish 
Cypriot state in the first place and thus altering the key parameters of the plan 
as mentioned by Annan in his report to the UNSC on April 1, 2003. To revive 
the plan, a new timetable was set by Annan. According to this new timetable, 
technical committees would complete their work by March 28, 2003. On the 
same day, the leaders would notify the Secretary General whether they are 
ready or not to hold the referendum on April 6, 2003. DenNWDúGLGQRWDFFHSW
this offer either (Hannay 2005: 216-7). 
 
In the run up to the Hague meeting, the AKP had recently been elected to 
government in November 2002. Despite his persuasion that a solution was 
HVVHQWLDO IURP WKH RXWVHW (UGR÷DQ GLG QRW IHel himself powerful enough to 
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exert influence on the forceful Turkish civilian-military bureaucracy, which 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ YLHZHG &\SUXV DV D ³QDWLRQDO FDXVH´ DQG VRXJKW D ³FRQIHGHUDO
VHWWOHPHQW´ LQ WKH LVODQG g]FDQ So, after a meeting with foreign 
ministry bureaucrats, he decided to go along with the Turkish bureaucracy. 
  
According to the model employed in this thesis, despite the presence of the EU 
and leadership components, the decision-making context within Turkey was 
not propitious for the AKP government to force a policy change. ErdR÷DQGLG
not want to engage in a head-on confrontation with the powerful Turkish 
civilian-military bureaucracy. At that stage, the AKP was a newly formed 
government, which was at the focus of the secular establishment. The AKP 
government was not powerful enough at that point to engage in a battle the 
Turkish bureaucracy. 
 
Owing to the initially ZHDNSRVLWLRQRI(UGR÷DQDQGKLVJRYHUQPHQW7XUNH\
and the Turkish Cypriots missed a crucial opportunity, prior to the Hague 
meeting on March 10, 2003, to put substantial pressure on the Greek Cypriot 
side before it signed the Accession Treaty with the EU on April 16, 2003. The 
Annan II was UHMHFWHG E\ 751& )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU 7DKVLQ (UWX÷UXOR÷OX DV
'HQNWDúUHIXVHGWRJRWR&Rpenhagen to negotiate the plan) on December 13, 
2002 in Copenhagen and the Annan III was UHMHFWHGE\'HQNWDúRQ0DUFK
2003. With these rejections, the Greek Cypriots, outwardly reconcilable, 
obtained EU membership without a solution as the sole representative of the 
island by signing the Treaty of Accession with the EU on April 16, 2003.  
 
1.2. Successful Foreign Policy Change on Cyprus 
 
Upon the insistence of the AKP government to re-start the talks before the 
entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU on May 1, 2004, Annan sent a 
letter to the parties on February 4, 2004 to submit a fourth version of the plan 
in New York on February 10, 2004. At this stage, the US played an important 
UROH (UGR÷DQ FRQYLQFHG 3UHVLGHQW %XVK WKDW $QNDUD VLQFHUHO\ GHVLUHG D
VROXWLRQ7KHUHXSRQ%XVKWDONHGWR$QQDQDQGYRLFHGWKDW³7KLVLVWKHJUHDW
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moment for a solution in Cyprus. We will do whatever we can in our power to 
KHOSILQGDVHWWOHPHQW´ (Milliyet February 5, 2004). Annan invited the parties 
to negotiations. It is argued that never before had a US President encouraged 
the UN Secretary General (Ibid). 
 
After the meeting on February 10, 2004, the parties would finalize the plan by 
March 25, 2004 in Nicosia and if there still remained points of divergence by 
March 31, 2004, Annan, himself, would bridge these gaps. In contrast to the 
FDVHRI0DUFKZKHQ(UGR÷DQGLGQRWSXVKKDUGIRUWKHDFFHSWDQFHRI
the UN plan for Cyprus to avoid confrontation with the Turkish bureaucracy, 
this time, (UGR÷DQZRXOGEHSRZHUIXO enough to press for the acceptance of 
the Annan Plan in April 2004 after sufficiently consolidating power within the 
Turkish decision-making structure. 
 
,QFRQWUDVWWRSUHYLRXVWDONV'HQNWDúGLGQRWKDYHDIUHHKDQGLQ1HZ<RUN
Newly elected pro-solutionist Prime Mimister Mehmet Ali Talat (December 
2003) was also a member of the negotiating team. For the first time, Ankara 
H[HUWHGIRUFHIXOSUHVVXUHRQ'HQNWDúWRDFFHSWWKHSODQ(UGR÷DQsaid WKDW³,W
LVRXWRITXHVWLRQIRU'HQNWDúWRUHWUHDWIURPWKHWDONV'HQNWDúLVJLYHQDURDG
map. If he does not UHPDLQ OR\DO WR LW WKHQ WKH 751& ZLOO SD\ WKH ELOO´ 
(Milliyet February 11, 2004). 
 
$V WKLV WLPH ERWK $QNDUD DQG $WKHQV EDFNHG WKH LQLWLDWLYH 'HQNWDú DQG
Papadopolous, the two rejectionist leaders, grudgingly went to and committed 
themselves in New York to put the plan to simultaneous referenda on April 21, 
2004 after a rapid negotiation process. If no agreement was reached until 
March 22, then Greece and Turkey would be brought into the process. If these 
four-party talks also do not produce the final text by March 29, Annan would 
fill in the blanks in the plan to be put to referenda (Anastasiou 2008: 128-9). 
 
The talks commenced in Nicosia on February 19, 2004, but ended in failure by 
0DUFK  7KH WDONV ZHUH GLUHFWHG WR %UJHQVWRFN ZLWK WKH SDUWLFLSDWLRQ RI
Greece and Turkey, but again fell flat. Annan submitted the final (fifth) 
version of the plan on March 31, 2004 at the closing ceremony of the 
  245 
 
%UJHQVWRFNWDONVDIWHUILOOLQJWKHSDUWVRIWKHSODQZKHUHWKHSDUWLHVFRXOGQRW
come to an agreement'HQNWDúUHIXVHGWRJRWR%UJHQVWRFN0$7DODWDQG
6HUGDU'HQNWDúRQWKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWVLGe and Papadopoulos on the Greek 
Cypriot side, Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Petros Molyviatis and 
$EGXOODK*OWKH3ULPH0LQLVWHUVRI*UHHFHDQG7XUNH\&RVWDV.DUDPDQOLV
DQG5HFHS7D\\LS(UGR÷DQDQG.RIL$QQDQZHUHSUHVHQW7KLV final version 
of the plan was put to the vote on both sides of the island on April 24, 2004. 
While 65% of Turkish Cypriots accepted the plan, it was declined by 75% of 
Greek Cypriots. 
 
$WWKLVODVWDWWHPSWWRFKDQJH$QNDUD¶V&\SUXVSROLF\DOl three components of 
the model used in this thesis converged. In the abortive initiative between 
1RYHPEHUDQG0DUFK(UGR÷DQDVWKHOHDGHURIWKHQHZO\HOHFWHG
post-Islamist government, was not able to force a policy shift due to 
unpropitious decision-making setting. Between March 2003 and April 2004, 
on the other hand, a propitious decision-making moment emerged and enabled 
(UGR÷DQ WR SXVK IRU D SROLF\ VKLIW RQ &\SUXV I will focus on how such a 
decision-making emerged by analyzing the positions of the decision-making 
actors thoroughly by drawing extensively on the primary sources. 
 
2. The Political Actors 
 
2.1. (UGR÷DQDQG*O 
 
(UGR÷DQDQG*OZHUHWKHSULPDU\DFWRUVLQ7XUNH\¶VSROLF\VKLIWRQ&\SUXV
)RU WKH ILUVW WLPH LQ WKH KLVWRU\ RI WKH &\SUXV SUREOHP 'HQNWDú DQG KLV
supporters appeared dissociated from TurNH\¶VQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWVDVWKH$.3
government was slowly in a process of re-defining its goals with regard to the 
opportunities provided by EU accession process. This called for regional 
stability, integration and peace rather than adversarial ethno-centric 
nationalism (Anastasiou 2008: 121). 
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(UGR÷DQZDV DOO DOong convinced that settlement of the Cyprus problem and 
7XUNH\¶V(8DVSLUDWLRQVZHUHVWURQJO\LQWHUWZLQHGEven prior to his advent to 
power, he maintained WKDW ³WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ ZDV D JRRG RSSRUWXQLW\ IRU DQ
DELGLQJVHWWOHPHQWRQWKHLVODQG´DQGWKDW&\SUXV KDGEHFRPH³DQLPSHGLPHQW
for Turkey in all DVSHFWV´ Haber Vitrini 2002). Reading the JRYHUQPHQW¶V
programme to the parliament right after the formation of the cabinet, he 
emphasised that a solution in Cyprus was a foreign priority mentioning that 
³WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW EHOLHYHV LQ WKH QHHG WR ILQG D VROXWLRQ WR WKH &\SUXV
GLVSXWHE\DOOPDQQHURIPHDQV´ (TBMM Reports Journal March 18, 2002). In 
0DUFK  (UGR÷DQ ODLG RXW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V SRVLWLRQ publicly when he 
declared to the parliament that ³:HQHYHUVXSSRUWDSROLF\RIQRQ-VROXWLRQ«
:HDUHGHWHUPLQHGWRILQGDVHWWOHPHQW«:H find the Annan plan negotiable´ 
(TBMM Reports Journal March 29, 2003). This new approach to the Cyprus 
GLVFRUGZDVWLPHDQGDJDLQUHSHDWHGE\(UGR÷DQ,Q'HFHPEHU(UGR÷DQ
DLUHGWKDW³ZHVLQFHUHO\EHOLHYHWKDW&\SUXVTXHVWLRQKDVWREHVHWWOHG,QWKLV
SURFHVV WKH PRVWO\ XVHG FRQFHSW E\ XV KDV EHHQ VROXWLRQ´ (TBMM Reports 
Journal December 24, 2003). This approach was at loggerheads with the 
passive and status-TXRRULHQWHGSROLFLHVRIWKH$.3¶VSUHGHFHVVRUV  
 
Following a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair after the electoral 
victory of the AKP in November 2002 (UGR÷DQ UHPDUNHG WKDW Ke had 
VXJJHVWHG D SDFNDJH IRU ³WKH VHWWOHPHQW RI WKH µ(XURSHDQ 6HFXULW\ DQG
'HIHQVH3ROLF\¶(6'3WKHGDWHIRULQLWLDWLRQRI(8-Turkish accession talks 
and the Cyprus SUREOHP´ (UGR÷DQ also VWDWHG WKDW ³(YHU\ZKHUH WKH\
travelled they faced the same approach, which was that without a solution of 
the Cyprus dispute, Turkey cannot obtain a negotiation date at the Copenhagen 
6XPPLW´(Haber Vitrini 2002). 
 
(UGR÷DQ FULWLFL]HG WKH XQFRPSURPLVLQJ DQG XQFRQVWUXFWLYH DWWLWXGH RI WKH
751& 3UHVLGHQW DQG 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU :KHQ 751& 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU (UR÷OX
YRLFHG WKDW ³WKH SODQ VXJJHVWHG E\ $QQDQ LV XQDFFHSWDEOH´ (Milliyet 
November 27, 2002)(UGR÷DQFULWLFL]HGhim saying WKDW³DSROLWLFLDQ¶VWDVNLV
not to produce problems EXW UDWKHU WR SURGXFH VROXWLRQV´ (Ibid). He 
underlined that the plan has to be negotiated and PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³LI D
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politician NHHSVDZD\IURPQHJRWLDWLRQVWKHQKHGRHVQRWKDYHDQDUJXPHQW´ 
(Ibid). (UGR÷DQ FULWLFL]HG 'HQNWDú¶V LQWUDQVLJHQW VWDQFH RQ WKH &\SUXV LVVXH
(UGR÷DQPHQWLRQHG WKDW ³,W LV HYLGHQW WKDW WKHUH LV DSUREOHP LQ&\SUXV WKDW
has to be addressed. Turkish side should not avoid from sitting at the 
negotiation table and setting forth its arguments. If you advocate your interests 
unilaterally, yoX FRXOG QHYHU UHDFK D VROXWLRQ´ (Milliyet January 4, 2003). 
Finally, (UGR÷DQ FDOOHG RQ WKH 81 6HFUHWDU\ *HQHUDO WR UH-start the talks at 
their meeting in Davos in January  8SRQ (UGR÷DQ¶V XUJHQFH $QQDQ
invited the parties to re-start the talks. This process eventually led to the 
emergence of the final Annan Plan (TBMM Reports Journal April 06, 2004). 
 
%HVLGHV (UGR÷DQ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU $EGXOODK *O EDFNHG D VROXWLRQ RQ WKH
basis of the Annan Plan. He endeavoured to convince the public opinion and 
other significant foreign policy decision-making actors in favour of the Annan 
Plan. In a parliamentary intervention after the advent to power of the AKP, 
*OXQGHUOLQHGWKDWWKHQHHGWRILQGDVROXWLRQWRWKH&\SUXVGLVFRUG as soon as 
possibOHPHQWLRQLQJWKDW³the Helsinki summit of 1999 as well as Copenhagen 
summit of 2002 made clear that without a solution in Cyprus, Turkey would 
not be granted a date to begin accession talks with the EU´ (TBMM Reports 
Journal December 17, 2002). 8SRQ WKH SURQRXQFHPHQW RI 'HQNWDú WKDW ³WKH
$QQDQ 3ODQ LV XQDFFHSWDEOH´ *O HPSKDVL]HG WKDW ³ZH ZLOO GHILQLWHO\
negotiate the Annan Plan and there is no other way as by May 2004 we will 
find an officially recognized state by the EU and the TRNC will not profit by 
DQ\WKLQJ´ (+UUL\HW December 29, 2003). 
 
*O VDLG WKDW 5RPDQo Prodi, the President of the European Commission, 
ensured the Turkish government that the accord to be reached in Cyprus would 
be rendered congruent with EU law. Praising the compromising stance of 
'HQNWDúLQ1HZ<RUNLQ)HEUXDU\*OVWDWHG³RQHGD\ 'HQNWDúZLOO
EH WKH3UHVLGHQWRI&\SUXV´ (Zaman February 15, 2004). At a parliamentary 
GHOLYHU\ *O SXEOLFO\ ODLG RXW WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V VWDQGSRLQW LQ IDYRXU RI D
VROXWLRQ RQ &\SUXV *O PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³We saw that Greek Cypriot side 
would be a member of the EU and no one could stop this. Willingly or 
unwillingly Cyprus quesWLRQDQG7XUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQprocess into the EU has 
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become directly interlinked. So, settlement of the Cyprus dispute prior to the 
entry of the Greek Cypriot Administration into the EU on May 01, 2004 has 
become indispensable for the protection of the interests of Turkey and the 
TRNC´ (TBMM Reports Journal February 17, 2004). 
 
On the issue RI7XUNH\¶VJXDUDQWRUVKLSRQHRI7XUNH\¶Voverriding concerns 
LQD&\SUXVVHWWOHPHQW*OVWDWHGWKDW³RXUJXDUDQWRUVKLSLQ&\SUXVFRQWLQXHV
with fidelity. We told in Switzerland that we would not make any concessions 
RQWKLVLVVXH´*ODOVRGLVDYRZHGWhe allegations as regards the settlement of 
100.000 Greek Cypriots in the north according to the accord (Zaman April 6, 
2004).  
 
In April 2004, speaking at the parliament to the members of his party, *O
emphasized the heavy burden on Turkey caused by the outlays for the 
maintenance of the TRNC economy (Milliyet April 7, 2004). In support of the 
$QQDQ3ODQ*OVWDWHGWKDW ³LI*UHHN&\SUiots agree and we will also agree to 
the plan, we will first demand the lifting of the embargo on and later we will 
VHHNUHFRJQLWLRQIRUWKH751&´ (Milliyet April 19, 2004). 
 
,QWKLVVHQVH(UGR÷DQDQG*OHPHUJHGDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWDFWRUVLQIDYRXU
of a policy shift on Cyprus. After an interactive learning process, they 
managed to convince the other decision-making actors and public opinion that 
a policy shift was necessary. $IWHUWKLVSURFHVV(UGR÷DQwas able to make the 
GHFLVLRQWRFKDQJH$QNDUD¶V&\SUXVSROLF\ 
 
2.2. The Business Elite 
 
The business world since late 1990s openly backed a solution on the basis of 
WKH$QQDQ3ODQDQGWKHSRVLWLRQRI(UGR÷DQDQG*ORQ&\SUXVOn the whole,  
the dynamic and innovative big business, principally 7h6ø$' and the Turkish 
Union of Chambers and Bursaries (TOBB), have begun to play major roles in 
national politics since the 1990s. In the early 1990s7h6ø$'ZDVDOHDGHULQ
pressing for legal and institutional reforms in Turkey, with the aim of 
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enhancing the institutional capacity of the Turkish economy. Since then, 
7h6ø$'has, under WKHVORJDQµOHVVJHRSROLWLFVPRUHHFRQRPLFV¶, advocated 
7XUNH\¶VLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLc system and membership 
in the EU. The group has also become the greatest champion of the 
government with regard to its acceptance of the Annan Plan for Cyprus (G. 
g]FDQ-3). 
 
Accompanied by other liberal institutions like the Economic Development 
)RXQGDWLRQ ø.9DQG WKH7XUNLVK(FRQRPLF DQG6RFial Studies Foundation 
(TESEV), 7h6ø$'EXFNOHGGRZQWROREE\LQJ%UXVVHOVto grant EU candidacy 
status to Turkey and strove to manipulate public opinion prior to the EU 
Helsinki Summit in December 1999 through the print and broadcast media as 
well as the internet (U\ÕOPD]. The decision taken at the summit to 
grant Turkey candidate status represented the genuine culmination of 
7h6ø$'¶V HIIRUWV WR ILUPO\ WLH EU conditionality to democratic reforms in 
Turkey.  
 
Transnational business elites, including both domestic and international 
investment communities, started to view EU membership as an instrument that 
could be used to strengthen the Turkish economy gQLú-5). While the 
industrialists were urgently in favour of integrating the Turkish economy with 
the global economy, their line of thought had become increasingly at variance 
with that of the military. Thus, the 7h6ø$'became the leading champion of 
the AKP government against the military, the judiciary and others in a broad 
Euro-sceptic opposition 8÷XUDQG<DQND\D-93). The AKP¶VSRVW-
election program and action plan, which prioritized EU membership and 
settlement of the Cyprus dispute and emphasized constitutional and legal 
reforms in Turkey in line with EU norms, sharply contrasted with the previous 
half-hearted efforts of the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government to meet the 
&RSHQKDJHQ&ULWHULD$VDUHVXOW7h6ø$'YLHZHGWKH$.3JRYHUQPHQWDVDQ
opportunity for political stability and social transformation in Turkey, and the 
period between 2001 and 2004 was one of cooperation between big business 
and the government. 7KH 7h6ø$' EDFNHG WKH $.3¶V LQLWLDWLYH E\ OREE\LQJ
and advising in favour of EU membership and a settlement in Cyprus. The 
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7h6ø$'RUJDQL]HGFRQIHUHQFHVRQWKHEHQHILWVRIDFFHVVLRQLQWRWKH(8DQG
backed $.3¶VHIIRUWVODUJHO\ by using the media.  
 
With regard to Cyprus, whereas the military favoured maintaining the status 
quo on the basis of two separate states, from the early 2000s onwards, 
7XUNH\¶V EXVLQHVV HOLWH KDG EHJXQ WR TXHVWLRQ WKH PLOLWDU\¶V VWUDWHJLF
calculations and unconditional support for the intransigent policies of Rauf 
'HQNWDú In November 2001, when the Turkish Cypriot leader turned down 
UN Secretary-*HQHUDO .RIL $QQDQ¶V FDOO IRU UHVXPSWLRQ RI QHJRWLDWLRQV KH
ZDVDYRZHGO\FULWLFL]HGE\7h6ø$'&KDLUPDQ7XQFD\ g]LOKDQZKRDVVHUWHG
WKDW³WKHFRXQWU\¶VGHVWLQ\ZDVEORFNHG´ *g]FDQ 
 
In December 2001, the statement of )RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUøsmail Cem WKDW³7XUNH\
could soon come to a point to take a "costly decision" on Cyprus and integrate 
the TRNC with Turkey in case of accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the 
(8´ (Turkish Daily News January 6, 2002) stirred up a heated national debate 
whether or not Turkey should sacrifice Cyprus for the sake of its EU bid. 
:KHQùNU6LQD*UHOWKHVWDWHPLQLVWHULQFKDUJHRI&\SUXVDIIDLUVYRLFHG
that "There is no price Turkey could not SD\IRU&\SUXV´ (Ibid), the 7h6ø$'
came into the battle calling on the Ankara government to stick to its EU 
PHPEHUVKLS ELG DQG QRW WR VXSSRUW XQFRPSURPLVLQJ 'HQNWDú as he was 
EORFNLQJ7XUNH\¶VSDWKWRWKH(8ZLWKKLV³LQWUDQVLJHQFH´ It was the first time 
in Turkey that a prominent group was moving away from the official Cyprus 
policy and taxing the Turkish Cypriot leader, revered throughout Anatolia as 
the most trusted statesman (Ibid).  
 
In 2002, the 7h6ø$' RQFH DJDLn fell to campaigning for settlement of the 
Cyprus dispute, launching a persistent media campaign that called into 
question the policy of maintaining the status quo  and playing on the economic 
prospects of EU membership to convince policymakers and public opinion 
gQLú  . In December 12, 2002 and January 14, 2003, Turkish 
Cypriots held demonstrations in support of a settlement for the Cyprus 
problem. The demonstrations were backed by non-governmental 
organizations, including the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, which 
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ZDVLQFORVHFRQWDFWZLWK7h6ø$'(Dodd 2010: 228)7h6ø$'DOVRODLGRXW
policy documents in favour of a new approach on Cyprus, as an array of 
seminars were organized and regular reports published on the issue by the 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV), and several 
conferences on Cyprus were held at various Turkish universities. Against this 
background, a media debate among journalists, diplomats, generals, 
businessmen and others generated a convenient environment for contesting 
7XUNH\¶V traditional Cyprus policy and airing new ideas with respect to a 
settlement .HPDO.LULúoLD. 
 
During the process that led up to $QNDUD¶V acceptance of the Annan Plan, 
7h6ø$' DORQJ ZLWK 7(6(9 DQG WKH Economic Development Foundation 
(ø.9), were probably the most effective non-governmental organizations to 
influence Turkish politics, as they made use of the media to bolster political 
and economic reforms gQLú-4). According to these groups, the risks 
stemming from economic instability could be much more detrimental to 
Turkey than the traditional military-security threats (Aybet 2006: 544-5). 
Furthermore, the Separate Association of Independent Businessmen 
0h6ø$' representing small and medium-sized business corporations 
owned by observant Muslims and dispersed throughout Anatolia, changed their 
former anti-EU stance in favour of integration with the EU and the global 
market economy, which aligned with their business interests and quest for 
domestic stability (Robins 2003: 86-7: Ayata 2004: 264-5). It is noteworthy 
that not only big business, as represented by 7h6ø$'EXWDOVRVPDOOHU-scale 
businesses converged on the aim of EU membership. These circles were 
HPSRZHUHGE\WKH(8¶VSUH-accession process to push for their own interests 
and consequently for a foreign-policy change on Cyprus. 
 
$WWKHFRQIHUHQFHRQ³(XURSHDQ6HFXULW\DQG7XUNH\´RUJDQL]HGE\7h6ø$'
the University of Bosphorus and University of BLUPLQJKDP LQ øVWDQEXO LQ
$SULO  gPHU 6DEDQFÕ WKH 3UHVLGHQW RI WKH H[HFXWLYH ERDUG RI WKH
7h6ø$'stated that, 
³we back and congratulate the political will and initiative demonstrated 
by the Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriot government. We 
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hope that a positive vote will emerge from the referendum on April 24 
and the United Cyprus will accede to the EU on May 1. A solution in 
Cyprus is exceedingly LPSRUWDQW IRU 7XUNH\¶V (8 SURFHVV DQG ZLOO
pave the way for growing levels of prosperity, investment and trade in 
Cyprus´(+UUL\HW April 03, 2004). 
 
72%%ø.9ø62øVWDQEXO&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFH7h6ø$'0h6ø$'DQG
many other business institutions announced in April 2004 that,  
³the Turkish Cypriots will eLWKHU VD\ ³QR´ WR WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ DQG
remain as an unrecognized state and maintain a life politically and 
economically isolated from the world anxious for their future or say 
³\HV´ DQG EHFRPH D SROLWLFDOO\ HTXDO PHPEHU RI WKH 8QLWHG &\SUXV
protecting their sovereignty and identity, become EU citizens and find 
the opportuniW\ WR LQWHJUDWH ZLWK WKH ZRUOG´ (+UUL\HW April 14, 
2004b). 
 
In the course of 2002 and 2004, the Turkish business elite, composed of 
72%%ø.9ø62øVWDQEXO&KDPEHURI&RPPHUFH7h6ø$'0h6ø$'DQG
many other business institutions, emerged as the biggest champion of a 
VHWWOHPHQW LQ&\SUXVDQG7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSELG The business sector 
used a persistent media campaign that called into question the policy of 
maintaining the status quo and underlined the economic prospects of EU 
membership to convince policymakers and public opinion. The business elite 
also organized several seminars and conferences and laid out regular reports 
playing to the favourable aspects of a solution in the island. The business 
sector contributed to the emergence of a vibrant media debate on the Cyprus 
question among journalists, diplomats, generals, businessmen and others, 
which generated a convenient environment for expression of a new outlook on 
the Cyprus dispute. However, while the business elite was an influential actor, 
it helped frame the issue and create circumstances that encouraged change 
rather than being directly involved in the decision-making process. 
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2.3. The Military 
 
Another effective political actor in the run up to the referenda on the Annan 
Plan was the military, which disputed a policy shift on Cyprus. For the most 
part, the Turkish military was highly politicized. Known to be rigorously loyal 
to the Kemalist principles of laicism and nationalism, it viewed itself as the 
guardian of Turkey¶VODLF structure as well as its territorial integrity. Up until 
early 2000s, the military had been highly autonomous of governmental and 
legislative control and had had a major impact on decisions related to national 
defence and security through its forceful presence in the National Security 
&RXQFLO0*.ZKHUHLPSRUWDQWGHFLVLRQVZLWKUHJDUGWR7XUNH\¶VGRPHVWLF
and external affairs were discussed and taken. Terzi maintains that the MGK 
had been the chief institution involved in determining Turkish security policy 
as well as foreign-policy matters with a security aspect, such as Cyprus, 
Greek-Turkish relations, northern Iraq, Syria and Israel (Terzi 2005: 127).  
 
Alongside its role in the Turkish decision-making structures, the Turkish 
military had also had a socio-historical role as a guide among the Turkish 
society, who treated the military as the most esteemed institution in Turkey. In 
WKLV VHQVH LWV GHFLVLRQV RQ PDWWHUV UHODWHG WR 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DQG
security were taken seriously by the society (Yavuz 2009: 272-3). Loyal to the 
ancient regime, the military held a nationalistic view with regard to Cyprus. 
The Turkish Armed Forces General Staff had serious misgivings as regards 
the protection of interests of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots under the 
Annan Plan.  
 
However, with the acceleration of the globalization and Europeanization 
SURFHVVHV LQ 7XUNH\ WKH PLOLWDU\¶V SURPLQHQW SRVLWLRQ LQ 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF
framework had beguQ WR UHFHGH %HWZHHQ WKH $.3¶V DGYHQW WR SRZHU LQ
November 2002 and the commencement of EU accession talks in October 
2005, WKH -'3¶V GHPRFUDWLF PDQGDWH served as a forceful motive behind the 
JRYHUQPHQW¶s eagerness to cut back the political prerogatives and tutelage of 
the Turkish military as part of the EU accession process (Cizre 2007: 132-3). 
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During this period, the Turkish high command came to understand that to 
perpetuate its traditional approach of wielding political sway on policy might 
harm its own corporate interests. Under the circumstances, the military faced 
two options: either to confront a highly popular government with a highly 
popular EU project or settle for losing some degree of its power. This 
SUDJPDWLF DSSURDFK DFFRXQWV IRU WKH PLOLWDU\¶V UHWLFHQFH LQ WKH IDFH RI
curtailment of some level of its power (Cizre 2007: 141). 
 
The guiding role of the military had also changed towards the new 
bourgeoisie. The new vanguard of transformation was the evolving 
bourgeoisie rather than the military. The new class of intellectuals who were 
sponsored by the new bourgeoisie and worked outside the state institutions 
redefined the political language in Turkey in pursuant to global discourses of 
human rights, democracy and market economy (Yavuz 2009: 272-3). 
Consequently, the Turkish people were no longer a subject defined by the 
state, but an object, who desired to define its own destiny. This new search 
called for a new social contract and redefinition of the role of the military in 
Turkish society and the rigid Kemalist public philosophy (Yavuz 2009: 272-
3).  
 
In addition to the waning sociological power base of the military, the AKP 
government after its advent to power in 2002 was intent on altering the 
epicenter of Turkish politics from the civil-military bureauracy towards civil 
society (Cizre 2007: 134-5). In line with this vision, the AKP government 
passed the democratic package of August 2003 that tilted the civilian-military 
balance in favor of the civilians. The package underscored the advisory nature 
of the NSC decisions; increased the civilian members to a majority voting 
position by incorporating the deputy prime minister and the minister of justice 
in addition to the extant prime minister, ministers of national defence, interior 
and foreign affairs; cut down the number of times the NSC meets from 
monthly to bimonthly, allowed greater parliamentary scrutiny of the military 
budget, GHFUHDVHG WKH 16&¶V EXGJHW E\  SHUFHQW and removed the 
confidentiality rule surrounding the activities of the NSC by stipulating that a 
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new bylaw be passed on the rules and regulations of the NSC (Cizre 2007: 
137-8). 
 
After the mid-2000s, the military came to the conclusion that an expanded role 
for the military, let alone military interventions, are not panacea for the ills of 
GHPRFUDF\$W OHDVW WKH KLJK FRPPDQGXQGHU WKH OHDGHUVKLSRIg]N|N, who 
UHSODFHG+VH\LQ.ÕYUÕNR÷OXDVWKH&KLHIRI6WDII, is of the opinion that they 
should start having more faith in people judgement, and thus, Kemalism too 
should be reinterpreted in a more liberal direction (Heper 2005: 227). g]N|N, 
was quick to realize the evolving environment within Turkey. In contrast to 
his predecessor .ÕYUÕNR÷OX, who was an isolationistg]N|NZDVDSUR-EU and 
democratically minded commander (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 6). He discerned that 
the Turkish Armed Forces had to stop expressing views on and interfering in 
every matter of national importance, which was eliciting growing reaction 
from the public opinion and had to adjust itself to the changing circumstances 
similar to that of a military of a European state øOQXUdHYLN$SULO. 
Despite contrary voices within the military, who held fast to the traditional 
confederalist line in Cyprus, and despite his own misgivings as regards the 
Annan Plan, Hilmi g]N|NWKHChief of Staff, opted to leave the last word to 
the government after expressing his concerns on the plan.  
 
Instead of the traditional military viewpoint, g]N|N strove to bring a new 
vision to the Turkish Armed Forces in line with contemporary conditions. He  
showed the Turkish Parliament as the supreme power in Turkey as the elected 
representatives of the people and made clear that the army would not strive to 
interfere in areas within the remit of the politicians øOQXU  dHYLN $SULO 
2004). +H WKRXJKW WKDW ³WKH SROLWLFDO GHFLVLRQV KDG WR EH WDNHQ E\ WKH
politicians and the military had to do what was required from it.´ He did not 
talk much and did not want anybody from his headquarters to talk. He made 
clear that when there was a need to talk on behalf of the Turkish Military 
Forces it was him (Birand April 15, 2003 ) Unlike President Sezer and some 
other commanders, he did not dismiss the Annan Plan out of hand even if he 
discerned the drawbacks of the plan and voiced them. He assumed a flexible 
stance and IRFXVHG RQ 7XUNH\¶V ORQJ-term interests. He preferred 
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reconciliation and rational approaches rather than confrontation, threats and 
altercation (Ibid).   
 
This did not mean that the military in generDODQGg]N|NLQSDUWLFXODUGLGQRW
have concerns regarding the Annan Plan. g]N|N said in January 2003 that 
³acceptance of the Annan Plan will weaken the position of the Turkish 
Cypriots and will LQIHU WKH LQFDUFHUDWLRQ RI WKH 7XUNV LQ $QDWROLD´ (Milliyet 
January 27, 2003). In January 2003, General $\WDo<DOPDQ WKHFRPPDQGHU
of the Turkish Land Forces, visited Cyprus to demonstrate the support of the 
7XUNLVK PLOLWDU\ IRU 3UHVLGHQW 'HQNWDú. HH ZDV FULWLFL]HG E\ (UGR÷DQ RQ
January 24 in Davos due to his lack of political will to settle the Cyprus 
GLVFRUG<DOPDQWROGUHSRUWHUVGXULQJDFDOOWRWKHRIILFHRI3UHVLGHQW'HQNWDú
WKDW³WKHUHYLVHG81SODQIRUDVHWWOHPHQWRQ&\SUXVFRXOGODQGWKHLVODQGLQ
YLROHQFHUHPLQLVFHQWRIWKHHUD´ (Turkish Daily News January 28, 2003). 
+H DOVR PHQWLRQHG WKDW ³'HQNWDú KDV WKH FRQILGHQFH DQG IXOO VXSSRUW RI WKH
7XUNLVKQDWLRQDQGKLVKDQGOLQJRIWKH&\SUXVSUREOHPLVDSSUHFLDWHG´ (Ibid). 
<DOPDQDOVRXQGHUOLQHGWKDW³WKH81SODQLQFOXGHVXQDFFHSWDEOHFRPSRQHQWV
and seriously threatens Turkey's vital interests on the eastern Mediterranean 
LVODQG´ (Ibid). 
 
In April 2004, g]N|N VWDWHG WKDW ³IRU WKH ILUVW WLPH WKHUH HPHUJHG D
GLVDJUHHPHQWRQWKHQDWLRQDOFDXVH´ (+UUL\HW April 13, 2004). He mentioned 
WKDW ³WKH 7XUNLVK $UPHG )RUFHV H[SUHVVHG LWV YLHZV DQG VXJJHVWLRQV ZLWK
regard to the settlement of the Cyprus issue at the MGK meetings on January 
23, 2004 and April 5, 2004 and submitted in writing on February 15, March 9, 
and March 28, 2004 to the Prime Ministry. This does not amount to a 
convergence on every matter including the decision to authorize the UN 
Secretary General with the power of arbitration going beyond the decision of 
the January 23, 2004 MGK meeting.´ g]N|Nsaid WKDW³WKHSODQFRQWDLQVSURV
and cons and has the potential to give rise to troubles in the implementation 
VWDJH´ (Ibid). +HVDLGWKDW³ZKLOHKDYLQJSRVLWLYHDVSHFWVWKH$QQDQ3ODQIDLOV
to satisfy some of the demands by TuUNH\´ (Turkish Daily News April 14, 
2004)7KHPRVWVLJQLILFDQWGHILFLHQF\RIWKH$QQDQ3ODQDFFRUGLQJWRg]N|N
was the lack of permanent derogations on the part of the Turkish Cypriots. 
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g]N|N VWDWHG WKDW WKH GHURJDWLRQV, which aim at safeguarding the Turkish 
Cypriot constituent state, should be incorporated into EU primary law. Failure 
to do this could imperil the presence of the Turkish Cypriots and the 
maintenance of bi-]RQDOLW\LQWKHLVODQGg]N|NVDLGWKDW³WKHEHVW way to do 
this is the ratification of the derogations in the national parliaments of each 
PHPEHUVWDWH´ (Ibid). 
 
Speaking for WKH *HQHUDO 6WDII g]N|N stated WKDW ³WKHUH DUH IDYRXUDEOH DQG
unfavourable points in the Annan Plan. We respect the view among our people 
that the Turkish Armed Forces should express its opinion plainly in every 
important matter. However, the military should not be expected to take sides 
and share its opinion on each matter with the public opinion. It is inappropriate 
for me to say yes or no for the referendum on the Annan Plan´ (+UUL\HW April 
12, 2004). 
 
In April 2004, g]N|NWDONHGDWDVSHFLDOSUHVVFRQIHUHQFHRQWKH$QQDQ3ODQ
and demonstrated his new vision for the Turkish Armed Forces to embrace 
contemporary values. He made it clear that the military was not intent on 
PHGGOLQJ LQ SROLWLFV DQ\ PRUH +H VDLG WKDW ³7XUNLVK &\SULRW SHRSOH ZLOO
decide their fate free of any outside pressures and that the supreme power in 
Turkey is the Turkish Parliament as the elected representatives of the people to 
GHFLGHZKHWKHURUQRWRXUFRXQWU\VKRXOGDSSURYHWKH&\SUXVVROXWLRQ´ øOQXU
dHYLN$SULO, showing all the traits of a commander of a democratic 
Western country. There was also a mentality change in the military where the 
new generation commanders EDFNHGUHIRUPVDQGSURJUHVVg]N|Nunderlined 
that the military was concerned with issues related to the security, law and 
order in the Annan Plan demonstrating that the military had defined its areas 
of authority and remit and would not strive to interfere in other areas as was 
the case in the past (Ibid). 
 
g]N|N as the head of the most esteemed Turkish institution, showed 
considerable forethought. He was cognizant of the emerging forceful civil 
society composed of Anatolian entrepreneurs, Kurds, Alevis, neo-Islamic 
movements and large segments of the Turkish society, who do not desire the 
  258 
 
military to meddle LQ SROLWLFV EXW FRQILQH LWVHOI WR 7XUNH\¶V GHIHQVH DJDLQVW
external threats. g]N|N brought a new vision to the Turkish Armed Forces. He 
criticized the Annan Plan, but refrained from taking sides. He indicated the 
pros and cons of the plan and PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW ³WKH PLOLWDU\ ZRXOG QRW
interfere in such a decision.´ His impartial stance strengthened the hands of 
the government. There were rumours that the Ground Forces and Gendarmerie 
as well as some retired generals wHUH UHVLVWLQJ WKH SODQ +RZHYHU g]N|N
dexterously manipulated the resistance within the military. He discerned 
ZKHUH 7XUNH\¶V ORQJ-term interests lay and worked in harmony with the 
JRYHUQPHQWg]N|NUHPDUNHGWRWKHRSSRVLWLRQZLWKLQ the military that such a 
³GHFLVLRQ LV WR EH WDNHQ E\ WKH JRYHUQPHQW´ DQG ³WKH PLOLWDU\ VKRXOG QRW
H[FHHG WKH OLQH RI H[SUHVVLQJ LWV YLHZV´ (Birand April 03, 2004). Such a 
conciliatory stance on the part of the military, the most esteemed institution in 
Turkey, played inWRWKHKDQGVRI(UGR÷DQ 
 
2.4. President Sezer 
 
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who was a resolute guardian RIWKH$WDWUNLVW
laicist state, popular with the military, and an advocate of Denktaú¶VWDQFHRQ
the island was another weighty actor with regard to the decision on the Annan 
Plan. He was plainly opposed to the acceptance of the plan, but after 
comprehensive discussions throughout the 2003 and early months of the 2004, 
he was somewhat persuaded by the favourable aspects of the Annan Plan and 
his stance moderated. 
 
Sezer, concerned about a policy shift on Cyprus after the advent to power of 
the AKP, asked the two leaders in the PDUOLDPHQW (UGR÷DQ DQG %D\NDO in 
November 2002 WR GHOLYHU D MRLQW SURQRXQFHPHQW H[SUHVVLQJ WKDW ³&\SUXV
could not be sacrificed in return for a date to commence accession talks with 
WKH(8´ (Milliyet November 07, 2002). Sezer made another bid on December 
  DQG FRQYHQHG 'HQNWDú 7XUNLVK &\SULRW )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU 7DKVLQ
(UWX÷UXOR÷OX, 3HUPDQHQW 6HFUHWDU\ WR WKH 7XUNLVK &\SULRW 3UHVLGHQF\ (UJQ
2OJXQ 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU *O &KLHI RI 6WDII g]N|N )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU <DúDU
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<DNÕúDQG3HUPDQHQW6HFUHWDU\DWWKH0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUV8÷XU=L\DO
The meeting at the Presidential Palace reaffirmed no change in Turkish 
position on Cyprus. The target remained to reach a 'mutually acceptable' 
negotiated settlement on the basis of 'two equal sovereign states'. Sezer also 
expressed his backing IRU'HQNWDú(Turkish Daily News December 19, 2002). 
President Sezer, speaking at the opening speech of the second legislative year 
in 2003, H[SUHVVHG IXOOVXSSRUW IRU'HQNWDúDQG WKH751&Sezer applauded 
'HQNWDú¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ in protecting the equal and sovereign rights of the 
7XUNLVK &\SULRWV 6H]HU DOVR DLUHG WKDW ³DQ HQGXUDEOH VROXWLRQ LV XQOLNHO\ LQ
Cyprus unless the presence of the TRN& LV GLVUHJDUGHG LQ WKH LVODQG´
demonstrating his open backing for a confederal settlement in Cyprus (TBMM 
Reports Journal October 01, 2003).  
 
President Sezer, in his 2004 New Year message, XQGHUOLQHGWKDW³DVHWWOHPHQW
in Cyprus could be achieved on the basis of the existing realities on the island, 
D SKUDVLQJ DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK 'HQNWDú DQG D FRQIHGHUDO VROXWLRQ DQG DOVR E\
EHQHILWLQJIURPWKHVWHSVWDNHQE\WKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWVLGH´ (Dodd 2010: 240-
1), amounting to the recognition of the two states in Cyprus. On January 8, 
2004, a meeting was held under the chairmanship of President Sezer with the 
SDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKH)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU$EGXOODK*ODQGKLJK-level civilian and 
military officials. The brief statement after the meeting once again announced 
that a solution should take into account the realities on the island (Dodd 2010: 
240-1). 
 
Similarly, President Sezer, in his April 15, 2004 speech to the military 
personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces at the War Academy Headquarters in 
østanbul, criticized the government, alleging that it had acted in contravention 
of the decision of the National Security Council of January 23, 2004 when 
(UGR÷DQ DJUHHG ZLWK $QQDQ LQ 'DYRV DW WKH :RUOG (FRQRPLF )RUXP on 
January 24, 2004 to put the Annan Plan to a referendum in the TRNC øOQXU
dHYLN$SULO7KHIDFWWKDW(UGR÷DQZDVDEOHWRcarry through in the 
face of opposition from both the president and the MGK, traditionally two of 
the important actors in Turkish foreign policy-making is evidence that these 
actors were no longer had the power to counteract the prime minister and that 
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0*.UHVROXWLRQVZHUH QR ORQJHU DSULRULW\ LQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V IRUHLJQDQG
security policy conduct.  
 
On April 5, 2004, in the MGK meeting that was convened for the purpose of 
evaluating the Annan Plan, harsh discussions had taken place between 
President Sezer and the military members of the MGK on one side and Prime 
0LQLVWHU(UGR÷DQDQG WKHJRYHUQPHQWPHPEHUVRQ WKHRWKHU ùÕN$UDOÕN
2011). The final announcement of the meeting underlined that the presence of 
WKH 7XUNLVK SRSXODWLRQ LQ &\SUXV 7XUNH\¶V JXDUDQWRUVKLS DQG bi-zonality 
should not be compromised and pointed to the eventual unfavourable 
consequences of the implementation of the plan. However, it made clear that 
the responsibility for the initiation of the process for the formalization of the 
Annan Plan is withLQWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHPLW (Zaman April 06, 2004). 
 
6H]HU¶V HDUOLHU FRPPHQWV DQG SURQRXQFHPHQWV RQ WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ LQ 
reflect a more radical and uninformed stance on the Annan Plan and was a 
reflection of 'HQNWDú¶V SRVLWLRQ At this stage, he unreservedly backed 
'HQNWDú¶V FRQIHGHUDOLVW SROLFLHV LQ &\SUXV +RZHYHU KLV VWDQFH VWDUWHG WR
moderate when the referendum on the Annan Plan was drawing near due to 
discussion of the Cyprus issue on a daily basis throughout 2003 and early 
2004. As a member of the MGK meetings, Sezer became more acquainted 
ZLWK WKH YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI D VROXWLRQ LQ &\SUXV LQFOXGLQJ 7XUNH\¶V (8
accession process. Over time his speeches on the Annan Plan became more 
informed and sophisticated. In the later stages, instead of dismissing the plan 
out of hand, he rather emphasized the drawbacks of the plan, such as the 
safeguarding of the bi-zonality and the status of the Turkish Cypriots.  
 
6SHDNLQJDERXWWKHPHWKRGRI$QQDQ¶VDXWKRUL]DWLRQto fill in the gaps in April 
2004, Sezer assumed that not only the dissidents of the Annan Plan, but also 
the proponents of it enjoyed good intentions. Sezer underlined the interim 
QDWXUHRI ³WKH OLPLWDWLRQV LPSRVHGRQ*UHHN&\SULRWVRQSURSHUW\SXUFKDVHV
and length of stay in the north´ %DOFÕ $SULO  . He emphasized the 
temporary nature of the derogations and eventuality of dilution of the 
agreement by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the 
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European Union Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions as the deficiencies of the 
plan. He stated that "when the derogations end, there is the possibility of 
Greek Cypriot contestation of the derogations at ECJ and the ECHR" %DOFÕ
April 19, 2004). SezerOLNHg]N|N offered the ratification of the agreement by 
each and every EU member Parliament, in order to turn the derogations into 
EU primary law %DOFÕ$SULO, which also demonstrates the mutual 
learning process and level of convergence among the members of the decision 
unit on the Cyprus issue. 
 
8QOLNH'HQNWDúZKRDVVHUWHGWKDWWKH$QQDQ3ODQZDV³GLDEROLFDODQd would 
OHDGWRWKHH[WHUPLQDWLRQRIWKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWV´ (+UUL\HW April 14, 2004a), 
Sezer put forward suggestions to overcome the deficiencies of the plan. He 
offered ratification of the accord by each and every EU member Parliament, in 
order to turn the derogations into EU primary law rather than ruling out the 
plan out of hand. He stated in April 2004 that a crossroads was reached as 
regards the national cause of Cyprus and the issue was comprehensively 
discussed in an unprecedented and vibrant environment. He offered a critical 
and sceptical approach to the matter. Recognising the need to make 
compromises to reach a settlement, he also underscored that ³not every goal 
and result is obtainable in a negotiation process´ (Ibid). 
 
ThLVGHPRQVWUDWHV6H]HU¶VOHDUQLQJSURFHVVLQLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKRWKHUdecision-
making actors, who advocated a settlement on the island along the lines of the 
$QQDQ3ODQ8÷XU=L\DOZDVQRWDEO\LPSRUWDQWLQWKis learning process and the 
HPHUJHQFHRIDUHODWLYHFRQVHQVXVRQ7XUNH\¶VGHFLVLRQWRDFFHSWWKH$QQDQ
Plan. 6H]HUDQGg]N|NYRLFHGVLPLODUFRQFHUQVDVUegards the plan indicating 
the plan was extensively discussed in the MGK meetings of January 23 and 
April 5, 2004 and a certain degree of convergence was reached with regard to 
the pros and cons of the plan. This is also discernible in the moderation of 
6H]HU¶VVWDQFHLQUHlation to the plan.  
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2.5. Political Parties 
 
Alongside WKHSUHVLGHQW'HQNWDú¶VSRVLWLRQ LQ&\SUXVZDVEDFNHGE\DOO WKH
political parties in and outside the Turkish parliament, save the AKP, as well 
as distinguished political personalities, including former Prime Ministers 
%OHQW(FHYLWDQG6OH\PDQ'HPLUHO The AKP government often came under 
criticism of the other political parties as regards its new policy on Cyprus. The 
CHP, the only opposition party at the parliament at the time, took the lead in 
this process in opposing the policies of the government. HaúLP2UDO deputy of 
the CHP from the city of Denizli, the only party at the parliament at the time, 
plainly expressed WKHSDUW\¶VRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH$QQDQ3ODQZKHQhe criticized 
(UGR÷DQ¶VEDFNLQJIRUWKH$QQDQ3ODQ+HDLUHGWKDW³ZHDUHGLVWXUEHGE\WKH
fDFW WKDW (UGR÷DQEDFNV $QQDQ¶VSODQ IRUFHV WKH7XUNLVK&\SULRWV WR DGHDO
DQG SXWV 'HQNWDú LQ DQ XQHDV\ VLWXDWLRQ´ (TBMM Reports Journal February 
26, 2003). +DOXN .Ro &+3 GHSXW\ IURP WKH FLW\ RI 6DPVXQ criticized the 
Cyprus policy of the AKP government mentioning that ³ZLWK WKHFRPLQJRI
WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW WR RIILFH $QNDUD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO &\SUXV SROLF\ is 
damaged.´ .Ro DOVR SUDLVHG 'HQNWDú¶V VWDQFH RQ WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ airing 
that ³WKH$.3JRYHUQPHQWEODPHV'HQNWDúZKRPZHKDYHUHFHQWO\OLVWHQHG
KHUH SURXGO\ IRU EHLQJ LQWUDQVLJHQW´ (TBMM Reports Journal March 21, 
2003).  
  
Similarly, 2QXU g\PHQ D VHQLRU GLSORPDW DQG D GHSXW\ RI WKH &+3 
responsible for the foreign affairs, plainly portrayed the position of the CHP 
ZKHQ KH FULWLFL]HG WKH $.3 JRYHUQPHQW¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ at the Turkish 
Parliament+HDFFHQWXDWHGWKDW³Turkey held out in the face of pressures and 
embargoes for years on the Cyprus issue. But, the AKP government could not 
offer resistance against the divide and rule policieV´ Declaring the Plan as 
³XQDFFHSWDEOH´g\PHQVWDWHGWKDWit ³FRXOGFUHDWHJUDYHVHFXULW\ULVNVIRUWKH
7XUNLVK&\SULRWV´ (TBMM Reports Journal March 26, 2003). At  a later stage 
of the negotiations, two CHP deputies, Kemal Anadol (deputy from the city of 
ø]PLU DQG $OL 7RSX] GHSXW\ IURP WKH FLW\ RI øVWDQEXO TXDOLILHG ³WKH
entitlement of UN Secretary General to fill in the parts where the parties could 
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QRW FRQYHUJH DQG VXEPLVVLRQ RI WKH SODQ WR UHIHUHQGD´ as acts of unilateral 
concession and wrong policies on the part of the AKP government (TBMM 
Reports Journal February 10, 2004). 
  
Even Turkish opposition parties without representatives in the parliament 
lined up in demonstrations to rally against the Annan Plan. On April 15, 2004, 
MXVWSULRUWRWKHUHIHUHQGXPLQWKH751&'HQNWDúGHOLYHUHGDGHFODPDWLRQLQ
the Turkish parliament to express his concerns regarding the drawbacks of the 
Annan Plan entailed for the Turkish Cypriots. During his allocution, present to 
VXSSRUW'HQNWDúZHUHQRWRQO\WKHGHSXWLHVRIWKHPDLQRSSRVLWLRQ5HSXEOLFDQ
3HRSOH¶V 3DUW\ EXW DOVR WKH 1ationalist Movement Party Chairman Devlet 
%DKoHOL, Islamist Felicity Party Leader Recai Kutan and former deputies from 
both parties (neither of which had deputies in parliament at the time), and 
former PrimH0LQLVWHU%OHQW(FHYLWFKDLUPDQ of the Democratic Left Party 
and architect of the 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, as well as former 
Democratic Left Party deputies %DOFÕ$SULO. 
 
$IWHU 'HQNWDú¶V speech to the parliament, the leaders of the political parties 
VWURQJO\ EDFNHG 'HQNWDú ZKR condemned the Annan Plan as a document 
cutting Turkey off from the island and paving the way to the extermination of 
the Turkish Cypriots. (FHYLWVDLG³'HQNWDúGUHZDYHU\UHDOLVWLFSLFWXUHRIWKH
situation in Cyprus and he explained the dangers the Turkish Cypriots face" 
(Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004) %DKoHOL VDLG WKDW , DJUHH ZLWK HYHU\
sentence and every word he said in his address. Denktaú LV QRW DORQH 7KH
Turkish nation is with him" (Turkish Daily News April 17, 2004). Kutan said 
³'HQNWDú H[SODLQHG WKH WUDSV DJDLQVW WKH 7XUNLVK &\SULRWV DGGLQJ KH KRSHG
WKDW 7XUNLVK &\SULRWV ZRXOG UHMHFW WKH SODQ´ (Turkish Daily News April 17, 
2004). Leader of the Grand Unity Party (BBP) stated that "A possible murder 
to be committed by the Western world together with Greece and Greek 
Cypriots could only be encumbered by rejecting the plan" (Turkish Daily 
News April 17, 2004). 
 
The mainstream political parties held to the old notion of foreign policy based 
on security considerations, and advocated the confederalist line of DHQNWDú
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However, they were ineffective in mobilizing the public opinion against the 
plan nor did they take part in the decision-making process. This was because 
of the fact that (UGR÷DQ KDG D VWURQJ PDMRULW\ LQ the parliament. The AKP 
government was also empowered by the EU membership process, which also 
weakened the veto points, such as the military. 
 
2.6. The Advent to Power of the CTP-DP Coalition 
 
The election of a new conciliatory government in the TRNC on December 14, 
2003 was also an important development that empowered the AKP 
government. The Turkish Cypriots came to believe that a settlement would 
extricate them from international isolation. The EU membership prospect 
functioned as a focal point of cooperation for the Turkish Cypriots and a large 
coalitiRQ DQG SXEOLF RSLQLRQ HPHUJHG DJDLQVW 'HQNWDú¶V LQWUDQVLJHQW VWDWXV
quo-oriented policies on Cyprus. He was facing growing rebellion against his 
rule. Turkish Cypriots were tired of international isolation and wanted to be 
part of the EU (Ker-Lindsay 2005: 6). In December 12, 2002 and January 14, 
2003, Turkish Cypriots held massive demonstrations against the hard-line 
policies of 'HQNWDú 7KH 'HFHPEHU   SDUOLDPHQWDU\ HOHFWLRQV LQ WKH
north turned into a campaign of approval or rejection of the Annan Plan and 
EU membership. The Turkish Republican Party led by Talat, the Peace and 
'HPRFUDF\ 0RYHPHQW OHG E\ 0XVWDID $NÕQFÕ DQG Whe Solution and the EU 
Party led by Ali Erel formed an alliance on September 4, 2003, to fight on a 
FROOHFWLYH JRDO7KLVZDVRXVWLQJRI'HQNWDú IURP WKHSRVLWLRQRIQHJRWLDWRU
and reaching a settlement on the basis of the Annan Plan that would allow a 
unified Cyprus to accede to the EU (Christou 2004: 158-9).  
 
Consequently, the December 14, 2003 parliamentary elections differentiated 
the political forces favouring a solution to the Cyprus dissension from the 
secessionist nationalist forces favouring the perpetuation of the status quo. 
Pro-solution parties could not set up their own government nor relieve 
'HQNWDú RI KLV GXWLHV DV QHJRWLDWRU 1RQHWKHOHVV DQWL-'HQNWDú YRWHV IRU WKH
first time exceeded the 50% mark signalling a fundamental paradigm shift in 
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the north (Anastasiou 2008: 117-9). The liberal/leftist Republican Turkish 
Party won the elections by garnering 35.18% of the votes and the Democratic 
3DUW\RI6HUGDU'HQNWDúZKRZDVQRWVRPXFKDJDLQVW WKH$QQDQ3ODQZRQ
12.93% of the votes and pro-Annan Plan Peace and Democracy Movement got 
13.14% of the votes. The Republican Turkish Party and the Democratic Party 
formed a coalition government. 
 
The electoral victory of the pro-settlement moderates in the TRNC gave 
(UGR÷DQLPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOOHYHUDJHWRFXUERSSRVLQJQDWLRQDOLVWVDPRQJWKH
political establishment and the Turkish military, in which reformists were also 
gaining ground. With the advent to power of a pro-solution government in the 
north, the AKP government announced that it accepted the Annan Plan as a 
framework for a final solution of the Cyprus discord. After the December 14, 
HOHFWLRQVLQWKH751&ZKHQ'HQNWDúFULWLFL]HGWKH$QQDQ3ODQKHZDV
reprimanded by the AKP government. This open confrontation further 
XQGHUPLQHGWKHGLVFUHGLWHG'HQNWDúLQWKHH\HVRISXEOLFRSLQLRQ(Anastasiou 
2008: 122). 
 
While Rauf DHQNWDúDUJXHG WKDW³WKH$QQDQ3ODQ LVQRWFRPSDWLEOHZLWK WKH
good offices mission of the UN Secretary General and places Cyprus under the 
Greek Cypriot rule. With limited rights given to the Turkish Cypriots, an 
agreement based such a plan, would over timHUHGXFHWKHODWWHU¶VVWDWXVLQWRD
PLQRULW\´ (TBMM Reports Journal March 06, 2003). The newly elected 
FRDOLWLRQ OHDGHUV3ULPH0LQLVWHU7DODW DQG6HUGDU'HQNWDúZKR UHSUHVHQWHG
the pro-settlement forces within the TRNC, worked in harmony with each 
other and Ankara in the run up to the referendum on the Annan Plan. Talat 
amended relations ZLWK$QNDUDPDLQWDLQHGKLVUHODWLRQVZLWK'HQNWDúDQGJRW
DORQJ ZHOOZLWK6HUGDU 'HQNWDúZKR DOVR VKRZHG WKDWKHZDV LQ IDYRU RI D
solution despite his wavering stance (Birand April 03, 2004). 
 
Therefore, at a crucial phase in the run up to the referendum, the election of a 
pro-settlement and pro-(8 IRUFH LQ QRUWKHUQ &\SUXV ERRVWHG (UGR÷DQ¶V
&\SUXV SROLF\ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ LQ WKH 751& WKDW 'HQNWDú¶V SROLFLHV ZHUH
JURZLQJO\EHLQJTXHVWLRQHGDPRQJWKHSXEOLF(UGR÷DQVHL]HGWKLVRSSRUWXQLW\
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and persuaded Annan in January 2004 for the re-commencement of the 
negotiations on the Annan Plan.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
(UGR÷DQ DQG *O¶V VWDQFH RQ WKH &\SUXV TXHVWLRQ FRQILUPHG WKH RYHUULGLQJ
DUJXPHQWRIWKLVWKHVLV:KLOHWKHOHDGHUVRIWKH$.3¶VSUHGHFHVVRUFRDOLWLRQ
government were not open to change on the Cyprus TXHVWLRQ (UGR÷DQ DQG
*O, who were convinced that a settlement was crucial for Turkey to proceed 
with its EU membership process, engaged in a process of changing the 
viewpoints of the Turkish decision-making elite. In this process, the MGK 
meetings, where all the decision-making actors took part, and comprehensive 
discussion of the Annan Plan in the media throughout 2003 and 2004 played a 
VLJQLILFDQW UROH 8÷XU =L\DO ZKR ZDV D ZHOO-informed and knowledgeable 
diplomat, played an important role in demonstrating to the doubtful members 
of the decision-making unit, notably Sezer aQGg]N|NWKHIDYRUDEOHDVSHFWV in 
accepting the Annan Plan. 
 
Against such a background, empowered by the prospect of EU membership, 
the AKP leadership was able to slim down in large measure the potential costs 
of a foreign-policy change on Cyprus and counter the resistance of the military 
and civilian Euro-sceptics to the Annan Plan. Thus, through the differential 
empowerment of domestic political actors, the EU also contributed to 
Turkey¶Vpolicy shift on Cyprus. 
 
7KLVWKHVLVHPSOR\VWKH³DXWKRULWDULDQGHFLVLRQXQLW´PRGHOWRDFFRXQWIRUhow 
the decision-making actors interacted with each other and how a policy shift 
on Cyprus emerged. TKHµDXWKRULWDULDQGHFLVLRQXQLW¶LV the domestic actor(s) 
with a say in decisions through their participation in the decision-making 
process (See Chapter V, Section 2.3). Briefly, there are three types of 
authoritative decision units: a predominant leader, i.e. an individual who is 
able to stifle all opposition and make a decision single-handedly; a single 
group of individuals who collectively choose a course of action in consultation 
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with each other; and a coalition of autonomous actors, i.e. separate 
individuals, groups or representatives of institutions, each of whom has the 
power to reverse the decision and none of whom has the power to force the 
compliance of the others (M. G. Hermann and Hermann 1989: 367-9; M. G. 
Hermann 2001: 56-7). ,QWKHFDVHRI7XUNH\¶VFKDQJHLQLWVIRUHLJQSROicy vis-
j-vis Cyprus, the decision was enacted by a predominant leader, Prime 
0LQLVWHU(UGR÷DQ 
 
The decision-PDNLQJ XQLW ZDV FRPSRVHG RI (UGR÷DQ 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU *O
)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU<DNÕú3UHVLGHQW6H]HU&KLHIRI6WDIIg]N|NDQG8÷XU=iyal. 
:KLOH(UGR÷DQDQG*OZHUH convinced all along that a foreign policy shift on 
Cyprus was necessary and engaged in a process of persuasion the other 
members of the group, g]N|NSOD\HGWRWKHGHILFLHQFLHVRIWKH$QQDQ3ODQDQG
demanded that the derogations, stipulated to protect the bi-zonality aspect of 
the Annan Plan and the Turkish Cypriot entity, should be rendered the primary 
ODZRIWKH(81RWZLWKVWDQGLQJKLVVFHSWLFDOVWDQFHg]N|NPHQWLRQHGWKDWWKH
last word belonged to the government. 7KH LPSDUWLDO VWDQFH RI g]N|N
empowered the government in the face of the adversaries of the Annan Plan. 
Sezer was opposed to a policy change in the beginning. Nevertheless, over 
time, he came to be acquainted with the various aspects of the Cyprus question 
and began to see the favourable elements in accepting the Annan Plan, such as 
UHPRYLQJ D PRPHQWRXV EDUULHU RQ 7XUNH\¶V URDG WR (8 PHPEHUVKLS 8÷XU
Ziyal was an influential actor in the learning process of Sezer and amongst the 
other members of the group. He informed the group members on the Cyprus 
LVVXHDQG7XUNH\¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSSURVSHFWThe election of pro-EU and pro-
settlement forces in the December 14, 2003 general elections in the TRNC 
IXUWKHU ERRVWHG WKH SRVLWLRQ RI (UGR÷DQ GHPRQVWUDWLQJ WKDW WKH 7XUNLVK
Cypriots were at variance with WKHVWDWXVTXRRULHQWHGSROLFLHVRI'HQNWDú 
 
The emergence of this pro-EU and pro-solution coalition was reflected in the 
final statement of the MGK meeting on January 23, 2004. Despite the rift of 
opinion between the members of the government on the one side and the 
military officials and the President on the other side, the final statement of the 
MGK meeting reflected a consensus on the need and necessity of the 
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resumption of the Cyprus talks. The MGK statement urged the resumption of 
the Cyprus peace talks on the basis of the good offices mission of the UN 
Secretary-General DQGVDLG³$QNDUDVXSSRUWV$QQDQ
VJRRGZLOOPLVVLRQDQGLV
committed to exploring a solution on the basis of a Annan Plan and the 
UHDOLWLHV RI &\SUXV´ (Turkish Daily News January 24, 2004). The next day, 
however, (UGR÷DQ went beyond this decision when he met with Annan in 
'DYRVDQGDFFHSWHG WKH816HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO¶VRIIHU WR WXUQKLVPLVVLRQRI
³JRRG RIILFHV´ inWR ³DUELWUDWLRQ´ ILOO LQ WKH JDSV ZKHUH WKH &\SULRW SDUWLHV
could not converge and put the Annan Plan to a referendum.  
 
Whereas the Turkish business sector was an important pro-EU interest group, 
it did not have the institutionalised channel to participate directly in the 
foreign- and security-policy decision-making process. Accordingly, the 
business elite had to rely on indirect efforts such as lobbying and advising by 
using the media, on which Cyprus issue was discussed extensively on a daily 
basis. While the Turkish military was an institutionalized veto player through 
its presence in the MGK by five memEHUV RI WKH WRS EUDVV RQO\ g]N|N
participated in the decision-making process. Some other members of the top 
brass SXEOLFO\ GHQRXQFHG WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V RYHUWXUHV 7KH\ DOVR SDLG ZHOO-
publicized visits to the top brass in the TRNC and supported demonstrations in 
both Turkey and in the TRNC against the AKP's diplomatic moves. 
Nonetheless, the military was unable to enlist sufficient popular backup to 
successfully pressure the government into refusing the Annan Plan (g]FDQ
2010: 34-6). 
 
Not only the president and some members of the top brass but also some 
prominent political figures as well as all political parties in and outside the 
parliament, save the AKP, plainly rejected the Annan Plan. However, the AKP 
was a single-party government. The only other political party that was in the 
parliament, the CHP, was not in the government. The chairmen of the CHP, 
the MHP, the DSP, the BBP and the SP, all declared that they were against the 
Annan Plan, but none of them was in the decision-making unit to have an 
impact on the decision.  
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None of these actors was able to thwart the decision of a single-party 
government with a highly popular leader, enjoying 365 out of 542 seats in the 
parliament and a prominent position in the pre-accession process. In the 
DEVHQFH RI DSSURYDO E\ g]N|N RU 6H]HU DQG LQ FRQWUDYHQWLRQ RI WKH 0*.
decision, (UGR÷DQLQKLVPHHWLQJZLWK6HFUHWDU\-General Annan in Davos on 
January 24, 2004, H[SUHVVHG $QNDUD¶V UHVROYH WR UHVWDUW WDONV DQG single-
handedly agreed to submit the Annan Plan to referenda. The Turkish public, 
the state bureaucracy and the political parties were divided on the matter. 
Nevertheless, the AKP government emphasized that the responsibility laid 
with the government and overlooked all criticisms. In April 2004, Chief of 
6WDII+LOPLg]N|NDUJXHGWKDWWKHRXWFRPHVRIWKH1HZ<RUNWDONVRQ&\SUXV 
in which (UGR÷DQ made the radical proposal that the secretary-general become 
involved in the process if the parties failed to reach agreement, had gone far 
beyond the resolutions of the MGK meeting on January 23, 2004 %DOFÕ$SULO
19, 2004).  
 
In the run up to the referendum, none of the opposition ± whether the 
dissidents members of the military, the president or any political party in or 
out of parliament ± was able to mobilize Turkish public opinion against the 
Annan Plan. This lack of influence may be attributed to the dominant position 
of the AKP government. The EU not only helped swing the domestic 
equilibrium in favour of pro-EU actors in Turkey, but it contributed to limiting 
the position of veto players in the pre-accession process. Moreover, within the 
$.3QRRQHZDVLQDSRVLWLRQWRULYDOWKDWRI(UGR÷DQZKRVHcharisma and 
organizational skills enabled him to maintain his authority 6|]HQ D
111). (UGR÷DQ was interested in becoming involved in the decisions on 
Cyprus, and he himself conducted negotiations and contacted the 
representatives of the other governments involved. No other bureaucratic or 
organizational body participated in the decision-making process. The military, 
the parliament, the Foreign Ministry, the president and the political parties had 
QRLPSDFWRQO\(UGR÷DQ*ODQGWKHLU advisers were involved, with the final 
VD\EHORQJLQJWR(UGR÷DQDORQHIn short, empowered by the EU pro-accession 
process, the AKP was able to force a policy change on Cyprus. 
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In the decision to aFFHSW WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ (UGR÷DQ ZDV WKH DXWKRULWDWLYH
decision-making unit as a predominant leader with the exceptional authority to 
commit government resources in foreign matters and the power to counteract 
other bodies in and out of government from bluntly reversing his decision. 
Against the will of some members of the top brass, the president and all other 
political parties (UGR÷DQ WRRN WKH GHFLVLRQ WR DFFHSW WKH $QQDQ 3ODQ
manipulating public opinion and the Turkish Cypriot government by the force 
provided to the AKP government through the EU pro-accession process.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis contributes to the literature on foreign policy analysis, leadership 
and Europeanization. After summarizing the findings in these three areas, this 
thesis concludes by examining the relevance of the model constructed here to 
the current situation on Cyprus and by suggesting future areas of research that 
may serve to overcome the limitations of the present study. 
 
Findings: Foreign Policy Change Theory 
 
With regard to foreign policy analysis, this thesis shows that foreign policy 
change is a multi-causal phenomenon that can be explained by a combination 
of various factors, but that these factors vary on a case-by-case basis. In other 
words, there is no ready-made formulation that can account for all instances of 
foreign-policy alteration. Variables that have the potential to initiate changes 
in foreign policy may be subsumed under four chief categories, namely, 
international systemic factors, domestic factors, organizational factors and 
leadership-related factors. The list of individual determinants presented in this 
thesis is not exhaustive; nonetheless, it should be considered helpful in terms 
of forming the basis by which other scholars may forge their own models 
relevant to specific cases of foreign-policy change.  
 
From the list of potential determinants of foreign-policy change presented in 
Chapter IV, the following model was constructed to account for the case of 
Turkish foreign-policy change on Cyprus in 2002:  
 
1. Leadership with a new constructive outlook on foreign affairs 
2. Europeanization of the Cyprus discord (EU Conditionality) 
3. A propitious decision-making context  
 
This model not only demonstrates the weight of the leadership factor in 
foreign-policy change that has been expressed by many scholars (Holsti 1982; 
Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1984, 1988, 1989, 1999, 2001; C. F. 
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Hermann 1989, 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra-Mayer 
2001; M. G. Hermann et al. 2001; Boronza 2008), it also substantiates the 
argument that foreign-policy change is a multi-causal phenomenon (Holsti 
1982; Goldmann 1982; C. F. Hermann 1990; Carlsnaes 1993; Rosati 1994; 
Gustavsson 1999; Kleistra and Mayer 2001). However, a leadership, intent on 
a foreign policy shift, and a propitious decision-making context appear to be 
ineluctable components of a successful foreign policy alteration. 
 
Findings: Leadership and Social Learning 
 
%RWK WKH$.3JRYHUQPHQW¶VQHZVWDQGSRLQWRQ WKH&\SUXVTXHVWLRQDQG WKH
$.3¶V SUHGHFHVVRU FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW¶V DGKHUHQFH WR WUDGLWLRQDO 7XUNLVK
policy can be explained by employing the social-learning model of Checkel 
(2001) and Risse (2001), who suggest that identity re-construction occurs as a 
consequence of social learning prompted by a new and uncertain environment, 
crisis or vehement policy failure. By applying 5LVVH¶V PRGHO WR WKH UDGLFDO
transformation of the Turkish Islamist movement, it was possible to show how 
this movement underwent a radical ideational transformation from an Islamist 
political party towards an EU-oriented political party by late 1990s. Similar 
models have been applied to the cases of radical ideational transformation of 
the French Socialist Party, the French right (Risse 2001), the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party (BSP), the Social Democratic Party (PSD) in Romania and the 
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (Vachudova 2006), all of which 
experienced major ideational transformations and adjusted their rhetoric and 
agendas to fit EU requirements.  
 
In the case of the Turkish Islamist Movement, constant policy setbacks and an 
identity crisis brought about a solemn ideational transformation. Unable to 
appeal to and mobilize large segments of Turkish society (Kepel 2000), and 
having experienced the closure by the Turkish Constitutional Court of several 
representative political parties, followed by approval of these closures by the 
European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Islamists eventually gave up 
political Islamism 7DúNÕQ  , moved to the center of the Turkish 
political spectrum and began espousing EU norms. The AKP was able to come 
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to power in 2002 by abandoning its Islamist identity, and while its ideational 
transformation was initially motivated by the desire to come to and remain in 
power, having constructed a new identity, the 7XUNLVK µSRVW-,VODPLVWV¶QHYHU
UROOHGEDFNWR,VODPLVPRUTXHVWLRQHG7XUNH\¶V(8RULHQWDWLRQWRZKLFKWKH\
had once been vehemently opposed. In contrast, the politicians that comprised 
WKH $.3¶V SUHGHFHVVRU FRDOLWLRQ JRYHUQPHQW -2002) were unable to 
overcome their socialization within a historical and institutional environment 
that had constructed foreign policy as a matter of security and Cyprus as an 
issue of national significance (dXKDGDU-g]ND\QDNDQGg]NHoHFL-Taner 2004; 
g]NHoHFL-Taner 2005). 
 
'UDZLQJ RQ .OHLVWUD DQG 0D\HU¶V GHVFULSWLRQ RI IRUHLJQ-policy change, this 
WKHVLV VKRZV KRZ 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ VLQFH  KDV XQGHUJRQH
noteworthy alterations in terms of instruments, goals and normative 
foundations. The paramount change occurred at the normative level with the 
advent to power of a new Turkish leadership with a new mindset, who 
regarded foreign affairs from a more liberal vision, not only sizing up cost-
benefits of such a new outlook but also undergoing an ideational 
transformation itself in line with the EU requirements. In contrast to its 
predecessors, who held fast to a confederal line in Cyprus, the AKP 
government not only deviated from this radical stance, but also from its 
Islamist predecessors, who embraced an anti-EU policy, by adopting the 
(XURSHDQL]DWLRQSURFHVV DV WKHSDUW\¶VXOWLPDWHSROLcy objective. Within this 
framework, according to the new principles formulated by Foreign Minister 
Ahmet 'DYXWR÷OX ± µ]HURSUREOHPVZLWKQHLJKERXUV¶µSURDFWLYHHQJDJHPHQW
DQG SUHYHQWLYH GLSORPDF\¶ DQG DQ µLPDJH-FKDQJH¶ IRU 7XUNH\ 'DYXWR÷OX
2001, 2010) ± the government flung itself headlong into an initiative aimed at 
ironing RXW7XUNH\¶VGLIIHUHQFHVZLWKLWVQHLJKERXUVWDNLQJDFRQFLOLDWRU\DQG
pragmatic stance towards a solution on Cyprus. 
 
In addition to this fRXQGDWLRQDO FKDQJH 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ FKDQJHG LQ
terms of instruments as well as goals. The most important instrumental change 
occurred in 2004, when Turkey invested the UN Secretary-General with the 
power of arbitration that instituted a time-bound program for completion of 
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the Cyprus talks (Uslu 2011). Other new instruments include pressure on the 
Turkish Cypriot leadership in the form of lobbying, propaganda and the 
sending of emissaries, i.e. AKP MPs, to induce the Turkish Cypriots to accept 
the Annan Plan and transform it into a final agreement. This was in line with 
WKH FKDQJH LQ 7XUNH\¶V foreign-policy goal, namely, a settlement consonant 
with UN parameters envisioning a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation on 
Cyprus.  
 
Findings: Europeanization and Foreign Policy Change 
 
Although many scholars have emphasized the EU as the overriding 
determinant in Turkish foreign policy change (Terzi 2005; Kaliber 2005; 
.LULúoL$UDV the literature does not offer a sufficiently thorough 
analysis of the role of the Europeanization process in the change in Turkish 
foreign policy vis-j-vis Cyprus. This thesis found that the EU contributed to 
the process in two very important ways: first, by Europeanizing the Cyprus 
discord; second, by differentially empowering the domestic actors within 
Turkey, the latter of which is examined in the chapter on the decision-making 
process (Chapter VIII) as it is firmly associated with the domestic actors 
within Turkey. The EU¶Vimpact RQ$QNDUD¶VCyprus policy shift was essential 
not only through rendering a settlement in Cyprus a de facto condition for 
Turkey, but also through swaying the decision-making composition in favour 
of the pro-settlement actors within Turkey. 
 
First, the EU contributed to the process by the Europeanization of the Cyprus 
disagreement in the form of institutionalization of EU norms within the legal 
framework of Turkey. International institutionalization is mentioned by many 
scholars as a dynamic of foreign-policy change (Goldmann 1982; Rosati 1994; 
Greffenius 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; Smith 2004). In this sense, the 
foreign policy of a state is not independent of WKDW VWDWH¶V SDVW DOOLDQFH
agreements, political engagements and commercial relationships. International 
laws, norms and regimes influence the existing foreign policies of states 
(Rosati 1994). The institutional setting of the EU forces its members to adapt 
its rules and regulations and thus becomes a significant factor in the foreign-
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policy behaviour of member countries as well as candidates (M. E. Smith 
2004).  
 
The Europeanization of the Cyprus issue started with the Greek Cypriot 
application to the EU in 1990 and concluded with its accession to membership 
in May 2004. Rather than being a legitimate or determinate criterion as part of 
democratic or acquis conditionality, settlement of the Cyprus question started 
to become a de facto part of conditionality for Turkey, principally after 1999, 
with the Europeanization of the Cyprus question. The 1999 Helsinki European 
Council made clear that the Republic of Cyprus would be accepted as an EU 
member even without a solution on the island. This promise and the actual 
entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU on May 1, 2004, considerably 
LQIOXHQFHG$QNDUD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKH&\SUXVTXHVWLRQ (Interview 14 September 
5, 2011). With CypruV¶V DFFHVVLRQ 7XUNH\ ZDV IDced with the adversity of 
settling the Cyprus dispute in order to progress in its own accession process, 
which had stalled by the mid-2000s, to a great extent owing to its failure to 
extend to the Republic of Cyprus the Additional Protocol, which would 
require opening Turkish ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels and 
aircraft and formally recognizing the Republic of Cyprus. EU summit meeting 
of December, 14-5,  RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH (8 &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
recommendations, suspended negotiations on eight of the thirty-four chapters 
of the acquis. Put differently, the extension of the Additional Protocol to the 
Republic of Cyprus became a de facto acquis criteria for Turkey, and progress 
of TuUNH\¶VDFFHVVLRQWDONVZLWKWKH(8ZDV tied to a settlement on the island.  
 
In explicating the Europeanization of the Cyprus disagreement, the alternative 
Europeanization models of determinacy and legitimacy of rules, credibility of 
conditions and size and speed of rewards (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Vachudova 2005; Sasse 2008) used to explain EU 
FDQGLGDWH FRXQWULHV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK (8 QRUPV were also examined. 
However, these models were found to be scant to account for 7XUNH\¶V
foreign-policy change on Cyprus, as the settlement of the Cyprus dispute was 
neither a determinate nor a legitimate condition.  
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7KHVHFRQGDVSHFWRIWKH(8¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWR7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQ-policy change 
RQ&\SUXVZDVWKH(8¶VGLIIHUHQWLDOHPSRZHUPHQWRIGRPHVWLFDctors within 
Turkey. This part relates to the decisision-making process and thus 
incorporated in the chapter on this topic (Chapter VIII). An analysis of this 
factor combined the model of differential empowerment of domestic actors 
(Grabbe 2002; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002) with that of veto players (C. F. 
Hermann 1990; Moravcsik 1993; Skidmore 1994; Kleistra and Mayer 2001; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Tsebelis 2010). The mechanism 
of differential empowerment functions through the E8¶V UH-distribution of 
powers and interests among domestic actors and its challenging the existing 
equilibrium (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002). Through this mechanism, the EU 
LQWHQGVWRDOWHUWKHµFRJQLWLYHLQSXW¶LQWRRSSRUWXQLW\VWUXFWXUHVWRFKDQJHWKH
expectations and beliefs of the domestic actors in pursuant to EU demands, 
and it provides a focal point of cooperation and a common objective for 
cooperation among the political forces in opposition (Grabbe 2002; 
Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2007). By influencing the 
µFRJQLWLYH LQSXW¶ LQWRRSSRUWXQLW\VWUXFWXUHV LQ7XUNH\ Whe EU helped swing 
the debate on Cyprus in favour of pro-EU, pro-solution circles. The EU also 
provided a focal point of cooperation, namely EU membership. In other 
words, the EU weakened the dissenters of the Annan Plan and empowered its 
proponents by providing them with a common objective, namely removing the 
&\SUXVEDUULHUWKDWUHPDLQHGRQ7XUNH\¶VURDGWR(8PHPEHUVKip.  
 
The Chapter on Europeanisation of the Cyprus discord (Chapter VII) also 
examined WKH SRVLWLRQV RI WKH (8 DFWRUV WRZDUGV 7XUNH\¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS
and the Cyprus question throughout 2002-4. This section demonstrated that, 
apart from Greece, all of the EU members backed the settlement initiatives of 
the UN without having a preference for the type of a solution in Cyprus. On 
the whole, while Germany (CDU), France, Netherlands and Austria opposed 
7XUNH\¶V PHPEHUVKLS %ULWDLQ ,WDO\ 6SDLQ DQG 3RODQG FRQVWDQWO\ EDFNHG
7XUNH\¶V DFFHVVLRQ LQWR WKH (8  The Commission evaluated 7XUNH\¶V
performance according to whether or not Turkey honoured the accession 
criteria drawn up by the Commission in the Regular Reports for Turkey at the 
end of each year. This stance of the EU Commission empowered the Turkish 
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government vis-a-vis the domestic dissidents of a settlement in Cyprus. Yet, 
the lack of a consensus among the members states based on their various 
interests and concerns concernLQJ 7XUNH\¶V membership rendered Turkish 
accession a contentious issue within the EU. 
 
Findings: Propitious Decision-Making Framework 
 
Chapter VIII on the decision-making process involves a thorough analysis of 
the roles and positions of the decision-making actors within Turkey in the 
course of 2002-2004, when the Cyprus decision was taken. This chapter 
showed that without such a propitious decision-making setting, a policy 
change on Cyprus would not have been possible. An examination of the 
Turkish decision-making setting showed WKDWZKLOH(UGR÷DQDQG*OEDFNHG
by the Turkish business sector and the EU, all along desired to accept the 
Annan Plan, they were unable to do so in March 2003 when they avoided a 
head-on confrontation with the powerful civilian-military bureaucracy at a 
time when the AKP government was recently elected. In such a setting, in 
March 2003 the decision-making context was not propitious for a policy shift 
on Cyprus. However, after an interactive process among the decision-making 
actors within Turkey, namely, 7D\\LS(UGR÷DQ$EGXOODK*O the President, 
the Chief of Staff, the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, QRWDEO\ 8÷XU =L\DO D
propitious decision-making context emerged within Turkey for a policy shift 
on Cyprus. When all these three components, namely leadership, the EU and a 
propitious decision-making context, converged a new policy in Cyprus 
became possible for Ankara in April 2004 when the Turkish government 
accepted the Annan Plan. 
 
As shown in the previous section, the EU militated in favour of an alteration in 
the decision-making composition in Turkey by rendering the government the 
main target of EU conditionality in the course of the pre-accession process, 
minimizing the number of institutionalized veto points (Dimitrova 2002; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005) and facilitating a change in the 
decision-making composition in Turkey in favour of the government (Robins 
g]EXGXQ*g]FDQ  
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This thesis employed Hermann¶V PRGHO RI tKH µDXWKRULWDWLYH GHFLVLRQ XQLW¶, 
which has the capacity to commit the resources of the government in foreign 
affairs and has the power to counteract other bodies within and outside the 
government from bluntly reversing its position (M. G. Hermann and C.F. 
Hermann 1989; M. G. Hermann 2001). 7KH µDXWKRULWDWLYH GHFLVLRQ XQLW¶ LV
significant because foreign-policy decisions can be foiled by influential actors 
in the decision-making process, such as a politically active military or the 
Catholic Church, which may have the veto power to block governmental 
decisions (Goldmann 1982; M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; Hagan 1994; Kleistra 
and Mayer 2001). The argument that influential veto players in the decision-
making process may stem foreign-policy change (M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; 
M. G. Hermann and C.F. +HUPDQQ  %|U]HO DQG 5LVVH 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005; Tsebelis 2010) necessitates a 
thorough analysis of the actual decision-making process, the transformation of 
which, in the Turkish case, brought about a propitious decision-making 
environment for a new policy on Cyprus. 
 
Highly politicized militaries may have a significant role in foreign and 
security decisions and serve as veto players in preventing major alterations in 
foreign-policy decisions (M. G. Hermann 2001; Cottey et al. 2002; Tsebelis 
2010). As a highly politicized army, the Turkish Armed Forces falls into this 
FDWHJRU\*g]FDQ5RELQVAgainst this backdrop, as well 
as the actors directly involved in the interactive process on the decision on 
Cyprus, the positions of the Turkish business sector, as the greatest proponent 
of the democratization process and change in Cyprus policy gQLú 
5RELQV8÷XUDQG<DQND\D, and of the Turkish military, the main 
opposition to a new Cyprus policy among the influential foreign-policy actors, 
are examined *g]FDQ5RELQV.  
 
This thesis demonstrated that both the business sector and the military 
endeavoured to tilt the power balance in favour of their position by resorting 
to informal tools such as advising, lobbying, organizing conferences and 
drawing up reports and striving to have an impact on the public opinion 
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without directly getting involved in the process 5RELQV  gQLú 
g]FDQ . In the run up to the Annan Plan, the military was unable to 
PRELOL]H 7XUNLVK SXEOLF RSLQLRQ DJDLQVW WKH SODQ 5RELQV  g]EXGXQ
2007). 7KH&KLHIRI6WDII+LOPLg]N|NSOD\HGDFUXFLDOUROHLQUHVWUDLQLQJWKH
uncompromising members of the senior Turkish military. In contrast to his 
SUHGHFHVVRUV g]N|N GLG QRW JLYH XQFRQGLWLRQDO EDFNLQJ WR 'HQNWDú +H
XQGHUOLQHGWKHSURVDQGFRQVRIWKHSODQDQGPDGHFOHDUWKDW³VXFKNLQGRID
decision was to be taken by the governmentQRW WKHPLOLWDU\´ (Birand April 
15, 2003 ).  
 
According to Hermann, tKHµDXWKRULWDWLYHGHFLVLRQXQLW¶, who has the capacity 
to make a decision, PD\ EH D µSUHGRPLQDQW OHDGHU¶ D µVLQJOH JURXSµ RU
µPXOWLSOHDXWRQRPRXVDFWRUV¶If a single individual has the power to commit 
(or withhold) all the resources of the regime in an issue area regardless of 
opposition by others, then the decision unit is a predominant leader. The 
decision unit is a single group if several individuals take part in a common 
dominant policy group that makes decisions through an interactive process 
among its participants. The decision unit is multiple autonomous actors if 
there are two or more separate, non-hierarchical actors (groups, organizations), 
QRQH RI ZKLFK KDYH WKH DXWKRULW\ WR FRPPLW RU ZLWKKROG WKH UHJLPH¶V
resources in addressing the immediate problem (M. G. Hermann 1988, 2001; 
M. G. Hermann and C. F. Hermann 1989) 
 
$JDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRI+HUPDQQ¶VGHILQLWLRQLWZDVFRQFOXGHGWKDW7XUNH\¶V
foreign-policy change on Cyprus was discussed in an interactive process by a 
single group ZLWKWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRI(UGR÷DQ*Og]N|N6H]HUDQG)RUHLJQ
Ministry bureaucrats. The pros and cons of the Annan Plan were extensively 
discussed within this group and there emerged a relative consensus on the 
acceptance of the Annan Plan. Among this group, (UGR÷DQ emerged as a 
predominant leader, who, as thH µDXWKRULWDWLYH GHFLVLRQ XQLW¶ DQG DIWHU DQ
interactive process with the other decision-making actors, was able to make 
WKHGHFLVLRQWRFKDQJH7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\RQ&\SUXVZLWKRXWKDYLQJKLV
GHFLVLRQ WKZDUWHG E\ DQRWKHU SROLWLFDO DFWRU ZLWKLQ 7XUNH\¶V GRPHVWLF
framework. This conclusion is consonant with theories of Europeanization that 
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argue that given the asymmetrical nature of negotiations, the government 
becomes the main target of EU conditionality and the number of 
institutionalized veto points are minimized during the pre-accession process 
(Dimitrova 2002, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 2005).  
 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research  
 
This study has a number of limitations, each of which in turn suggests areas in 
which further research may be warranted. First of all, as a time-specific study, 
it examines the factors involved in the change in Turkish foreign policy vis-j-
vis Cyprus in 2002, but it does not purport to be an extensive historical 
DQDO\VLV RI WKH G\QDPLFV RI 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ RYHU WLPH Moreover, 
while it touches upon the causes of the Cyprus disagreement, attempts at its 
resolution, its legal and constitutional aspects and the role of outside powers as 
well as domestic Cypriot institutions, it does not delve into them exhaustively. 
Accordingly, the model formulated in this thesis is not necessarily applicable 
to the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 1974, in which other 
variables likely played key roles. Prior to 1999, when EU membership for 
Turkey lacked credibility, the EU had limited impact on Turkish foreign 
policy, and, likewise, EU influence in terms of pressure regarding compliance 
with the acquis or the empowerment of some domestic actors at the expense of 
RWKHUV KDV VFDQW H[SODQDWRU\ PHULW IRU 7XUNH\¶V &\SUXV SROLF\ WRGD\, since 
Ankara has already accepted a settlement in Cyprus based on the UN 
parameters, which the EU has also consented to as an appropriate formula for 
a solution. In terms of the decision-making structure, a reversion to the 
previous decision-making composition in which the military was inordinately 
powerful seems to be unlikely, given the changing institutional and socio-
economic structure of Turkey. Thus, the present study may be expanded to 
H[DPLQHQRWRQO\WKHG\QDPLFVRI7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\SULRUWREXWWR
hypothesize as to what this policy may look like in the future. Research along 
WKHVH OLQHVPD\QRWRQO\DGG WRDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI7XUNH\¶V&\SUXVSROLF\
over time, but to the determinants of foreign policy in general. 
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Given the deep-VHDWHGQDWXUHRIWKHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLQWKH7XUNLVKOHDGHUVKLS¶V
outlook on foreign policy DQG7XUNH\¶V(8SURVSHFW7XUNH\¶VSROLF\YLV-j-vis 
Cyprus is unlikely to be subject to reversal. As a result of a normative change 
in the mindset of the Turkish leadership, Ankara no longer views its 
environment from a conflictual standpoint, but strives to find win-win 
solutions to its problems with its neighbours. The Turkish elite and public 
opinion in general has also begun to evaluate the Cyprus dispute from this 
new, non-security-oriented, conciliatory, pragmatic perspective. Furthermore, 
the EU prospect for Turkey renders an uncompromising stance on Cyprus 
XQOLNHO\VLQFHZLWKRXWDVHWWOHPHQWLQ&\SUXV7XUNH\¶V(8SURFHVVLVGRRPHG
to failure. In the event of a shift in leadership, the new government is also 
likely to adhere to the foreign-policy principles adopted by the AKP 
leadership on Cyprus, as these new norms have to a large extent gained 
legitimacy within the Turkish foreign-policy bureaucracy. Given the degree of 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI 7XUNH\¶V QHZ &\SUXV SROLF\ any policy alteration 
would be arduous for any future government. 
 
The second limitation of the present study is that it comprises only one case, 
WKDWRI7XUNH\¶VFKDQJHLQSROLF\WRZDUGV&\SUXVXQGHUWKH$.3JRYHUQPHQW
While the case of Cyprus offers the best opportunity for examining the 
dynamics of foreign-policy change within the framework of the 
Europeanization process, further case studies may focus on unveiling the 
determinants of Turkish foreign policy towards other countries including 
Syria, Greece and Russia during the same period examined in the present 
study in order to determine whether or not these cases bear out the findings of 
this research. However, in conducting such case studies of Turkish foreign-
policy change, differences in dynamics must be considered on a case-by-case 
basis. For instance, an examination of the Russian Federation and the United 
States rather than EU as chief external actors would be more relevant to a 
study of Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia. Still, given the findings of 
the present study, it is likely that a change in foreign-policy outlook on the 
part of the leadership combined with a favourable decision-making 
environment would be found to remain among the crucial elements of any 
foreign-policy change. 
  282 
 
 
The third limitation of the present study has to do with the impact of the EU 
on foreign policy in cases other than that of Turkish policy towards Cyprus. 
Further research may expose how the EU accession process has affected the 
foreign policies of the Republic of Cyprus and other EU member countries. A 
ZLGHU SHUVSHFWLYH WKDW H[DPLQHG WKH (8¶V WUDQVIRUPDWLYH SRZHU RYHU WKH
foreign policies of its members as well as on other candidate countries may 
have helped to provide greater insight into the dynamics of the EU accession 
process in terms of its affect on Turkish foreign policy. With regard to a 
settlement on Cyprus, up until now, the EU appears to have been ineffectual in 
pushing the Republic of Cyprus towards a compromise, and it may be that 
rather than being influenced by the EU principles and norms, the Republic of 
Cyprus will exploit its EU membership to attain a preferential solution in the 
future. 
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1. Interview 1 (September 05, 2011), Member of Turkish Resistance 
Organization, Nicosia/Cyprus.  
2. Interview 2 (September 9, 2011), Academic, Expert on Cyprus, 
Nicosia/Cyprus. 
3. Interview 3 (September 08, 2011), Leader of a Political Party in the 
North, Nicosia/Cyprus. 
4. Interview 4 (September 6, 2011), Member of the Republican Turkish 
Party, Nicosia/Cyprus.  
5. Interview 5 (September 29, 2011), Expert on Cyprus, Nicosia/Cyprus. 
6. Interview 6 (August 24, 2011), Diplomat, Turkish Foreign Ministry, 
Ankara/Turkey.  
7. Interview 7 (September 27, 2011), Expert on Cyprus Question, 
Famagusta/Cyprus. 
8. Interview 8 (July 29, 2011), Professor, Expert on Cyprus, 
Ankara/Turkey. 
9. Interview 8 (September 6, 2011), Member of National Union Party, 
Nicosia/Cyprus. 
10. Interview 10 (August 26, 2011), Diplomat, Senior Member of the 
Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara/Turkey.  
11.  Interview 11 (September 16, 2011), Diplomat, a Senior Member of the 
TRNC Foreign Ministry, Ankara/Turkey.  
12. Interview 12 (August 08, 2011), Professor, Expert on Cyprus, 
Ankara/Turkey.  
13. Interview 2 (September 7, 2011), Diplomat, Member of the TRNC 
Foreign Ministry, Nicosia/Cyprus. 
14. Interview 14 (September 5, 2011), Member of the Turkish Republican 
Party, Nicosia/Cyprus. 
15. Interview 15 (September 27, 2011), Journalist, Expert on Cyprus, 
Nicosia/Cyprus.   
  284 
 
16. Interview 16 (September 6, 2011), Member of the Turkish Republican 
Party, Nicosia/Cyprus. 
17. Interview with (July 26, 2011), Expert on Cyprus, Ankara/Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  285 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
$KPDG )DUR]  
7KH +LVWRULFDO %DFNJURXQG RI 7XUNH\¶V )RUHLJQ
Policy', in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds.), The Future of 
Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
$NVX (úUHI  The United Nations, Intra-State Peacekeeping and 
Normative Change (Manchester, UK; New York: Manchester 
University Press; Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave). 
$NVX )ÕUDW  
7XUNLVK-Greek Relations and the Cyprus Question: Quo 
Vadis?', UNISCI Discussion Papers, 207-25. 
$OWXQÕúÕN0HOLKD%HQOL
7KH3RVVLELOLWLHVDQG/LPLWVRI7XUNH\
V6RIW
Power in the Middle East', Insight Turkey, 10 (2), 41-54. 
Anastasiou, Harry (2008), The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic 
Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse 
University Press). 
$UDV %OHQW  
7XUNH\
V 5LVH LQ WKH *UHDWHU 0LGGOH (DVW 3HDFH-
Building in the Periphery', Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies, 11 (1), 29-41. 
Arsava )VXQ  
.ÕEUÕV 6RUXQX¶QXQ 8OXVODUDUDVÕ +XNXN DoÕVÕQGDQ
'H÷HUOHQGLULOPHVL (YDOXDWLRQ RI WKH &\SUXV 3UREOHP DV SHU
International Law)', $QNDUD hQLYHUVLWHVL 6L\DVDO %LOJLOHU )DNOWHVL
Dergisi (Journal of University of Ankara, Faculty of Social Sciences), 
51 (1), 43-51. 
Ayata, Sencer (2004), 'Changes in Domestic Politics and the Foreign Policy 
Orientation of AK Party', in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis 
(eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press). 
$\EHW*OQXU06), 'Turkey and the EU after the First Year of Negotiations: 
Reconciling Internal and External Policy Challenges', Security 
Dialogue, 37 (4), 529-49. 
$\GÕQ 0XVWDID  
'HWHUPLQDQWV RI 7XUNLVK )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ &KDQJLQJ
Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War', Middle Eastern 
Studies, 36 (1), 103-39. 
--- (2003), 'Turkish Foreign Policy Framework and Analysis', in Tareq Y. 
Ismael and Mustafa Aydin (eds.), Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st 
Century: a Changing Role in World Politics (Aldershot, Hants, 
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate). 
%DFÕN *|NKDQ  
7KH 5LVH RI ,GHQWLW\ 3ROLWLFV LQ 7XUNH\
 UNISCI 
Discussion Papers, 23. 
%DOFÕ .HPDO 
8QLted Cyprus Divides Turkey ', +UUL\HW 'DLO\ 1HZV DQG
Economic Review, 
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=united-cyprus-
divides-turkey-2004-04-19 >, accessed. 
Barnett, Michael (1999), 'Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: 
Israel's Road to Oslo', European Journal of International elations 5(1), 
5-36. 
Barnett, Michael N;  and Finnemore, Martha (2004), Rules for the World: 
International Organizations in Global Politics ed. Cornell University 
Press Ithaca. 
  286 
 
Bartmann, Barry (1999), 'Facing New Realities: The Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus and Unrecognised States in the International System', 
Perceptions, 4 (3). 
Bila, Fikret (November 04, 2001), 'Ecevit: TRNC shall not be ceded to the 
Greek Cypriots (Ecevit: KKTC Rumlara teslim edilmez).', Milliyet. 
%LUDQG 0HKPHW $OL $SULO   
(UGR÷DQ DQG *O 6HWWOHG &\SUXV
.ÕEUÕV¶Õ(UGR÷DQYH*Oo|]GOHU
+UUL\HW. 
--- $SULO 
g]N|NKDVDGLIIHUHQWYLHZSRLQWg]N|NROD\ODUDIDUNOÕ
EDNÕ\RU
+UUL\HW. 
--- (March 9, 2004), 'A new era started LQ*UHHFH<XQDQLVWDQ¶GD\HQLELUGHYLU
DoÕOGÕ
+UUL\HW. 
Birand, Mehmet Ali (December 21, 2002), 'Without Bush this result could not 
be obtained', Turkish Daily News. 
--- (February 28, 2003), 'Turkey refrains from taking the bargaining process 
too far)', Turkish Daily News. 
Black, Ian 'Europe asks Turkey to help unite Cyprus', 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/15/eu.turkey>, accessed. 
Boronza, A. (2008), 'Ideas, Gorbachev, and the End of the Cold War', The 
International Studies Association Annual Convention (San Francisco). 
%RUUDJiQ1LHYHV3pUH]-6ROyU]DQR
(8$FFHVVLRQDQG,QWHUHVW3ROLWLFV
in Central and Eastern Europe', Perspectives on European Politics and 
Society, 5 (2), 243-72. 
%|U]HO 7DQMD  
:KHQ (XURSHDQLVDWLRQ +LWV 6WDWHKRRG 7KH :HVWHUQ
Balkans as a Test Case for the Transformative Power of Europe', KFG 
Working Paper, 30. 
%|U]HO 7DQMD DQG 5LVVH 7KRPDV  
&RQFHSWXDOLVLQJ WKH 'RPHVWLF
Impact of Europe', in Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli 
(eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press). 
--- (2012a), 'When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion: Exploring New 
Territory', West European Politics, 35 (1), 192-207. 
--- (2012b), 'From Europeanisation to Diffusion: Introduction', West European 
Politics, 35 (1), 1-19. 
%|U]HO 7DQMD DQG 6R\DOWÕQ dL÷GHP  
(XURSHDQL]DWLRQ LQ 7XUNH\
Stretching a Concept to its Limits?', KFG Working Paper, 36. 
Bose, Sumantra (2007), Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, 
Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). 
%R]GD÷OÕR÷OX <FHO  
0RGHUQLW\ ,GHQWLW\ DQG 7XUNH\
V )RUHLJQ
Policy', Insight Turkey, 10 (1), 55-76. 
Bryant, Rebecca (2004), Imagining the Modern: the Cultures of Nationalism 
in Cyprus (London; New York: I.B. Tauris; In the U.S. distributed by 
Palgrave Macmillan). 
Bush rebuff to Chirac over Turkey 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/06/29/bush.chirac.turke
y/index.html>, accessed. 
Buzan, Barry (2001), 'A Transformed International RROH
LQ.HPDO.LULúoLDQG
Barry Buzan (eds.), Turkey in World Politics: an Emerging 
Multiregional Power (Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
  287 
 
dDUNR÷OX $OL  
:KR :DQWV )XOO 0HPEHUVKLS" &KDUDFWHULVWLFV RI
Turkish Public Support for EU Membership', Turkish Studies, 4 (1), 
171-94. 
Carlsnaes, Walter (1993), 'On Analysing the Dynamics of Foreign Policy 
Change: A Critique and Reconceptualization', Cooperation and 
Conflict, 28 (1), 5-30. 
dHOHQN $VOÕ $VOÕKDQ  
7KH 5HVWUXFWXULQJ RI 7XUNH\¶V 3ROLF\ WRZDUGV
CyprXV 7KH -XVWLFH DQG 'HYHORSPHQW 3DUW\¶V 6WUXJJOH IRU 3RZHU

Turkish Studies, 8 (3), 349-63. 
dHWLQVD\D*|NKDQ 
$7DOHRIWZR&HQWXULHV&RQWLQXLWLHVLQ7XUNLVK
)RUHLJQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\
LQ1$WHúR÷OX*QH\HGContentious 
Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey (Aldershot: Ashgate), 5-18. 
dHYLN øOQXU -XQH  
0*. LV QR /RQJHU 6XSUHPH

<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=mgk-is-no-longer-
supreme-2004-04-16>, accessed. 
dHYLN øOQXU $SULO   
7KH DUP\ RI DQ (8 FRXQWU\
 Turkish Daily 
News, . 
Checkel, Jeffrey (2001), 'Why Comply? Social Learning and European 
Identity Change', International Organization, 55 (3), 553-88. 
--- (2005), 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction 
and Framework', International Organization, 59 (4), 801-26. 
Chirac encourages Turkey EU bid 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3912055.stm>, accessed. 
Chirac: Turkey not ready for EU membership 
<http://euobserver.com/enlargement/15397>, accessed. 
Christou, George (2004), The European Union and Enlargement: the Case of 
Cyprus (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
&L]UH hPLW  
7KH -XVWLFH DQG 'HYHORSPHQW 3DUW\ DQG WKH 0LOLWDU\
5HFUHDWLQJWKH3DVWDIWHU5HIRUPLQJLW" 
LQhPLW&L]UHHGSecular 
and Islamic Politics in Turkey. 
dRODN <ÕOPD]  
2WWRPDQLVP YV .HPDOLVP &ROOHFWLYH 0HPRU\ DQG
Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey', Middle Eastern Studies, 42 (4), 
587-602. 
Commission of the European Communities (2004a), 'Regular Report on 
Turkey's Progress towards Accession', in Commission of the European 
Communities (ed.), (Brussels). 
--- E 
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQ RI WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ RQ 7XUNH\¶V
Progress Towards Accession', in Commission of the European 
Communities (ed.), (Brussels: Commission of the European 
Communities). 
--- (2006), 'Turkey 2006 Progress Report (November 8, 2006)', in Commission 
of the European Communities (ed.). 
Constitution of the Turkish Republic (1982). 
&RRSHU0DOFROP
7KH/HJDF\RI$WDWUN7XUNLVK3ROLWLFDO6WUXFWXUHV
and Policy-Making', International Affairs, 78 (1), 115-28. 
Cottey, Andrew, Edmunds, Timothy, and Forster, Anthony (2002), 
'Introduction: the Challenge of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in 
Postcommunist Europe', in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and 
Anthony Forster (eds.), Democratic Control of the Military in post-
  288 
 
Communist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave). 
Council of the European Union (1999), 'Presidency Conclusions', in Helsinki 
European Council (ed.). 
--- (2002), 'Presidency Conclusions ', (December 12-3, 2002; Copenhagen 
European Council: Copenhagen European Council). 
--- (2004), 'Presidency Conclusions', in Council of the European Union (ed.), 
(Brussels: Council of the European Union). 
dXKDGDU-g]ND\QDN (VUD DQG g]NHoHci-Taner, Binnur (2004), 'Decision-
Making Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign 
Policy Cases', Turkish Studies 5(2). 
Danforth, Nicholas (2008), 'Ideology and Pragmatism in Turkish Foreign 
3ROLF\)URP$WDWUNWRWKH$.3
Turkish Policy Quarterly, 7 (3), 83-
95. 
'DYXWR÷OX $KPHW  6WUDWHMLN 'HULQOLN 7UNL\H
QLQ 8OXVODUDUDVÕ
Konumu (Strategic Depth, Turkey's International Position) (Aksaray, 
,VWDQEXO.UH<D\ÕQODUÕ 
---  
7XUNH\¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\9LVLRQ$Q$VVHVVPHQWRI7', Insight 
Turkey, 10 (1). 
--- (2010), 'Conference on the Turkish Foreign Policy and Relations with 
Europe (March 11, 2010)', <http://www.iiea.com/videos/ahmet-
davutoglu-on-turkish-foreign-policy>, accessed March 11. 
Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus (2005), 'Declaration by Turkey on Cyprus, 
July 29, 2005', in Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Turkey (ed.), 
(Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
Deringil, Selim (1989), Turkish Foreign Policy during the Second World War: 
an "Active Neutrality" (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University 
Press). 
Diez, Thomas (2002), The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern 
Conflict, Postmodern Union (Manchester; New York: Manchester 
University Press). 
Dimitrova, Antoaneta (2002), 'Enlargement, Institution-Building and the EU's 
Administrative Capacity Requirement', West European Politics, 25 (4), 
171-90. 
--- (2011), 'Speeding up or Slowing down? Lessons from the Last 
Enlargement on the Dynamics of Enlargement-Driven Reform', South 
European Society and Politics, 16 (2), 221-33. 
Dodd, Clement H. (1999), 'Confederation, Federation and Sovereignty', 
Perceptions, 4 (3), 1-9. 
--- (2005), 'Constitutional Features of the UN Plan for Cyprus and its 
Antecedents', Turkish Studies, 6 (1), 39-51. 
--- (2010), The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Doeser, F (2010), 'International Constraints, Domestic Politics and Foreign 
3ROLF\ &KDQJH LQ 6PDOO 6WDWHV 7KH )DOO RI WKH 'DQLVK µ)RRWQRWH
3ROLF\¶ 6HSWHPEHU -11, 2010)', SGIR 7th Pan-European IR 
Conference (Stockholm). 
'R÷DQ%DVULDQG<D÷FÕ<DVLQ)HEUXDU\
7XUNH\¶V,VODPGRHVQRW
DIIHFW WKH (8¶V GHFLVLRQ 7UNL\H¶QLQ 0VOPDQOÕ÷Õ $% NDUDUÕQÕ
etkilemez)', Zaman. 
  289 
 
Doyle, Michael W.   (1997), Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, 
and Socialism (Norton New York). 
Edwards, Geoffrey (2006), 'The New Member States and the Making of EU 
Foreign Policy', European Foreign Affairs Review, 11, 143±62. 
(OHFWLRQ0DQLIHVWRRI WKH$.3 
+HUúH\7UNL\H LoLQ$.3DUWL
6HoLP%H\DQQDPHVL(YHU\WKLQJLVIRU7XUNH\(OHFWLRQ0DQLIHVWRRI
the JDP) '. 
(OLVH )HURQ DQG /LVDQLOHU )DWPD *OHU  
7KH &\SUXV &RQIOLFW in a 
Comparative Perspective: Assessing the Impact of European 
Integration', in Thomas Diez and Natalie Tocci (eds.), Cyprus: a 
Conflict at the Crossroads (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Emilianides, A. C. (2009), 'Contra: Constitutional Structure of the Annan 
Plan', in A. Varnava and Hubert  Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: 
the Annan Plan and beyond (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd), 95-106. 
Eralp, Atila (2004), 'Turkey and the European Union', in Lenore G. Martin and 
Dimitris Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy 
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). 
--- (2009), 'Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship', 
EDAM Discussion Paper Series, 2. 
(UKDQ dD÷UÕ  
5HODWLRQV ZLWK WKH 86$ DQG 1$72 -1980, 
Relative Autonomy', LQ%DVNÕQ2UDQ$WD\$NGHYHOLR÷OXDQG0XVWDID
$NúLQHGVTurkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses 
with Documents (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press). 
(U\ÕOPD]%XUoLQ
(XURSHDQL]DWLRQRI7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&\SUXV
Case (May 24-6, 2007)', 6th Convention of the Central and East 
European International Studies Association (CEEISA) (Wroclaw, 
Poland). 
European Commission (1997), 'Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider 
Union', COM(97) July 1997, Vol. 1, 44. 
--- (November 5, 2003), 'Strategy Paper and Report for the European 
Commission on the Progress towards Accession by Bulgaria, Romania 
and Turkey'. 
European Community (2005), 'Declaration by European Community and 
Member States (September 21, 2005)', in European Community (ed.), 
(Brussels). 
European Council (1993), 'Conclusions of the Presidency (June 21-2, 1993)', 
SN 180/1/93 REV 1 (Article 7; Copenhagen). 
Faustmann, Hubert (2011), 'The Cyprus Issue after Accession', in James; 
Faustmann Ker-Lindsay, Hubert; Mullen, Fauna (ed.), An Island in 
Europe, the EU and the Transformation of Cyprus (London, New 
York: I.B.Taurus). 
)ÕUDW0HOHN 
$.3+NPHWL¶QLQ.ÕEUÕV3ROLWLNDVÕWKH&\SUXV3ROLF\
RIWKH-'3*RYHUQPHQW
LQøOKDQ8]JHODQG%OHQW'XUXHGVAKP 
.LWDEÕ%LU'|QúPQ%LODQoRVXWKH-'3%RRNWKH%DODQFH6KHHWRI
a Transformation) (Ankara: Phoenix). 
--- (2010a), '1980-1990: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc-2', in Baskin 
2UDQ$WD\$NGHYHOLR÷OXDQG0XVWDID$NúLQHGVTurkish Foreign 
Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press). 
  290 
 
--- (2010b), '1945-1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', in Baskin 
2UDQ$WD\$NGHYHOLR÷OXDQG0XVWDID$NúLQHGVTurkish Foreign 
Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press). 
Fisher Onar, Nora (2009), 'Echoes of a Universalism Lost: Rival 
Representations of the Ottomans in Today's Turkey', Middle Eastern 
Studies, 45 (2), 229-41. 
Fouskas, Vassilis and Tackie, Alex O. (2009), Cyprus: the Post-Imperial 
Constitution (London; New York: Pluto Press; Palgrave Macmillan). 
Freizer, S. (2012), 'On the Eastern Mediterranean: Zone of Conflict or 
Opportunity? (April 4, 2012)', 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x90y3A2J8y8>, accessed July 
2012. 
French Lawmakers Debate Turkish EU Bid, The French parliament is set for a 
heated debate on the controversial issue of Turkey's EU accession, an 
issue that divides French politicians and public alike 
<http://www.dw.de/french-lawmakers-debate-turkish-eu-bid/a-
1361182>, accessed. 
)XOOHU *UDKDP  
7XUNH\¶V 6WUDWHJLF 0RGHO 0\WKV DQG 5HDOLWLHV

Washington Quarterly, 27 (3). 
Geldenhuys, Deon (2009), Contested States in World Politics (Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
*ROGPDQQ.MHOO
&KDQJHDQG6WDELOLW\LQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\'pWHQWHDVD
Problem of Stabilization', World politics, 34 (2), 230-66. 
*|]HQ 5DPD]DQ  
7XUNLVK )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ LQ 7XUEXOHQFH RI WKH 3RVW
Cold War Era: Impact of External and Domestic Constraints', in Idris 
Bal (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era (Boca Raton, 
Florida: Brown Walker Press), 27-53. 
Grabbe, Heather (2001), 'How Does Europeanization Affect CEE 
Governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Journal of 
European Public Policy, 8 (6), 1013-31. 
--- (2002), 'European Union Conditionality and the "Acquis Communautaire"', 
International Political Science Review 23 (3), 249-68. 
Greffenius, Steven F. (1994), 'Foreign Policy Stabilization and the Camp 
David Accords: Opportunities and Obstacles to the Institutionalization 
of Peace', in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson 
(eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to 
Global Change (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press). 
Gustavsson, Jakob (1999), 'How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change?', 
Cooperation and Conflict, 34 (1), 73-96. 
Haber Vitrini  
(UGR÷DQ .ÕEUÕV 6RUXQX d|]OPHGLNoH 7UNL\H 7DULK
$ODPD] 'L\RUODU (UGR÷DQ µ,W LV 6DLG WKDW 7XUNH\ &DQQRW Get a 
1HJRWLDWLRQ 'DWH ZLWKRXW D 6HWWOHPHQW LQ &\SUXV¶ 1RYHPEHU 
2002)', <http://www.habervitrini.com/haber.asp?id=58914>, accessed 
May 2011. 
Hagan, Joe D. (1994), 'Domestic Political Regime Change and Foreign Policy 
Restructuring: A Framework for Comparative Analysis', in Jerel A. 
Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson (eds.), Foreign Policy 
Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press). 
  291 
 
Hale, William M. (2000), Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000 (London; 
Portland, OR: Frank Cass). 
Hannay, David (2005), Cyprus: The Search for a Solution (London; New 
York: I.B. Tauris ). 
Henley, Jon (December 15, 2004), 'Chirac to make case on TV for EU-Turkey 
talks', The Guardian. 
Heper, Metin (2005), 'The Justice and Development Party Government and the 
Military in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 6 (2), 215-31. 
Hermann, Charles F. (1990), 'Changing Course: When Governments Choose 
to Redirect Foreign Policy', International Studies Quarterly, 34 (1), 3-
21. 
Hermann, Margaret G. (1988), 'The Role of Leaders and Leadership in the 
Making of American Foreign Policy', in Charles W. Kegley and 
Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign 
Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York: St. Martin's Press). 
--- (2001), 'How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical 
Framework', International Studies Review, 3 (2), 47-81. 
Hermann, Margaret G. and Hermann, Charles F. (1989), 'Who Makes Foreign 
Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry', International 
Studies Quarterly, 33 (4), 361-87. 
Hoffmeister, Frank (2006), Legal Aspects of the Cyprus Problem Annan Plan 
and EU Accession (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff). 
Holsti, K. J. (1982a), 'From Dependence to Diversification: Canada, 1972-8', 
in K. J. Holsti (ed.), Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy 
Restructuring in the Postwar World (London; Boston: Allen & 
Unwin). 
--- (1982b), Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the 
Postwar World (London; Boston: Allen & Unwin). 
+UUL\HW $SULO   
7h6ø$' IXOO\ EDFNV WKH JRYHUQPHQW RQ &\SUXV
7h6ø$'
GDQKNPHWH.ÕEUÕVNRQXVXQGDWDPGHVWHN
 
--- $SULO   
g]N|N 7KH SHRSOH DQG WKH 7XUNLVK 3DUOLDPHQW ZLOO
decide for Cyprus g]N|N.ÕEUÕVLoLQKDONYH7%00NDUDUYHUHFHN
 
--- $SULO   
$GPRQLWLRQ IURP WKH JHQHUDO 2UJHQHUDO g]N|N
WHQ
X\DUÕ
 
--- $SULOD 
6H]HUVSRNHIRUWKHILUVW WLPHRQ&\SUXV6H]HU.ÕEUÕV
NRQXVXQGDLONGHIDNRQXúWX
 
--- (April 14, 2004b), 'Announcement from the business world for a solution in 
&\SUXVøúGQ\DVÕQGDQµ.ÕEUÕVDUWÕNo|]OVQ
LODQÕ
 
--- 'HFHPEHU
6FKU|HGHU-%DONHQHQGH7KHDLPLV7XUNH\¶VIXOO(8
PHPEHUVKLS 6FKU|HGHU-%DONHQHQGH +HGHI 7UNL\H
QLQ $%
\H WDm 
\HOL÷L
 
--- (December 29, 2003), 'The only way is to negotiate the Annan Plan (Tek 
oDUH$QQDQ3ODQÕ¶QÕJ|UúPHN
 
--- (February 9, 2004), 'Simitis: There is little time for negotiations, (Simitis: 
0]DNHUHOHULoLQ]DPDQD]
 
--- (July 10, 2002), 'World Press: The government is on the verge of collapse 
'Q\DEDVÕQÕ+NPHW\ÕNÕOPDQÕQHúL÷LQGH
 
--- (March 03, 2004), 'Admonition from Straw to the Greek Cypriots, 
6WUDZ¶GDQ5XPODU¶DX\DUÕ
 
  292 
 
--- (March 05, 2003), 'Two decisions emerged from the summit (Zirve'den iki 
NDUDUoÕNWÕ
 
--- 0D\
-RLQWDFWLRQSODQ2UWDNH\OHPSODQÕ
 
--- 1RYHPEHU   
1RRQH ZLOO VD\ QR WR 7XUNH\ .LPVH 7UNL\H
\H
KD\ÕUGHPH\HFHN
 
--- 1RYHPEHU   
dDQND\D 7XUNH\ DQG WKH 751& DUH LQ IXOO
agreePHQWdDQND\D7UNL\HYH..7&WDPELUJ|UúELUOL÷LQGH
 
,OJÕW $ DQG g]NHoHFL-Taner, B. (2012), 'Identity and Decision-Making: 
Toward a Collaborative Approach to State Action', in Vaughn P. 
Shannon and Paul Kowert (eds.), Psychology and Constructivism in 
International Relations: an Ideational Alliance (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press). 
,QDO1XUD\1D]OÕDQG<H÷HQR÷OX'XGHQ 
*HUPDQDQG)UHQFK
/HDGHUV¶ 9LHZV RQ 7XUNH\¶V (8 0HPEHUVKLS
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/german-and-
french-leaders-views-on-turkeys-eu-membership,'. 
,VPDLO6DEDKDWWLQ$SULO
%LUOHúPLú0LOOHWOHU3DUDPHWUHOHUL+DNNÕQGD
%LUúH\ %LOPH\HQ 7DODW¶ÕQ .HQGLVL :KR 'RHV 1RW +DYH DQ\ ,GHD
About the UN Parameters is Talat Himself) ', 
<http://www.volkangazetesi.net/yazici.asp?id=27479>, accessed July 
2011. 
Kaarbo, Juliet (2010), 'Coalition Politics & Turkish Foreign Policy', 
International Studies Association (New Orleans, Louisiana, USA). 
Kaliber, Alper (2005), 'Securing the Ground through Securitized "Foreign" 
Policy : the Cyprus Case', Security Dialogue, 36 (3), 319-37. 
--- 
7XUNH\¶V&\SUXV3ROLF\$&DVHRI&RQWH[WXDO(XURSHDQLVDWLRQ
LQ
dL÷GHP1DVDQG<RQFDg]HUHGVTurkey and the European Union: 
Processes of Europeanisation (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
Karpat, Kemal H. (1975), Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974 
(Leiden: Brill). 
Keck, Margaret E;  and Sikkink, Kathryn A. (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: 
Advocacy Networks in International Politics, ed. Cornell University 
Press Ithaca. 
Keohane, Robert  and Nye, Joseph   (1989), Power and Interdependence: 
World Politics in Transition (Boston: : Little, Brown and Company). 
Keohane, Robert O. (1984), After Hegemony, Cooperation and Discord in 
World Political Economy, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
Kepel, Gilles (2000), -LKDG  ([SDQVLRQ HW 'pFOLn de l'Islamisme (Paris: 
Gallimard). 
Ker-Lindsay, James (2005), EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus 
(Palgrave Macmillan). 
KerǦLindsay, James (2007), 'The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards 
7XUNH\¶V(8$FFHVVLRQ
Turkish Studies, 8 (1), 71-83. 
Kesgin, B. and Kaarbo, J. (2010), 'When and How Parliaments Influence 
Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey's Iraq Decision', International 
Studies Perspectives, 11 (1), 19-36. 
Khashman, Zeliha (1999), 'Is a Federal Structure Really an Appropriate 
Political Solution for Multiethnic Societies? The Case of Cyprus', 
Perceptions, 4 (2). 
  293 
 
.ÕOÕo<DúÕQ*|]GH0D\ 
.ÕEUÕV'DYDVÕ¶QÕQ'Q%XJQ<DUÕQÕ
(The Past, Today and Future of the Cyprus Cause)', 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auXNfTKJl98>, accessed August 
2011. 
.ÕQDFÕR÷OX 0 DQG 2NWD\ (  
7KH 'RPHVWLF '\QDPLFV RI 7XUNH\¶V
&\SUXV 3ROLF\ ,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU 7XUNH\¶V $FFHVVLRQ WR WKH (XURSHDQ
Union', Turkish Studies, 7 (2), 261-73. 
.LULúoL.HPDOD
7XUNH\
V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\LQ7XUEXOHQW7LPHV
Chaillot 
Paper (Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies). 
.LULúoL .HPDO   E 
7XUNH\¶V )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ LQ 7XUEXOHQW 7LPHV

Chaillot Paper No 92  
Kleistra, Yvonne and Mayer, Igor (2001), 'Stability and Flux in Foreign 
Affairs: Modelling Policy and Organizational Change', Cooperation 
and Conflict, 36 (4), 381-414. 
Knill, Christoph and Lehmkuhl, Dirk (2002), 'The National Impact of 
European Union Regulatory Policy: Three Europeanization 
Mechanisms', European Journal of Political Research, 41 (2), 255-80. 
.|VHEDODEDQ+DVDQTurkish Foreign Policy: Islam, Nationalism, and 
Globalization (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Kramer, Heinz (1997), 'The Cyprus Problem and European Security', Survival: 
Global Politics and Strategy, 39 (3), 16-32. 
Kubicek, Paul (2005), 'The European Union and Grassroots Democratization 
in Turkey', Turkish Studies, 6 (3), 361-77. 
Kushner, David (1997), 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary 
Turkey', Journal of Contemporary History, 32 (2), 219-33. 
.XW ùXOH  
7he Contours of Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1990s', in 
.HPDO .LULúoL DQG %DUU\ %X]DQ HGV Turkey in World Politics: an 
Emerging Multiregional Power (Lynne Rienner Publishers). 
Kyris, George (2011), 'Turkey, Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot Political 
Parties: the Ephemeral Catalyst of EU?', Turkish Policy Quarterly, 10 
(2), 97-105. 
Le Monde $SULO
7KH803ODXQFKVZDUDJDLQVW7XUNH\¶VHQWU\LQWR
WKH(8/
803SDUWHQJXHUUHFRQWUHO
DGKpVLRQGHOD7XUTXLHjO
8(
 
--- (April 9, 2004), 'The UMP tDNHVSRVLWLRQDJDLQVW7XUNH\¶VHQWU\ LQWR WKH
(8 6H GpPDUTXDQW GH -DFTXHV &KLUDF O
803 SUHQG SRVLWLRQ FRQWUH
O
HQWUpHGHOD7XUTXLHGDQVO
8(
 
--- (April 10, 2004), 'Ankara desires to believe in a peripeteia in French 
domestic politics (Ankara veut croLUH HQXQHSpULSpWLHGH ODSROLWLTXH
LQWpULHXUHIUDQoDLVH
 
Lijphart, Arend (2004), 'Constitutional Design for Divided Societies', Journal 
of Democracy, 15 (2), 96-109. 
Lindley, Dan (2007), 'Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the 
Partition of Cyprus', International Studies Perspectives, 8 (2), 224-41. 
Loizides, Neophytos G. (2007), 'Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in 
Cyprus', International Studies Perspectives, 8 (2), 172-89. 
Lordos, Alexandros, Kaymak, Erol, and Tocci, Nathalie (2009), People's 
Peace in Cyprus: Testing Public Opinion on the Options for a 
Comprehensive Settlement (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies). 
  294 
 
Lynott, M.E. (2009), 'Identity Crisis? Europeanization and the Challenge to 
Kemalism in Turkey', The Annual Meeting of the Southern Political 
Science Association (New Orleans, LA). 
March, James G. and Olsen, Johan P. (1998), 'The Institutional Dynamics of 
International Political Orders', International Organization, 52 (4), 943-
69. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (1994), 'The False Promise of International Institutions ', 
International Security, 19 (3), 5-49. 
Merkel Calls For Petition Against Turkish Membership 
<http://www.dw.de/merkel-calls-for-petition-against-turkish-
membership/a-1356052-1>, accessed. 
0LFKiOLV 0LFKDHO 6  Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating 
History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Milliyet (April 04, 2004), 'Chirac: Our stance has not changed (Chirac: 
7DYUÕPÕ]GH÷LúPHGL
 
--- $SULO
*OSXWHPSKDVLVRQPRQH\*O¶GHQSDUDYXUJXVX
 
--- $SULO
,ZLOOKHOSWKH7XUNV7UNOHUH\DUGÕPHGHULP
 
--- (April 19, 2004), 'Turkish army will be empowered to interfere in the south 
7UNDVNHULJQH\HPGDKDOHHGHELOHFHN
 
--- )HEUXDU\   
$PHULFDQ %UDNH WR WKH 7HQVLRQ *HUJLQOL÷H $%'
Freni)'. 
--- )HEUXDU\   
$QQDQ LV FRQYLQFHG E\ %XVK $QQDQ¶Õ %XVK LNQD
HWPLú
 
--- )HEUXDU\
'HQNWDúFDQQRWVWHSEDFN'HQNWDúoHkilemez)'. 
--- )HEUXDU\   
%HFRPH D SULYLOHJHG SDUWQHU RI WKH (8 $%¶\H
øPWL\D]OÕRUWDNROXQ
 
--- )HEUXDU\
(82XUUROHLVVXIILFLHQW$%5ROP]\HWHUOL
 
--- )HEUXDU\ 
(8¶VVHFRQGEORZWR WKH*UHHN&\SULRWV 5XPODU¶D 
ikinci AB darbesi)'. 
--- -DQXDU\
'HQNWDúLVQRWFRJQL]DQW'HQNWDúIDUNÕQGDGH÷LO
 
--- -DQXDU\
<RXDUHLQGHEWHGLQ&\SUXV.ÕEUÕV¶WDERUoOXVXQX]
 
--- -DQXDU\
$VVXUDQFHIURP%XVK%XVKJYHQFHVL
 
--- (January 27,  
2UJHQHUDO<DOPDQ¶ÕQ=L\DUHWLQH'LNNDW $WWHQWLRQ WR
*HQHUDO<DOPDQ¶V9LVLW
Milliyet, January 27, 2003. 
--- (January 31, 1996), 'Admonition from the US to not to Go to War 
$%'¶GHQ6DYDúPD\ÕQ8\DUÕVÕ
 
--- (January 31, 2002), 'There shall be no EU membership without a settlement 
d|]PV]$%\HOL÷LROPD]
 
--- (March 5, 2003), 'If you cannot solve Cyprus, forget about EU membership 
.ÕEUÕV¶Õo|]HPH]VHQL]$%\HOL÷LQLXQXWXQ
 
--- 0DUFK   
(UGR÷DQ 1RQ-6ROXWLRQ EORFNV RXU URDG (UGR÷DQ: 
d|]PV]ON|QP]WÕNÕ\RU
 
--- (March 09, 2003), 'At the Cyprus summit at the Prime Ministry, the 
DSSURYDORIWKH$.3¶VOHDGHU(UGR÷DQZDVREWDLQHGIRU7XUNH\¶VPRYH
EHIRUH WKH PHHWLQJ WR EH KHOG LQ WKH +DJXH %DúEDNDQOÕN¶WDNL .ÕEUÕV
zirvesinde, Lahe\¶GH \DSÕODFDN WRSODQWÕ |QFHVL 7UNL\H¶QLQ DWDFD÷Õ
DGÕPLoLQ$.3OLGHUL(UGR÷DQ¶ÕQRQD\ÕDOÕQGÕ
 
--- 0DUFK
626WR:DVKLQJWRQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶D626
 
--- 0DUFK
:DUZLWKRXWDZLQQHU*DOLELROPD\DQVDYDú
 
  295 
 
--- (November 3, 2001), 'HLVWRULFDOGHPDUFKHIURP7XUNH\7XUNL\H¶GHQWDULKL
rest)'. 
--- 1RYHPEHU   
6H]HU¶V VHQVLWLYLW\ RQ &\SUXV 6H]HU¶LQ .ÕEUÕV
hassasiyeti)'. 
--- (November 27, 2002), 'Those who keep away from the negotiating table, 
does not have an argument (Masadan NDoDQÕQWH]LGH\RNWXU
 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993), 'Preferences and Power in the European 
Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 31 (4), 473-524. 
--- (1997), 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International 
Politics', International Organization, 51, 513-53. 
Morgan, Tabitha (2010), Sweet and Bitter Island: a History of the British in 
Cyprus (London; New York: I.B. Tauris). 
Morgenthau, Hans   and Thompson, Kenneth  (1985), Politics Among Nations 
(6 edn.; New York: McGraw-Hill). 
Mr Erdogan's Greek friend Chumminess will help, but not suffice, if foes are 
to turn into partners 
http://www.economist.com/node/3093567?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b85
61b012f603b9fd9577f0e, 
<http://www.economist.com/node/3093567?zid=309&ah=80dcf288b8
561b012f603b9fd9577f0e>, accessed. 
0IWOHU-%Do 0HOWHP  
7XUNH\
V $FFHVVLRQ WR WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ
The Impact of the EU's Internal Dynamics', International Studies 
Perspectives, 9 (2), 201-19. 
0IWOHU %Do 0HOWHP  
7KH &\SUXV GHEDFOH ZKDW WKH IXWXUH KROGV

Futures, 31, 559-75. 
Napolitano, L. (2011), 'The Cyprus Peace Process Since March 2008: Short 
History, State of the Art and What is Next in Store', Istituto Affari 
Internazionali Working Papers 11, 11. 
1RXWFKHYD *HUJDQD DQG ']JLW 6HQHP $\GLQ  
/RVW LQ
Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and Turkey', West European 
Politics, 35 (1), 59-78. 
O'Rourke, Breffni 'EU: Report Underscores Turkey's Progress, But Notes 
Much Work Still To Be Done', 
<http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1104903.html>, accessed. 
Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information 
(June 6, 1999), <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx>, accessed 
November 2011. 
--- (June 21, 1999), <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx>, accessed 
November 2013. 
--- (November 4, 2002), <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi2-
detay.aspx?y=2009&a=10>, accessed May 2011. 
--- (November 5, 2003), <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi2-
detay.aspx?y=2009&a=10>, accessed April 2011. 
--- (November 6, 2003), <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi2-
detay.aspx?y=2009&a=10>, accessed April 2011. 
--- <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/ayin-tarihi.aspx>, accessed. 
2÷X]OX 7DUÕN  
6RIW SRZHU LQ 7XUNLVK )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\
 Australian 
Journal of International Affairs, 61 (1), 81-97. 
  296 
 
--- (2010), 'Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?', Political Science 
Quarterly, 125 (4), 657-83. 
2OJXQ(UJQ
&\SUXV$1HZDQG5HDOLVWLF$SSURDFK
Perceptions, 4 
(3). 
gQHU 6HOFHQ  
(XURSHDQLVDWLRQ RI &LYLO6RFLHW\ LQ 7XUNH\ GXULQJ WKH
$FFHVVLRQ3URFHVVWRWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
LQdL÷GHP1DVDQG Yonca 
g]HU HGV Turkey and the European Union: Processes of 
Europeanisation (Aldershot: Ashgate). 
gQLú=L\D 
'RPHVWLF3ROLWLFV,QWHUQDWLRQDO1RUPVDQG&KDOOHQJHVWR
the State: Turkey-EU Relations in the post-Helsinki Era', Turkish 
Studies, 4 (1), 9-34. 
--- (2009), 'Conservative Globalists Versus Defensive Nationalists : Political 
Parties and Paradoxes of Europeanisation in Turkey', Turkey's Road to 
European Union Membership: National Identity and Political Change 
(Abingdon: Routledge), 35-48. 
Oppermann, K. (2010), 'The Concept of Issue Salience in Foreign Policy 
Analysis: Delineating the Scope Conditions of Theoretical Approaches 
in the Field', The SGIR 7th Pan-European Conference on IR 
(Stockholm, Sweden). 
2UDQ %DVNÕQ  
7UN 'Õú 3ROLWLNDVÕ 7HPHO øONHOHUL YH 6R÷XN 6DYDú
(UWHVLQGHNL'XUPXh]HULQH1RWODU 7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\1RWHVRQ
the Basic Principles and the Situation in the post-Cold War Period)', 
$QNDUD hQLYHUVLWHVL 6%) 'HUJLVL 8QLYHUVLW\ RI Ankara, Journal of 
Faculty of Social Sciences), 51 (1), 353-70. 
--- (2010), Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with 
DocumentsHGV%DVNÕQ2UDQ$WD\$NGHYHOLR÷OXDQG0XVWDID$NúLQ
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press). 
g]EXGXQ (Ugun (2007), 'Democratization Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004', 
Turkish Studies, 8 (2), 179-96. 
g]FDQ*HQFHU
7KH0LOLWDU\DQG0DNLQJRI)RUHLJQ3ROLF\LQ7XUNH\

LQ%DUU\5XELQDQG.HPDO.LULúoLHGVTurkey in World Politics: An 
Emerging Multiregional Power (London and Boulder: Lynne Rienner). 
---  
7KH &KDQJLQJ 5ROH RI WKH 7XUNH\¶V 0LOLWDU\ LQ )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\
Making', UNISCI Discussion Papers,  (23), 23-46. 
g]FDQ0HVXW  DQG8VXO$OL5HVXO  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH1HZ7XUNLVK
Foreign Policy: Changes within Continuity. Is Turkey Departing from 
the West?', 8OXVODUDUDVÕ +XNXN YH 3ROLWLND ,QWHUQDWLRQDO /DZ DQG
Politics), 6 (21), 101-23. 
g]HUVD\.XGUHW$XJXVW 
.XGUHWg]HUVD\
OD0D÷XVD6|\OHúLOHUL3DUoD
 0D÷XVD &RQYHUVDWLRQV ZLWK .XGUHW g]HUVD\ 3DUW 

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJVw6ygaogY&feature=relmfu>, 
accessed August 2012. 
g]JUJQ + 0D\   
&RQIHUHQFH DW WKH 6H\KDQ &HQJL] 7XUKDQ
&RQIHUHQFH+DOORI$WÕOÕP8QLYHUVLW\
-XQH 
g]NHoHFL-Taner, Binnur (2005), 'The Impact of Institutionalized Ideas in 
Coalition Foreign Policy Making: Turkey as an Example, 1991-2002', 
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1 (3), 249-78. 
Palley, Claire (2005), An International Relations Debacle: the UN Secretary-
General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1999-2004 (Oxford; 
Portland, Or.: Hart Publishing). 
  297 
 
Papadakis, Yiannis, Peristianis, N., and Welz, Gisela (2006), Divided Cyprus: 
Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press). 
Park, Bill (2012), Modern Turkey: People, State, and Foreign Policy in a 
Globalized World (London; New York: Routledge). 
Park, Tong Whun, Ko, Dae Won, and Kim, Kyu-Ryoon (1994), 
'Democratization and Foreign Policy Change in the East Asian NICs', 
in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson (eds.), 
Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global 
Change (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press). 
Pericleous, Chrysostomos (2009), The Cyprus referendum: A Divided Island 
and the Challenge of the Annan Plan (London; New York: I.B. 
Tauris). 
3KLOOLSV 'DYLG / 
7XUNH\¶V 'UHDPV RI $FFHVVLRQ  )RUHLJQ $II

<http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/fora83
&div=84&id=&page=>, accessed. 
Prime Ministry Secretariat General for the European Union Affairs (2007), 

$YUXSD%LUOL÷L8\XP<DVD3DNHWOHUL(8$GDSWDWLRQ/DZ3DFNDJHV
 
Prodi presses Turkey over Cyprus 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3401353.stm>, accessed. 
Rabasa, Angel and Larrabee, F. Stephen (2008), The Rise of Political Islam in 
Turkey (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation). 
Radikal )HEUXDU\
7XUNVEHOLHYHXV7UNOHUEL]HLQDQÕQ
 
--- )HEUXDU\   
%RRVW WR 7XUNH\¶V PRUDO E\ 6FKU|GHU 6FKU|GHU
morali)'. 
--- (November 6, 2003), 'Verheugen: Bu Siyasi bir Mesaj (Verheugen: This is 
a Political Message)'. 
Report of the Secretary-General Kofi Annan on His Mission of Good Offices 
in Cyprus (2004), 'Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan on 
his mission of good offices in Cyprus (May 28, 2004)'. 
Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 
(2010), 'Report of the Secretary-General on his Mission of Good 
Offices in Cyprus (November 24, 2010) '. 
Richmond, Oliver P. and Ker-Lindsay, James (2001), The Work of the UN in 
Cyprus: Promoting Peace and Development (Houndmills, 
Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, N.Y.: Palgrave). 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991), 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and 
Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', World Politics, 43 (4), 479-
512. 
Risse, Thomas (2001), 'A European Identity? Europeanization and the 
Evolution of Nation-State Identities', in Maria Green  Cowles, James 
A.  Caporaso, and Thomas  Risse-Kappen (eds.), Transforming 
Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell 
University Press, 2001.), 198-217. 
--- (2010), A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public 
Spheres (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press). 
Robins, Philip (2003), Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the 
Cold War (Seattle, Washington: University of Washington Press). 
  298 
 
--- (2007), 'Turkish Foreign Policy since 2002: between a Post-Islamist 
Government and a Kemalist State', International Affairs, 83 (2), 289-
304. 
Rosati, Jerel A. (1994), 'Cycles in Foreign Policy Restructuring, The Politics 
of Continuity and Change in US Foreign Policy', in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe 
D. Hagan, and Martin W. Sampson (eds.), Foreign Policy 
Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press). 
--- (1995), 'A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy', in Laura 
Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick Jude Haney (eds.), Foreign 
Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall). 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2009), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond, 
eds Andrekos Varnava and Hubert  Haustmann (I.B.Tauris & Co.Ltd). 
Rynhold, Jonathan (2007), 'Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change: Israel 
and the Making of the Oslo Accords', Cooperation and Conflict, 42 
(4), 419-40. 
Sasse, Gwendolyn (2008), 'The Politics of EU Conditionality: the Norm of 
Minority Protection during and beyond EU Accession', Journal of 
European Public Policy Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (6), 
842-60. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank (2005), 'Strategic Calculation and International 
Socialization : Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and 
Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', International 
Organization, 59 (4), 827-60. 
--- (2008), 'EU Political Accession Conditionality after the 2004 Enlargement: 
Consistency and Effectiveness', Journal of European Public Policy, 15 
(6), 918-37. 
--- (2009), 'Entrapped Again: the Way to EU Membership Negotiations with 
Turkey', International Politics, 46 (4), 413-31. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank and Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2004), 'Governance by 
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe', Journal of European Public Policy, 11 
(4), 661-79. 
--- (2005), The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press). 
--- (2007), 'Candidate Countries and Conditionality', in Paolo Graziano and 
Maarten Peter Vink (eds.), Europeanization: New Research Agendas 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire [England]; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan). 
Schimmelfennig, Frank, Engert, Stefan, and Knobel, Heiko (2003), 'Cost, 
Commitment and Compliance: the Impact of EU Democratic 
Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey', Journal of Common 
Market studies, 41 (3), 495-518. 
Schraeder, P.J. (1994), 'Bureaucratic Incrementalism, Crisis, and Change in 
U.S. Foreign Policy towards Africa ', in Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan, 
and Martin W. Sampson (eds.), Foreign Policy Restructuring: How 
Governments Respond to Global Change (Columbia, S.C.: University 
of South Carolina Press). 
  299 
 
Sepos, Angelos (2008), The Europeanization of Cyprus: Polity, Policies and 
Politics (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
ùÕN %DUNÕQ 
6H]HU :KDW 6KDOO :H 5HFRPPHQG" 6H]HU 1H\L tavsiye 
edelim?) ', Cumhuriyet <http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=300574>, 
accessed May 2013. 
Smith, Helena 'Greece to back Turkey's EU bid', 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/may/08/turkey.eu>, 
accessed. 
Smith, Michael E. (2004), 'Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and 
European Foreign Policy Cooperation', European Journal of 
International Relations, 10 (1), 95-136. 
6|QPH]R÷OX )DUXN  
7XUNH\ DQG WKH :RUOG LQ WKH VW &HQWXU\
 LQ
Idris Bal (ed.), Turkish Foreign Policy in post Cold War Era (Boca 
Raton, Fl.: Brown Walker Press). 
Sotiris, Serbos (2008), 'Between the Functional and the Essential: European 
Perceptions and Domestic Choices in the Framework of Contemporary 
EU-7XUNLVK5HODWLRQV(YDOXDWLQJWKH(8¶V$QFKRULQJ&DSDFLW\LQWKH
Case of Turkish Candidacy: From Constructive Ambiguity to 
Progressive Isolation?', ECPR ± Standing Group on the EU 4th Pan-
European Conference on EU Politics. 
6R\VDO0PWD]
7KH)XWXUHRI7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\
LQ/HQRUH*
Martin and Dimitris Keridis (eds.), The Future of Turkish Foreign 
Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 37-47. 
6|]HQ$KPHW  
$0RGHORI3RZHU-Sharing in Cyprus: from the 1959 
London-Zurich Agreements to the Annan Plan', Turkish Studies 5(1), 
61-77. 
--- (2010a), 'A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and 
Challenges ', Turkish Studies, 11 (1), 103-23. 
--- 'Lecture at the Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus 
(Summer 2010)', <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wd-
emiS6hxE&NR=1>, accessed May 18, 2011. 
6|]HQ$KPHWDQGg]HUVD\.XGUHW
7KH$QQDQ3ODQ6tate Succession 
or Continuity', Middle Eastern Studies, 43 (1), 125-41. 
Stone, Leonard (2004), 'Turkish Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity', 
Insight Turkey, 6 (4). 
Strasbourg Franco-German Summit Chirac-6FKU|GHU RQ 7XUNH\
<http://senas.canalblog.com/archives/2004/10/02/127471.html>, 
accessed. 
Strategy Paper Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports 
(November 08, 2000), (SPEECH/00/419; Brussels: European 
Parliament, 
European Commission,). 
7DúNÕQ <NVHO  
$.3¶V 0RYH WR ³&RQTXHU´ WKH &HQWHU-Right: Its 
Prospects and Possible Impacts on the Democratization Process', 
Turkish Studies, 9 (1), 53-72. 
7DúSÕQDU gPHU  
7XUNH\
V 0LGGOH (DVW 3ROLFLHV EHWZHHQ 1HR-
Ottomanism and Kemalism', Carnegie Paper 10. 
TBMM Reports Journal (April 06, 2004), 'Session 69, Term: 22, Legislative 
Year: 2', (44), 322-2. 
  300 
 
--- (December 17, 2002), 'Session 11, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (1), 380. 
--- (December 22, 2003), 'Session 34, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 2', 36, 11. 
--- (December 24, 2003), 'Session 36, Term: 22,  Legislative Year: 2', (36), 
343. 
--- (February 10, 2004), 'Session 50, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 2', (40), 251. 
--- (February 17, 2004), 'Session 53, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 2', (41), 108-
9. 
--- (February 26, 2003), 'Session 37, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (5), 649. 
--- (January 14, 2003), 'Session 21, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (1), 782. 
--- (January 15, 2004), 'Session 43, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 2', (39), 49. 
--- (March 06, 2003), 'Session 42, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (6), 407. 
--- (March 11, 2003), 'Session 43, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (6), 438. 
--- (March 13, 2003), 'Session 45, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (7), 157. 
--- (March 15, 2003), 'Session 47, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (7), 472. 
--- (March 18, 2002), 'Session 49, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (8), 135. 
--- (March 21, 2003), 'Session 52, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (8), 379. 
--- (March 26, 2003), 'Session 56, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (10), 318. 
--- (March 29, 2003), 'Session 58, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (10), 798. 
--- (May 23, 2003), 'Session 84, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (15), 202. 
--- (May 29, 2003), 'Session 87, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (16), 29. 
--- (November 23, 2002), 'Session 3, Term: 22, Volume: 1, Legislative Year: 
1', (1), 57. 
--- (November 26, 2002), 'Session 4, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 1', (1), 76. 
--- (October 01, 2003), 'Session 01, Term: 22, Legislative Year: 2', (26), 37. 
Tellal, Erel (2010), '1980-1990: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc', in 
Baskin Oran, Atay Akdevelioglu, and Mustafa Aksin (eds.), Turkish 
Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents (Salt 
Lake City: University of Utah Press). 
THU]L g]OHP  
(XURSHDQLVDWLRQ RI )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ DQG &DQGLGDWH
Countries: A Comparative Study of Greek and Turkish Cases', 
3ROLWLTXH(XURSpHQQH 2005/3 (17), 113-36. 
--- 'The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy'. 
The European Council (December 12-3, 1997), The European Council 
meeting (Luxembourg). 
Tocci, Nathalie (2004), EU Accession Dynamics and Conflict Resolution: 
Catalysing Peace or Consolidating Partition in Cyprus? (Aldershot, 
Hampshire: Ashgate). 
--- (2005), 'Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?', South 
European Society & Politics, 10 (1), 73-83. 
--- (2007), 'The Missed Opportunity to Promote Reunification in Cyprus', in 
Nathalie Tocci (ed.), The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting 
Peace in the Backyard (London, New York: Routledge). 
Trimikliniotis, N. (2009), 'Pro: Rethinking the Viability of the Constitutional 
Arrangement', in A. Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying 
Cyprus: the Annan Plan and beyond (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd.), 
107-21. 
Tsebelis, George (2010), 'Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An 
,QWURGXFWLRQ
 LQ 7KRPDV .|QLJ *HRUJH 7VHEHOLV DQG 0DUF 'HEXV
(eds.), Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and 
  301 
 
Decision-Making in Modern Democracies (New York; London: 
Springer). 
7UNHú0XVWDID
&\FOHVRI7UDQVIRUPDWLRQRIWKH&\SUXV4XHVWLRQ
LQ
1XUúLQ $WHúRJOX*QH\HGContentious Issues of Security and the 
Future of Turkey (Aldershot: Ashgate), 159-76. 
Turkish Daily News (April 2, 2004), 'EU and US appeal for 'yes' vote'. 
--- $SULO 
g]N|N)LQDOVD\UHVWVZLWK3DUOLDPHQWDQGWKH7XUNLVK
Cypriots'. 
--- $SULO
'HQNWDú
VDGGUHVVGLYLGHV7XUNLVKSROLWLFV
 
--- (December 19, 2002), 'Summit: No change in policies'. 
--- (February 3, 1997), 'Russian missiles for Greek Cypriots, Susurluk charges, 
DQG7h6ø$'GRPLQDWHHYHQWVLQ-DQXDU\
 
--- )HEUXDU\   
6FKU|HGHU JLYHV FRQFUHWH GDWH *O SURPLVHV QHZ
reforms'. 
--- )HEUXDU\
2QO\$QQDQDQG(UGR÷DQKRSHDTXLFN&\SUXVIL[
 
--- (January 6, 2002), 'Is a Cyprus settlement finally become discernible?'. 
--- (January 21, 1997), 'New era in ties with the TRNC'. 
--- (January 24, 2004), 'Ankara urges resumption of Cyprus talks'. 
--- (January 28, 2003), 'AK Party makes another Cyprus twist as military 
GHFODUHVIXOOVXSSRUWIRU'HQNWDú
 
8÷XU 0HKPHW DQG <DQND\D 'LOHN  
3ROLF\ (QWUHSUHQHXUVKLS 3ROLF\
2SSRUWXQLVP DQG (8 &RQGLWLRQDOLW\ 7KH $.3 DQG 7h6,$'
Experience in Turkey', Governance, 21 (4), 581-601. 
8OXoHYLN 7XJD\ 
&\SUXV DQG 5HDlities (10) (April 8, 2010)', New Volkan 
Daily <http://www.volkangazetesi.net/koseyazisi3.asp?id=28754>, 
accessed November 7, 2011. 
Uslu, Nasuh (2004), 'The Cyprus Question Between 1974 and 2004 and its 
Relation to Turkish Foreign Policy', in Idris Bal (ed.), Turkish Foreign 
Policy in post Cold War Era (Boca Raton, Fl.: Brown Walker Press). 
---  
7UNL\H
QLQ .ÕEUÕV 3ROLWLNDVÕ 7XUNH\
V &\SUXV 3ROLF\
 LQ
%XUKDQHWWLQ'XUDQ.HPDOøQDWDQG0XKLWWLQ$WDPDQHGV7UN'Õú
3ROLWLNDVÕ<ÕOOÕ÷Õ$QQXDORI7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\ (Seta 
<D\ÕQODUÕ-93. 
Uzer, Umut (2011), Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy: the Kemalist 
Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus (London; New York: I.B. Tauris 
; Distributed in the United States by Palgrave Macmillan). 
Uzgel,  øOKDQ  
1HROLEHUDO '|QúPQ <HQL $NW|U 7KH -'3 1HZ
Actor of the Political Transformation)', 0ONL\H 'HUJLVL -RXUQDO RI
0ONL\H 30 (Fall), 7-18. 
--- 
$.31HROLEHUDO'|QúPQ<HQL$NW|U7KH-'31HZ$FWRU
RI1HROLEHUDO7UDQVIRUPDWLRQ
LQøOKDQ8]JHODQG%OHQW'XUXHGV
%LU '|QúPP %LODQoRVX 7KH JDP Book: The Balance Sheet of a 
Transformation) (Ankara: Phoenix). 
Vachudova, Anna (2005), Europe Undivided : Democracy, Leverage, and 
Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
--- (2006), 'Democratization in Postcommunist Europe: Illiberal Regimes and 
the Leverage of International Actors', Center for European Studies 
Working Paper Series, 139, 1-36. 
Volgy, Thomas J. and Schwarz, John E. (1991), 'Does Politics Stop at the 
Water's Edge? Domestic Political Factors and Foreign Policy 
  302 
 
Restructuring in the Cases of Great Britain, France, and West 
Germany', The Journal of Politics, 53 (3), 615-43. 
Walker, Joshua W. (2007), 'Learning Strategic Depth: Implications of 
Turkey's New Foreign Policy Doctrine', Insight Turkey, 9 (3), 117. 
Waltz, Kenneth N (2001), Man, the State, and War, A Theoretical Analysis 
(Columbia University Press, New York). 
Wendt, Alexander (1992), 'Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social 
Construction of Power Politics', International Organization, 46 (2), 
391-425. 
Yakinthou, Christalla (2009), Political Settlements in Divided Societies: 
Consocialism and Cyprus (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
Yavuz, M.Hakan (2009), Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey 
(Cambridge University Press). 
<HúLODGD%LURO$DQG6|]HQ$KPHW(2002), 'Negotiating a Resolution to the 
Cyprus Problem: Is Potential European Union Membership a Blessing 
or a Curse?', International Negotiation, 7 (2), 261-85. 
Zaman $SULO   
*O 2XU JXDUDQWRUVKLS LQ &\SUXV FRQWLQXHV ZLWK
ILGHOLW\*O.ÕEUÕV
WDJDUDQW|UO÷P]D\QHQGHYDPHWPHNWH
 
--- (April 06, 2004), 'The government supported solution; the MGK cleared 
WKH URDG IRU WKH SURFHVV +NPHW o|]PH WDP GHVWHN YHUGL 0*.
VUHFLQ|QQDoWÕ
 
--- (December 17, 2004), 'The Date is October 03, 2005, Cyprus is the Knot 
7DULK(NLP.ÕEUÕVG÷P
 
--- )HEUXDU\
*O2QHGD\'HQNWDúZLOOEHWKHSUHVLGHQWRIXQLWHG
&\SUXV *O 'HQNWDú ELU JQ %LUOHúLN .ÕEUÕV¶ÕQ FXPKXUEDúNDQÕ
olacak)'. 
--- (January 10, 2004), 'Warm messages from Verheugen and Fischer to 
7XUNH\9HUKHXJHQYH)LVFKHU¶GHQ7UNL\H¶\HVÕPVÕFDNPHVDMODU
 
--- (July 21, 1997), 'Turkey-TRNC Joint Statement (TC-KKTC Ortak 
Deklarasyonu)'. 
--- (March 7, 2003), 'The Parliament issued a declaration of unanimous 
VXSSRUW IRU 'HQNWDú 0HFOLV R\ELUOL÷L\OH 'HQNWDú¶D GHVWHN
GHNODUDV\RQX\D\ÕQODGÕ
 
--- 0D\   
7XUNH\¶V (8 PHPEHUVKLS LV DQ DVVHW IRU RXU VHFXULW\
7UNL\H¶QLQ$%\HOL÷LJYHQOL÷LPL]LoLQND]DQo
 
--- (November 04, 2001), 'BaKoHOL7XUNH\LVQRWFRQWHQWZLWKDIDLWDFFRPSOL
LQ&\SUXV%DKoHOL7XUNL\H.ÕEUÕV¶WDROGXELWWL\HUD]ÕGH÷LO
 
 
